Does the adoption of IFRS affect corporate social disclosure in annual reports?

In this exploratory study we investigate the impact of the implementation of IFRS on corporate social disclosures (CSD) within the context of stakeholder theory. We measure the level of CSD in annual reports using a disclosure instrument based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report “Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports”. We find that IFRS adoption had a differential effect on CSD based on a firm's institutional setting i.e., the stakeholder–management relationship prevalent in their institutional environment. Firms in the stakeholder countries did not have a significant change in the level of CSD following the mandatory adoption of IFRS while firms from the shareholder countries experienced a significant increase over the same period resulting in shareholder countries providing an overall higher level of CSD after IFRS adoption than stakeholder countries. These findings suggest that firms' reactions to the requirements of IFRS and the stakeholder pressure to provide additional CSD are influenced by institutional environment. Further, our results provide support for the use of stakeholder theory to predict the level of CSD.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.     

Judgment effects of familiarity with an analyst’s name

We conduct an experiment with MBA students where we manipulate whether participants are exposed to an analyst’s name in Stage 1, and whether they are given a cue in Stage 2 about the particular analyst’s prior performance as an All-star analyst. We find that in the absence of a favorable performance cue about the analyst, mere exposure to the analyst’s name enhances perceived analyst credibility, which in turn influences the investors’ earnings estimates. This suggests a benefit to analysts in terms of building credibility merely through media exposure that cannot be explained by performance. In fact, a diagnostic cue such as the analyst’s high prior performance no longer matters to investors once they have prior exposure to the analyst’s name. However, this enhancement of an analyst’s credibility through investors’ prior exposure to his/her name is reversed when the analyst’s forecast turns out to be inaccurate.     

Reference point formation by market investors

The disposition effect [Shefrin, H., Statman M., 1985, The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long. Journal of Finance, 40, 777–790], investors’ tendency to sell gaining assets and hold on to loosing assets, relies on the notion of a reference point distinguishing between losses and gains. While literature using aggregated market data documented the existence of such a reference point affecting investors’ decisions, it had not pinpointed it. The main goal of our work is to shed light on the mechanism of reference point formation. We hypothesize that salient events taking place during a stock’s holding period influence investors’ perceptions and make them update the stock’s reference point. Using analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock price data, and firms’ quarterly earnings announcements, we document that company-specific events indeed affect the reference points. We discover that the earnings announcements played a role in reference point formation when they were not anticipated, i.e., when (i) analysts’ earnings forecasts failed to provide accurate predictions; and (ii) the earnings announcements were followed by market price reactions. Moreover, the reference points were affected more profoundly for low market capitalization, high beta firms, pointing that the reference point updating process is more reactive to events when information flow is low and prices are sensitive to market fluctuations. Our results also corroborate the attention hypothesis, i.e., the observation that agents facing numerous alternatives may consider primarily those that have caught their attention.     

An investigation of nonprofessional investors’ qualitative materiality judgments incorporating SEC listed vs. non-listed events

When the SEC began listing specific potentially material events in its Regulation FD [Regulation Fair Disclosure, 2000. SEC Release 33-7881, Rules 101–103], it deviated from its long-time “policy” of not providing materiality guidance to auditors and managers. What is currently unclear in the materiality literature is which factor(s) – information-based characteristics or user-based characteristics – has an effect on nonprofessional investor qualitative materiality judgments. Using a series of experimental markets, we examine and find no evidence that an information-based characteristic (distinguishing between listed and non-listed events) has an effect on nonprofessional investors’ materiality judgments. Our evidence regarding user-based characteristics is mixed. We do not find evidence of the direction of disclosed events impacting investors’ judgments, but we do find evidence of an anchoring effect. Our findings indicate that the content of the information disclosed to nonprofessional investors is not as important as the timing of the disclosure. Our investigation is unique in that we consider the (qualitative) nature of the event, rather than simply its (quantitative) magnitude.     

Regulation FD, accounting restatements and transient institutional investors’ trading behavior

We examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD) on transient institutional investors’ abnormal trading behavior around accounting restatements. We find that while in the pre-RFD period, transient institutional investors exhibit abnormal selling of restating firms’ stocks one quarter before the restatement is publicly announced, in the post-RFD period there is no such abnormal selling. Furthermore, we find that this phenomenon is driven by (a) firms with low analyst following (i.e., firms with poor information environment), (b) firms with high stock price reaction to earnings surprise (i.e., firms with high informativeness of earnings), (c) firms where the restatements’ impact on earnings is high, and (d) firms with non-revenue related restatements.     

The effect of CEO reputation and explanations for poor performance on investors’ judgments about the company’s future performance and management

Two experiments are conducted in which MBA students make judgments about a company’s future performance and management’s reputation after the company reports poor financial results. Information about the CEO’s pre-existing reputation is manipulated at three levels (favorable, unfavorable, or none) and the plausibility of management’s explanation is manipulated at two levels (plausible or implausible). Generally, the results indicate that management’s explanations influence investors’ judgments of the company’s future performance and that judgments about management were jointly influenced by both manipulated factors. Specifically, our results indicate that a pre-existing favorable management reputation is an enduring trait that is not damaged even when management offers an implausible explanation. Our results are consistent with Mercer (2004) but inconsistent with other research (40 and 53) suggesting that a good reputation is easily lost. Our results also indicate that offering a plausible explanation improves the reputation of managers with an unfavorable reputation. We also find that judgments about management’s intentions for explaining poor performance represent a partial mediator for judgments about management’s reputation. Finally, we provide evidence that judgments about the company’s future performance and management’s reputation are consequential in that they are associated with investors’ equity judgments.     

Information immobility,industry concentration,and institutional investors’ performance

This paper examines foreign institutional investors’ portfolio allocation and performance in US securities. We test how information immobility, proxied by information barriers between the investors’ home markets and the US, influences portfolio strategies. Consistent with theoretical predictions, foreign institutional investors’ total investment in the US is negatively related to information immobility. Similarly, information immobility is a significant driver of portfolio under-diversification across industries. Industry concentration has declined over time, consistent with declining search costs. Industry-concentrated portfolios outperform more diversified portfolios for both foreign and US institutional investors. Concentration especially helps institutional investors with the easiest access to information.     

Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.