掏空与控制权转移的财富效应——以啤酒花为例

基于控制权转移市场理论,文章以啤酒花(600090)为例,对上市公司控制权转移中的财富效应进行了实证分析。研究发现,控制权转移并没有给上市公司带来绩效的改进。收购方股东通过获得上市公司控制权进行"掏空",即通过包括担保贷款、占用上市公司资金等方式从上市公司和中小股东处获取了巨额财富。     

政府干预、大股东资产注入:支持抑或掏空

政府干预企业经营活动是普遍存在的现象。本文研究了国有控股上市公司资产注入中的"支持"、"掏空"现象。研究发现,政府控股股东比民营控股股东资产注入的动机更强烈。当上市公司盈利时,政府控股股东通过向上市公司注入资产"掏空"上市公司的动机比民营控股股东更加强烈,从而导致盈利的国有控股上市公司在资产注入之后业绩下降更多;而当政府控股上市公司被ST时,政府控股股东通过向国有控股上市公司注入资产"支持"上市公司的动机和力度比民营控股股东更加强烈,从而导致ST国有控股上市公司在资产注入之后业绩增长更快。     

对上市公司资产重组几个会计问题的再认识

近年来，我国上市公司资产重组的实践日趋丰富。探讨资产重组中的问题将有助于完善资产重组的理论，从而更好地指导上市公司资产重组的实践。 一、控股合并方式下“下推法”会计的运用问题。 上市公司的控股股东将其持有的大宗股权转让给他人 (或企业 )的行为，称作股权转让。这是各类资产重组中较为普遍的重组形式。通过股权受让，新控股股东取得了对上市公司的控制权。有的观点认为，对控股或合并方式下的被购并企业而言，持续经营假定不再适用，应当采用“下推法会计” (push－ down accounting)进行调帐处理。下推法会计指的是企业购…     

市场环境与控股股东“掏空”行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

控股股东的“掏空”行为侵害了中小股东的利益,如何防范与治理控股股东的“掏空”行为已成为市场关注的重点。本文的研究表明,市场环境显著地影响了控股股东“掏空”的行为。换言之,地区间政府干预市场越少、金融市场越发达,该地区的上市公司越不会发生控股股东“掏空”行为,因而如何减少政府干预,促进金融市场的发展是政府在减少控股股东“掏空”行为应扮演的重要角色,同时,地方政府的财政赤字会直接或间接地驱动了控股股东“掏空”行为,制定监管政策在一定程度上能遏止“掏空”的行为。这说明,制度层面的约束和公共治理对公司层面的行为具有重要的影响。     

浅析上市公司大股东利益输送行为

一直以来,我国的资本市场上各类违规事件频发,有为了业绩好看而进行的财务造假,有为了谋求个人利益而进行的内幕交易,也有为了再融资或者资产重组而人为的操纵利润,在研究了很多的案例后,我发现上市公司各类违规行为的层层迷雾后,通常都与一件事情相关,那就是大股东的利益。我国的上市公司普遍存在着具有控制权的大股东,股权高度集中,内控制度不健全,再加上在我国资本市场缺乏保护中小股东的法律机制,这就使得大股东有便捷的途径可以转移上市公司的利益,以此掏空上市公司,将利益完全转为个人所有。而另一种情况,大股东所持有的股份比例并没有达到完全控制,但是却由于某些原因具有完全控制权,那么大股东也存在利益输送的动机和途径。以上无论哪种情形,中小股东的权益必然受到损害,而保护中小投资者利益,维护资本市场健康秩序是我们资本市场现阶段的重要目标之一,因此有必要探讨一下上市公司大股东的各种利益输送行为,对其途径和原因进行详细的解析。     

企业控制权转移动因研究

本文选取了1999-2003年间发生控制权有偿转移的131家上市公司作为样本,通过考察控制权转移企业绩效对控制权转移动因进行检验.结果表明,没有证据支持我国上市公司控制权转移可以用国外的代理成本和效率理论解释,再分配理论有一定的解释力,价值低估理论和掏空理论可以解释我国上市公司控制权转移现象.     

浅析上市公司大股东利益输送行为

一直以来,我国的资本市场上各类违规事件频发,有为了业绩好看而进行的财务造假,有为了谋求个人利益而进行的内幕交易,也有为了再融资或者资产重组而人为的操纵利润,在研究了很多的案例后,我发现上市公司各类违规行为的层层迷雾后,通常都与一件事情相关,那就是大股东的利益。我国的上市公司普遍存在着具有控制权的大股东,股权高度集中,内控制度不健全,再加上在我国资本市场缺乏保护中小股东的法律机制,这就使得大股东有便捷的途径可以转移上市公司的利益,以此掏空上市公司,将利益完全转为个人所有。而另一种情况,大股东所持有的股份比例并没有达到完全控制,但是却由于某些原因具有完全控制权,那么大股东也存在利益输送的动机和途径。以上无论哪种情形,中小股东的权益必然受到损害,而保护中小投资者利益,维护资本市场健康秩序是我们资本市场现阶段的重要目标之一,因此有必要探讨一下上市公司大股东的各种利益输送行为,对其途径和原因进行详细的解析。     

“掏空”财技

大股东围绕“掏空”进行的盈余管理的终搬目的是将账面利润留在上市公司,而让真金白银的现金流向自己。这里的“掏空”是一个财务概念,其主要含义是指能够控制公司的股东为了自身的利益将公司的财产和利润转移出去的行为。大股东“掏空”方式可以划分为直接或间接的资金占用、资产购销、产品购销以及高派现等,典型表现为：以较低的价格将上市公司的资产出售给控股股东（或经理）拥有较高现金收益权的公司、     

上市公司增发中控股股东行为分析

<正>以上市公司作为行为主体的股票增发过程中控股股东的掏空与支持行为之间是否存在相关关系,是一个值得关注的话题。本文对控股股东掏空与支持行为和上市公司增发之间的关系及其经济后果进行了分析。研究发现,为了促进上市公司     

合理掏空动机、超额掏空动机与控制权私有收益

以2004—2007年我国上市公司为样本,实证研究结果发现：（1）控股股东的”合理掏空动机”与”超额掏空动机”伴随着现金流权的上升呈现的是一种此消彼长的关系,而这两类动机都会引致控股股东对于控制权私有收益的追逐,但是二者的作用机理却是完全不同的;（2）伴随着现金流权的影响,控股股东的”超额掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的正向效应和”合理掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的负向效应的综合作用结果是不同的。     

Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China

Friedman et al. (2003) develop a model in which, in equilibrium, controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling or propping of their listed companies depending on the magnitude of an adverse shock and the magnitude of the private benefits of control. In this paper, we employ connected transaction data from China to test the implications of their model. We hypothesize that, when listed companies are financially healthy (in financial distress), their controlling shareholders are more likely to conduct connected transactions to tunnel (prop up) their listed companies and the market reacts unfavorably (favorably) to the announcement of these transactions. Our empirical findings strongly support our hypotheses. We also find that all of the transaction types in our sample can be used for tunneling or propping depending on different financial situations of the firms. Finally, political connection is negatively associated with the announcement effect. Overall, our analysis supports Friedman et al.'s (2003) model by furnishing clear evidence for propping and tunneling to occur in the same company but at different times.     

Propping by controlling shareholders,wealth transfer and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Propping acts by controlling shareholders are common in Chinese listed firms. In this paper, we use data on related-party transactions of all listed Chinese firms from 2002 to 2008 to investigate the motivation behind controlling shareholders’ propping acts and subsequent wealth-transfer behavior and how both affect firm performance. We find that such institutional motivators as the maintenance of shell resources and qualification for refinancing have a significant effect on the propping behavior of controlling shareholders of Chinese listed firms and that such behavior is often followed by more serious tunneling when shareholders are driven by these motivators. Compared with non-state-owned firms, state-owned firms with the motivation to qualify for refinancing exhibit more severe tunneling after engaging in propping behavior. We also find that while propping by controlling shareholders improves a firm’s current operating performance, in firms whose controlling shareholders’ are motivated by the desire to maintain shell resources or obtain a refinancing qualification their performance declines in the following year because of subsequent tunneling. The results presented in this paper provide us with a better understanding of the relationship between propping and tunneling, controlling shareholders’ engagement in both and the consequences of that behavior.     

运用债务重组手段处置金融不良资产的实例研究

债务重组已成为我国的国有资产管理公司处置金融不良资产的重要手段.本文概述了债务重组的定义和方式,探讨了以债务重组手段处置金融不良资产的优势以及风险防控等值得注意的问题,并对一个处置实例进行了具体分析,总结了项目运作的经验,以供参考.     

重大资产重组核准制效果研究北大核心

2014年,证监会对《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》进行了第二次修订,修订前上市公司所有的重大资产重组都需要得到证监会核准,而修订后现金支付的重大资产重组不再需要证监会核准。本文以此次修订作为准自然实验,选取2007—2018年中国A股上市公司作为收购方参与的重大资产重组事件为研究样本,研究原本需要核准但因政策放松不再需要核准的重大资产重组事件的绩效变化。研究发现,相较于对照组,放松核准后的重大资产重组虽然数量显著提高,但绩效有所降低并具有异质性:放松核准后重组绩效下降的情况在收购方第二类代理问题较严重和成长性较低的重组事件中更加显著,而对于成长性较高的企业,放松核准却会提高其重组绩效。进一步研究表明,放松核准后,收购方进行跨省和跨国重组的可能性增大,但这两种重组的绩效降低;放松核准还增加了重组后商誉减值的可能性。本文结论表明,放松核准可以有效地激发市场活力,但依然存在相关因素影响市场化改革。     

Tunneling and propping up: An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies

We examine a sample of related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their controlling shareholders during 2001–2002. Minority shareholders in these firms seem to be subject to expropriation through tunneling but also gain from propping up. On balance, there seems to be more tunneling than propping up. Both types of firms have larger state ownership compared to the rest of the Chinese market but firms that are propped up are larger and have larger state ownership than firms subject to tunneling. Propped up firms are more likely to have foreign shareholders and to be cross-listed abroad compared to firms that are subject to tunneling. Propped up firms also tend to have worse operating performance in the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the related party transaction. Finally, we find that related party transactions representing tunneling are accompanied by significantly less information disclosure compared to related party transactions representing propping.     

上市公司“重整融资”模式的检讨与改进路径

非公开发行股票成为当前上市公司重整的一种主流模式,这种模式具备重整融资的表象,却不具有其实质,且容易引发许多问题。本文对这些上市公司重整所适用的融资模式进行考察,在比较国际通行的重整融资模式的基础上,分析其产生的原因及对破产法和资本市场等调整上市公司运行的制度体系产生的影响,进而提出改进我国公司重整融资制度的路径。     

大股东股权质押与上市公司资本运作

资本运作一方面可以提高股价,另一方面可以让公司股票停牌,那么是否会成为大股东度过质押风险的方式呢？基于此,本文以2007—2018年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了大股东股权质押对上市公司资本运作的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:(1)大股东股权质押比例越高,上市公司进行资本运作的可能性越大; 这一关系在质押股权面临的平仓风险越高和非国有控股的上市公司中更为显著。(2)机制检验发现,随着质押比例的提高,上市公司进行资本运作后的停牌时间越长;从股价提升的效果来看,资本运作在短期内能提高股价,缓解质押风险,但从长期来看效果并不显著。(3)上市公司进行资本运作的方式主要为股权转让、资产收购和资产剥离;其中,大股东主要利用资产收购和资产剥离增加停牌时间,利用股权转让助推股价。在控制了潜在的内生性问题影响以及各种稳健性检验下,上述结论仍然成立。     

Reward meritocracy or nepotism: The case of independent financial advisors appointed by Chinese listed companies

As independent financial advisors, securities firms are the core intermediaries in major asset reorganization (MAR) of listed companies. Furthermore, they play the dual roles of transaction and authentication. Based on this institutional background, this paper studies how listed companies choose between industry experience (“meritocracy”) and relationships (“nepotism”). Using the MAR of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2013 as the sample, this paper shows that higher transaction costs (i.e., greater demand for the transaction function of advisors) are related to the higher possibility of advisors with weaker relationships and more industry experience being hired. It also shows that higher suspicion of tunneling (i.e., greater demand for the signal of fairness associated with advisors’ authentication function) is related to the higher possibility of advisors with weaker relationships being hired, but it is not significantly related to whether advisors have more or less industry experience. This paper also shows that reputation has a certain governance effect on the negative consequences of relationship. For the most part, listed companies reward meritocracy but not nepotism when appointing independent financial advisors.     

Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China

Conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could affect executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we use data on Chinese listed companies and show that controlling shareholders’ tunneling reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. These results suggest that while incentive payment schemes are generally adopted in Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders who obtain private benefits from listed companies have less incentive to strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.