投资者情绪、经理激励契约与企业投资

本文基于中国上市公司经理激励契约安排的制度背景,把经理激励契约纳入投资者非理性分析框架,就投资者情绪与经理激励契约如何相互作用影响企业投资进行了理论分析,并进行了实证检验。结果发现,高管持股会诱发高管利用投机的股市进行过度投资,而与股价弱相关的货币薪酬没有这种作用,而且经理薪酬的这种作用因企业实际控制人性质不同而有所差异。本研究表明高管持股在企业投资决策中具有负面的公司治理效应。     

基于阶段性的矿业基金联合投资的持股偏好及其影响研究 ——来自多伦多证券交易所的经验证据

作为风险分散的主要投资策略,联合投资在矿产投资中相较其他行业使用突出.本文以2008-2013年投资多伦多证券交易所矿产企业的国际矿业基金为研究对象,采用阶段性分析方法,来理解联合投资的投资决策行为及其影响.研究发现,与单独投资相比,采取联合投资策略的矿业基金更关注企业的盈利能力和企业规模.在投资中的持股变化阶段,联合投资者更注重对投资风险的分散及对收益的获取,这符合联合投资行为的动机.而且,"跟投"现象明显.最后,联合投资持股对被投资企业绩效有显著的正影响,并表现出持续性.由于联合投资的合作关系的积极效应,参与联合投资的矿业基金数量越多,基金之间实力越相近,对于被投资企业的绩效管理更为有利.     

信托型企业年金治理中的非理性行为分析

从行为金融理论的角度来看,信托型企业年金治理中非理性行为主要集中在年金计划基金的投资管理阶段.非理性行为的主体既有计划的受托人和投资管理人,也有计划的参加者和受益人,主要是投资风险分散不足,过度投资于自己就职的公司,投资管理人在投资决策中的羊群效应以及投资及业绩评估中的偏差.行为金融学的视角突破了理性经济人的假设,有助于更深刻地理解引起企业年金治理中非理性行为的群体心理.     

金融科技影响企业创新投资的效应与机制研究

基于2011—2021年沪深A股上市企业数据,运用固定效应模型和中介效应模型探究金融科技发展对企业创新投资的影响及其作用机制。研究发现：金融科技发展有助于提高企业创新投资水平,能够通过促进企业短期金融资产配置行为、抑制企业长期金融资产配置行为提高企业创新投资水平;高管股权激励和政府补助均对金融科技的创新投资驱动效应有显著的强化作用;在非国有企业中,金融科技对于创新投资的驱动效应更显著。     

支持创新投资活动税收政策的研究

创业投资企业投资中小高新企业的所得税优惠已执行9年了,本文主要阐明深圳市目前支持创新投资活动的税收政策的执行情况和问题,包括天使投资在内的投资种子期、初创期等创新活动投资的运行模式、特点和税收政策着力点,提出改进税收政策措施的相关意见。     

增值税税率下调对企业投资影响的实证研究——基于减税的中介效应

通过采取双重差分法及中介效应模型实证检验增值税税率下调对企业投资的影响,可以发现:(1)增值税税率下调对企业投资规模具有显著促进作用;(2)增值税税率下调在投资机会成本效应及价格效应作用下可以有效降低企业税费负担;(3)企业税费负担的降低在增值税税率下调和企业投资规模之间发挥了中介作用,即增值税税率下调通过影响企业税费负担能够显著影响企业投资规模。基于研究结论,本文提出以下建议:在增值税税率下调的同时,进一步简并增值税税率,增强税制改革的红利;强化税收政策对特定类型投资的激励作用,优化企业投资结构;企业要同时注重投资规模和投资效率的优化。     

政治关联企业环保投资决策——"带头表率"还是"退缩其后"?

环保责任是企业需要承担的重要社会责任.本文手工搜集了2010-2017年我国A股上市公司的环保投资数据,以企业环保投资代理环保责任,研究了企业政治关联对其环保投资决策的影响.研究表明:(1)企业政治关联对环保投资具有负面效应,表现为政治关联高管比例越高、高管政治关联等级越高,企业环保投资越少;(2)通过对比政治关联高管和政治关联董事对环保投资的影响发现,政治关联高管对企业环保投资的抑制作用更显著.进一步分析表明,公司治理机制中的各类委员会能够制衡高管政治关联对环保投资的抑制效应;考察环保投资的经济后果发现,其并未给企业带来较高的市场价值;结合政策环境考察发现,中共十八大、十九大建设"美丽中国"的号召及政府环境规制均能够缓解企业政治关联对环保投资的抑制效应,而这种监管效应主要来自环境污染监管.     

新企业所得税制度下我国居民企业实际平均税负的估测

企业承担的实际平均税率作为企业实际税负的一个体现,在很大程度上影响着潜在投资者的投资决策,准确而全面地估测企业的实际平均税率,可以为投资者及政策制定者提供有价值的参考。在我国实施新企业所得税制度的背景下,从企业和股东个人这两个层面分别估测投责者采取不同融资方式、投资于不同资产时可能承担的实际平均税率,并检验上述结果对各种假设条件的敏感性,具有重要的现实意义和参考价值。     

投资者决策行为偏差探析及应用

行为金融学理论基于心理学的角度研究发现,投资者在投资决策中存在着各种行为偏差,这些偏差让其在投资中做出各种失误的决策,导致亏损,造成市场波动.这一研究成果对于投资者制定正确的投资策略,战胜市场具有重要意义.     

投资行为中的参照点效应研究综述

从行为角度研究投资决策正成为金融学领域的主流,本文选取参照点这一行为研究的基本原理视角,综述了投资行为中参照点的选取和更新,参照点对投资行为的影响路径,以及参照点对个体投资决策和群体投资决策的影响,展望了未来投资行为中参照点效应的研究方向。     

经开区招商引资政策对企业投资的影响

国家级经济开发区政府招商引资,往往需要从产业集聚、税收优惠、政府职能和宏观税负等几个不同的方面,分别对企业投资带来的影响进行必要的考察,企业投资决策也往往受到地方政府各种优惠政策等几个层面的影响。目前学界研究对政府招商引资与企业投资决策考虑因素较为单一,缺乏深度解析,本文就此提出相关构想,引导未来招商引资研究向深层领域拓展。     

Do corporate tax cuts increase investments?

This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth.     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.     

The perceived instability of tax legislation and its effect on consumption-investment decisions

During the past decade, there appears to have been an alarming decline in the flow of investment capital into ventures with uncertain returns. One factor which may have contributed to investor aversion to such investments is an increase in the perceived instability of the tax laws. This study examines the effect which this increase in the perceived instability of the tax laws may have on the two representative consumption-investment decisions of an owner-manager of a closely held corporation, namely: 1) the optimal periodic salary to draw from the corporation, and 2) the optimal time horizon for planning corporate affairs. These decisions are analyzed in the context of multiperiod optimization models. The study reveals that: 1) under certain conditions, increased tax rate uncertainty causes an increase in salary, and 2) increased tax rate uncertainty may cause a decrease in the time horizon for planning corporate affairs.     

Taxes and production: The case of Pakistan

This paper investigates the effectiveness of investment incentives and corporate income taxes in influencing production and investment decisions in the Pakistani wearing apparel and leather products industries. Three tax instruments are considered: the corporate income tax (CIT), the investment tax credit (ITC), and the capital cost allowance (CCA).The results show that since there are significant capital adjustment costs, it is important to distinguish between the short, intermediate, and long-run effects associated with the tax instruments. Production decisions are relatively more responsive to changes in the ITC rate compared to changes in either CCA or CIT rates in each run. However, only in the long run for the apparel industry are the ITC and CCA rates cost effective in stimulating investment. The CIT is never cost effective. Thus targeted instruments outperform the general CIT instrument. In addition, although the incentive to invest is enhanced, there is little effect on output. Therefore, tax incentives essentially make production techniques more capital intensive.     

Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?

We examine corporate financial and investment decisions made by female executives compared with male executives. Male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives. Further, acquisitions made by firms with male executives have announcement returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female executive firms, and debt issues also have lower announcement returns for firms with male executives. Female executives place wider bounds on earnings estimates and are more likely to exercise stock options early. This evidence suggests men exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared with women.     

Do corporate taxes affect employee welfare? Evidence from workplace safety

We examine the impact of tax policy on worker safety that exploits spatial discontinuity in treatment and control establishments stemming from state-level corporate tax changes. The granularity of our data and econometric approach allows us to exploit within-firm, across-establishment variation in worker safety shedding light on the real effects of headquarter versus plant-level decisions. Plant-level injury rates increase with tax hikes in establishment states, but not with those in headquarter states, highlighting the importance of plant-level decisions. We explore three plausible non-mutually exclusive mechanisms to help explain these findings ─ safety investment, leverage, and labor stress channels. We find that in the presence of a tax hike, firms reduce safety-related investments, and the tax effect on injury rates is exacerbated for firms that increase leverage and for firms where employees work longer hours and seasonal workers are used. Overall, our findings suggest that tax increases lead to negative welfare outcomes for employees, with no similar benefit accruing for tax cuts.     

Do tax incentives affect investment quality?

This paper examines the effect of tax incentives in the form of bonus depreciation on investment quality. Using the expiration of tax incentives via bonus depreciation in eastern Germany and a representative panel of West German establishments, we show that bonus depreciation significantly lowers investment quality. The average quality of investments, measured by the responsiveness of future revenue and other proxies for cash flow to current investment, reduces by 15.2–23.8% in the short run and 31.8–41.4% in the long run. Our research suggests that this adverse effect of tax subsidies is greater for jurisdictions with higher tax rates, in times of high unemployment, and for large or low-productivity establishments. Overall, while increasing investment quantity, as shown by prior literature, tax incentives such as bonus depreciation substantially reduce the quality of investments.     

财政压力、企业要素投入扭曲与经济绩效

本文利用中国取消农业税改革作为准自然实验,探讨区县级政府财政压力对政府决策和微观企业资源配置的影响,进而分析由此带来的宏观经济绩效影响效应。研究发现:地方政府行为受到财政压力的影响,农业税改革带来的财政压力使企业资本要素投入的边际收益和边际成本的缺口上升5.72%,企业资本要素投入不足情况加剧,而对劳动要素投入的影响并不显著;进一步的机制分析表明,财政压力对企业资本要素投入的扭曲效应更多源于税收征管提高、环境规制放松、交易费用增加和企业规模分布变异,这一干扰效应最终导致经济总量生产率平均下降约19.32%。     

高管团队内部治理与企业资本结构调整——基于非CEO高管独立性的视角

本文以2001-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管团队内部治理对企业资本结构的影响。研究发现:当企业负债不足时,高管团队内部治理效应能够显著提高企业(尤其是非国有企业)的负债水平,降低企业实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。这种高管团队内部治理效应在第一类委托代理问题比较严重以及非CEO高管监督动机较强的企业中更加显著。作用机制分析表明,高管团队内部治理效应能够通过降低第一类代理成本来降低企业资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。本文的研究结论为改善我国上市公司治理提供了新的思路,对于优化企业融资结构、深化金融供给侧结构性改革具有一定的启示意义。