公司治理、激励机制与高管薪酬制度重构

1990年代以来，公司高管薪酬持续飞涨，即使在全球金融危机背景下，一些接受政府注资的公司高管仍然领取天价高薪，因此，改革高管薪酬制度的呼声越来越高。本文认为，企业高管薪酬的失衡从根本上源于传统薪酬制度理论的不合理，而这些理论假定的不合理则导引于公司治理的内在缺陷。因此，重构薪酬制度，完善激励机制，必须以改革公司治理为逻辑起点。本文在分析公司治理与激励机制关系基础上，对高管薪酬制度的理论假定与现实困境进行了全面深入地剖析．对高管薪酬制度框架的设计与重构提出了具体设想。     

我国上市公司内部治理结构的缺陷及对会计信息质量的影响

有效的公司治理是提高会计质量信息的环境条件，高质量的会计信息是完善公司治理的基石。披露不及时和不完整的会计信息担曲了市场的资源配置，打击了广大投资者的积极性，干扰了国民经济的正常运行。会计制度的缺陷、会计人员的专业知识和执业能力等都会影响会计信息的质量，但公司治理才是影响会计信息质量的深层次原因。目前我国上市公司国有股“一股独大”现象仍然严重。国有股的所有者缺位也造成了“内部人控制”，监事会、独立董事制度与审计委员会在有些公司形同虚设，另外，管理层的聘任、激励与约束机制也没有发挥应有的作用。     

我国上市公司内部治理结构的缺陷及对会计信息质量的影响

有效的公司治理是提高会计质量信息的环境条件,高质量的会计信息是完善公司治理的基石。披露不及时和不完整的会计信息扭曲了市场的资源配置,打击了广大投资者的积极性,干扰了国民经济的正常运行。会计制度的缺陷、会计人员的专业知识和执业能力等都会影响会计信息的质量,但公司治理才是影响会计信息质量的深层次原因。目前我国上市公司国有股"一股独大"现象仍然严重,国有股的所有者缺位也造成了"内部人控制",监事会、独立董事制度与审计委员会在有些公司形同虚设,另外,管理层的聘任、激励与约束机制也没有发挥应有的作用。     

公司高管薪酬制度的困境与重构

20世纪90年代以来,公司高管薪酬持续飞涨,即使在全球危机背景下,一些接受政府注资的公司高管仍然领取天价高薪,以致于引起社会各界的口诛笔伐,改革企业高管薪酬制度的呼声越来越高。企业高管薪酬的失衡从根本上源于对传统薪酬制度假设的不合理,而这些理论假定的不合理则源于公司治理的内在缺陷,因此重构薪酬制度,完善激励机制,必须以改革公司治理为逻辑起点。     

我国国有商业银行治理结构缺陷及矫正思路

我国国有商业银行在股权结构和董事会等方面都存在缺陷,这些缺陷严重影响了国有商业银行的竞争能力和经营效率,也增加了金融风险。本文从股权结构和董事会这两个国有商业银行公司治理的重要方面展开分析,并提出改进国有商业银行公司治理的政策建议。     

我国国有商业银行治理结构缺陷及矫正思路

我国国有商业银行在股权结构和董事会等方面都存在缺陷,这些缺陷严重影响了国有商业银行的竞争能力和经营效率,也增加了金融风险.本文从股权结构和董事会这两个国有商业银行公司治理的重要方面展开分析,并提出改进国有商业银行公司治理的政策建议.     

试论我国国有商业银行法人治理结构改革

本文论述现代商业银行公司治理结构的基本特征,并联系实际剖析我国国有商业银行公司治理制度的现状与缺陷,最后提出国有商业银行公司治理结构改革目标设想。     

浅析高校资产经营公司法人治理结构的完善

目前高校资产经营公司都表现出较好的发展态势,但是资产经营公司法人治理结构还存在明显不足。其原因在于作为法人一人有限公司本身存在的缺陷和该类公司自身存在的缺陷,这些缺陷对高校资产经营公司的今后发展极为不利。本文主要针对目前高校资产经营公司法人治理结构存在的问题进行分析,提出不断完善高校法人治理结构的对策建议。     

公司会计治理与公司治理:同构、嵌入还是交叉?

公司会计治理通常被看作是公司治理的一部分,而且将公司会计治理看作是嵌入公司治理中或与公司治理同构。因此,以公司治理为导向的会计治理强调弥合公司治理中委托代理关系链务的缺陷及其对审计独立性的影响。本文从会计信息产权演变的角度将公司会计治理从公司治理中“解析”出来,认为公司治理与公司会计治理同源于委托代理难题,但治理的基础和目标不同,公司治理的监督机制与会计治理对监督机制的内在需求是不同的,因此,公司会计治理结构与公司治理结构应该是交叉的或大部分同构,同属于现代企业组织制度的范畴。本文主张应按照公司会计治理的逻辑结构及其与公司治理的关联性对其进行研究和建构。     

盈余管理——基于制度方面的分析

盈余管理是会计研究的重要内容，目前对盈余管理的定义学术界并未形成统一认识，这在一定程度上给盈余管理的研究造成了混乱。盈余管理的手段多样化，既可以利用会计手段实现盈余管理，也可以利用非会计手段实现盈余管理。股票的发行与上市制度的缺陷、会计准则制度的缺陷、公司治理制度的缺陷，这些制度方面的缺陷为盈余管理的实现提供了条件。因此，对于盈余管理的治理，可以从完善现行上市公司制度、健全会计规范和执行机制、健全公司治理等方面实现。     

公司治理机制与公司治理效率——基于公司治理成本的分析

国内外不断改革的公司治理实践都迫切要求对公司治理机制的效率进行成本收益分析。本文在已有文献的基础上对公司治理成本的概念进行了界定与分类,对公司治理机制、公司治理系统与公司绩效之间的关系进行了分析,并归纳了研究公司治理效率的方法。最后,从治理成本的视角分析治理效率对中国公司治理改革的意义。     

Corporate Governance and Information Efficiency in Security Markets

This paper investigates a neglected topic in corporate governance research; namely, do governance characteristics affect the market reaction to news? The topic is important given the emphasis by governance regulations and codes of best practice on the need for greater transparency of corporate activities. For the first time in the corporate governance literature, we show that corporate governance characteristics (particularly the presence of founding family directors and gender diverse boards) affect the market reaction to company specific news. The results of the paper point to the analysis of the impact of governance characteristics on the market reaction to news being a new and complementary research agenda within corporate governance.     

Does better corporate governance result in higher valuations in emerging markets? Another examination using a new data set

This paper utilizes a new data set from AllianceBernstein that, unlike other corporate governance data, has monthly-updated firm-level governance ratings for 21 emerging markets countries for almost a five year period. With these unique data, we examine how changes in corporate governance ratings impact firm valuation. Using this test we find evidence that improvements in corporate governance result in significantly higher valuations.     

公司治理结构存在问题及对策

在经济全球化进程日趋加快的新形势下 ,加强公司治理已成为国际潮流 ,受到国际企业界的普遍高度重视。本文从简述目前公司治理结构存在的问题着手 ,在此基础上 ,提出几点完善设想 ,以期对公司治理问题展开进一步讨论。     

Corporate Governance and Performance of Externally Managed Singapore Reits

This paper employs a new scoring framework designed by the Asia Pacific Real Estate Association (APREA) to examine the link between corporate performance and quality of corporate governance among externally managed REITs listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (S-REITs). The empirical tests provide evidence supporting a positive correlation between corporate governance practices and stock performances. However, we find no positive correlation with operating performance proxied by accounting measures. In other words, S-REITs with higher corporate governance tend to register better risk-adjusted returns but do not outperform operationally. To test for market efficiency, the study shows that S-REITs with the best corporate governance practices also have less information asymmetry.     

The impact of corporate governance on Internet financial reporting

This study examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure transparency measured by the level of Internet financial reporting (IFR) behavior. We measure corporate governance by shareholder rights, ownership structure, board composition, and audit committee characteristics. We develop a disclosure index to measure the extent of each sample firm’s IFR by presentation format, information content, and corporate governance disclosures. Results indicate that firms with weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of blockholder ownership, a higher percentage of independent directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher percentage of audit committee members that are considered financial experts are more likely to engage in IFR. The findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm’s Internet disclosure behavior, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Additional exploratory analysis indicates that the association between corporate governance and IFR varies with firm size. Our results suggest that new regulatory guidance in corporate governance leads to improved disclosure transparency via IFR.     

The Role of Auditing in Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand: A Research Synthesis

Corporate governance is of growing importance in Australia, New Zealand and all over the world. Corporate governance interacts with auditing and it is useful to understand how corporate governance and auditing affect companies. A related issue is whether better governance is a substitute for auditing or a complement. Previous studies of that issue have had mixed results. This review article provides a synthesis of Australian and New Zealand research about corporate governance and auditing that assesses what has been found and examines issues that can be explored using multiple studies. We conclude that despite extensive research, there is still considerable uncertainty about how corporate governance mechanisms are related to auditing and how auditing is associated with corporate governance. We conclude that recommendations for better governance (beyond a minimum level) are not yet supported by evidence. The results are intended to be helpful in providing advice about policy in Australia and New Zealand, and in determining directions for new research.     

The rise of corporate governance in corporate control research

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on specific industries and evidence on bidding strategies in takeovers. This analysis leads us to our second task – to examine the evolution of corporate control research, broadly defined. Our analysis shows a movement in research from mergers and acquisitions to a broader analysis of corporate governance, especially internal governance features. We suggest that there is a trend toward an increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to discipline from the market from corporate control. This trend reflects an important change over the past several decades in the means through which the market disciplines corporate behavior.     

Corporate governance and the stock market reaction to new product announcements

This study examines the explanatory power of corporate governance mechanisms on the wealth effect of firms?? new product strategies. We show that board size, board independence, audit committee independence, CEO equity-based pay, analyst following and shareholder rights are all of significance in explaining the variations in the wealth effect of new product introductions. Our results reveal that the new product strategies announced by firms with better corporate governance mechanisms tend to receive higher stock market valuations than those of firms with poorer governance mechanisms. This study provides empirical support for the notion that enhanced governance mechanisms can reduce both agency and information asymmetry problems for firms announcing new products.     

The differential CEO dominance-compensation and corporate governance-compensation relations: Pre- and post-SOX

We examine the relationship between corporate governance (as measured by traditional corporate governance variables and a new measure of corporate governance, called CEO dominance) and executive compensation, pre- and post-SOX. We conceptualize CEO dominance as a measure of a CEO's power and define it as the difference between CEO pay and the next highest executive's pay divided by the CEO's pay. We argue that for traditional corporate governance variables, the inverse governance-compensation relation that exists pre-SOX will improve post-SOX. On the other hand, we expect a strong and positive CEO dominance-compensation relation to exist both pre- and post-SOX. Consistent with expectations, our results indicate that SOX has changed the relationship between CEO duality and compensation relation, but it has not changed the CEO dominance-compensation relation. This suggests that SOX regulatory reforms do not limit the ability of CEO power to obstruct traditional corporate governance mechanisms in extracting compensation-related rents.