销售人员的激励扭曲与反馈激励分析

销售人员激励是企业激励机制的一个重要组成部分.以系统思考的方法对销售人员激励机制进行分析,揭示了销售人员激励扭曲的原因在于销售人员激励机制运行系统中各子系统之间的反馈作用,提出了以反馈激励的方法来有效地设计激励措施并控制销售人员激励扭曲问题.     

以作业预算为基础的业绩合同管理运行研究

以作业预算为基础的业绩合同是建立企业内部激励约束机制的依据，并可以将代理人的报酬与其所做的努力联系起来，但业绩合同必须具有可操作性和有效性。本文从业绩合同管理模式、管理工具、过程控制和业绩考评等方面对业绩合同管理的运行进行了分析，从而有助于提高业绩合同的可操作性和有效性。     

关于股票期权在国有商业银行高管激励中的运用探讨

一、长期激励缺乏:现行国有商业银行高管薪酬体系的一大缺陷 目前,银行对高管人员的薪酬激励已形成一个较为完整的体系,包括基于当期业绩的薪酬激励(即短期激励)和基于长期业绩的薪酬激励(即长期激励)两种.而从国有商业银行薪酬体系(图1.1)和美国银行薪酬体系(图1.2)的对比中,可以看出国有商业银行的收入结构单一,高管人员的薪酬结构中正规收入只有两部分,即工资收入和福利收入,收入结构中无中长期部分.而美国银行目前高层管理人员的长期激励收入已占收入的主要部分,并且已有愈来愈多的收入是依赖于长期激励计划的.表1.1分别反映出早在1999年,美国地区性银行前5名最高领导人的收入水平、收入结构及其相应的比例中,长期激励收入已占了高管收入的大部分,平均达到50%以上.     

上市公司股权激励实施效果的实证检验——基于中国A股市场的经验证据

<正>本文以我国A股市场2006—2008年实施股权激励的上市公司为研究对象,考察了股权激励机制的激励效果。实证结果表明,上市公司实施股权激励能显著提高企业经营业绩。研究结果也表明相比实施基于股价的股权激励模式,实施基于业绩的股权激励模式具有更强的激励性,更能提高企业业绩。此外,研究没有找到股权激励度与企业业绩的显著性证据。     

基于业绩的经理人激励方式探讨

由于两权分离所产生的所有者与经营者的委托代理关系,使经理人激励成为必要。如何有效激励经理人是理论界和实务界公认的难题。笔者认为,经理人激励要基于业绩而非表现,因为只有业绩才是"有效行为"的结果。本文对基于业绩的激励方式进行了简要介绍,并对这类激励方式有效性的影响因素进行了分析和说明,并提出一个"好"的业绩评价系统本身就是激励的观点。     

业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性

本文论述了通过提高高管人员报酬——业绩敏感性来激励高管人员努力工作,要受到业绩指标选择和业绩风险大小的影响。针对我国上市公司的实证研究发现,在控制公司规模、股权结构和公司成长性因素后,上市公司高管人员报酬契约能够针对高管人员职责的不同,合理选择业绩指标的报酬——业绩敏感性。但是,实证研究没有发现业绩风险大小对高管人员报酬——业绩敏感性有影响的证据。     

股票期权报酬会计处理的国际趋势

股票期权费用化会计处理的争论 一直以来,股票期权被公司治理专家认为是解决委托代理问题的有效激励措施.这种激励机制通过让高管人员分享剩余收入,协调经营者和所有者之间的利益关系,从而激励高管人员创造优秀业绩.但是,近年来美国多起财务丑闻的揭露表明,股票期权已成为公司高管人员财务舞弊的动机之一.由于实行股票期权后,上市公司股价的微小变动也会直接影响到高管人员所持股票期权的价值,因此,高管人员往往过分关注股价的变动,少数人不惜通过财务舞弊手段来隐瞒公司真实经营业绩从而抬高股价.     

管理层股权激励具有经济效果吗？——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文基于中国A股上市公司2007年至2012年的面板数据,实证检验管理层股权激励是否具有积极的经济效果.实证研究发现,管理层股权激励产生了良好的经济效果,管理层持股比例越高的公司经营业绩越好.进一步通过面板数据的固定效应模型控制内生性问题后实证结果保持不变.强化管理层股权激励方式对于提高公司经营业绩具有重要意义.     

浅谈企业物流外包工程的合同风险管理

1.物流外包合同概述1.1物流外包合同物流外包合同是一份由交易各方达成的具有法律效力的文件。其中第三方物流服务提供商承诺在一定的条件(如数量、质量、价格、送达时间、采购时间等)下向物流服务需求方(通常理解为制造和销售企业)提供物流服务,而物流服务需求方根据合同的规定(包括合同的激励因素和惩罚因素)向第三方物流服     

南昌印钞厂工程技术人员业绩量化评价的研究

企业的发展依靠核心竞争力的提升,而核心核心竞争力的提升离不开技术实力和工程技术人员队伍及其素质的培养和成长。本文以业绩评价和能力评价模型,就工程技术人员的量化评价和激励的实践进行探讨.     

中国国有商业银行激励机制:一个新的非线性激励契约

我国传统的银行管理人激励方法是根据银行最终实现的收益决定对管理人的奖励,一般是线性的。本文通过对这种线性激励契约的剖析,发现由于银行管理人的有限责任以及企业软约束的存在,银行的预期收益与风险水平呈倒U字的二次关系,因此线性激励契约只会使管理人过度冒险,而无益于银行的预期收益。因此,本文构建了修正的资本资产定价模型,并在此基础上提出了一个新的非线性激励契约:对管理人的奖励计划不再是连续的,而是提供一个有限的奖励范围以避免银行管理人的过度冒险;只有当银行管理人选择的风险水平不超过最优风险水平时,他才可以拿到与其努力水平相等的奖金。     

An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.     

Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital

This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral-hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank-loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral-hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.     

Strategic alliances,equity stakes,and entry deterrence

I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the established firm's incentive to enter one of its partner's markets. I show that equity can eliminate the entry incentive, but accommodation is sometimes chosen to encourage entrepreneurial effort on future growth options. I analyze stake sizes, block pricing, and welfare effects. The results have implications for equity alliances, corporate venture capital, and the organization of research activities.     

Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem

This paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information. In addition, the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully. We analyze three contracting regimes: (1) first-best where effort is observable, (2) linear with unobservable effort, and (3) the optimal contract within the Bhattacharya-Pfleiderer quadratic class. We find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager. This underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. These contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk-tolerant principals.     

The incentive problem and the design of investment banking contracts

This paper summarizes the first-best contract between an issuer and an investment banker when there is no incentive problem and determines the optimal deviation from that contract when an incentive problem is present. Since the offer price is observable, the issuer can dictate the price he prefers. The issuer, however, is unable to observe the distribution effort, and thus an incentive problem arises. Under reasonable conditions the issuer will give the banker a commission function that is an increasing function of the net proceeds from the issue and involves a bonus when the issue is sold out at the offer price.     

Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency setting

This paper studies, in a dynamic agency setting, how incentives and contractual efficiency are affected by leading indicators of firms’ future financial performance. In our two-period model, a leading indicator variable provides a noisy forecast of the uncertain return from the manager’s long-term effort, and both contracting parties cannot refrain from renegotiating contract terms based on updated information. We find that the leading indicator can reduce the manager’s long-term effort incentive, as it allows the firm owner to capture more of the resulting return through renegotiated wages (i.e., the manager is held up). By reducing the uncertainty about future aggregate cash flows, the leading indicator also exacerbates the “ratchet” effect and discourages the manager’s short-term effort. In equilibrium, as the leading indicator becomes more accurate in forecasting future cash flows, the first-period contract attaches higher explicit weights to both the forward-looking leading indicator and backward-looking cash flow, and yet the manager may find it optimal to reduce both the short- and long-term efforts. We further show that with a more accurate leading indicator variable, the explicit incentive on the lagging cash flow may increase more than that on the leading indicator, and the equilibrium firm profit may decrease and diverge from the manager’s equilibrium efforts.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

税收优惠方式对研发投入激励效应研究

以我国2014 ～2020年A股上市公司为样本,利用手工搜集整理的独特数据,获取了上市公司实际享受的税率优惠、加计扣除、加速折旧摊销的金额,并以此为基础检验不同税收优惠方式对企业研发投入的激励效应.实证结果表明,税率优惠、加计扣除、加速折旧摊销这三种税收优惠方式都能激励企业加大研发投入,三种税收优惠方式对研发投入的激励...     

Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets

This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and liquidity in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the negotiated listing contract length. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their list price strategy. Both list price and length of marketing time affect broker sales effort and therefore a property’s realized selling price and liquidity. Analysis of house transaction data from Virginia indicates that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increase selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity.