监管政策、审计师变更与后任审计师谨慎性

本文以我国2001～2002年出台的相关审计监管政策为例,讨论审计监管对审计师变更和后任审计师谨慎性的影响。由于证监会2001年发布的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露编报规则第14号—非标准无保留审计意见及其涉及事项的处理》(以下简称14号文)增强了非标审计意见之于上市公司的不利后果,因此可能推动了机会主义审计师变更的增加。我们发现,在14号文出台后,前期非标审计意见同审计师变更的正相关关系变得更为紧密,且大所向小所的审计师变更频率显著上升。但是,没有证据表明,相比于未变更公司而言,变更公司的后续审计意见改善程度更高。并且,在2000～2002年,后任审计师针对变更公司的谨慎性有逐渐增强的趋势,这意味着2002年中注协关于审计师变更的监管政策可能发挥了一定的积极作用。     

审计师变更之管理层与审计师博弈：模型与抉策

审计师的变更具有经济后果。管理当局通过变更审计师，购买有利的审计意见或是通过提出变更审计师威胁审计师的独立性，都将有损审计质量。本文通过构建管理层与审计师的博弈模型，分析可能影响其行为决策的因素，以期对我国审计师变更监管政策的制定存所帮助。     

审计费用信息隐藏与审计质量——基于审计独立性和投资者感知视角的研究

根据证监会的规定,上市公司应当在年度报告中披露支付给会计师事务所的报酬。然而,我国每年仍有一定数量的公司没有按照规定披露审计费用。为此,本文从审计独立性和投资者感知审计质量两个视角分析审计收费信息隐藏情境下的审计质量。研究发现:(1)如果上市公司不披露审计费用信息,那么会弱化可控应计与非标审计意见之间的正向关系,这意味着不披露审计费用可能会有损审计独立性;(2)不披露审计费用的公司所披露的超预期盈余的盈余反应系数较低,即投资者对这类公司的感知审计质量较低。     

审计意见购买行为特征及监管研究述评

审计意见购买行为是审计功能异化的集中体现,也是审计监管的重要议题.国内外学者主要研究了意见购买的行为动机、行为路径、行为后果和监管等内容.研究表明,意见购买行为是客观存在的,其实现的主要途径是通过审计师变更向继任审计师购买意见,或者以审计费用或提供非审计服务的方式收买现任审计师.部分研究还表明,意见购买行为具有一定的经济后果.同时,意见购买行为的监管效应则取决于监管成本和监管收益的均衡.以往研究的不足在于尚未进一步揭示意见购买行为的动因,从国内来看,非审计服务是否损害审计独立性以及意见购买行为是否产生不利的经济后果,仍然缺乏必要的经验证据.     

高管变更、审计师忙碌程度与审计费用

本文以2005-2021年我国沪深A股上市公司数据为样本，探讨高管变更对审计费用的影响。实证结果表明，发生高管变更的上市公司，其审计费用更高，由忙碌程度高的审计师进行审计会进一步加强这一效应。进一步研究发现，上市公司发生高管变更会导致战略调整程度和审计投入的增加而使得审计费用增加；异质性检验表明，在公司规模较大的样本中，高管变更对审计费用的影响更为显著。研究结果为上市公司、审计师和相关部门关于公司高管变更审计与监管提供了决策参考。     

非审计服务影响注册会计师独立性吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验数据

长期以来,非审计服务对审计独立性的影响问题备受各界争议,且目前国内尚无人从实证研究角度进行验证。本文以2001—2004年报中同时披露审计与非审计费用的A股上市公司为研究对象,以操控性应计利润作为审计独立性的替代变量,在国内首次验证了非审计服务对审计独立性的影响。检验结果表明：非审计费用及其与总费用比重的大小对操控性应计利润没有明显影响。也就是说,在我国,没有证据显示,非审计服务的提供会影响注册会计师的审计独立性。     

我国审计定价影响因素的实证研究

审计定价与注册会计师的独立性和审计质量息息相关.通过运用2006年沪、深两市上市公司的实证数据对我国审计定价影响因素进行实证研究,结果表明:非审计费用未影响审计定价,董事会规模、董事会勤勉与独立性、事务所品牌、企业规模和子公司数目等直接影响审计定价.     

关键审计事项披露对利益相关者行为的影响研究

本文对关键审计事项在审计报告中的披露研究进行了文献综述。这些研究分析了关键审计事项的披露对利益相关者行为的影响,本文以此为基础分析了研究的局限性和对研究的有效建议。分析关键审计事项披露对利益相关者行为影响的五大实证研究主要包括:(1)股东(如投资者对审计师责任的看法和诉讼、价值相关性);(2)债权人(如贷款合同条款);(3)外部审计师(如审计流程和审计费用);(4)董事会董事(如盈余管理);(5)其他利益相关者(如信息对供应商和客户的价值)。本文主要选取其中三项:关键审计事项披露对股东和债权人、外部审计师行为的影响进行研究和综述。虽然国际审计报告准则的制定者假设关键审计事项披露对利益相关者的反应有积极影响,但大量的实证研究却显示出了不同的结果。此外,由于受关键审计事项披露的影响,公司的声誉可能是正面的,也可能是负面的,所以,这项研究对进行管理决策尤为重要。     

注册会计师审计独立性影响因素分析

要提高审计独立性就必须把握影响独立性的因素,针对各影响因素采取相应的措施。本文对审计独立性影响因素从注册会计师、会计师事务所、职业团体及管制机构等不同层面进行了较全面的分析,形成了较完整的分析框架,以期为进一步研究与规范提供基础平台。注册会计师执行审计业务从初始委托到最终披露报告所涉及到的主体有企业(由于上市公司最具代表性,所以本文主要讨论上市公司)、注册会计师、会计师事务所、职业团体以及管制机构。这些不同主体及其之间尤其是上市公司与注册会计师的关系,均会对审计独立性产生重要影响。本文将对各主体及其之间的关系对审计独立性的影响进行分析。     

行业与地域因素对审计收费定价的影响

审计收费问题一直是审计领域研究中被关注较多的问题之一。对于这种客户与会计师事务所之间经济联系的研究,一方面有助于政府监管者对审计市场的了解,进而更加有效地监管各审计市场主体的行为,另一方面有助于审计实务者了解审计市场的竞争状况,从而更加积极地制定其战略方向。在西方,对审计收费问题的实证研究从Simunic开始,经过20多年的发展已经形成了一个比较成熟的研究领域。其中经常讨论的议题有两个:一是是否存在垄断的市场结构而导致过高的审计收费;二是是否存在低价揽客或审计折扣行为,进而损害到审计师的独立性。2001年,证监会发布了《公开发行证券的公司信息披露规范问答第6号——支付会计师事务所报酬及其披露》,使得上市公司的审计收费进入到公众视野。我国学者结合本国国情,涌现了许多有别于国外研究的成果,如盈余管理、审计师任期和流动资产等对审计收费的影响,为审计市场的规范化和健康发展做出了一定的贡献。那么行业和地域差异因素对审计收费又会产生什么样的影响呢?     

Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China

Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.     

Audit market structure,fees and choice in a period of structural change: Evidence from the UK – 1998–2003

This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and auditor fee levels in the UK market in the crucial period of structural change following the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) merger and encompassing Andersen’s demise (1998–2003). Given the current interest in auditor choice, analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level and by industry sector. There is evidence of significant upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 but only for smaller auditees. Audit fee income for top tier auditors (Big 5/4) did not change significantly while the number of auditees fell significantly, consistent with a move towards larger, less risky, clients. A decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the period identifies the impact of four distinct consumer-based reasons for change: leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; and (only for the audit fees measure) audit fee changes. Andersen’s demise markedly reduced the level of inequality among the top tier firms but PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’. On switching to the new auditor, former Andersen clients experienced an initial audit fee rise broadly in line with inflation, with no evidence of fee premia or discounting. They also reported significantly lower NAS fees, consistent with audit firms and auditees responding to public concerns about perceptions of auditor independence. There is no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit fee by NAS. The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing; the key concerns remain the lack of audit firm choice and issues concerning the governance and accountability of audit firms.     

The determinants of audit fees—evidence from the voluntary sector

Given the growing demand for accountability in the public sector, there is a need to begin to investigate audit pricing issues in this sector. This study makes three contributions. First, it develops and estimates, for the first time, a model of audit fee determinants for the charity sector. As in previous private sector company studies, size, organisational complexity and audit firm location are the major determinants. A positive association between audit fees and fees for non-audit services is also observed. Charity sector factors of empirical significance include the nature of the charity (i.e., grant-making or fund-raising), its area of activity and the importance of trading income. Separate models for grant-making and fund-raising charities reflect the relative complexity of the audit of fund-raising charities. Second, the lower auditor concentration in the charity sector market, compared to the private sector market, permits a more powerful test of whether large firms and/or auditor expertise are rewarded with a fee premium. In the more complex audit environment of fund-raising charities, the results show that Big Six audit firms receive higher audit fees (18.5%, on average) than non-Big Six firms. Also, non-Big Six audit firms with charity expertise are rewarded with a fee premium over other non-Big Six firms. Finally, the study demonstrates that the charity audit fee rate is significantly lower than that of private sector companies; in fact it is approximately half. A change in the reporting of charity audit fees is proposed to reflect any element of ‘charitable giving’ by the audit firm.     

Large audit firm premium and audit specialisation in the public sector

The outsourcing of public‐sector audits to the private sector is an important issue. This study examines the fee premium in the public sector by comparing audit fees between the government auditor and the Big5. The study (i) statistically adjusts for self‐selection bias, (ii) allows the slope coefficients in the audit fee model to vary between the Big5 and the government audit and (iii) estimates the counterfactual audit fee premium. The Big5 premium is around 23 percent. However, the variation in premium depends on whether the Big5 auditor is an industry or city specialist.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Perceived auditor independence and audit firm fees

Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.

Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. This paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.     

Auditor independence and nonaudit services: Director views and their policy implications

The external auditor's role and relationship with an audit client are not purely matters of private concern between the two parties. The rationale for the external auditor's work—indeed a primary justification for the existence of the public accounting profession—arises from the need for reliable financial information in order for our economy to operate smoothly. Thus the auditor, in certifying financial statements, performs a quasi-public function. The necessary relationship between auditor and client is one of complete independence. In recent years public policymakers including the U.S. Congress have questioned the propriety of auditors' performing nonaudit services for their clients. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of U.S. corporate directors who considered the propriety of allowing a firm's auditors to perform various nonaudit service engagements.The results show, especially in the case of systems design, increasing director concern and a lack of overall consensus as nonaudit services approach 40 percent of the firm's audit fee. Policy implications of the findings are considered.     

On the persistence and dynamics of Big 4 real audit fees: Evidence from the UK

Despite the huge audit pricing literature, there is a dearth of evidence on the temporal dynamics of audit fee adjustments and the persistence of audit fees. Based on a sample of 76,867 panel observations for a sample of UK companies audited by the Big 4 over the period 1998 to 2012, we employ consistent lagged dependent variable panel estimators to provide new evidence on the persistence and dynamics of real Big 4 audit fees. Contrary to extant research, which assumes that audit fees adjust immediately in a single period, our empirical results indicate that Big 4 real audit fees are persistent, being partly dependent on their previous realisations. We conclude that static audit fee models omit a potentially important temporal dimension of audit pricing behaviour and that further research is warranted into dynamic audit fee models across other jurisdictions.     

To switch or not to switch? The effect of audit firms’ economies of scale on audit firm switches after audit price deregulation in China

We exploit the unique setting of China’s 2014 audit price deregulation policy to examine whether audit firms use their economies of scale (EOS) to compete for clients. We find a significant increase in client firms switching from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation policy was implemented. The additional analyses show that EOS audit firms are more likely to offer audit fee discounts than non-EOS audit firms while retaining audit quality. We also find that the auditors’ EOS effect is more pronounced for highly homogeneous industries and firms paying high abnormal audit fees, firms in financial distress, and firms receiving less capital market attention than for less homogeneous industries and firms paying low abnormal audit fees, financially stable firms, and firms receiving more capital market attention. Finally, we find that the presence of state-owned enterprises and political connections both separately and jointly moderate the effect of audit firm–client realignments from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation. Overall, our study provides important insights for policymakers and regulators reviewing and developing new policies on audit services.