基于相对EVA的股票期权激励模式研究

股票期权的激励作用受股市有效性的影响很大 ,股市的弱式有效性削弱了期权的激励作用。本文引入业绩评价指标EVA和相对绩效评价方法 ,将经理人的激励报酬和业绩贡献、行业分类指数的变动联系在一起 ,并剔除了外部系统因素对经理人激励报酬的影响。在此基础上 ,设计了基于相对EVA的股票期权激励模式 ,在一定程度上解决了股票期权计划实施中股市价格出现失真的问题 ,对推动股票期权在我国的进一步实施进行了探讨。     

浅谈股票期权在我国实行的意义和障碍

股票期权亦称认股权,是指公司无偿 (或有偿)授予经理人在未来某一特定日期,以合同规定的价格购买本公司一定数量股票的选择权,其实质上是由公司所有者向经营者提供激励的一种报酬制度。经理人股票期权作为一种激励制度,是建立在委托-代理理论、激励-动机理论和人力资源产权理论等多种理论的基础上,通过报酬激励和所有权激励等产生作用。在我国,股票期权作为一种协调经营者与股东利益关系的长期激励制度已经受到了越来越多的关注。     

EVA激励机制在企业中的应用

围绕激励机制，系统地介绍了经济增加值及其计算方法，探讨了经济增加值在解决代理问题的优越性。针对中国的现实环境提出了利用EVA激励机制设定目标奖金、建立奖金银行、建立杠杆股票期权等解决所有者与经营者利益冲突方面的有效措施。     

中国股票期权激励制度的有效性分析

起源于美国的股票期权激励制度是一种旨在解决企业委托代理矛盾的长期激励计划。其核心是将管理层的个人收益和广大股东的收益,尤其是长期利益统一起来,从而使股东价值成为管理层决策行为的准则。股票期权的本意是通过经营者经营能力——公司业绩——股票价格——高层管理人员回报,建立一套科学的激励制度。但实践中,实施的效果却大相径庭。说明简单地认为管理层持股有助于改善企业业绩的观点有失偏颇。本文认为,在中国当前的管理体制下,实施股票期权时,在经营者经营能力的衡量,公司业绩的评价,股票价格的确定机制等方面都存在缺陷,因此股票期权在中国实行必须符合中国国情,必须根据中国的具体情况进行完善和改进。     

股票期权激励制度的新发展——EVA激励制度

企业采取股票期权激励制度的弊端越来越明显,迫切需要新的激励制度,EVA激励制度应运而生。文章对EVA激励制度进行分析,说明EVA激励制度是当前企业有效的激励制度。     

实施股票期权制度问题探讨

股票期权的积极作用主要表现在股票期权能在一定程度上将经营者的利益与公司股东的利益统一起来，因而它能在相当程度上解决企业中存在的代理问题。其局限性主要表现在：一是股票期权诱使管理者采用激进的会计政策；二是股票期权的有效性依赖于资本市场的有效性，而资本市场并不完全有效；三是股票期权假定管理者是万能的，而事实上，管理者并非万能。     

股票期权制度的负效应及纠错

股票期权激励制度因为其能够激励经营者和员工的长期努力,因此成为上市公司激励制度重要构成部分.但是,股票期权激励百密不只一疏,存在相当程度的负面作用,需要采取措施加以防范.     

股票期权是激励公司代理人的主要方式

股票期权自20世纪50年代在美国出现以来，逐渐显示出巨大的生命力。根据西方法学和经济学中的代理理论和人力资本管理理论，解决公司代理问题的关键是监督和激励代理人，并以激励为主，股票期权就是一种主要的激励方式。     

股票期权与上市公司经理人激励

根据委托—代理理论,签约双方目标函数不一致且信息非对称,引致激励不相容问题发生.要解决此问题,必须注重代理人长期报酬设计,将经理人利益与企业发展紧密结合起来.采用股票期权的制度安排方式,以股票增值实现代理人的剩余索取,能有效防范经理人道德风险的发生.针对我国国企经营者长期激励偏弱的现实,引进股票期权制度,重塑经理人激励约束机制,对深化激励制度改革具有重要的借鉴意义.     

影响我国上市公司股票期权效果的主要因素分析及对策

股票期权（英文名称是Stock Option），是西方上市公司给予高级管理人员的一种权利。持有这种权利的高级管理人员可以在规定时期内以股票期权的行权价格（Exercise Price）购买本公司的股票，这个购买的过程称为行权（Exercise）。在行权以前，股票持有人没有任何的现金收益；行权以后，个人收益为行权价与行权日市场价之间的差价。高级管理人员可以自行决定在任何时间出售行权所得股票。期权激励具有以下几个特点1．期权激励的标的与获利机制是分离的。期权激励的标的是股票，而获利机制是股票在市场上的市值。2．它是一种权利，而非义务的成分。期权已经锁定了交易条件，从而减少了买方的交易风险。买方可以决定买或不买，而卖方不能决定卖或不卖。因此期权激励对经营者来说是“负盈不负亏”。如果企业赢利增长，股票市值上涨，则经营者可以使用期权以获利；反之，经营者可以放弃行权以避险。3．它是一种未来概念，不侵害所有者既有利益。期权激励不是对全部利益部分的分割，而是对新的利益增长部分的分割，具有很大的不确定性，但这也正是期权激励的魅力所在。     

关于当前我国证券公司实行股权激励的监管思考

我国证券公司目前实行股权激励的部分背景条件正逐步形成,但是仍存在制约因素,而且可供复制的相关成功实践较少。因此,全面开展证券公司股权激励还为时过早,证券监管部门应引导先试点再推行,使得股权激励为证券业发展发挥积极作用。     

Piecewise linear incentive scheme and participative budgeting

This paper studies the economic incentives of participative budgeting through the design of incentive schemes within the agency theory framework. In particular, a piecewise linear incentive scheme (PLIS), an optimal version of Weitzman's New Soviet Incentive Scheme (NSIS), is derived. The characteristics of PLIS are: first, unlike NSIS, the bonus (penalty) rates of the optimal PLIS vary according to the agent's type in order to improve the principal's welfare, second, a penalty may be imposed on the overfulfillment of the agent's performance in order to maintain incentive compatibility, and finally, it is shown that if the coefficients are constant as in NSIS, there is no need for participative budgeting. Also, PLIS is compared with a quadratic incentive scheme. Both incentive schemes achieve the optimal solution, but each incentive scheme has its own advantage over the other depending on the situation.     

Background Risk in the Principal-Agent Model

We examine the effect of background risk in the standard two-state, two-action principal-agent model. We analyse situations where the background risk is environmental (always present) and where the background risk is contractual (only present if the contract is accepted). With contractual background risk, expected wages always rise and the incentive scheme is flatter if the agent's preferences satisfy weak decreasing absolute risk aversion. With environmental background risk, the optimal incentive scheme becomes flatter if the agent is weakly prudent. We provide conditions under which the environmental background risk decreases the agent's expected wage.     

Motivating Innovation

Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation‐motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long‐term success. Moreover, commitment to a long‐term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation‐motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrenchment.     

The effects of incentive subjectivity and strategy communication on knowledge-sharing and extra-role behaviours

This study examines the effects of performance measurement system design on employees’ willingness to share knowledge and their general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours. Two key design issues are examined, namely, incentive scheme subjectivity and communicating the value of human-based intangible assets through a strategy map. Using a controlled experiment we found that employees are more willing to share knowledge with a co-worker (even if it means diverting resources away from incentivised areas) under a subjective weighting scheme than a formula-based scheme. In addition, we found an interaction effect where the communication of the strategic value of human-based intangible assets increases employees’ general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours under a subjective weighting scheme, but decreases this tendency under a formula-based scheme. Our study contributes to the performance management literature and has implications for practice by providing empirical evidence demonstrating how the design of performance measurement systems can motivate discretionary behaviours in relation to performance areas that are not recognised by the formal incentive scheme.     

公司治理结构对总经理长期激励的影响分析

本文研究了上市公司董事会特征和股权结构对总经理长期激励程度的影响.发现,董事会规模与总经理长期激励程度无显著相关关系;独立董事比例、内部董事比例、总经理与董事长年龄都与总经理的长期激励程度显著正相关;国有股比例对总经理的长期激励的影响呈现倒U型关系.     

Motivating Management to Reveal Inside Information

This paper develops incentive schemes which motivate a manager to release private information that he has concerning the probabilities of occurrence of the various output levels of his firm. It is shown that, in the context of a pure-exchange economy, a complete prohibition on the manager's trading in his firm's stock is sufficient to motivate him to truthfully release his private information. When the setting is extended to that of a production-exchange economy, the manager must also be allowed to choose the production plan that he most prefers in order for him to be motivated to release his information truthfully. In fact, no incentive scheme in a general production-exchange economy can be guaranteed to motivate the manager to release his information truthfully if he is not allowed to choose the production plan freely. However, when more structure is placed on the economy, such an incentive scheme can be developed as described in the latter part of this paper.     

高校人才财务激励初探

现有的高校人才激励体系往往注重于教师，而忽略学生这一重要人才资源。文章在界定高校人才财务激励相关概念的基础上，重点进行了高校人才财务激励体系设计。从个人激励和团队激励两大方面建立了较系统的财务激励模型。个人激励又包括了教师和学生两个具体方面。文章设计的财务量化激励体系，可以为高校人才财务激励提供理论和实务的指导。     

RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES OF BANKS AND RISK-ADJUSTED DEPOSIT INSURANCE

The manager of a depository institution is shown to exhibit risk-taking behavior under the current insurance arrangement. Perfect monitoring or risk-based deposit insurance would eliminate this incentive if information were symmetric between bank managers and the insuring agency. Absent symmetric information, it is shown that a recently suggested scheme, where insurers collect insurance premiums based on projected and actual risk levels, does not control the risk-taking incentive. The only way to control this incentive through insurance rates is to levy a relatively high premium, which is not actuarially fair.     

Portfolio optimization under convex incentive schemes

We consider the terminal wealth utility maximization problem from the point of view of a portfolio manager who is paid by an incentive scheme, which is given as a convex function g of the terminal wealth. The manager’s own utility function U is assumed to be smooth and strictly concave; however, the resulting utility function U°g fails to be concave. As a consequence, the problem considered here does not fit into the classical portfolio optimization theory. Using duality theory, we prove wealth-independent existence and uniqueness of the optimal portfolio in general (incomplete) semimartingale markets as long as the unique optimizer of the dual problem has a continuous law. In many cases, this existence and uniqueness result is independent of the incentive scheme and depends only on the structure of the set of equivalent local martingale measures. As examples, we discuss (complete) one-dimensional models as well as (incomplete) lognormal mixture and popular stochastic volatility models. We also provide a detailed analysis of the case where the unique optimizer of the dual problem does not have a continuous law, leading to optimization problems whose solvability by duality methods depends on the initial wealth of the investor.