Does the financial analysts' usage of non-financial information influence the analysts' forecast accuracy? Some evidence from the Belgian sell-side financial analyst

This paper examines whether the use of non-financial information by sell-side financial analysts influences the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. The research findings, based on a survey of Belgian financial analysts, suggest that financial analysts who use more forward-looking information and more internal-structure information offer more accurate forecasts. Furthermore, the listed Belgian firms examined in this study have improved their non-financial information reporting over time. However, neither the frequency nor the quantity of non-financial information mentioned by financial analysts in their reports appears to have increased over time.     

A discussion of “Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?”

It is well known that both managers and analysts frequently define earnings by excluding various amounts from GAAP earnings. Christensen et al. (Rev Account Stud, 2011) make a prediction of causality whereby managers actively influence how analysts define earnings. They argue that the mechanism through which managers accomplish this is guidance of analysts’ earnings forecasts within a fiscal period. Using a large sample of firms actively followed by analysts, the authors examine whether the existence of earnings guidance is associated with higher levels of total exclusions in analysts’ definition of earnings. The study provides suggestive evidence that managers actively influence analysts’ definition of earnings that they forecast. However, the indirect nature of the research design calls for additional work to specifically link directed guidance of GAAP earnings exclusions to amounts actually excluded by analysts.     

Relative accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts over time: a Markov chain analysis

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the time patterns of individual analysts’ relative accuracy ranking in earnings forecasts using a Markov chain model. Two levels of stochastic persistence are found in analysts’ relative accuracy over time. Factors underlying analysts’ performance persistence are identified and they include analyst’s length of experience, workload, and the size and growth rate of firms followed by the analyst. The strength and the composition of these factors are found to vary markedly in different industries. The findings support the general notion that analysts are heterogeneous in their accuracy in earnings forecasts and that their superior/inferior performance tends to persist over time. An analysis based on a refined measure of analysts’ forecast accuracy ranking that strips off firm-specific factors further enhances the empirical validity of the findings. These findings provide a concrete basis for researchers to further explore why and how analysts perform differently in the competitive market of investment information services.     

CEO stock options and analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO stock options and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. A higher level of stock options may induce managers to undertake riskier projects, to change and/or reallocate their effort, and to possibly engage in gaming (such as opportunistic earnings and disclosure management). These managerial behaviors result in an increase in the complexity of forecasting and hence, less accurate analysts’ forecasts. Analysts’ optimistic forecast bias may also increase as the level of stock options pay increases. Because forecast complexity increases with stock options pay, analysts, needing greater access to management’s information to produce accurate forecasts, have incentives to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Alternatively, a higher level of stock options pay may lead to improved disclosure because it better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests. The improved disclosure, in turn, may result in more accurate and less biased analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical evidence indicates that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy decreases and forecast optimism increases as the level of CEO stock options increases. This evidence suggests that the incentive alignment effects of stock options are more than offset by the investment, effort allocation and gaming incentives induced by stock options grants to CEOs.     

Analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ research and development expenses

This study examines whether reported values for firms’ research and development (R&D) affect analysts’ annual earnings forecast revisions following quarterly earnings announcements. Because R&D introduces uncertainty into earnings forecasts, analysts may benefit from additional information searches in an effort to increase forecast accuracy. Also, accounting standards mandate an immediate expensing of R&D, in essence projecting a zero value for the R&D. To the extent that R&D will produce future payoffs, the expense treatment reduces the informativeness of reported earnings for forecasting future earnings. Thus, the marginal benefit of analysts’ efforts to produce more information may increase with the magnitude of the R&D component of earnings announcements and trigger additional forecast revisions. Alternatively, if the cost of information searches exceeds the benefit, analysts’ forecast revisions may decrease. Our results show a positive relation between R&D expenses and analysts’ forecast revision activity. We also find a positive and significant association between the level of R&D expenses and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast revisions following quarterly announcements. These results point to a greater amount of analyst scrutiny when reported earnings are accompanied by high levels of R&D expenses.

An examination of factors affecting Chinese financial analysts’ information comprehension,analyzing ability,and job quality

This paper examines various factors affecting Chinese financial analysts’ information comprehension, analyzing ability and job quality. We hypothesized that financial analysts with better educational background, more experience, superior resources provided by large brokerage firms and more information sources have better information comprehension, stronger analyzing ability, and higher job quality. Using a survey method to collect data, we found that information sources have a significant impact on analysts’ information comprehension, analyzing ability and job quality. Specifically, analysts tend to exhibit greater information comprehension and better job quality when they conduct more company-level surveys. Additionally, when they have more access to firms’ indirect information, analysts tend to have a stronger analyzing ability and better job quality. We also found that analysts’ educational background has a positive impact on their analyzing ability while analysts’ work experience improves their job quality. This study’s results indicate that financial analysts are still a fledgling profession in current China, and the capabilities of Chinese financial analysts need to be improved through additional training and continued education. Moreover, our study is important in highlighting the urgency of fostering the development of the financial analysis profession in China.      

Chinese Walls in German Banks*

Analysts in a bank’s research department cover firms that have no relationship with the bank as well as companies in which the bank has a strategic interest. Officially, banks must establish Chinese Walls around their research departments to allow the analysts to work independently and to avoid the flow of insider information. We examine analyst behavior under long-term bank-firm relationships using ownership data and analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for German companies from 1994 to 2001. We find evidence that is consistent with analysts reconciling their employers’ interests with their own career concerns. They seem to use their information advantage strategically by releasing favorable and thereby more precise reports when the market underestimates earnings. In order not to jeopardize the bank-client relationship, they suppress negative information when the market is too optimistic. Combining situations where the market over- and underestimates earnings, we can replicate the unconditional positive bias in analyst forecasts found in the previous literature. Despite the bias in affiliated analysts’ forecasts, they nonetheless selectively communicate valuable information to investors. *We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data. This data has been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectations research. We thankfully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) under the Jubil?umsfonds grant number 8523. We thank Werner Antweiler, Michael Halling, Helmut Elsinger, Evelyn Hayden, Greg Hebb, Cornelia Kullmann, Kai Li, Colin Mayer, Stefan Pichler, Duane Seppi, Alex Stomper, Neal Stoghton, Michael Stutzer, Suresh Sundaresan, Yishay Yafeh, Josef Zechner, Christine Zulehner, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at UBC, the Northern Finance Association meetings, the Western Finance Association meetings, and the European Finance Association meetings for helpful comments and Eva Smolen for excellent research assistance.     

Never judge a book by its cover: what security analysts have to say beyond recommendations

Our study analyzes market reaction to the entire content of a large sample of analysts’ reports from the period 2002 to 2004 for the German market. In particular, we explore whether the three summary measures in the reports, i.e., recommendation revisions, earnings forecast revisions, and target price forecast revisions are acknowledged by the market. Additionally, we investigate if stated justifications in the written text of analysts’ reports contain information value beyond the three summary measures. We find that earnings forecast revisions and target price forecast revisions contain valuable information, both unconditionally and conditional on the rest of the information in the report. Our findings also reveal that justifications made by analysts are of high salience to market participants. These justifications provide valuable information, both unconditionally and conditional on all other types of information in a report. Our findings also suggest that business ties between banks and the analyzed companies do not affect market reaction to dissemination of an analysts’ report.

Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations over the 1994–2000 period, we find that analysts’ recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment banking relationships and brokerage pressure but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.     

On the information role of stock recommendation revisions

We examine the information transmission role of stock recommendation revisions by sell-side security analysts. Revisions are associated with economically insignificant mean price reactions and often piggyback on recent news, events, long-term momentum, and short-run contrarian return predictors, typically downgrading after bad news and upgrading after good news. However, the revisions are usually information-free for investors. The findings go against the long-standing view that recommendations are an important means by which analysts assimilate information into stock prices. They disagree with the view of policymakers that analysts’ stock picks materially impact stock prices.     

Financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: A better surrogate for market expectations

The specification of the market expectation of accounting numbers is a common feature of many empirical studies in accounting and finance. Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) found that financial analysts' forecasts have information content. This study evaluates the quality of analysts' forecasts as surrogates for the market expectation of earnings and compares it with that of prediction models commonly used in research. Results indicate that prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements, suggesting that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-series models. The study also identifies factors that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts'forecasts. The broadness of the information set employed by analysts and, to a lesser extent, their reliance on information released after the end of the fiscal year appear to be important contributors to their performance.     

How efficient is the market for Australian firms’ earnings information?

We construct a measure of the speed with which forecasts issued by sell-side analysts accurately forecast future annual earnings. Following Marshall, we label this measure earnings information flow timeliness (EIFT). This measure avoids the aggregation problem inherent in price-based measures of information efficiency. We document large variation in EIFT across firm-years, and show that EIFT is positively associated with the extent of analyst following, consistent with increased analyst coverage improving the speed with which earnings-related information is recognised. We also find that EIFT is higher for firm-years classified as ‘bad news’ (i.e., where analysts’ forecasts at the start of the financial period exceed the reported outcome). However, when we separately consider instances where analysts appear to forecast non-GAAP (or ‘street’) earnings rather than GAAP earnings, we find that the greater timeliness of bad news is concentrated among observations where analysts forecast non-GAAP earnings, where unusual items are typically excluded. We conclude that the market for accounting information is more efficient for negative operating outcomes than for negative outcomes reflecting unusual items.     

IPO pricing: growth rates implied in offer prices

This paper studies the valuation of companies going public and defines a methodology to infer the growth expectations implicit in the prices of their Initial Public Offering (IPO). The proposed reverse-engineered DCF model is operable by individual investors, as it does not require access to private information or sell-side analysts’ forecasts. Applying the procedure to a sample of IPOs in three European countries (France, Italy, and Germany), we estimate the cash flow growth implied by offer prices and examine the bias of implied growth in comparison to the realized. We find that the estimated growth in cash flow is much higher than its actual realization, with the median IPO firm overvalued at the offering by 74%. Estimation errors increase with IPO firms’ leverage and underpricing, and decrease with age, size, and book-to-market ratios. Further tests find that post-IPO stock returns are lower for issues whose implied growth is more upward biased.     

Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses

Some Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.     

Analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt

We examine the relation between analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt financing. Consistent with the view that the information contained in analysts’ forecasts is economically significant across asset classes, we find that analyst activity reduces bond yield spreads. We also find that the economic impact of analysts is most pronounced when uncertainty about firm value is highest (that is, when firms have high idiosyncratic risk). Our findings are robust to controls for private information in equity prices and level of corporate disclosures. Overall, the results indicate that the information contained in analyst forecasts is valued outside the equity market and provide an additional channel in which better information is associated with a lower cost of capital.     

Analysts’ sale and distribution of non fundamental information

We examine an analyst’s sale and distribution of information related to short-term price movements but unrelated to underlying firm value. By selling non fundamental information, the analyst increases competition on the signal, but prices become more sensitive to net order flow, creating an offsetting increase in the non fundamental signal’s value. More precise non fundamental information is more widely distributed. In the limit, a perfect non fundamental signal will be publicly disclosed for an arbitrarily small fee, and the analyst earns profits as if he possessed fundamental information. Consistent with empirical findings, analysts’ recommendations can be profitable, even when widely distributed or seemingly inconsistent with detailed forecasts. Analysis based on non fundamental information does not contribute to greater price efficiency but reduces liquidity costs. In a multi-period setting, traders with non fundamental information do not front-run, preferring to transact only in the period in which uninformed demand is executed.     

Macro information environment change and the quality of management earnings forecasts

The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors’ expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied. Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers’ tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.

Does earnings acceleration convey information?

Valuation theory, investment managers, financial analysts, and textbooks advocating horizontal financial statement analysis suggest that the change in earnings growth (earnings acceleration) conveys value relevant information. We test this assertion using a large sample of U.S. firms. Results from cross-sectional short-window (around earnings announcements) and long-window (annual) returns-earnings regressions reveal a strong association between contemporaneous returns and earnings acceleration after controlling for earnings levels and changes. Moreover, earnings acceleration is useful in predicting future earnings, and financial analysts appear to use the information in earnings acceleration in addition to earnings levels and changes in revising their forecasts. Furthermore, earnings acceleration conveys information incremental to that provided by changes in analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth. This study extends the empirical returns-earnings model that includes only earnings levels and changes and shows that more useful information can be extracted from reported earnings numbers than has been previously documented.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and analysts’ reliance on earnings announcements

Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibits corporations from selectively disclosing material information to groups of favored analysts and institutional investors. If information previously provided is excluded by the new regulation from analysts’ information set, it is plausible that the relative importance of the other information, such as earnings announcements, which remains could increase (Arya et al., 2005). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether analysts become more reliant on firm earnings announcements in revising their forecasts after implementation of the regulation. Our empirical results show that, after the regulation, more analysts issue forecasts immediately after earnings announcements. In addition, analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to converge more after observing earnings announcements in the post-regulation period. These results, in conjunction with the finding of higher overall level of forecast errors and dispersion, indicate that earnings announcements become more important information sources in the post regulation period. These findings suggest that analysts are more reliant on earnings announcements and there is an increase in analyst herding as a result of Regulation Fair Disclosure.     

An empirical assessment of the premium associated with meeting or beating both time-series earnings expectations and analysts’ forecasts

Recent research provides evidence of a market premium accruing to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We find similar results for our sample of firms. However, we also find a market premium for firms that meet or beat time-series forecasts, and that the highest market premium accrued to firms that meet or beat both analysts’ and time-series forecasts. These findings are supported by assessments of future financial performance over the next two subsequent years. Our findings are consistent with the notion that when time-series benchmark is used in conjunction with analysts’ forecasts, investors obtain a more reliable (i.e., less noisy) signal regarding whether firms have actually met or beaten market expectations.