管理者过度自信与盈余管理的实证研究

从行为经济学的视角对我国上市公司高管人员过度自信的现实表现及与管理者盈余管理行为的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验.研究表明:在实施股权激励的上市公司中,相对短期过度自信而言,管理者更多地表现为长期过度自信;短期过度自信的管理者倾向于正向盈余管理,而长期过度自信的管理者则更倾向于负向盈余管理.     

管理者非理性行为与非效率投资关系研究

本文基于有限理性假设,以中国A股上市公司2009-2015年财务数据作为研究样本,研究管理者的三种非理性行为(管理者过度自信、管理者风险偏好和管理者从众行为)对企业非效率投资的共同影响。结果表明:管理者过度自信与管理者从众行为会导致上市公司非效率投资;过度自信和非过度自信管理者的从众行为均会加剧企业非效率投资,非过度自信管理者的从众行为对非效率投资的影响尤为严重;过度自信管理者的风险偏好与非效率投资显著正相关,而非过度自信管理者的风险偏好与非效率投资显著负相关,即非过度自信管理者适当的风险偏好行为在一定程度上会缓解企业非效率投资。因此,要想提高公司非效率投资管理应从管理者的心理素质培养入手,重点培养其避免从众心理,积极主动地根据自己企业的实际情况进行投资;对非过度自信的管理者还需要培养其适当的风险偏好。     

行为公司治理理论的研究综述

管理者过度自信行为与公司治理机制的相互作用构成了目前行为公司治理理论研究的主题.本文笔者首先分析了管理者过度自信产生的原因,其次阐述了管理者过度自信对公司治理的影响,最后提出了监督或制约过度自信管理者的三种治理机制.     

行为公司治理理论的研究综述

管理者过度自信行为与公司治理机制的相互作用构成了目前行为公司治理理论研究的主题。本文笔者首先分析了管理者过度自信产生的原因，其次阐述了管理者过度自信对公司治理的影响，最后提出了监督或制约过度自信管理者的三种治理机制。     

管理者过度自信与企业资本结构的相关性研究——来自上海证券交易所上市公司的经验数据

心理学和行为经济学的研究表明．人们在判断和决策时往往受到心态和情绪的影响。企业管理者在经营活动中表现出的超出一般自信水平的非理性状态称为管理者过度自信。本文试图探讨非理性的管理者过度自信与企业的融资结构相关关系。在对上海证券交易所上市的131家企业2012年的样本数据进行分析,实证结果表明：管理者过度自信与公司的资产负债率呈显著的反向关系,公司的净资产收益率和公司规模与资产负债率呈显著的正向关系。管理者过度自信程度越高,企业的资产负债率越低,其资本结构越偏向于权益资本。     

公司管理者过度自信、过度投资行为与治理机制——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文从行为金融学视角出发,以2002~2009年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,研究管理者过度自信这一心理因素对公司过度投资行为的影响,并检验了公司内外部治理机制对它的抑制作用。研究表明,中国上市公司的管理者过度自信与公司过度投资行为之间存在显著正相关关系,而现有的公司治理机制并不能对这种非效率行为进行有效约束。本文的研究发现有助于我们更好理解中国上市公司的过度投资行为,也对如何完善中国上市公司治理机制有一定启示意义。     

投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与现金股利政策北大核心

本文基于行为公司金融的视角,在相关研究的基础上进一步放宽了"理性人"假设,分析了投资者非理性与管理者非理性共存时对公司现金股利的影响,并以2010—2013年期间A股上市公司为研究样本进行了实证分析。结果发现,虽然投资者情绪与管理者过度自信各自对公司现金股利有不同的影响,但是投资者情绪和管理者过度自信两者的共同作用会对公司现金股利产生负向的影响。本文有助于人们从新的角度来认识股利政策。     

投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与现金股利政策

本文基于行为公司金融的视角,在相关研究的基础上进一步放宽了"理性人"假设,分析了投资者非理性与管理者非理性共存时对公司现金股利的影响,并以2010—2013年期间A股上市公司为研究样本进行了实证分析。结果发现,虽然投资者情绪与管理者过度自信各自对公司现金股利有不同的影响,但是投资者情绪和管理者过度自信两者的共同作用会对公司现金股利产生负向的影响。本文有助于人们从新的角度来认识股利政策。     

管理者过度自信、现金流量与投资决策

随着投资行为的多元化和复杂化,关于人类理性的严格假设在实践中遭到质疑。过度自信是基于非理性的一种主观心理行为。投资决策是公司在给定资本约束情况下对可能的投资项目进行有效选择,以实现投资收益最大化。在针对公司管理者的研究中发现,管理者在进行投资项目决策时,往往会表现出过度自信,同时管理者的自信度也可以在特定投资机会下改变企业现金流的成本和收益。本文研究了在资金充裕的情况下,管理者过度自信对投资决策的影响。本文在以管理层持股数变化作为衡量过度自信的标准,在对管理者过度自信、现金流量和企业投资决策的关系进行实证分析的基础上,得出了管理者过度自信与公司的投资水平呈正相关关系。即管理者过度自信会带来投资过度,损害企业价值。本文假设现金流量在一定程度上会影响投资支出,但是经过严格的实证检验,发现结果并不显著,所以出于尊重数据的考虑,本文认为在特殊时期(金融危机),且样本量有限的情况下,现金流量不会对投资决策产生显著影响。     

管理者自信会影响投资效率吗——兼论融资融券制度的公司外部治理效应

基于我国2008-2017年A股上市公司数据,研究发现管理者自信通过促进过度投资与投资不足而降低投资效率;进一步检验发现自信不足管理者通过降低过度投资与投资不足而提升投资效率,但过度自信管理者通过促进过度投资和投资不足而降低投资效率。然后采用双重差分模型研究发现相比控制组样本,在引入融资融券制度后,处理组中的融资融券标的企业通过降低过度投资与投资不足而提升了投资效率;融资融券通过降低管理者自信对过度投资的促进作用削弱管理者自信对投资效率的负向影响,上述结果表明实施融资融券制度具有显著的公司外部治理效应。本文的研究发现对于证券监管部门、上市公司及其投资者具有一定的参考意义。     

中国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励与盈余管理

以中国国有控股上市公司为样本,从盈余管理对高管薪酬及其薪酬业绩敏感性的影响两方面,研究高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的关系,实证检验表明在调高操控性应计利润情况下,盈余管理程度分别与管理者的年度报酬水平和股权激励呈正相关关系,另外,盈余管理对薪酬业债敏感性也有正向影响,据此提出了有效控制盈余管理行为的政策建议.     

Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies

This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings and earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in the United States. We first find that performance, earnings management, and corporate governance are endogenously determined. Thus, OLS estimation can lead to biased coefficients and a simultaneous equations approach is used. We find that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), board independence, and capital are positively related to earnings and that earnings, board independence, and capital are negatively related to earnings management. We also find that PPS is positively related to earnings management. Finally, PPS and board independence are positively related and the relationship is bidirectional. While both PPS and board independence are associated with higher earnings, our results indicate that more independent boards appear to constrain the earnings management that greater PPS compels.     

Predictive versus opportunistic earnings management,executive compensation,and firm performance

We examine the association between earnings management and an important component of corporate governance, the incentives provided through compensation. We argue that firms with predictive (opportunistic) earnings management, in which discretionary accruals do (do not) relate to future cash flows, provide a more (less) ideal setting for the use of compensation as incentives. Our empirical tests show that CEO compensation levels (measured by salary, bonus, and other forms of compensation) are positively related to predictive earnings management and negatively related to opportunistic earnings management. We also find that predictive earnings management is positively associated with future returns, whereas opportunistic earnings management is negatively associated with future returns. Overall, our results suggest that firms provide more incentives if their earnings are also more informative because of discretionary accruals.     

IPO Underpricing, Firm Quality, and Analyst Forecasts

We find that IPO underpricing is positively related to post-IPO growth in sales and EBITDA, but is not significantly related to growth in earnings. Our evidence suggests that accrual reversals or earnings management may cause this inconsistency. We interpret the growth rates of sales and EBITDA as measures of firm quality, and conclude that our evidence supports the notion that IPO firms with greater underpricing are of better quality. Our tests on analysts' earnings forecast errors show that analysts are less positively biased in their earnings forecasts for IPO firms that have greater underpricing.     

Economic policy uncertainty and bank earnings opacity

Using a sample of U.S. banks and an index for economic policy uncertainty developed by Baker et al. (2016), we investigate whether economic policy uncertainty is systematically related to bank earnings opacity. When economic policy is relatively uncertain, it is easier for bank managers to distort financial information, as unpredictable economic policy changes make assessing the existence and impact of hidden “adverse news” more difficult for investors and creditors. Economic policy uncertainty also increases the fluctuation in banks’ earnings and cash flows, thus providing additional incentives and opportunities for bank managers to engage in earnings management. Our results show that uncertainty in economic policy is positively related to earnings opacity, proxied by the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions and the likelihood of just meeting or beating the prior year’s earnings, and negatively related to the level of accounting conservatism (i.e., the timeliness of recognition of bad news relative to good news). Collectively, our results suggest that economic policy uncertainty leads to greater earnings opacity. We also find that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on financial reporting distortion is less pronounced for stronger banks (i.e., banks with high capital ratios).     

The effects of corporate name changes on firm information environment and earnings management

We study how corporate name changes affect a firm's information environment and its earnings management. We show that the stock market reacts negatively to name changes. This effect is specifically pronounced for firms that have lower visibility. We also find that firms that change their names tend to have a relatively worse information environment. Finally, we show that earnings management is positively related to firm name changes.     

The use of management forecasts to dampen analysts' expectations by Chinese listed firms

This paper studies the use of management earnings forecasts (MEF) to dampen analysts' expectations, i.e. expectation management, by Chinese listed companies. We reveal several important findings: Firstly, information asymmetry is positively associated with the use of MEF to dampen analysts' expectations. State control has been found to moderate this relationship. Secondly, dampening analysts' expectations using MEF leads to negative stock return reactions and downward analysts' forecast revisions. Thirdly, the effectiveness of “pre-empting bad news through MEF” appears mixed and dependent on the information content of MEF and measures of actual earnings surprises. Finally, firms that disclose MEF are found to engage in more earnings management to meet the forecasts than firms that do not.     

Information Uncertainty,Earnings Management,and Long‐run Stock Performance Following Initial Public Offerings

We examine how information uncertainty surrounding IPO (initial public offering) firms influences earnings management and long‐run stock performance. For low‐information‐uncertainty issuers, at‐issue earnings’ management is positively related to subsequent unmanaged earnings and has no relationship to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offering. For high‐information‐uncertainty issuers, however, at‐issue earnings’ management is unrelated to subsequent unmanaged earnings and negatively related to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offer. The evidence suggests that, on average, managers in low‐information‐uncertainty firms tend to engage in earnings’ management for informative purposes, while managers in high‐information‐uncertainty firms engage in earnings’ management for opportunistic purposes.     

Product market competition and earnings management: A firm‐level analysis

In this paper, we employ a firm‐level measure of product market competition constructed from the textual analysis of firms’ 10‐K filings to examine the relationship between managers’ perceived competition pressure and earnings management. We find that accounting irregularities and accrual‐based earnings management are positively related to product market competition. This finding is consistent with the notion that competition pressure increases managerial incentives to manage earnings, due to their career concerns. We also find that real earnings management is negatively related to product market competition. This finding suggests that real earnings management involves actions that decrease firms’ competitiveness and thus is costly for firms confronted with high competition pressure.     

On the Relation between Conservatism in Accounting Standards and Incentives for Earnings Management

This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's expected future payoff) and the stewardship role (in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk‐averse manager), current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management. Such manipulation reduces accounting numbers' stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing. We then show that risk sharing, and hence contract efficiency, can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias, compared with under an unbiased standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias.