开放式基金持有人申购赎回行为“收益敏感性指标”的分析

本文首先设计了包含基金拆分和分红因素的净赎回率指标,并通过Granger因果检验,确定了年化收益率作为基金业绩的评价指标.以上述指标为基础,论文构建了我国开放式基金持有人中购赎回行为"收益敏感性指标",进而考察了我国开放式基金的"赎回异象"是否长期存在,分析了基金持有人的行为方式.研究发现,我国开放式基金的赎回异象有减弱的趋势,基金持有人行为对基金管理人的正向激励作用在逐步显现.     

开放式基金流动性风险及其管理

自从我国开放式基金成立以来,基金份额的持续性大规模赎回就是基金管理人所面临的一个严峻问题。开放式基金在遭遇大规模赎回时,如果现金不足,就只有被迫将资产变现以应付赎回,在此过程中不可避免的要承受流动性损失,由此也会造成市场的波动。基金份额的巨额赎回会给开放式基金带来严重的流动性风险,甚至可能导致基金清盘,它已成为了阻碍我国开放式基金健康发展的一个不可忽视的因素。一、开放式基金流动性风险的内涵流动性是指金融资产持有者按该资产的价值或接近其价值出售的容易程度。对于开放式基金而言,流动性就是指基金管理人在面对赎回压力时,将其所持有的资产——投资组合在市场中变现的能力。或者说开放式基金流动性风险也就是指其所持资产在变现过程中价格的不确定性和可能遭受的损失。因此,开放式基金流动性风险与它所持有的资产——投资组合的流动性之间存在着显著的正相关。赎回风险特指当基金面临投资者大额赎回时,无法及时将资产变现可能带来的资产和声誉损失。流动性风险除赎回风险外,还包括基金资产在交易中存在的无法变现风险,如股票跌停板等等。一般而言,流动性风险的大小取决于两方面因素,从资金的供给角度看,取决于股票市场和货币市场;从资金需求的角度看,则要看...     

开放式基金流动性风险控制的分析——简议强化基金内部流动性风险的预算管理

随着中国对外开放的程度不断加深,证券市场面临对外开放的考验也更加严峻,在开放条件下,急需有效的市场机制来化解和防范可能出现的金融风险和金融危机。现代市场经济中的证券市场具有自我调节、自我控制风险、提高收益的机制。发展开放式基金,能够提供必要的机制来稳定市场,分散和降低市场风险,然而开放式基金自身也存在不少风险,最主要的是流动性风险。本文介绍了开放式金流动性风险的定义即指金融资产迅速变为货币而又不会在价值上蒙受损失的能力。阐述了开放式基金流动性风险的形成机理以及我国开放式基金管理的特殊性,这主要因为我国与海外成熟的开放式基金相比,尚处于发展阶段,所以可供交易的品种少、缺乏做空交易和规避风险的工具、资金来源分散而造成的,从理论上提出了中国开放式基金流动性风险的管理方法。分析了强化基金内部流动性风险的预算管理。分为预测赎回申请的现金的需求、分析基金持有人的清单及证券选择。给出了对赎回现金需求进行预测的常用历史模拟法模型。     

美英日等国开放式基金监管简介

一、开放式基金及其优势开放式基金是指资产额不固定,投资者可随时申购和赎回基金单位的证券投资基金。对应于开放式基金的是封闭式基金,即指资产额固定,发行完毕不再追加发行,也不能赎回,投资者只能在二级市场上交易基     

基金理财专家门诊

低风险基金的申购问题Q:请问,债卷基金和货币市场基金有没有投资期限?货币市场基金可以只持有两个月吗?这两类基金的手续费是多少?什么情况下不收手续费?河南读者马海龙A:债券基金和货币市场基金都属于开放式基金,一般而言,除非出现因为巨额赎回以致暂停赎回或清盘,或者在基金成立时的封闭运行期内,开放式基金都是没有规定投资期限的。     

规模整体缩水，迷你化基金需格外警惕

上半年,股市、债市整体表现不佳,使得公募基金的规模缩水明显,部分基金遭遇大额赎回,加剧了基金的迷你化趋势。据2014年8月8日实施的《公开募集证券投资基金运作管理办法》,基金合同生效后,基金份额持有人数量不足200人或者基金资产净值低于5000万元规模连续60个工作日的,基金管理人应当向中国证监会报告并提出解决方案。市场上规模不足5000万元的基金被定义为迷你基金,该类基金因规模过小,存在清盘或者转型的可能性。需要知道的是,无论清盘还是转型,都会使投资者的投资效率大大降低,甚至带来额外的亏损。因此,投资者选择基金时一定要规避迷你基金;已经持有迷你基金的投资者,应提高重视,适时赎回。     

开放式基金的优势与风险

开放式基金是指基金规模不固定、投资者可以根据基金净值报价随时申购或赎回的投资基金.随着开放式证券投资基金试点工作的推进,我国首只开放式基金即将面世.作为我国证券市场上全新的投资品种,开放式基金在运作中有哪些优势,又将面临哪些风险,是值得我们认真探讨的问题.     

开放式基金的营销与流动性管理

随着我国证券市场的迅速发展，我国即将推出开放式证券投资基金。然而开放式证券投资基金的推出不仅面临封闭式证券投资基金折价交易的竞争，而且还存在着如何发行和管理 等问题，封闭式基金即使投资业绩不佳，投资者也夫法从基金管理公司那里收回投资。如果开放式基金投资业绩不佳，投资者纷纷向基金管理公司赎回基金，最终基金有可能被迫清盘。封闭式基金募集时发行量既定，募集后可上市流通,并有一定的溢价，发行容易获得成功，开放式基金募集时发行量只规定上下限，募集后不上市流通，但可按基金净值向基金管理 公司申购或赎回，发行的难度大，因此，对于开放式基金而言，投资理财与基金 销都非常重要，不仅需要投资管理人才也需要营销管理人地和，并需增设有关的职能部门，如销售部、客户部等。     

开放式基金的赎回动因分析

本文从投资者视角,采取动因分析的方法,从宏观与微观两个角度对开放式基金的赎回行为进行分析。得出结论:影响投资者赎回的宏观因素主要包括政局因素、法律因素、宏观经济背景和地区文化因素;而对于个体开放式基金而言,微观因素主要包括基金收益率、基金分红、基金收益的风险、基金规模、基金的持有结构、基金的存续时间、基金业绩的排名、基金家族的规模、基金费率以及其他基金特征因素。通过动因分析,我们能够找到对开放式基金赎回行为有影响的因素,并展开进一步的研究与实证。     

开放式投资基金:资本市场发展的必然选择

开放式投资基金,又称变动式投资基金,是指基金份额从而基金资本因投资者要求申购或赎回而发生变动的投资基金。基金管理人可根据市场的变化、基金单位资产净值的变化和投资者的申购要求等,出售新的基金份额,使基金规模扩大。基金持有人也可根据市场状况、自己的投资取向变化等要求基金管理人赎回,从而使基金规模缩小。开放式基金一般不上市交易,有关申购或赎回手续通常在规定的柜台办理。     

Underwriter Lock-up Releases, Initial Public Offerings and After-market Performance

The lock‐up agreement between an underwriter and an issuing firm's principals prohibits sale of securities for a period of time following the offering date. Investment banks must support the stock following an offering. The lock‐up assures investors that the restricted shares will not enter the market, at least for a period of time. Negative abnormal returns prior to the lock‐up release show that unrestricted investors liquidate positions prior to the scheduled lock‐up release. Negative abnormal returns are more robust for firms that are not influenced by SEC Rule 144 than for firms that are.     

ASSET PRICING WITH IN- AND OUTFLOW CONSTRAINTS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SWEDEN

The paper analyzes asset pricing and portfolio choice when domestic investors collectively cannot hold foreign assets beyond a maximum value. We add the constraint that foreign investors cannot hold more than a fraction of the shares of domestic assets. Consistent with Swedish stock market data, both domestic and foreign investors pay premiums for investing in the other country's assets. Some empirical observations are inconsistent with the CAPM framework.     

Is trading behavior stable across contexts? Evidence from style and multi-style investors

In this paper we study priming of identity within the context of inherent vs. contextual financial decision making. We use a sample of individual trading accounts in equity-style funds taken from one fund family to test the hypothesis that trading styles are inherent vs. contextual. Our sample contains investors who invest either in a growth fund, a value fund, or both. We document behavioral differences between growth fund investors and value fund investors. We find that their trades depend on past returns in different ways: growth fund investors tend towards momentum trading and value fund investors tend towards contrarian trading. These differences may be due to inherent clientele characteristics, including beliefs about market prices, specific personality traits and cognitive strategies that cause them to self-select into one or the other style. We use a sample of investors that trade in both types of funds to test this proposition. Consistent with the contextual hypothesis, we find that investors who hold both types of funds trade growth fund shares differently than value fund shares.     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

投资者特征与盈余公告后的漂移现象

本文以1999～2004年的上市公司为样本，研究了不同类型投资者对盈余公告后漂移（PEAD）的影响。研究发现，对于好消息，盈余公告后基金重仓持有股票的漂移小于非基金重仓持有的股票；但对于坏消息，基金重仓持有股票的漂移要大于非重仓持有股票的漂移。可能的解释是，基金重仓持有的股票如果公布的是好消息，说明与基金预期一致，所以这类股票的漂移比散户投资的利好股票漂移小；如果公布的是坏消息，则说明基金预期错误，此时基金等机构投资者会积极卖出，由于资金量大引起散户投资者跟着卖出相应股票，从而漂移比非基金重仓持有的利坏股票的漂移大。     

Decoupling by clienteles and by time in the financial markets: The case of two-stage stock-financed mergers

A two-stage stock-financed merger occurs when an acquiring firm first issues shares, and then engages in a cash acquisition shortly afterward. Such deals allow us to test two important hypotheses derived from decoupling: by clienteles via segmentation and by time. The acquirer's value is maximized by selling shares to investors preferring to hold them, and use the raised cash to pay the target shareholders (the decoupling by clienteles hypothesis). Two-stage deals also provide an option to the acquirers by allowing them to decouple their own shares from the correlated target's shares by issuing at an earlier date and wait for good acquisition opportunities (the time decoupling hypothesis). We find empirical evidence in support of both hypotheses.     

深市小微市值账户近五年盈亏情况报告

对2007年1月1日至2011年12月31日五年的登记结算数据进行分析显示:五年间深市证券账户盈利621.95亿元,所有账户中仅机构账户总体盈利。从盈亏账户比重来看,机构账户盈利占比最高,个人账户中,微型市值账户盈利占比最高。个人账户尤其是小微市值账户ST股持股比重高于机构账户,而深成指持股占比远低于中大市值账户和机构账户。并且,小微市值账户的交易频率远低于中大市值账户,而持股集中度高于中大市值账户与机构账户。小微市值账户的开户时间越早、投资经验越丰富、年龄越大,其盈利能力相对越强;反之,交易越频繁、投资越分散,盈利能力则随之降低。其他类型账户与小微市值账户的情况大致相同。     

Who,if anyone,reacts to accrual information?

We show that the vast majority of investors ignore value-relevant accruals information when it is first released, but that investors who initiate trades of at least 5,000 shares tend to transact in the proper direction. These investors trade on accruals information only when the previously-announced earnings signal is non-negative. Unconditionally, those investors initiating the smallest trades appear to respond to accruals in the wrong direction, but further investigation suggests this behavior is explained by their attraction to attention-grabbing stocks. Finally, we find that those who trade on accruals information have insufficient market power to mitigate the accruals anomaly.     

创业板高市盈率发行的原因及解决对策——基于2009年6月新股发行体制改革的视角

本文先列举了创业板高市盈率发行的表现,并从2009年6月新股发行体制改革视角探讨了创业板发行市盈率不断升高的原因,提出以美国式招标确定新股网下配售价格、机构投资者在初步询价中要缴纳保证金、分期支付超募资金所产生的保荐费、让主承销商持有部分新股并设定锁定期等政策建议.     

Crushed by a rational stampede: Strategic share dumping and shareholder insurrections

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of institutional share dumping surrounding control events. Institutional investors sometimes dump shares, despite trading losses, in order to manipulate share prices and trigger activism by “relationship” investors. These institutional investors are motivated to trade not only by trading profits but also by a desire to protect the value of their inventory and to disguise the quality of their own information. Relationship investor profit from targeting firms both by improving firm performance and by generating private information.