机构投资者对IPO定价效率的影响分析

本文通过对沪深两地1996～2006年A股市场IPO样本的研究发现：IPO抑价率与IPO政策变量及机构投资者参与程度显著负相关。机构投资者参与询价和发行配售，对IPO抑价率的降低起到了显著作用，有利于提高市场发行定价效率。总体上看，现阶段中国A股发行市场定价效率仍然偏低。高抑价率的主要原因在于行政管制使股票发行人和承销商的议价能力发挥不足，根本原因还在于发行制度市场化程度不高。     

我国机构投资者对股市高抑价率主导力量研究

在2005年开始实施询价制以来,我国A股IPO抑价率也高居不下,其中机构投资者对高抑价率的形成具有重要的决定作用。在目前我国询价制中对询价诸多细节的规定,使我国机构投资者对IPO定价影响力高于承销商的定价影响力,这种由行政规制获得的权利,抑止了机构投资者发挥其自身专业判断、评估与定价力量来影响IPO定价的市场力量,而滋长了机构投资者以低定价来获取二级市场潜在巨大利益的动机,尤其是我国机构投资者家数少难以形成市场竞争时,更容易产生合谋对IPO低定价局面,从而产生IPO高抑价率现象。     

发行制度:困境与突破

"当市场现实屡屡与政策目标背道而驰的时候,我们更应该探寻制度改革中存在的种种深层次问题。"在2010年11月开始的新股发行改革中,完善报价申购和配售约束机制成为重中之重,诸如"进一步完善报价申购和配售约束机制"、"扩大询价     

投资者情绪、承销商定价与IPO新股回报率

在中国式IPO询价发行体制下,承销商没有新股分配权力,而定价市场化改革赋予了其定价权力。面对投资者的过度乐观情绪,承销商的理性选择是利用情绪抬高发行价格,通过收取与融资金额成正比例的承销费用实现其利益最大化。本文利用强制披露的询价机构网下全部报价数据,实证检验了中国式询价制的运作机理,结果发现:在机构报价形成的股票需求曲线上,承销商实际选择在相对高位定价,发行价格显著高于各类报价均值,而承销商声誉能够在一定程度上抑制这种定价拔高行为;定价拔高越大,IPO上市首日收益率越低;IPO上市后的交易价格呈现出显著的下降趋势,定价拔高越大,机构配售新股解禁后的累计异常收益率越低。     

网下优先配售制度对IPO抑价影响的实证研究

IPO抑价是在世界资本市场中普遍存在的现象,但是在我国IPO抑价率长期偏高的现象尤为突出.文章为了研究针对公募和社保基金机构投资者的优先配售制度对于我国A股IPO抑价率的影响,选用2014年一季度在我国A股上市的48只新股和2012年在A股上市的48只新股作为研究样本,利用多元线性逐步回归的方法,实证检验了优先配售制度对于我国IPO抑价率影响的存在性,研究结果表明:优先配售制度的存在降低了我国IPO的抑价率.     

询价制度改革与新股发行定价——来自创业板的经验证据

基于询价制改革的背景,从制度变革对承销商与询价对象行为影响的角度,以创业板新股为实证样本,研究了中国股票市场的IPO定价问题。结果表明:随着询价制改革的推进,创业板IPO定价有了显著的下降。在制度层面,赋予承销商配售权与引入个人投资者参与网下询价均有利于降低IPO定价,但是取消网下申购股票锁定期却提高了IPO定价。     

发行制度：困境与突破

在2010年11月开始的新股发行改革中,完善报价申购和配售约束机制成为重中之重,诸如“进一步完善报价申购和配售约束机制”、“扩大询价对象范围,充实网下机构投资者”、“增强定价信息透明度”、“完善回拨机制和中止发行机制”等提法成为新股发行制度改革的着力点。     

询价对象之间是竞争还是合谋——基于IPO网下配售特征的分析

本文基于对IPO网下配售特征的分析,检验了参与新股询价过程的询价对象之间的互动关系,并进一步考察了可能影响这一互动关系的因素。研究发现:询价对象在询价过程中没有为了获得更多网下发行的新股而相互竞价,相反它们选择相互合谋共同压低报价;询价对象家数对合谋程度具有显著影响,家数越多,合谋程度越低;询价对象的异质性对合谋程度具有显著影响,异质性越高,合谋程度越低。     

从IPO抑价考察文化类企业上市融资

IPO抑价是资本市场长期存在的现象,信息不对称理论认为IPO抑价率由上市企业的质量所决定,不同抑价率代表市场对企业不同的认可程度。通过对中国文化类企业IPO抑价率和中国资本市场整体IPO抑价率对比,发现文化类企业IPO抑价率显著高于资本市场整体水平,这表明我国证券市场对文化类企业的认同度较高,且一、二级市场对文化产业的认识有一定悖离,文化类股票在资本市场供给的相对不足更为明显。从文化产业成长和资本市场发展两个维度考察,提出应积极推动更多文化类企业上市融资。     

投资者情绪与IPO定价效率关系研究

本文分析了投资者情绪与IPO定价效率的动态关系,主要结论为:首先,承销商在最终定价时会根据拟发行企业的内在价值,对询价对象提供的报价进行反向调整;其次,IPO抑价率与投资者情绪表现出了较为持久的相互作用影响。市场的投资者情绪是影响IPO定价效率的因素之一。因此,提升IPO定价效率,还要培育真正的机构投资者,并引导其实现长期价值投资。     

The strategic reallocation of IPO shares

In this work, we study the reallocation of shares to retail and institutional investors, measured as the difference between the allocation declared before the initial public offering (IPO) and the effective allotment decided by the underwriter after the bookbuilding process. The reallocation is disaggregated into three components, two of which are under the direct control of the underwriter: the initial allocation, and the demand satisfaction ratio. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 193 hybrid IPOs issued in Italy between 1997 and 2012. Controlling for firm and IPO characteristics, we find that the IPO shares are typically shifted toward institutional investors when positive information is collected during the bookbuilding process. The IPO pricing and share reallocation are found to be interdependent, and reallocation is used in combination with partial adjustment to reward institutional investors.     

Relationship-Specific Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services

This paper investigates the effect of setup costs on the pricing of investment banking services. The existence of setup costs is predicted to result in lower underwriter spreads in IPOs for firms that are expected to issue again. Consistent with this prediction, I find significantly lower spreads for firms that make subsequent issues. I also find that a firm's likelihood of changing underwriters in a subsequent offer is related to the time between offerings and the underwriter's pricing performance in the IPO. These results suggest that the deviations from optimal IPO pricing carry a penalty for the underwriter.     

League table: a study of the competition to underwrite floating rate debt

We find evidence of price and non-price competitions in the competition for market shares among underwriters. The market pricing for underwriter’s service is rationally determined. Gross spread is a function of cost of production and distribution, underwriter’s organizational assets, and the extent of competition. Strategic discount pricing affects market share in the short run. There exists evidence of client loyalty to an underwriter, albeit much weaker than expected. The number of effective competitors for any particular issuer is quite small, ranging from three to five. Commercial banks are more aggressive in pricing to first-time issuers and have gained limited success in attracting clients of investment banks. They expand the market by bringing in new issuers, while causing gross spread to fall.     

影响企业短期融资券发行定价的因素

本文运用偏相关分析、多元回归方法等对企业短期融资券发行定价的各种影响因素进行分析,试图找出我国承销商和发行人在确定发行价格时应考虑的主要因素,以及这些因素对发行定价的影响程度,从而为首次公开发行定价真正走向市场化提供指导.研究结果表明,企业所有制性质、央行票据发行利率、行业特征、发行规模等因素显著影响发行价格,流动性风险是发行市场考虑的重要因素,而发行主体的偿债能力、主承销商声誉等级等对发行价格的影响不显著.     

IPOs with and without allocation discretion: Empirical evidence

Bookbuilding, the dominant offering mechanism for IPOs, is controversial because of the power it gives underwriters over IPO allocations. Critics argue that allocations could be abused to generate kickbacks for underwriters while proponents hold that allocation power could improve pre-market price discovery. We examine underpricing, bidding, and allocations from two regimes in the Indian IPO market with varying underwriter allocation power. When underwriters control allocations, bookbuilding is associated with lesser underpricing, but the effect quickly dissipates when regulations withdraw allocation powers. Using proprietary datasets of IPO books in both regimes, we find that allocation powers are used quite extensively. Identical bids can receive significantly different allocations, which depend not only on the bid but also on the bidder identity. When allocation powers are withdrawn, we find evidence of bidder exit, new bidder entry, and altered bidding strategies with exit by both favored and unfavored bidders. Our evidence supports bookbuilding theories in which giving underwriters allocation powers assists in pre-market price discovery.     

Debt Issue Costs and Issue Characteristics in the Market for U.S. Dollar Denominated International Bonds

This paper analyzes the issue costs and initial pricing of bonds in the international market. In particular, we investigate the determinants of three components of issue costs: underwriter fee, underwriter spread (the difference between the offering price and the guaranteed price to the issuer), and underpricing (the difference between the market price and the offering price). Total underwriter compensation increases with the bonds' credit risk and maturity, but it is insignificantly related to issue size. Interestingly, underwriters appear to price some issue characteristics directly (by adjusting the fee) and other characteristics indirectly (by setting the guaranteed price). The two compensation components (fee and spread) are negatively related to each other. We provide evidence that this trade-off is consistent with income tax considerations, as well as with two-tier pricing by underwriters. We find no evidence of underpricing.     

IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest

The underwriter of an IPO has two sources of compensation for its services on behalf of the issuer. One is through a commission (spread), the other is by buying issued shares for itself (or its affiliates) and reselling them in the post-issue market. Profits from the former decrease along with the magnitude of underpricing while profits from the latter increase with it. Faced with these countervailing interests, the present paper analyzes how the underwriter decides upon the pricing and allocation of IPOs.      

Duration of IPOs between offering and listing: Cox proportional hazard models—Evidence for Chinese A-share IPOs

This paper estimates the duration from offering to listing of Chinese A-share IPOs issued from 1994 to 2005. We firstly compare the effects of the two issuing systems on the length of this duration and find that the waiting time to listing has been shortened greatly after the Approval System is adopted. Secondly, this study emphasizes on exploring endogenous factors related to an issuer itself, including the issuer's quality, market sentiment, allocation mechanism, and underwriter, etc. Then a Cox proportional hazard model is employed to examine these factors' influences on this issuer's final listing. Further, this paper extends the analysis to explore the role of the issuing system and issuing year respectively. Most endogenous factors are found to still be functioning when we take into account the effect of the issuing system, but the effects of underwriter, allocation mechanism, offering price and floatation size diminish in favour of the effect of issuing year.     

Underwriter reputation and the pricing of securities: Evidence from asset-backed securities

This paper investigates whether and how the underwriter reputation can affect the pricing of securities. Using data on collateralized loan obligations (CLO), asset-backed securities (ABS), and asset-backed medium-term notes (ABN) from 2014 to 2019 in China bond market, we find that the underwriter's reputation has a significantly negative impact on the issuance spread. This effect is more pronounced in the CLO and ABS markets, while that in the ABN market is not significant. Furthermore, we find that the originators play a critical role in determining the issuance spread of securities, as state-owned and listed originator receive a lower initial yield spread. In addition, the number of tranches and the proportion of subordination in a deal also have a stronger effect on the relation between which the underwriters' reputation and securities prices. These results suggest that underwriters play a role in reducing information asymmetry between originators and investors, which is partly corrected via underwriter reputation.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.