由次贷危机到中国房地产经济

美国的次级抵押贷款简称“次级贷款”,有人简化称其为“次级贷”,也有人干脆就叫它“次贷”,我们所说的“次贷危机”,实际上指的是次级抵押贷款的危机。与“次贷危机”相关的还有一个名词叫“次级债”,美国的次级债是特指基于次级住房抵押贷款而发行的债券,次级债的实质是次级抵押贷款支持的证券。事实上．“次级贷”与“次级债”都属于金融产品和工具范畴。而我们看到的从次级贷危机到次级债危机．又是一脉相承的,它们既相互关联又相互作用,体现了金融产品的资金链条、信用及风险传导的内在本质。     

透视次级债危机中的金融风险

一、美国次级债风波 2007年2月一场发端于美国的次级债危机,席卷全球.次级债危机,高不开滋生的土壤:次级贷款市场和资产证券化,后在对冲基金风险推动作用下,波及全球.     

2007年八大财经“超预期”

次级债危机引发全球金融动荡 2007年2月份,美国次级债问题初露端倪;3月份,美国次级债危机显现;美国股市首次因次级抵押贷款市场危机而出现大跌。此后这一由单一国家、单一市场、单一业务的金融事件所引发的动荡迅速向国际金融市场、金融机构蔓延,引起全球震动。     

华丽的诱惑：美国次级债迷局

今年3月美国次级抵押贷款危机显现(本刊今年第4期有专门报道),然而当时并未引起国内市场的过多关注。事隔三个月,次级债危机引发全球主要金融市场连续暴跌,及至波及国内市场,至此次级债问题成为世人高度关注的焦点。那么,美国次级抵押贷款究竟是什么,怎么会有如此巨大的威力掀起市场狂澜?由此产生的风险将蔓延何处、持续何时?美国次级抵押贷款供应商和使用者早前为何青睐此类高风险产品,他们在危机爆发后将承受怎样的命运……?种种问题亟待释疑。为此,我们特别以较大篇幅组织了系列文章对美国次级抵押贷款做了全面的介绍分析,以便读者对此更加透彻了解。     

美国次级债危机产生条件的警示

一．美国次级债危机的产生条件 （一）次级债的由来 美国抵押贷款市场的“次级”（Subprime）及“优惠级”（Prime）是以借款人的信用条件作为划分界限的。次级抵押贷款是指美国向信用分数较低、收入证明缺失、负债较重的人提供住房贷款,其利率通常比最优级贷款利率高2％～3％。     

美国次贷危机中高盛的赢家之道

次贷危机中几家欢喜几家愁,就在美国次级抵押贷款市场危机出现恶化迹象之时,美国高盛集团却高奏凯歌。让我们回顾一下高盛在这次次级债危机中的精彩表现。2007年年初,高盛敏锐地从次级债和结构性信用市场中淡出。2007年7月信贷市场急转直下时,     

美国次贷危机中高盛的赢家之道

次贷危机中几家欢喜几家愁,就在美国次级抵押贷款市场危机出现恶化迹象之时,美国高盛集团却高奏凯歌。让我们回顾一下高盛在这次次级债危机中的精彩表现。2007年年初,高盛敏锐地从次级债和结构性信用市场中淡出。2007年7月信贷市场急转直下时,高盛的许多次级债产品已经出手并买了不少保险,但美     

美国次级债危机后全球流动性新趋势及其对中国的影响

次级债危机可能继续蔓延美国的房地产泡沫从上个世纪70年代到现在出现过三次。最近的一次开始于1994年,当时美国房地产正处于历史低谷,到2005、2006年达剑高峰。美国次级房地产危机和资产证券化有很大关系,资产证卷化(发行以次级房地产贷款为抵押的债券即次级债)允许银行将房地产市场的风险转嫁给证卷投资者,     

美国次级债危机对中国的启示——基于个人住房按揭贷款研究

今年7月底,一场愈益严重的美国次级债危机终于爆发,并向全球金融市场深度蔓延。对于美国次级债危机,我们更应关注的是对成长中的中国金融市场有多少启示。因为这次美国次级债危机的导火线是房地产市场过热——在这方面中国的房地产市场"毫不逊色"。目前我国房地产开发资金来源中大约有一半以上来自银行贷款,其中,个人住房按揭贷款也占到相当大的比例。所以,在购房贷款占商业银行贷款的比重越来越高,以及美国次级债危机的发生之时,我们有必要研究一下:我国的个人住房按揭贷款的发展及问题。     

美国次级抵押贷款市场危机解析

美国的住房抵押贷款市场经历了三个发展阶段,目前已进入证券化阶段.所谓次级抵押贷款,是相对于优质抵押贷款而言,美国金融制度的改变和房地产市场的发展促进了次级抵押贷款市场的发展.次级抵押贷款市场危机的特征是借款者被取消抵押品赎回权和抵押贷款坏账高涨,金融机构濒临破产.直接导致此次美国次级抵押贷款市场危机爆发的原因是房价泡沫的破灭和利率上升.掠夺性放贷和监管缺位是美国次级抵押贷款市场存在的主要问题.     

Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes

Public policy concerns increasingly have focused on subprime lending. Our research uses a survey of prime and subprime borrowers to address whether borrowers inappropriately are channeled to the subprime segment, if once having taken out a subprime mortgage borrowers are stuck in this market segment, and whether borrowers face higher costs by taking out subprime mortgages. We find that subprime borrowers are less knowledgeable about the mortgage process, are less likely to search for the best mortgage rates, and are less likely to be offered a choice among alternative mortgage terms and instruments—possibly making them more vulnerable to unfavorable mortgage outcomes. Our analysis of market segmentation confirms that typical mortgage underwriting criteria are most important in explaining whether borrowers obtain prime or subprime mortgages—higher credit risk borrowers are more likely to get a subprime loan. Our results further show that search behavior and other demographic factors including adverse life events, age, and Hispanic ethnicity contribute to explaining market segment, suggesting that borrowers may inappropriately receive subprime mortgages. While we find some persistence to market segment—borrowers are more likely to take out a subprime mortgage if their previous mortgage came from the subprime segment—we also find that market segment is not immutable. Analysis of the survey responses indicates that borrowers with subprime mortgages significantly are more dissatisfied with their mortgage outcomes. This is not surprising because subprime borrowers look worse across typical mortgage underwriting criteria. Consistent with policy concerns, however, despite holding constant these and other factors, taking out a mortgage in the subprime segment, by itself, appears to increase dissatisfaction with mortgage outcomes. We do not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether subprime lending, on balance, serves homebuyers well by providing access to mortgage credit to those otherwise constrained, or rather serves homebuyers poorly by inappropriately assigning them to a market where costs are high and the ability to transition to more attractive prime mortgages remains low. Our analysis, however, does provide some empirical support for concerns raised by critics of subprime lending, and for this reason justifies continued public policy debate and analysis.     

次贷危机中资产证券化对金融市场流动性的影响

次贷危机是一场金融市场流动性紧缩的危机.在流动性紧缩的过程中,连接多个利益主体的资产证券化负有很大责任.本文采用计量经济理论中的VAR模型对次贷危机中资产证券化对金融市场流动性的影响进行实证分析,发现在次贷危机的演进过程中,资产证券化确实对金融市场的流动性产生了持久的负面冲击效应,并导致了流动性紧缩的传导和扩散.因此,...     

The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending

Subprime lending in the residential mortgage market, characterized by relatively high credit risk and interest rates or fees, has developed over the past decade into a prominent segment of the market (Temkin, 2000). Recent research indicates that there is geographical concentration of subprime mortgages in Census tracts where there are high concentrations of low-income and minority households. The growth in subprime lending represents an expansion in the supply of mortgage credit among households who do not meet prime market underwriting standards. Nonetheless, its apparent concentration in minority and lower income neighborhoods has generated concerns that these households may not be obtaining equal opportunity in the prime mortgage market. Such lending may undermine revitalization to the extent that it is associated with so-called predatory practices.     

Subprime Lenders and Mortgage Market Completion

Without a subprime market, some borrowers by virtue of poor credit history, unstable income, and other characteristics are unable to qualify for a mortgage. With a subprime market, there is a more complete credit supply schedule with the market pricing for poorer credit quality in the mortgage rate. By completing the capital market, subprime lenders reduce borrowing constraints. The result is a social welfare gain. Low-credit applicants otherwise denied funding are able to qualify by paying higher interest rates in exchange for offering more equity or lower loan-to-value ratios. This prediction is consistent with the subprime applicants financing or refinancing their mortgages at relatively low loan-to-value ratios.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

CRA Lending in a Changing Context: Evidence of Interaction with FHA and Subprime Originations

This article uses a unique demonstration program to examine the interaction of CRA-related lending with subprime and FHA lending activity. Specifically, the empirical analysis identifies the extent to which the origination of a CRA mortgage substitutes for FHA and subprime originations during the period 1998–2006. The results suggest that in the years prior to the expansion of the subprime market (1998–2001), the origination of CRA loans carried a small substitution effect with respect to FHA originations, with little to no impact on subprime originations. Conversely, during the years of the subprime industry’s growth (2002–2006), CRA originations substituted at a much higher rate for high-cost originations. These findings are suggestive about the dynamic role of community reinvestment lending within the changing context of the broader mortgage market. To the extent that CRA originations carry lower foreclosure risk than many subprime products, they also carry implications for the extent of neighborhood externalities in the wake of the subprime foreclosure crisis.     

Volatility spillovers between the Chinese and world equity markets

We propose measures of the directional volatility spillovers between the Chinese and world equity markets based on Diebold and Yilmaz's (2011b) forecast-error variance decompositions in a generalized vector autoregressive framework. It was found that the US market had dominant volatility impacts on other markets during the subprime mortgage crisis. The other markets were also very volatile, and driven by bad news, their massive volatilities were transmitted back to the US market. The volatility of the Chinese market has had a significantly positive impact on other markets since 2005. The volatility interactions among the markets of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were more prominent than those among the Chinese, Western, and other Asian markets were. The major correction of the Chinese stock market between February and July 2007 significantly contributed to the volatility surges of other markets. Owing to the restrictions on foreign investment, the Chinese stock market was not considerably affected in terms of market volatility during the subprime mortgage crisis.     

住房贷款二级市场的经验教训与政策建议

本文结合主要国家实践,分析了一国住房贷款二级市场的驱动因素、成功要素及其主要的经济金融功能;在总结次贷危机带来的市场发展启示的基础上,探讨了未来房贷二级市场的主流模式。鉴于房贷二级市场对中国经济金融长期稳定发展具有一定的重要意义,文章进一步探讨了我国建立证券化房贷二级市场的模式选择与发展对策。     

美国次贷危机传导机理分析

美国次贷危机爆发后,迅速在国内和国际传导蔓延。从国内看,危机先从信贷市场传导至资本市场,又从资本市场回传到信贷市场,并对实体经济造成冲击。从国际看,危机通过金融渠道、贸易渠道和心理渠道向世界各国扩散。分析本次危机的传导机理,对日后有效防范金融危机的产生和蔓延具有理论和现实意义。     

浅议定量宽松政策在日本的实践与效果

该文介绍了日本实施定量宽松政策的由来与历史背景，详述了这一非常规货币政策的具体措施及其所取得的实际效果。虽然理论上仍存有异议，但是定量宽松政策有利于重塑市场预期，并为欧美等国应对次贷危机提供了宝贵的实践经验。