投资者保护、关联交易与公司绩效——来自长三角A股上市公司的经验证据

以2007~2009年长三角地区A股上市公司为研究样本,以投资者保护为切入点,分析投资者保护、关联交易对公司治理效率的影响。研究表明:长三角地区上市公司普遍存在控股股东,董事长来源于控股股东的公司关联交易明显多于其他公司,总经理来自控股股东的公司关联交易不明显,关联交易与投资者保护程度负相关,投资者保护程度与公司治理正相关。     

民营公司两权分离度、内部制衡机制与经营绩效关系

以中国的投资者保护为研究出发点,本文搜集沪深两市挂牌交易的由自然人创立并拥有的民营公司研究样本,实证检验其两权分离程度、内部制衡机制与公司经营绩效之间的关系。研究发现,在民营公司内部,控制权和所有权的分离对公司的经营绩效产生了显著的负面影响,两权分离程度越大,对公司经营绩效的负面作用越大;其次,内部制衡机制与公司经营绩效显著正相关,制衡机制越强,抑制终极控股股东的侵占行为的效果越显著;最后,两权分离程度与内部制衡机制之间存在着交互作用,在两权分离程度相同的情况下,制衡机制的程度越强,对于减少终极控股股东与中小投资者之间的委托代理成本,改善公司经营绩效的效果越明显。     

控股股东自我交易的法律规制

当前,我国公司关联交易存在的最大问题就是控股股东滥用控制权,肆意侵害少数股东、公司债权人利益.保护投资者尤其是中小投资者的法律体系的欠缺是产生此问题的主要原因.解决控股股东自我交易所存在的关键问题不在于人为的强制股权分散化或多元化来打破集中股权结构模式,而是完善法治,加大控股股东实施这些不公平交易的制度成本.结合各国的实践来看,法治正是加大控股股东成本的最便宜、最直接的手段.     

全流通市场中大股东交易的影响因素研究——基于股权结构的视角

全流通市场中的大股东交易问题日益成为关注的焦点。以2007年至2010年A股市场大股东交易作为研究对象,验证了股权结构对不同类型大股东交易行为的影响。研究结果显示控股股东净购买率与股权集中度显著负相关,与股权制衡度显著正相关;而非控股股东净购买率与股权集中度显著正相关,与股权制衡度显著负相关。这说明现有股权结构对控股股东和非控股股东交易行为的影响存在显著差异,而这种显著差异又将导致未来上市公司股权结构发生明显变化。     

我国上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为研究：一个委托代理模型

我国上市公司控股股东侵占上市公司以及中小股东利益的行为屡见不鲜。其主要途径包括：虚假招股说明书、关联交易、股利政策、定向增发以及利润操纵。上市公司中小股东与控股股东间存在着委托代理关系。控股股东的利益侵占行为不仅降低了上市公司的期望收益,还降低了控股股东自身的努力程度以及所享有的收益份额。通过推进上市公司股权分散化、完善上市公司信息披露制度、推进＂以股抵债＂等金融创新,可以纠正上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益行为。     

投资者保护与控股股东资产偏好

本文从控股股东资产偏好的角度构建了一个在股权集中型公司中研究控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为决策分析框架。理论分析表明,投资者保护可以缓解因控股股东对流动性资产的偏好而形成的投资不足,但公司现金持有水平取决于公司投资不足和控股股东资产转移两个方面的净效应。实证研究结果证实了较好的投资者保护能够在一定程度上缓解公司投资不足,并抑制控股股东的资产转移动机,从而促使外部投资者对公司所持有的现金予以较高的价值评估。我们还发现中国上市公司控股股东较高的现金流权对应着较高的控制权,其结果是加剧公司投资不足,导致公司现金水平较高而现金价值较低。     

股权集中与投资者利益保护——基于我国上市公司的实证分析

公司的股权集中度问题是公司不同主体利益分配和剩余索取权安排的基础问题,同时也是公司治理的核心。股权集中的程度决定了公司代理问题的基本性质,即在公司治理过程中面临的主要冲突是存在于管理者与股东之间还是控股股东与中小股东之间,学者们对此却有着不同的见解。同时,学术界在用何种指标来衡量投资者利益保护问题上,也未达成一致意见。本文从公司治理理论出发,构建投资者利益保护评价指标体系,研究公司股权集中度与投资者利益保护之间的关系。实证结果表明,公司第一大股东持股比例越大,越不利于投资者保护;公司股东的持股比例差距越小、分布越均衡,越利于投资者保护;同时,第一大股东与第二大股东持股比例的比值不宜过大,两大股东的股权制衡,有利于投资者利益的保护。相对于股权集中,公司股权的制衡是更有利于投资者的利益保护。     

上市公司大股东的“掏空”路径及制衡机制研究

在中国股权相对集中或高度集中的上市公司中,由于控股股东或大股东掌握着公司的实际控制权,大股东的自利天性与机会主义行为可能导致其利用资金占用、关联交易、股利政策和内幕交易等种种手段实现大股东掏空。为遏制大股东掏空现象的泛滥,需从内部治理和外部制衡两个角度,构建大股东掏空的内外部制衡机制,以保护中小股东权益的不受侵害。     

上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度绩效的实证检验

我国上市公司终极控股股东利用对上市公司的控制权,普遍通过非公平关联交易、违规信息披露、市场操纵等方式获取控制权私人收益,非法侵害中小投资者的合法权益。从上市公司股权结构等角度,通过逻辑回归分析,分别对股权分置改革时期、后股权分置时期中国上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度的绩效进行实证检验,这为制定保护中小投资者权益的政策提供了实证依据。     

整体上市对上市公司关联交易的影响分析

关联交易在减少交易成本和提高交易效率方面,有其独特优势。但是,关联交易却成为我国上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益的一种手段,关联交易成为了集团公司与上市公司之间利益输送的渠道。整体上市是我国证券市场上一种特有形式,对解决关联交易有显著作用。通过整体上市,上市公司可以减少关联交易,提高公司业绩。本文选取江西铜业整体上市的案例进行研究。     

Expropriation through loan guarantees to related parties: Evidence from China

We identify and analyze a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms that issued loan guarantees to their related parties (usually the controlling block holders), thereby expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. Our results show that the issuance of related guarantees is less likely at smaller firms, at more profitable firms and at firms with higher growth prospects. We also find that the identity and ownership of block holders affect the likelihood of expropriation. In addition, we use this sample to provide new evidence on the relation between tunneling and proxies for firm value and financial performance. We find that Tobin’s Q, ROA and dividend yield are significantly lower, and that leverage is significantly higher, at firms that issued related guarantees.     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.     

Accelerated investment effect of risky debt

In this paper we examine a new effect of risky debt on a firm’s investment strategy. We call this effect “accelerated investment”. It stems from a potential loss of investment option in the event of default. The possibility of default reduces the value of the option to wait and provides equity holders with an incentive to speed up investment. As a result, in the absence of wealth expropriation by a levered firm’s debt holders, its shareholders exercise their investment option earlier than the shareholders of an otherwise identical all-equity firm. This result is at odds with the generally accepted intuition that in the absence of potential wealth transfers and taxes the shareholders of a levered firm would follow the same investment policy as that of an unlevered firm. In addition to providing various illustrations of the accelerated investment effect, we relate its magnitude to the presence of competition for investment opportunities.     

CEO contractual protection and debt contracting

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contractual protection, in the forms of CEO employment agreements and CEO severance pay agreements, is prevalent among S&P 1500 firms. While prior research has examined the impact of these agreements on corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspective, there is little research on the impact from debt holders’ perspective. We find that, compared with other loans, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection on average contain more performance covenants and performance-pricing provisions. This effect increases with CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and opportunities, but it decreases with CEOs’ preference for and opportunity of enjoying a quiet life. Furthermore, for loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection, debt holders include stricter covenants, charge a higher interest rate and use a more diffuse syndicate structure. Collectively, these results shed light on the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting.     

Idiosyncratic Risk and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Jordan

ABSTRACT

This article offers evidence in support of the hypothesis that when investors have weak protection, small investors can suffer expropriation by large shareholders. In this kind of situation, a stock’s idiosyncratic risk is found to be negatively related to ownership concentration, which indicates that the cost of controlling ownership may outweigh its benefits. This is consistent with the view that minority investors have less incentive to invest in companies with weak protection for investors. When this is accompanied by low-quality information disclosed to the public, private information is not likely to be reflected in stock prices, resulting in lower idiosyncratic risk.     

Family control,expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations

We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverted U-shape relation between family control and firm value. Family firms incur a value discount when family equity holdings exceed approximately 50%. The nonlinear effect of family control is attributable to family firms from a strongly protective environment. When investor protection is weak, family control has a positive impact on firm value regardless of the ownership concentration level.     

Institutions,ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms

Johnson et al. (2002. American Economic Review 92 (5), 1335–1356) examine the relative importance of property rights and external finance in several Eastern European countries. They find property rights to be overwhelmingly important, while external finance explains little of firm reinvestment. McMillan and Woodruff (2002. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (3), 153–170) further conjecture that as transition moves along, market-supporting (financial) institutions should become more important. This paper reexamines those issues in the context of China in 2002, when the transition had moved far. We also find that secure property rights are a significant predictor of firm reinvestment. However, in line with McMillan and Woodruff, we find that access to external finance in the form of bank loans is also associated with more reinvestment. Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2003. Unbundling institutions. Unpublished working paper 9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA), we separate our proxies for the security of property rights into two groups: those measuring the risk of expropriation by the government and those measuring the ease and reliability of contract enforcement. Whereas those authors’ cross-country results suggest that risk of expropriation is the more severe impediment to economic development, ours indicate that both expropriation risk and contract enforcement play a role in Chinese firms’ reinvestment decisions. We also find that another aspect of property rights, the extent of private ownership, is associated with greater reinvestment. At China's current stage of development, expropriation risk, contract enforcement, access to finance, and ownership structure all appear to matter for reinvestment decisions. Some evidence also exists that access to finance and government expropriation affect small firms more than large ones.     

Agency Costs,Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.     

Agency conflicts,ownership concentration,and legal shareholder protection

This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.     

Does managerial ability facilitate corporate innovative success?

This paper examines whether managerial ability facilitates corporate innovative success. First, we show that managerial ability is positively associated with innovative output. Second, we show that the positive association between managerial ability and innovative output is weaker for older CEOs and managers who stay in the same job for longer, suggesting a preference for a ‘quiet life’ by long serving CEOs. Third, we find that the equity market values patents generated by more able managers more positively, suggesting that equity holders deem better skilled managers more effective at converting innovative ideas into valuable new products. Finally, we show that managerial ability is positively associated with more ‘radical’ innovations, which are outside of the firm's knowledge base. Overall, our results suggest that managerial ability is an essential component of corporate innovative success.