浅探税务筹划的非税成本与规避

有效税务筹划工作的稳步进行不仅需要考虑到企业税收成本及税务筹划成本,还需以降低其投入费用为主要工作内容.这一过程中,非税成本因其极强的隐蔽性和间接性而极易被忽略,由此难免造成税收筹划成本支出大于其最终受益,使企业亏损.本文主要通过分析税务筹划非税成本产生的原因并针对性提出非税成本的规避方法,以供业内人士交流之用.     

不同生命周期阶段的上市公司税收筹划行为研究

有效税收筹划不仅要降低企业的税收成本,还要努力降低税收筹划的非税成本。非税成本因其隐蔽性、间接性而容易被忽视,因而可能使税收筹划的成本（损失）大于其收益。非税成本的形成原因较多、其构成也比较复杂。文章选取沪深A股2008-2012年期间的4974家上市公司作为研究对象,运用多元线性回归模型检验了不同生命周期阶段的上市公司如何在税收节约与非税成本之间进行权衡。经验证据显示,处于成长期和衰退期的上市公司更倾向于采用积极的税收筹划行为,而处于成熟期的上市公司更倾向于采取较为保守稳健的税收筹划行为。结论为企业制定投资策略,监管机制完善管理提供了较好的理论基础。     

企业税收成本与非税成本的内生性机理研究

正一、引言纳税人视角下,税收成本即为企业的税收负担,是指企业按照国家税法规定应当缴纳的各种税款之和,不包括税收遵从成本。1992年,迈伦·斯科尔斯(Myron S.Scholes)与马克·沃尔夫森(Mark A.Wolfson)等合作出版《税收与企业战略:筹划方法》论著,提出非税成本概念,认为有效税务筹划需同时考虑交易各方、所有税收和所有成本(All parties,all taxes,all costs),其中所有成本强调要不     

隐性税收与非税成本:由理想到现实

<正>一、问题的提出非税成本是指企业因实施税务筹划所产生的连带经济行为的经济后果。非税成本包括可以量化的部分,也有不能够量化的内容。非税成本和隐性税收有何不同?盖地等(2005)认为非税成本包括隐性税收。但从现有文献来看,对隐性税收的概念至今仍不很清晰,有多种观点。斯科     

基于契约理论视角下的企业税收筹划研究——以企业与税收当局的博弈为例

税收是国家为实现其职能，凭借政治权利强制地、无偿地参与社会产品分配的一种方式。税收对纳税人来说是一种负担，纳税人为最大限度获得利润，会尽可能地减少税收负担，税收筹划正是减轻税收负担、增加税后收益的有效途径。有效税收筹划以“税后收益最大化为目标”，有效税收筹划要求筹划者必须考虑税收筹划对交易各方利益、隐性税收与非税成本。契约理论视角下要求企业必须考虑拟进行的交易对交易各方的税收含义。而税收当局是对企业有税收影响的最重要的契约方。分析契约理论及其在税收筹划中的应用，并以企业与对其有税收影响的最重要的交易方——税收当局的博弈为例进行分析，从而能够更深刻地理解契约理论在税收筹划中的应用。     

非税收入执收成本核定探讨

随着财政公共预算改革的深入,各预算单位的非税收入被纳入预算管理,收支脱钩,预算单位的支出与其收入不再有必然联系.收支脱钩后单位的支出中就肯定有涉及到与非税收入执收相关的成本.非税收入执收成本的核定对非税收入纳入预算管理的重要性是很明显的.如果非税收入的执收成本核定过高会导致预算支出过大财政负担加重,也不利于财政资金的节约使用.如果非税收入的执收成本核定过低则会影响执收单位的积极性导致不能应收尽收,减少财政收入.为确定一个合适的执收成本可以从非税收入数额、固定成本、变动成本三个方面进行核定.     

成本分摊协议管理初探

成本分摊协议是加强税务管理,减少税收风险的有效手段.文章从成本分摊协议的概念入手,详细分析目前我国成本分摊协议管理存在的主要问题,并提出解决的建议.     

市场竞争、产权安排与企业实际所得税负研究

一、理论分析与假设提出根据有效税务决策理论(Scholes和Wolfson,1992),单一最小化税收不一定就是最佳的方案,因为税收仅仅是众多经营成本中的一种,某一税收较小方案的实施可能会带来其他商业成本的增加,即所谓的非税成本。因此,管理层会根据其激励和压力程度,在经营活动及战略中同时考虑税     

国际比较视角下税务部门非税收入征管法律制度研究

2018年《国税地税征管体制改革方案》出台后，我国将更多的非税收入类型划转由税务部门征管。域外税务部门对非税收入存在不同征管模式与立法体例：在税务部门执行模式中，业务部门依各单行法负责确定和征收公法金钱债权，税务部门则依据税收程序法予以强制执行；在税务部门负责征收的模式下，存在制定单独的收费征收程序法、直接（部分）适用税收程序法、将非税收入的实体与程序统一规定于税法典的立法体例。当前，我国税务部门对各类非税收入的征管权责相对缺失，宜确立税务部门对非税收入的完整征管权，赋权费款的确定与征收保障措施，以实现税收收入与非税收入在征管主体、职责和程序上的统一。立法方面，我国应在未来制定的“非税收入管理法”中规定非税收入征管的基本规则，在各非税收入单行法中规定特殊规则，对其他共通征管程序可授权税务部门适用《税收征管法》。     

浅议企业所得税纳税筹划

依法筹划是进行税收筹划的前提条件,税收法律、法规是进行税收筹划的基本依据。为了有效降低税务成本,很多企业都开展税务筹划研究。而在所有的税务筹划研究内容中,所得税无疑是一项重点。本文通过分析企业所得税纳税筹划的可行性,总结出企业对所得税税务筹划的错误认识,提出了企业所得税纳税筹划的主要途径。     

Liquidity Premia and Transaction Costs

Standard literature concludes that transaction costs only have a second‐order effect on liquidity premia. We show that this conclusion depends crucially on the assumption of a constant investment opportunity set. In a regime‐switching model in which the investment opportunity set varies over time, we explicitly characterize the optimal consumption and investment strategy. In contrast to the standard literature, we find that transaction costs can have a first‐order effect on liquidity premia. However, with reasonably calibrated parameters, the presence of transaction costs still cannot fully explain the equity premium puzzle.     

Influence Costs and Capital Structure

This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.     

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.     

“绿色”成本点金术

环境成本控制是企业实现经济效益和社会效益双赢的手段。如今,打造绿色企业成为企业发展的一个趋势,绿色趋势的蔓延充分表明,企业开展环境成本控制,承担环境责任不仅仅是一种义务,更成为企业达成盈利目标的必需。面对越来越多的绿色消费者和越来越高的环保标准,能不能争取到最大的商业机会,很大程     

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

I exploit the adoption of state‐level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.     

Adjustment Costs and Capital Asset Pricing

Discrete-time models of asset pricing have hitherto generally avoided studying the relationship between the underlying technology inherent in the economy and the determinants of the price of capital. A fully articulated economy is constructed in which there is a nontrivial technology for producing capital. The existence of adjustment costs in augmenting the quantity of capital has interesting implications for the stochastic properties of asset prices, as well as other macroeconomic variables. Examples of such economies are used to illustrate this point.     

Functional Forms and Declining Average Costs

The translog form, if fitted to data exhibiting monotonically decreasing average costs, generally will imply spurious U-shaped average costs. The reason is that the log-log transform of any cost function characterized by monotonically declining average costs is strictly convex in the logarithm of size except in limited cases. Simulations suggest that the severity of the bias is exacerbated by a realistically skewed sample distribution. Similar properties of alternative forms also are considered. Estimates fitted to three samples of U.S. banks bear out the potential importance of these concerns.