预算松弛影响因素的研究综述

通过对2001—2012年间国内学者关于企业中预算松弛的文献做的总结梳理发现：预算松弛的影响因素有很多,如：市场环境、竞争程度、股权结构、组织文化、信息不对称、预算参与、预算强调、预算公平、报酬激励方案和员工的个人特征等。发现国内现有研究文献重规范轻实证．预算松弛的研究成果不是很多,部分结论的证明力不够．缺乏有分量的文献,于是本文在此基础上提出些许可供进一步研究的内容、方向和方法。     

基于信息不对称的预算松弛文献综述

本文在文献回顾的基础上,对信息不对称与预算松弛相互关系问题展开理论评述。然而随着现阶段对预算松弛行为认识的深入,理论界开始从不同的视角对这一问题加以研究,但信息不对称仍然是一个很重要的实验控制因素,信息不对称因素仍将会是未来研究预算松弛需要重点关注的实验控制环境之一。     

关于现代企业预算松弛的一些思考

随着社会经济的不断发展,企业的经营环境在发生变化,市场对于企业的要求也越来越高,企业也暴露出越来越多的问题.在全面预算管理方面,由于预算编制中的很多不确定因素、企业与个人的目标不一致、企业制定的预算目标不明确、上级与下级之间信息不对称、下级为了减轻自身的压力、下级为了规避不确定性带来的风险和保障自身的利益等问题的出现,使得企业预算出现的松弛现象,企业要想实现全面预算管理还有很长的一段路要走.本文对企业全面预算管理中出现的预算松弛现象以及导致预算松弛的原因进行了深入的分析.     

信息不对称对预算谈判的影响

本文探讨了二个问题:(1)当预算过程是以设置谈判的过程进行时,信息不对称对预算松弛的影响;(2)信息不对称对预算谈判过程的影响;当最初的差别是由于信息不对称的时候,这个结果则表明在最初的谈判位置微小的差别并不表明有更大的可能性同意.更进一步地说,信息不对称影响谈判达成可能性和预算松弛的关系.最后,与纯经济学视角不一致的是,在谈判失败后上级强加一个预算会导致下级失去动力     

零基预算对预算编制松弛的影响

零基预算是部门预算的主要编制模式,它从真实需求出发来确定支出预算。预算编制松弛是在编制支出预算时,有意高估支出,将支出预算确定在真实需求之上。本文基于部门预算的实证研究,从零基预算对预算编制松弛是否有显著影响这个角度,检验零基预算方法是否真正发挥作用。根据样本数据分析发现,零基预算对预算编制松弛无显著抑制作用,这个结果表明,我国的零基预算并未发挥其预期作用,部门预算改革还任重道远。     

浅析中央基层预算单位预算资产管理中存在的若干问题

一、中央基层预算单位预算管理中存在的主要问题及原因(一)预算编制不规范一是预算编制基础不真实。由于财政与预算部门间存在严重信息不对称,财政部门无法全面掌握各部门的预算资源、预算需求,只能在各部门上报预     

预算考评：在业绩与真实间踌行——思辨篇：两难选择

预算考评的业绩导向型与真实导向型，类似“鱼”与“熊掌”，企业欲兼得却难以兼得；作为目标导向，二者又是一对矛盾。追求真实会妨碍业绩的提升，追求业绩又往往诱发失真，从而成为预算考评中的一个两难问题。 东风汽车推出“榨油计划”，通过高压榨取更高业绩，实属无奈之举。它只能解决一时之需，长此以往，必将对上下级均造成伤害，从而损毁企业价值。 北辰集团引入联合基数法，以薪酬诱导真实预算，克服了预算松弛，理论上具有更大的制度优势，但却可能妨碍下级追求更高业绩。 诺基亚力图营造一种企业（预算）文化，从观念和行为模式上激励业绩和真实并重，既能使企业不断追逐更高的业绩，又能以真实准确的预算规划指导未来，从而增强市场应变能力。 然而，在当今中国企业预算管理实践中，诺基亚式的预算文化尚不具备普遍的借鉴意义。因为我们尚不存在真正意义上的职业经理人制度，同时，文化变革也是一种最深层次的变革，非一朝一夕所能达成。 不过，梳理真实诱导薪酬法的进化史，一览诸公司的预算考评实践，并体味其中的两难选择以及其他相关因素，无疑会使我们在思考与改进预算考评乃至整体预算管理时，多一分理性。 是多一点点，还是多很多？欲寻答案，请继续翻页。[编者按]     

由预算松弛问题看预算目标的制定

一、预算松弛现象预算松驰是指下级通过故意低估收入或高估成本进行虚报预算,使收入或成本预算与真实的收入或成本之间出现不合理的差异。1.预算松弛的不利影响由于预算执行者对预算管理没有     

新会计制度改革背景下医院预算管理的思考

对于公立医院的财务管理来说,预算管理属于一项薄弱的环节,许多医院开展财务预算仅仅是为了能满足财政收支预算的需要,普遍存在预算编制方法不合理、覆盖内容不全面、缺乏健全的组织机构等问题,在医院的实际运营过程中,预算管理并没有发挥出重要的财务内控效用。新会计制度背景下,加强了预算会计的核算,从而推动了公立医院财务预算管理体系的建设。本文针对公立医院在新会计制度改革的框架下,如何科学进行预算编制进行了分析和思考:探究了制度改革背景下医院预算编制存在的主要问题;并以此为基础,提出编制现金流预算、结合双制度差异表补充完善预算编制信息、利用科学化的预算编制方法、升级医院预算管理信息化系统等措施。希望通过建立科学的预算管理体系,制定合理的医院各项收支预算,完整披露医院的预算信息等策略,从而满足医院各项资金管理的需要,希望能为相关人士提供参考。     

新形势下高校全面预算管理相关问题探讨

新形势下,建设高校全面预算管理体系的要求越来越迫切。目前,高校预算管理普遍存在预算编制不规范,预算执行不到位,未严格执行收支两条线原则,收入支出核算不合规、不准确、不真实等相关问题。文章结合工作实践,分析了高校预算管理中可能存在的问题,尝试探讨解决预算管理中问题的策略,为高校高效率的使用资金提供有益的参考。     

The effect of information asymmetry on negotiated budgets: an empirical investigation

This study examines three issues: (1) the effect of information asymmetry on the budget negotiation process, (2) the effect of information asymmetry on budgetary slack when budgets are set through a negotiation process, and (3) whether subordinates consider superiors imposing a budget following a failed negotiation as being low in procedural justice, which in turn causes low subordinate performance. The results suggest that smaller differences in initial negotiation positions do not indicate a higher likelihood of agreement when initial differences are due to differential information symmetry. Further, information asymmetry affects the relationship between negotiation agreement and budgetary slack. Last, inconsistent with a pure economic perspective, having superiors impose a budget after a failed negotiation causes justice or fairness considerations to demotivate subordinates.     

The effect of option listing on financing decisions

This paper investigates the effect of option listing on corporate financing decisions. Firms experience a significant drop in leverage, which is driven mainly by an increase in new equity issues. This effect is more prominent in firms with greater information asymmetry and lower percentages of quasi-index and transient investors before listing and those with active options trading after listing. After options are listed, the newly listed firms hold more cash and engage in more acquisitions, which are funded mainly by equity issues. These findings suggest that option listing has a significant impact on financing decisions because of lower information asymmetry and that firms use the post-listing equity to build up financial slack and support major investments, such as acquisitions.     

CEO prior uncertainty and pay–performance sensitivity

A CEO's pay–performance sensitivity (PPS) is higher in the first year of their tenure than in the following years. I explain this finding with reference to chief executive officer (CEO) prior uncertainty: Because of information asymmetry and/or uncertainty about the quality of the match between a CEO and a firm, first-year compensation is often arranged to depend largely on performance. Consistent with this explanation, CEOs with higher prior uncertainty exhibit higher first-year PPS. Also, PPS is higher for outsider CEOs than insider CEOs. Among outsider CEOs, first-year PPS is lower for former executives of large public firms. An insider CEO's service time in a firm before becoming the CEO reduces first-year PPS.     

谁能免予薪酬惩罚?——基于ST公司的研究

本文以我国A股410个ST上市公司为样本,侧重从业绩信息的异质性和管理层权力两个方面,研究我国上市公司高管免于薪酬惩罚问题。研究发现:业绩信息异质性越强,管理层权力越大的ST公司高管越有可能免予薪酬惩罚。同时发现短期负债是上市公司高管不能免于薪酬惩罚的重要因素,而开董事会次数越多越能免予薪酬惩罚。本文研究结论证明了最优契约受业绩信息异质性和管理层权力影响,具体而言国有企业主要受管理层权力影响,非国有企业主要受业绩信息异质性影响。     

Does Dividend Policy Relate to Cross‐Sectional Variation in Information Asymmetry? Evidence from Returns to Insider Trades

We examine the relation between dividends and information asymmetry by using insider returns as a proxy for information asymmetry. We find that dividends are negatively related to returns to insider trades across firms. Firms that pay consistently high dividends have lower insider returns than do firms that pay consistently low dividends. These results do not support traditional dividend signaling models. Rather, they are consistent with the proposition that firms with the highest dividends have the lowest levels of information asymmetry.     

Budgeting and the propensity to create budgetary slack

This paper reports the results of a field study designed to investigate how managers' propensities to create budgetary slack are affected by the budgeting system and the technical context. The results show that propensities to create slack are lower where managers participate actively in budgeting, particularly when technologies are relatively predictable. But such propensities are higher if a tight budget requires frequent tactical responses to avoid overruns.     

The impact of reputation and variance investigations on the creation of budget slack

Experimental research and survey studies have yielded conflicting findings about the conditions under which budget slack is likely to arise. This study begins to reconcile the contradictory evidence by examining the impact of two features of the organizational context in which budget decisions are made: reputation concerns and variance investigations. The results of a laboratory experiment show concern for maintaining a favourable reputation leads to lower budget slack as does the existence of a variance investigation policy. The findings extend the agency theory framework by incorporating both pecuniary and non-pecuniary features that influence behavior when budgets have consequences beyond the immediate period. The results also suggest reputation concerns and control system features may serve as cost-effective substitutes for exhaustive incentive contracting in practical settings.     

Shared interest and honesty in budget reporting

This study uses two experiments to investigate the honesty of managers’ budget reports when the financial benefit resulting from budgetary slack is shared by the manager and other non-reporting employees. Drawing on moral disengagement theory, we predict that the shared interest in slack creation makes misreporting more self-justifiable to the manager and, therefore, leads to lower honesty. Consistent with our prediction, the results of our first experiment show that managers report less honestly when the benefit of slack is shared than when it is not shared, regardless of whether others are aware of the misreporting. Our second experiment investigates whether the preferences of the beneficiaries of the slack affect managers’ honesty. We predict that managers’ honesty will be improved when the beneficiaries of the slack have a known, higher-order preference for truthful reporting. Consistent with our prediction, the results show that managers report more honestly when other employees have a known preference for honesty than otherwise. The implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed.     

How Top‐down and Bottom‐up Budgeting Affect Budget Slack and Performance through Social and Economic Exchange

This paper investigates the effects of a top‐down (TD) versus bottom‐up (BU) orientation in different stages of the budgetary target‐setting process on slack and managerial performance. We use social exchange theory to explain the outcomes of these alternative budgetary arrangements, and complement the traditional focus on budgetary participation in target setting with a process‐oriented perspective. We develop hypotheses predicting that TD and BU orientations in the subsequent stages of the budgeting process have different effects on managers’ exchange relationships with the firm, and their behavioural responses. Using survey evidence from German managers across 127 firms we find that a TD orientation in the issuance of guidelines enhances economic exchange and that a BU orientation in the development of the initial budget proposal enhances social exchange, which in turn are associated with reduced slack and higher performance, respectively.     

Information-based stock trading and managerial incentives: evidence from China's stock market

This paper uses stock price informativeness, or information-based stock trading, to help explain the pay–performance sensitivity (PPS) of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in China's listed firms. We argue that higher stock price informativeness, which we measure by the probability of informed trading, helps and encourages shareholders to incentivize the top management team based on stock market performance. The regression results support our argument and show that a higher level of stock price informativeness is associated with higher CEO PPSs. Moreover, the impact of stock price informativeness on CEO incentives is stronger for privately controlled listed firms than it is for state-controlled listed firms. The results also hold when information asymmetry is approximated by the accuracy and dispersion of the earnings forecasts made by financial analysts.