The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

Higher risk,lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.     

Overcoming limits of arbitrage: Theory and evidence

Limits to arbitrage arise because financial intermediaries may face funding constraints when mispricing worsens. Using a model with limits to arbitrage, where we allow arbitrageurs to secure capital even in case of underperformance, we show that arbitrageurs that are more protected from withdrawals have more mean-reverting and volatile returns. Using data on hedge fund performance, we find robust support for these hypotheses: Funds with contractual impediments to withdrawals, and funds with performance-insensitive outflows, recover more quickly after a bad year and have more volatile returns. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that some hedge funds overcome the limits to arbitrage.     

A Time to Scatter Stones,and a Time to Gather Them: The Annual Cycle in Hedge Fund Risk Taking

Analyzing a sample of hedge fund daily returns from Bloomberg, we find a seasonal pattern in their risk taking. During earlier months of a year, poorly performing funds reduce risk. The reduction is stronger for funds with higher management fees, shorter redemption periods, and recently deteriorating performance, consistent with a managerial aversion to early fund liquidation. Toward the end of a year, poorly performing funds gamble for resurrection by increasing risk. It is largely achieved by increasing exposure to market factors, and can be linked to stronger indirect managerial incentives during the second half of a year.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

HEDGE FUNDS: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Hedge funds are attracting increased attention because of their reputation for earning superior (risk-adjusted) returns. Hedge Fund Research Inc. estimates that in 2001 there were about 7,000 hedge funds with investor capital of about $600 billion. And yet the diversity of hedge funds, combined with a general lack of transparency, makes the hedge fund industry something of a "black box."
This article provides an overview of the legal structure of hedge funds, the various fund investment strategies, and the existing research on overall hedge fund performance. Without uniform and comprehensive reporting requirements, it is difficult to ascertain the size and scope of hedge fund investments. Nonetheless, current research provides persuasive evidence that hedge funds earn positive risk-adjusted returns, on average, in contrast to their counterparts in the mutual fund industry. In an attempt to explain these higher returns, the authors begin by noting that hedge funds are subject to considerably less regulation than other investment institutions because their client base is limited to wealthy individuals and institutions. Hedge funds can thus employ investment strategies that mutual funds and pension funds are prohibited from pursuing, such as short selling, high leverage, derivatives, concentrated holdings, and limited redemptions. As a result, the funds may be able to earn excess returns by operating in illiquid and specialized markets where there is a shortage of arbitrage capital. At the same time, and perhaps even more important, hedge funds are in a better position than conventional mutual funds to attract skilled managers because of their use of performance-based incentive fee structures.     

Short-term hedge fund performance

Hedge fund returns are often explained using linear factor models such as Fung and Hsieh (2004). However, since most hedge funds live only for 3 years, these linear regressions are subject to over-parameterization. I improve the out-of-sample accuracy of the linear factor model by combining cross-sectional and time series information for groups of hedge funds with similar investment strategies. The additional cross-sectional information allows more accurate estimates of risk exposures. I also propose a trading strategy based on this methodology for extracting substantially larger risk-adjusted returns.     

The alpha and omega of fund of hedge fund added value

In spite of a somewhat disappointing performance throughout the crisis, investors are showing interest in hedge funds. Still, funds of hedge funds keep on experiencing outflows. Can this phenomenon be explained by the failure of fund of hedge fund managers to deliver on their promise to add value through active management, or is it symptomatic of a move toward greater disintermediation in the hedge fund industry? We introduce a return-based attribution model allowing for a full decomposition of fund of hedge fund performance. The results of our empirical study suggest that funds of hedge funds are funds of funds like others. Strategic allocation turns out to be a crucial step in the investment process, in that it not only adds value over the long-term, but most importantly, it brings resilience precisely when investors need it the most. Fund picking, on the other hand, turns out to be a double-edged sword.     

The risk in hedge fund strategies: Theory and evidence from long/short equity hedge funds

Theory suggests that long/short equity hedge funds' returns come from directional as well as spread bets on the stock market. Empirical analysis finds persistent net exposures to the spread between small vs large cap stocks in addition to the overall market. Together, these factors account for more than 80% of return variation. Additional factors are price momentum and market activity. Combining two major branches of hedge fund research, our model is the first that explicitly incorporates the effect of funding (stock loan) on alpha. Using a comprehensive dataset compiled from three major database sources, we find that among the three thousand plus hedge funds with similar style classification, less than 20% of long/short equity hedge funds delivered significant, persistent, stable positive non-factor related returns. Consistent with the predictions of the Berk and Green (2004) model we find alpha producing funds decays to “beta-only” over time. However, we do not find evidence of a negative effect of fund size on managers' ability to deliver alpha. Finally, we show that non-factor related returns, or alpha, are positively correlated to market activity and negatively correlated to aggregate short interest. In contrast, equity mutual funds and long-bias equity hedge funds have no significant, persistent, non-factor related return. Expressed differently, L/S equity hedge funds, as the name suggests, do benefit from shorting. Besides differences in risk taking behavior, this is a key feature distinguishing L/S funds from long-bias funds.     

The performance of hedge funds and mutual funds in emerging markets

Use of short selling and derivatives is limited in most emerging markets because such instruments are not as readily available as they are in developed capital markets. These limitations raise questions about the value added provided by hedge funds, especially compared to traditional mutual funds active in these markets. We use five existing performance measurement models plus a new asset-style factor model to identify the return sources and the alpha generated by both types of funds. We analyze subperiods, different market environments, and structural breaks. Our results indicate that some hedge funds generate significant positive alpha, whereas most mutual funds do not outperform traditional benchmarks. We find that hedge funds are more active in shifting their asset allocation. The higher degree of freedom that hedge funds enjoy in their investment style might thus be one explanation for the differences in performance.     

Speculative capital and currency carry trades

In this paper, we study a two-country general equilibrium model with partially segmented financial markets, where hedge funds emerge endogenously. Empirically, we show that the hedge fund investment strategy predicted by our model, which we call the “risk-adjusted carry trade” strategy, explains more than 16% of the overall hedge fund index returns and more than 33% of the fixed income arbitrage sub-index returns. The flow of new money to hedge funds affects market interest rates, exchange rates, and both the hedge funds’ contemporaneous and expected future returns as predicted by the model.     

The dynamics between stock returns and mutual fund flows: empirical evidence from the Greek market

This paper examines the interaction between mutual fund flows and stock returns in Greece. Specifically, we investigate the possibility of a causality mechanism through which mutual funds flows may affect stock returns and vice versa. The statistical evidence derived from the error correction model indicates that there is a bidirectional causality between mutual fund flows and stock returns. Cointegration results show that mutual funds flows cause stock returns to rise or fall. This may be explained by the fact that, in Greece, equity mutual funds are obliged by law to invest a certain percentage of their cash in stocks. Thus, inflows and outflows of cash in equity funds seem to cause higher and lower stock returns in Greek stock market.     

Does the choice of performance measure influence the evaluation of hedge funds?

The Sharpe ratio is adequate for evaluating investment funds when the returns of those funds are normally distributed and the investor intends to place all his risky assets into just one investment fund. Hedge fund returns differ significantly from a normal distribution. For this reason, other performance measures for hedge fund returns have been proposed in both the academic and practice-oriented literature. In conducting an empirical study based on return data of 2763 hedge funds, we compare the Sharpe ratio with 12 other performance measures. Despite significant deviations of hedge fund returns from a normal distribution, our comparison of the Sharpe ratio to the other performance measures results in virtually identical rank ordering across hedge funds.     

Capacity Constraints and Hedge Fund Strategy Returns

Hedge funds have generated significant absolute returns (alpha) in the decade between 1995 and 2004. However, the level of alpha has declined substantially over this period. We investigate whether capacity constraints at the level of hedge fund strategies have been responsible for this decline. For four out of eight hedge fund strategies, capital inflows have statistically preceded negative movements in alpha, consistent with this hypothesis. We also find evidence that hedge fund fees have increased over the same period. Our results provide support for the Berk and Green (2004) rational model of active portfolio management.     

Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets

This paper examines institutional price pressure in equity markets by studying mutual fund transactions caused by capital flows from 1980 to 2004. Funds experiencing large outflows tend to decrease existing positions, which creates price pressure in the securities held in common by distressed funds. Similarly, the tendency among funds experiencing large inflows to expand existing positions creates positive price pressure in overlapping holdings. Investors who trade against constrained mutual funds earn significant returns for providing liquidity. In addition, future flow-driven transactions are predictable, creating an incentive to front-run the anticipated forced trades by funds experiencing extreme capital flows.     

Capturing hedge fund risk factor exposures: Hedge fund return replication with ETFs

We develop a new factor selection methodology of spanning the space of hedge fund risk factors with all available exchange traded funds (ETFs). We demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology with out-of-sample individual hedge fund return replication by ETF clone portfolios. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to risk factors driving hedge fund returns. We further consider portfolios of “cloneable” and “noncloneable” hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R² matches, and demonstrate that our ETF clone portfolios slightly outperform cloneable hedge funds out of sample.     

Systematic risk and the cross section of hedge fund returns

This paper investigates the extent to which market risk, residual risk, and tail risk explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. The paper introduces a comprehensive measure of systematic risk (SR) for individual hedge funds by breaking up total risk into systematic and fund-specific or residual risk components. Contrary to the popular understanding that hedge funds are market neutral, we find that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining the dispersion of cross-sectional returns while at the same time measures of residual risk and tail risk seem to have little explanatory power. Funds in the highest SR quintile generate 6% more average annual returns compared with funds in the lowest SR quintile. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, systematic risk remains positive and highly significant, whereas the relation between residual risk and future fund returns continues to be insignificant. Hence, systematic risk is a powerful determinant of the cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.     

Hedge Fund Regulation and Misreported Returns

This paper introduces a cross‐country law and finance analysis of the misreporting behaviour in the hedge fund industry in terms of smoothing returns so that a fund consistently generates positive returns. We find strong evidence that international differences in hedge fund regulation are significantly associated with the propensity of fund managers to misreport monthly returns. We find a positive association between wrappers and misreporting, particularly for funds that do not have a lockup provision. Also, we find some evidence that misreporting is less common among funds in jurisdictions with minimum capitalisation requirements and restrictions on the location of key service providers. We assess the robustness of our finds to a number of specifications, including, different specifications of misreporting bin widths, subsets of the data by fund type, as well as specifications controlling for collinearity and selection effects and other robustness checks. We show misreporting significantly affects capital allocation, and calculate the wealth transfer effects of misreporting and relate this wealth transfer to differences in hedge fund regulation.     

Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds

We study how incentive fees and manager’s own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund’s investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.     

Value at risk and the cross-section of hedge fund returns

Using two large hedge fund databases, this paper empirically tests the presence and significance of a cross-sectional relation between hedge fund returns and value at risk (VaR). The univariate and bivariate portfolio-level analyses as well as the fund-level regression results indicate a significantly positive relation between VaR and the cross-section of expected returns on live funds. During the period of January 1995 to December 2003, the live funds with high VaR outperform those with low VaR by an annual return difference of 9%. This risk-return tradeoff holds even after controlling for age, size, and liquidity factors. Furthermore, the risk profile of defunct funds is found to be different from that of live funds. The relation between downside risk and expected return is found to be negative for defunct funds because taking high risk by these funds can wipe out fund capital, and hence they become defunct. Meanwhile, voluntary closure makes some well performed funds with large assets and low risk fall into the defunct category. Hence, the risk-return relation for defunct funds is more complicated than what implies by survival. We demonstrate how to distinguish live funds from defunct funds on an ex ante basis. A trading rule based on buying the expected to live funds and selling the expected to disappear funds provides an annual profit of 8–10% depending on the investment horizons.