县域财政转移支付均等化效果研究——基于福建省县域转移支付数据的分析

我国实行分税制改革已20余载,财政转移支付制度也在不断完善中,其目的在于均衡各地区的财力水平,使居民能够享受平等的公共产品和服务。本文在对财政转移支付的经济效应进行理论分析的基础上,采集2000~2015年福建省58个县(市)级～①的财政收支、人口与财政转移支付等数据,通过变异系数法和基尼系数法,分别从纵向与横向实证分析福建省县域财政转移支付均等化的效果。从纵向看,县域地区在获得财政转移支付后,财力得到了根本性的改善;从横向看,不同项目的转移支付起到的均等化效果各异,其中,税收返还均等效果不佳,一般性转移支付和专项转移支付占比大致均等,但一般性转移支付均等化效果要高于专项转移支付均等化效果。     

地区间财政能力均等化模型的构建与应用——基于地区间公共支出成本差异的视角

基于地区间公共支出成本差异的视角，引人人均财政收入指数、人均财政转移支付指数、人均财力指数的概念，根据公平与效率原则构建了地区间财政能力均等化模型，并对2000—2008年河北省地区间财政能力差异的适度性进行了检验，结论是河北省财政转移支付政策一贯遵循效率优先的原则。根据模型所测算的2008年河北省地区间财政能力均等化分配的模拟结果显示，在目前的财政体制下，要想实现地区间财政能力的均等化，应考虑进行横向转移支付。     

浅析完善我国横向转移支付制度的方案和对策

横向财政失衡是同层级地方政府之间在收入能力和支出需求方面存在的差异,会导致地区间基本公共服务提供水平差异的存在。在深化财政改革的进程中,需要区分不同情况,综合运用一般性和专项转移支付手段,以有助于达到均等化的目标,实现经济社会的可持续发展。在分析我国政府转移支付制度现状的基础上,借鉴德国横向政府转移支付制度。就分税制体制下我国建立横向转移支付制度进行了可行性分析并提出了政策建议。     

以基尼系数为视角的财政转移支付均等化效果研究——基于吉林省的实证分析

实现各地区基本公共服务均等化是我国政府未来一个时期内的主要政策取向之一,财政转移支付则是实现这一目标的重要手段。我们以吉林省为例,通过基尼系数测算工具,比较全面、完整地度量当前各类转移支付的均等化效果。其中,缓解县乡财政困难补助、取消农业特产税降低农业税率补助的均等化效果较强,均衡性转移支付、调整工资补助、农村税费改革补助的均等化效果一般,各项税收返还、专项补助没有均等化效果。因此,要优化转移支付结构、科学确定各项转移支付分配公式、提高落后地区政府改善民生的意愿和能力,逐步实现地区间基本公共服务的均等化。     

对财政转移支付均等化效应的分析与思考--以焦作辖区六县（市）为例

转移支付又称无偿支出,它主要是指各级政府之间为解决财政失衡而通过一定的形式和途径转移财政资金的活动。以焦作市辖区六县（市）财政转移支付为例,分析了对包括一般性转移支付、专项转移支付和税收返还在内的各项转移支付实施情况以及对财力均等化和地方公共服务均等化造成的影响,并从优化转移支付结构、修改转移支付测算方法、加快转移支付制度建设、强化转移支付立法等方面提出了建议。     

对财政转移支付均等化效应的分析与思考——以焦作辖区六县(市)为例

转移支付又称无偿支出,它主要是指各级政府之间为解决财政失衡而通过一定的形式和途径转移财政资金的活动。以焦作市辖区六县(市)财政转移支付为例,分析了对包括一般性转移支付、专项转移支付和税收返还在内的各项转移支付实施情况以及对财力均等化和地方公共服务均等化造成的影响,并从优化转移支付结构、修改转移支付测算方法、加快转移支付制度建设、强化转移支付立法等方面提出了建议。     

浅析完善我国横向转移支付制度的方案和对策

横向财政失衡是同层级地方政府之间在收入能力和支出需求方面存在的差异,会导致地区间基本公共服务提供水平差异的存在.在深化财政改革的进程中,需要区分不同情况,综合运用一般性和专项转移支付手段,以有助于达到均等化的目标,实现经济社会的可持续发展.在分析我国政府转移支付制度现状的基础上,借鉴德国横向政府转移支付制度.就分税制体制下我国建立横向转移支付制度进行了可行性分析并提出了政策建议.     

构建统一规范的财政转移支付制度

我国现行的转移支付制度存在政府间事权财权划分不清、转移支付的结构不合理、转移支付形式过多、缺乏相应的立法以及监督机制等问题。为实现基本公共服务均等化目标,加快形成统一、规范、透明、合理的财政转移支付制度成为当务之急。(一)优化转移支付结构。目前,我国转移支付结构不尽合理,最能平衡地区间财力差异的一般性转移支付尽管比例逐年升高,但仍未超过专项转移支     

完善我国中央对地方政府转移支付制度的策略选择

一、我国中央对地方政府转移支付的现状 财政转移支付是各级政府间按照财权与事权相匹配的原则合理划分财政收入的一种分配形式，一般指上级政府对下级政府的财力补助。转移支付是中央政府促进地区问基本公共服务能力均等化的重要制度安排。和国际上通行的做法一样，     

公共财政视角下完善转移支付制度的几点思考

转移支付制度是现行财政体制的重要组成部分，作为协调政府间财政分配关系、实现地区间基本公共服务均等化的基本手段，为各级财政广泛运用，已经成为体现财政政策倾向的重要杠杆。张家口市是一个经济欠发达地区，有11个县区是国家扶贫开发重点县，各级财政比较困难，是国家和省转移支付重点支持的地区。因此，分析研究现行转移支付制度，以便更好地用好各类转移支付资金，使其发挥更大的效益，是摆在我们面前的一个重要课题。     

Does competition for capital discipline governments? The role of fiscal equalization

This paper examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a decentralized economy. I build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in initial endowments try to attract capital by competing public input that enhances the productivity of capital; meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by the central government to reduce regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key prediction, borne out in data from the German equalization system, is that while competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it weakens discipline in the poorly endowed regions. However, a conventional equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can be effective in correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across competing regions.     

基本公共服务均等化的财税体制改革

建立有利于基本公共服务均等化①的财税体制保障制度是和谐社会的内在要求。实现基本公共服务均等化,必须从财政支出体制和收入体制的改革入手:改革和完善财政支出结构,解决政府越位和缺位问题,加大财政对基本公共服务领域的投入力度;健全中央和地方财力与事权相匹配的体制,严格界定各级政府的支出责任;完善中央与地方税收分配比例,推进地方税改革,改革财产税制,充裕地方财政,形成有利于基本公共服务均等化的转移支付机制。     

Tax competition and tax base equalization in the presence of multiple tax instruments

The literature on tax competition has argued that tax base equalization, which reduces regional disparities in tax bases, can serve as a means of internalizing horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities. This argument assumes that each government relies on a single tax base (a regional tax on mobile capital and a federal tax on savings). This paper considers the case in which a distortionary labor tax is also available. Internalizing fiscal externalities requires that while the regional capital tax base is fully equalized, a region’s equalization entitlement for the labor tax is positive when its tax base is “larger” than the average tax base of all regions. This efficient tax base equalization system is incompatible with the primary objective of fiscal equalization.

     

Tax competition and fiscal equalization under corporate income taxation

This paper challenges the view that tax base equalization by the so-called representative tax system (RTS) removes inefficient undertaxation in corporate tax competition. The innovation of the paper is that it focuses on a tax on corporate income, instead of the unit tax on capital considered in previous studies. We employ a tax competition model with fiscal equalization and show that the RTS fails to fully internalize pecuniary and fiscal externalities. As a consequence, the RTS yields inefficiently low tax rates in the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game between governments. Tax revenue equalization performs even worse, but combined with equalization of private income it implements the efficient tax rates on corporate income.     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

城市最低生活保障各级财政支出均等化效应研究——基于泰尔指数分解检验

运用泰尔指数及分解方法,测算了我国2005-2014年城市最低生活保障各级财政支出的均等化效应。测算结果表明:城市低保财政支出均等化水平不断提高,但也存在诸多不合理之处。对城市低保各级财政支出的均等化效应考察发现,中央财政支出起了主导性作用,但在东部省份的支出安排不尽合理;省级财政在城市低保中没有发挥与其财力相适应的均等化效应,甚至还产生阻碍作用,一定程度上抵消了均等化效应,县级财政支出的均等化效应高于省级财政,其支出负担较重。应缩小城市低保地区差异,提高各级财政支出的均等化效应,合理划分各级财政的支出责任。     

Agglomeration,tax competition,and fiscal equalization

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It uses a model focusing on the strategic reason for capital taxes to demonstrate that per capita fiscal capacity equalization improves the spatial allocation of capital provided a sufficiently rich (marginally) larger region and sufficiently strong agglomeration externalities. If tax revenue is used to finance public goods, per capita fiscal capacity equalization generally cannot simultaneously eliminate public good inefficiency and spatial inefficiency. However, the achievement of full efficiency for ex ante identical regions requires excessive (full) equalization in the presence (absence) of agglomeration externalities.     

Fiscal decentralization,equalization, and intra-provincial inequality in China

Using a nationwide county-level panel dataset for the years 1995–2009, this paper conducts the first analysis in the literature to examine the impacts of fiscal decentralization and fiscal equalization, both measured at the sub-provincial level, on intra-provincial inequality in China. While fiscal decentralization offers significant advantages regarding public expenditure efficiency, a potentially large disadvantage is that it may lead to increased regional inequality. In this paper, in line with our theoretical hypotheses, we find that while fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China leads to larger intra-provincial inequality, fiscal equalization efforts performed by provincial governments tend to mitigate the detrimental effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality. Our results also indicate that the quantitative effects of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality tend to be larger when they are measured from the expenditure side, which is consistent with the fact that expenditure decentralization is a much more meaningful measure of decentralization in China. Overall, we provide evidence on the potential inequality costs of using fiscal decentralization as a development strategy. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of implementing a fiscal equalization program to ensure the overall success of decentralization policy.     

Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation

This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a fiscal federal system in which both federal tax and intergovernmental grants are involved and the taxation is distortionary. Also, optimal federal grants and tax policies in a decentralized fiscal system are examined. Our major findings are: (i) the second best does not require the equalization of marginal cost of public funds across regions in a conventional form; (ii) matching grants based on either the local tax rates or tax revenues should be introduced to internalize the tax externality; and (iii) once lump-sum and matching grants are optimized, federal tax policy becomes redundant so the optimal fiscal gap is indeterminate.     

中国的财政均等化与转移支付体制改革

中国日益扩大的地区间基本公共服务差距已远远超过备受瞩目的经济差距,成为经济可持续发展与和谐社会建设的主要威胁因素.事实证明,扩张转移支付总量远不足以促进财政均等化,更重要的是必须对侧重控制功能的现行转移支付体制作根本的结构性改革,大大强化其再分配功能.