Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

Audit committee financial expertise and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

An important role of financial accounting information is to aid financial statement users in forming expectations about the firm's future earnings. Prior research finds that accounting financial expertise of the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. We extend this literature by examining the association between audit committee financial expertise and analysts' ability to anticipate future earnings. We find a significant association between accounting financial expertise on the audit committee and analyst earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less dispersed. In contrast, we do not find a significant association between non-accounting financial expertise (i.e., supervisory expertise) and forecast accuracy or forecast dispersion. These findings contribute to our understanding of the benefits of accounting expertise in audit committees by demonstrating an association between accounting financial expertise and improvements in analyst earnings forecasts.     

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.     

Domestic Accounting Standards, International Accounting Standards, and the Predictability of Earnings

We investigate (1) whether the variation in accounting standards across national boundaries relative to International Accounting Standards (IAS) has an impact on the ability of financial analysts to forecast non-U.S. firms' earnings accurately, and (2) whether analyst forecast accuracy changes after firms adopt IAS. IAS are a set of financial reporting policies that typically require increased disclosure and restrict management's choices of measurement methods relative to the accounting standards of our sample firms' countries of domicile. We develop indexes of differences in countries' accounting disclosure and measurement policies relative to IAS, and document that greater differences in accounting standards relative to IAS are significantly and positively associated with the absolute value of analyst earnings forecast errors. Further, we show that analyst forecast accuracy improves after firms adopt IAS. More specifically, after controlling for changes in the market value of equity, changes in analyst following, and changes in the number of news reports, we find that the convergence in firms' accounting policies brought about by adopting IAS is positively associated with the reduction in analyst forecast errors.     

Are more able managers good future tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.     

International Variation in Accounting Measurement Rules and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

We theorize that accounting systems affect analysts' forecast accuracy through changes in earnings variability. We argue that the matching and historical cost principles reduce earnings variability, and hence, reduce analysts' earnings forecast errors. We also argue that restricting the choice of accounting methods can result in larger forecast errors. We argue that more informative disclosure environments should reduce forecast errors. We test whether variation in these factors across countries explain variation in analysts' earnings forecast bias and accuracy. Our results indicate that these characteristics of financial accounting systems are complements, and that they affect financial analysts' earnings forecast errors.     

Causal language intensity in performance commentary and financial analyst behaviour

We use automated techniques to measure causal reasoning on earnings‐related financial outcomes of a large sample of MD&A sections of US firms and examine the intensity of causal language in that context against extent of analyst following and against properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find a positive and significant association between a firm's causal reasoning intensity and analyst following and analyst earnings forecast accuracy respectively. Correspondingly, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is negatively and significantly associated with causal reasoning intensity. These results suggest that causal reasoning intensity provides incremental information about the relationship between financial performance outcomes and its causes, thereby reducing financial analysts’ information processing and interpreting costs and lowering overall analyst information uncertainty. Additionally, we find that decreases in analyst following are followed by more causal reasoning on performance disclosure. We also find that firms with a considerable increase of causal disclosure especially attract new analysts who already cover many firms. Overall, our evidence of the relationship between causal reasoning intensity and properties of analyst behaviour is consistent with the proposition that causal reasoning is a generic narrative disclosure quality characteristic, able to provide incremental information to analysts and guide analysts' behaviour.     

Pro forma disclosures,audit fees,and auditor resignations

The disclosure of non-GAAP (pro forma) earnings numbers by managers in the post-SOX era continues to attract attention from regulators, media, and researchers. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how auditors view clients that emphasize pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings. We study the extent to which audit fees and auditor resignations are associated with opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. We find that during the pre-SOX period, optimistic pro forma differences, measured using either IBES actual earnings or hand-collected pro forma earnings, are associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignations. Additional results indicate that auditors seem to be more concerned with non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-SOX period.     

Do firms change earnings management behavior after receiving financial forecast warnings?

This study investigates whether government-issued financial forecast warnings are associated with earnings management in Taiwan. In particular, we examine whether firms receiving warnings use different earnings management tools than firms without warnings. We find that firms that were warned prefer to use real activities manipulation than accrual-based earnings management to avoid potential litigation and penalties. In addition, we document that firms receiving warnings employed both accrual-based and real activities earnings management especially through over-production in response to the regulatory change from mandatory to voluntary disclosure in 2005. Our results suggest that while the government warning mechanism might constrain the forecasting firms from using accrual-based earnings management, the adoption of voluntary financial forecast disclosure did not necessarily prevent them from engaging in accrual-based manipulation.     

Voluntary Causal Disclosures: Tendencies and Capital Market Reaction

In this study, we provide empirical evidence on whether voluntarily disclosed causal attributions made in management earnings forecasts are credible by investigating the conditions under which such attributions are made and the extent to which security price responses are associated with attribution existence. We find that causal attributions are more likely to be made when forecast news is bad (relative to good), and that the type of attribution made is more likely to be external (internal) for bad (good) forecast news. Incorporating the existence and type of attribution into models that explain announcement period three-day cumulative abnormal returns yields significant effects for attribution incidence and type after controlling for unexpected earnings and forecast type (e.g., point, range, etc.). Consistent with the idea that attributions enhance the credibility or precision of management forecasts, attribution disclosure enhances price reactions per dollar of unexpected earnings conveyed in a management forecast.     

Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments

Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm’s financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses.     

Impact of earnings performance on price‐sensitive disclosures under the Australian continuous disclosure regime

This study examines the relation between accounting earnings and the frequency of price‐sensitive corporate disclosure under Australia's statutory continuous disclosure requirements. Despite low litigation threats and excepting loss‐making firms, results show that firms with earnings declines (bad news) are more likely to make continuous disclosure than firms with earnings increases (good news). This suggests that market forces and regulators’ scrutiny are sufficient to induce a ‘bad news’ disclosure bias. This study also examines the ‘materiality’ requirement under the continuous disclosure requirements and finds a positive relation between disclosure frequency and the magnitude of earnings news. The earnings–return correlation is positively associated with disclosure frequency for the financial services industry.     

Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.     

An exploratory study of the effects of the European Union 8th Directive on Company Law on audit committees: Evidence from EU companies listed on the US stock exchanges

Member States in the European Union will be required to establish audit committees for all public-interest entities, according to the EU 8th Directive on Company Law. This EU 8th Directive creates a convergence of corporate oversight for both audit processes and financial reporting process and thus provides an opportunity to examine and contrast associations that exist among audit committee, board of directors characteristics with audit committee alignment, and the impact of such alignment on earnings management. Results of a logistic regression analysis suggest that firms with audit committees possessing greater financial expertise, with larger boards and more independent boards are less likely to engage in audit committee alignment while firms with audit committees possessing greater governance expertise are more likely to engage in alignment. In addition, we find that firms associated with audit committee alignment engage in less earnings management.     

To What Extent Does the Financial Reporting Process Curb Earnings Surprise Games?

Managers play earnings surprise games to avoid negative earnings surprises by managing earnings upward or by managing analysts' earnings expectations downward. We investigate the effectiveness of the financial reporting process at restraining earnings surprise games. Because the annual reporting process is subject to an independent audit and more rigorous expense recognition rules than interim reporting, it provides managers with fewer opportunities to manage earnings upward. We document that, relative to interim reporting, annual reporting reduces the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management and, to a lesser extent, of negative surprise avoidance, but increases the magnitude of downward expectations management. Our findings suggest that regulatory attempts to monitor corporations' internal checks and balances are likely to be more effective at curbing upward earnings management than at mitigating negative surprise avoidance.     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

“Big Bang” Accounting Reforms in Japan: Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy Declines as the Japanese Government Mandates Japanese Corporations to Adopt International Accounting Standards

The mandated adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) for Japanese corporations did not result in improved earnings that forecast predictability. These findings contradict the research findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas’ (2003) research findings support the need for mandating the adoption of IAS. They found that Japanese managers were “manipulating” reported earnings by managing the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. Adoption of IAS decreases the availability of this practice and it was and is expected to increase disclosure and transparency. Increased disclosure and transparency are expected to decrease financial analyst forecast errors, which did not decrease for 139 firms examined in this study for the timeframe of 1999–2002. This research finding does not support the idea that adoption of IAS improves financial information used in decision making relative to forecasting earnings. Assuming that increased predictability indicates higher quality reported earnings and enhanced usefulness of financial information, the mandated adoption of IAS did not result in these. Assuming that adoption of IAS in Japan increased the level of transparency and disclosure by Japanese firms, which made it harder for Japanese firms to manage their earnings in order to meet the managerial earnings forecasts that these firms must make. Thus, after the adoption of IAS in Japan, forecast errors for managerial forecasts of earnings increased. This evidence is new to the literature.     

Earnings Surprises in Analysts' Forecasts,Mandatory Disclosure,and Share Repurchases

This paper examines the impact of forecast errors and the mandatory disclosure of repurchase transactions required by 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations on share repurchases. We define forecast errors as the difference between analysts' forecasted earnings and actual earnings. We argue that firms with positive forecast errors imply greater information asymmetry, which may induce them to signal through share repurchases. We show that both the repurchase target and analysts' forecast revision are positively related to forecast errors. Furthermore, these associations are more pronounced in the low disclosure period (1989–2003) where greater information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is found, while increased transparency in the high disclosure period (2004–2006) leads to more significant improvement in long‐term performances for firms with positive forecast errors. The results are consistent with our expectations that the information asymmetry implied in forecast errors, along with a shock change from the introduction of the 2003 SEC regulation, affect both corporate and analysts' behaviour.     

The association between quarter length,forecast errors,and firms’ voluntary disclosures

Approximately 60 percent of adjacent fiscal quarters contain a different number of calendar days. In preliminary analyses, we find the change in quarter length is significantly associated with the changes in sales and earnings and that analysts condition on the prior quarter's results when making their forecasts. These results indicate that it is important for analysts to adjust for changes in quarter length when making forecasts. However, we find the quarterly change in days is positively associated with analysts’ sales and earnings forecasts errors, where forecast error equals the actual earnings minus the forecasted earnings. These results indicate that analysts systematically underestimate (overestimate) performance when quarter length increases (decreases). We find evidence indicating investors make similar errors as returns around earnings announcements are positively associated with the change in quarter length, but only when changes in firm performance is more sensitive to changes in quarter length. Corroborating these findings, managers are more (less) likely to discuss quarter length during conference calls when quarter length decreases (increases). These results are consistent with managers’ strategic disclosure incentives. In summary, our evidence suggests analysts and investors fail to fully take account of the quasi-mechanical effect that quarter length has on firm performance and managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosures to take advantage of these failures.     

The Impact of AASB 8 Operating Segments on Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: Australian Evidence

This paper evaluates the impact of firms’ adoption of AASB 8 segment disclosure rules on analysts’ earnings forecasts. It examines whether providing more disaggregated segment information following the adoption of AASB 8 is associated with an increase in analysts’ ability to forecast earnings. We find that analysts’ earnings forecasts have not improved significantly after adopting AASB 8 in Australia, regardless of whether firms disclosed more disaggregated segment information. Our use of control firms provides assurance that the results are due to AASB 8 and not to some other events concurrent with the adoption of AASB 8. Overall, our results imply that the benefits associated with the management approach as experienced by financial analysts in the United States have not been realised by financial analysts in Australia. This suggests that the successful adoption of an accounting standard in one country should not be the justification for recommending adoption in other countries. Further, our results raise questions about whether the enhanced disclosures required in the new standard are more for the other users of financial statements, such as investors, rather than analysts.