财政分权视角下的地方政府多维效用函数与环保支出偏好

国内地方政府的环保支出偏好受制于特殊的财政分权架构,并会受到上级引导、同级竞争、本级财力等多重因素的制约,现有研究较少对财政分权架构下的地方政府的多维效用函数及由此引致的环保支出偏好特征展开讨论。为此,结合理论模型推导及涵盖2012—2019年247个地级市面板数据的实证检验,对财政分权架构下的地方政府环保支出的多元驱动机制作出诊断,结果发现：上级政策引导会激励地方政府的环保支出意愿,同级经济竞争和自身财力约束则会对其环保支出力度形成制约;多维约束间存在明显的交互效应,同级经济竞争与上级政策引导对地方政府的环保支出偏好存在显著反向对冲效应,而本级财力约束则会影响地方政府在上级引导与同级竞争压力间的权衡;本级财力约束会透过向上的财政依赖和内部财政支出腾挪两种不同的传导机制影响地方政府的环保支出偏好。因此,应构建兼容地方政府多维目标的综合方案,打造“考核-竞争”的动态协同机制,设计适应地方财力约束的差异化路径,以有效解决地方政府环保支出激励问题。     

养老保险与教育投资

目前我国地方政府面临着养老保险支出日趋增加的压力,这也给地方经济发展形成了一定阻力。因而地方政府不得不对财政支出进行调节,以满足地方经济发展的需要。教育支出虽然对经济当期的增长贡献不大,但却是经济长期发展的主要推动因素。在养老保险支出比例增加的形势下,地方政府是否会因此而减少教育投资比例是一个值得思考的问题。本文正是基于这种考虑,以2007-2011年我国31个省市自治区的面板数据为样本,从教育的正外部性以及对经济发展影响的角度分析了不同经济水平的地方政府的调控行为。结果显示养老保险支出对教育投资确实存在挤出效应,但对于不同经济水平地区挤出效应力度不同。教育的正外部性并没有较大的阻碍经济落后地区对教育的投资;教育对经济的促进作用是地方政府考虑是否减小教育投资比例的主要因素,这也促成了经济发达地区的减小幅度较大,而经济落后地区的减小幅度较小的结果。     

国有企业集团公司作为政府融资平台的风险分析及控制建议

近年来,随着地方政府融资需求的增大,地方国有企业集团公司成为地方政府融资平台渐渐成为一个趋势。一方面,缓解了地方政府融资压力,对地方经济建设起到了一定的促进作用,但也加大了国有企业集团公司自身的风险,也进一步加大了地方政府的债务风险。本文首先对地方国有企业作为政府融资平台的现状进行概述,进而对存在的风险成因进行分析,最后得出控制风险的建议。     

地方财政支出与财政支出结构的优化——兼论我国公共财政改革的途径

本文主要从地方财政支出的角度提出了我国财政支出结构优化和公共财政改革的问题。对我国财政支出的实证分析表明，地方财政支出在整个国家财政支出中占有很重要的地,因而财政支出结构的优化和财政职能的调整必须从地方财政支出的改革入手。同时，本文在实证分析的基础上提出，在改革地方财政支出时，应该注意解决财政经济职能调整、社会性支出和维持性支出、政府间支出责任划分等几个问题。     

财政竞争与地方政府的政策选择——基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

本文基于1997-2009年中国省际面板数据,利用交互项系数符号的估计来研究财政竞争下地方政府税负、公共投入支出和公共服务支出三种政策工具之间的相互影响。通过研究,我们发现,地方政府的三种政策工具是相辅相成的,同时交互项的作用也存在着地区的差异,最后我们计算并比较了税负、公共服务支出和公共投入支出对经济增长的边际影响。上述研究结果为我们理解当前地方政府间财政竞争的特征和今后构建合理的财政制度提供有益的参考。     

财政竞争、地方政府政策选择与经济增长——基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

分税制背景下财政分权体制使得地方政府之间存在着激烈的财政竞争,其典型特征表现为税负、公共投入支出和公共服务支出三种政策工具之间的策略互动,从而影响各地区的经济增长。基于1997～2009年中国省级面板数据,通过估计交互项系数的符号,结果发现:地方政府的三种政策工具是相辅相成的;交互项的作用也存在着地区的差异;税负、公共服务支出和公共投入支出对经济增长有着不同的边际影响。     

从税收竞争视角看居民医疗保险筹资与商业健康保险发展

本文从地方政府税收竞争视角,探讨居民医疗保险筹资与商业健康保险发展的关系。在动态经济模型基础上,构建稅收竞争下居民医疗保险筹资与商业健康保险发展的理论框架。利用空间计量模型和合成控制法对理论模型进行系统的实证分析。研究结果表明:在财政下行压力和资本边际收益递减的宏观背景下,地方政府在民生领域的高支出竞争偏好,倒逼地方政府展开新一轮税收竞争,容易导致地方政府财政收入减少和财政困难,从而增加居民医疗保险财政筹资压力。在这个过程中居民医疗保险筹资水平提高,能够凸显商业健康保险在医疗保障筹资体系中的补充地位。     

谨防失业率快速上升

在投资收益较高的领域扩大民间投资,在促进消费支出明显的公共设施领域鼓励社会投资,稳定就业就业总体上并未出现明显问题。但当经济下行,销售下降使企业边际利润趋近于零这一临界点时,如果工资调整受最低工资标准等限制,企业就不会雇佣新工人。超过这一临界点,企业很可能会选择裁减工人,周期性失业就会出现。而一旦出现较多企业解雇工人,除非大规模政策刺激,短期内会很难扭转失业率上升趋势,正在煎熬欧美政府的、前几年我国也经历过的失业潮必然会出现。     

地区财政压力与地方政府减持之关系——来自我国上市公司的经验证据北大核心CSSCI

近年来频繁出现地方政府减持上市公司股票的现象,地方政府减持被理解为充实地方财政、缓解政府财政压力的手段。以我国证券市场2009~2013年发生地方政府减持的地方国有上市公司为样本,实证检验地区财政压力与地方政府减持的关系,结果表明:在控制了被减持公司特征的影响后,所在地区财政压力越大,地方政府发生减持的概率越大,并且减持规模越大。这意味着,当地方政府面临财政资金紧张的局面时,会通过减持其持有的地方国有上市公司股票来缓解其财政压力。应警惕地方政府在减持过程中利用信息优势侵害中小投资者利益的机会主义行为。     

外在压力与内在激励：老龄化背景下地方政府的财政选择

在人口老龄化背景下,地方政府的财政支出选择存在外在压力和内在激励。在理论分析人口老龄化影响地方财政支出偏好的作用机制基础上,采用中国省级财政数据检验老龄化背景下地方财政选择偏好。研究结果表明：地方政府财政支出是提高社会福利支出的外在压力和增强地方财政可持续性的内在激励的多路径效应结果,这种影响效应具有财政自给率和老龄化程度的非对称性。为了实现地方财政可持续性和有效应对老龄化社会的公众诉求压力,有必要尽快完善地方政府考核体系,完善地方公共支出的需求表达机制,改善当前财政支出责任地方化的状态。     

Chairman’s government background,excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises

Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China continue to face government interference in their operations. They are influenced both by the government’s “grabbing hand” and by its “helping hand.” Our study examines how SOE chairmen with connections to government influence their firm’s employment policies and the economic consequences of overstaffing. Using a sample of China’s listed local state-owned enterprises, we find that the scale of overstaffing in these SOEs is negatively related to the firms’ political connections to government. However, this relationship turns positive when the firm’s chairman has a government background. Appointing chairmen who have government backgrounds is a mechanism through which the government can intervene in local SOEs and influence firms’ staffing decisions. We also find that in compensation for the expenses of overstaffing, local SOEs receive more government subsidies and bank loans. However, the chairmen themselves do not get increased pay or promotion opportunities for supporting overstaffing. Further analysis indicates that whereas the “grabbing hand” of government does harm to a firm’s economic performance, the “helping hand” provides only weak positive effects, and such government intervention actually reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.     

The Impact of Government Intervention on Corporate Investment Allocations and Efficiency: Evidence from China

We examine whether government intervention plays an important role in determining corporate investment allocations and efficiency in China. We find the government tends to intervene to promote corporate investment in fixed assets, equity in other state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and natural resources including oil, natural gas, and mines, but reduces research and development (R&D) investment. However, the effects of government intervention on these investment allocations are primarily found in local SOEs rather than in central SOEs or in private enterprise. Government intervention also induces a crowding‐out effect in natural resource investments of private firms, suggesting that government intervention distorts investment allocations and reduces investment efficiency.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.     

产权性质、制度环境与内部控制

内部控制是近年来国内外监管部门、实务界和学术界关注的热点与前沿问题。本文研究我国上市公司最终控制人的产权性质与地区制度环境对公司内部控制质量的影响。利用厦门大学内控课题组(2010)构建的2007-2009年我国上市公司内部控制指数,本文主要发现:首先,相比于中央政府控制的公司,地方政府控制的公司内部控制质量相对较差,而非政府控制的公司内部控制质量与中央政府控制的公司之间则没有明显差异;其次,上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高或政府对经济的干预程度越低,公司的内部控制质量越高,尤其是对于地方政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司,并且,良好的外部制度环境有助于缩小地方政府控制和非政府控制公司的内部控制与中央政府控制公司之间的差距。本文的研究结果对相关主管部门及监管机构具有一定的政策启示意义。     

State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with non-state-owned firms, Chinese state-owned enterprises controlled by province, city, and county governments (local SOEs) are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region (small local auditors). In regions with less developed institutions, SOEs controlled by central government (central SOEs) also have such a tendency. However, the tendency of local and central SOEs to hire small local auditors is attenuated as the institutions develop. This auditor choice pattern is likely to be explained by SOEs’ lack of demand for large or non-local auditors, small local auditors’ superior local knowledge, and SOEs’ collusion incentives.     

Executive turnover in China’’s state-owned enterprises:Government-oriented or market-oriented?

Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China’s SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives’ economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

Local fiscal distress and investment efficiency of local SOEs

In this paper, we use A-share listed firms between 2002 and 2010 to investigate the relationship between local fiscal distress and the investment efficiency of local SOEs, along with the effect of corporate tax payments on this relationship. We find a positive relationship between the extent of local SOEs' overinvestment and the fiscal distress of the corresponding local government where the enterprise and this relationship become stronger for firms that pay fewer taxes. The pattern of underinvestment among local SOEs was in contrast,and these relationships do not exist for non-SOEs or central SOEs. Moreover,we find that expanding a firm's investment scale leads to an increase in total taxes paid, including income and turnover taxes, which further result in more local fiscal revenue. Overall, we conclude that local governments have an incentive to increase fiscal revenue when faced with fiscal distress by raising the investment scale of local SOEs and that the incentives and effects of such interventions appear to be stronger among firms that contribute less to local fiscal revenue.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.     

可口可乐对中国经济的影响

来自北京大学、清华大学和美国南卡罗来纳大学的学者最近公布了经过共同研究和调查推出的报告《可口可乐系统对中国经济的影响》边是国际上第一次对一个跨国公司对区域经济的影响进行全面深入的研究。中美联合调查研究表明,可口可乐的生产和销售对中国的就业、税收和产值产生了巨大而深远的影响。