风险投资认证影响新股发行吗——来自香港创业板的经验证据

实证分析发现,香港创业板市场有风险投资持股公司的发行价格要高于无风险投资持股的公司。风险投资持股显著影响着发行公司IPO时机的选择,无风险投资持股的公司会选择在其经营业绩最好的时间上市,有风险投资持股的公司则不然。研究还发现具有风险投资持股公司IPO后的经营业绩和市场表现并不好于无风险投资持股的公司。研究结论支持风险投资在香港创业板市场已初步具有西方发达证券市场那样的“认证”功能,有风险投资持股的公司被市场认为具有良好前途的信号,但风险投资并不具有为其持股公司提供增值服务的功能。     

风险投资对创业板IPO折价影响的实证研究

本文以截至2011年6月30日在我国创业板上市的236家公司作为研究对象,研究风险投资对创业板IPO折价的影响。研究发现：（1）有风险投资参与的企业IPO折价显著高于无风险投资参与的企业,支持声誉效应假说,即风险投资机构以IPO折价来提早退出投资项目,以此来建立自己的声誉,从而吸引更多的资金流入;（2）在对有风投参股的投资公司做进一步分析后发现一一随着风投参与度的增大,IPO调整折价率并未出现明显的提升,创业板企业IPO时风险投资机构的数量、风险投资机构持股比例与调整折价率关系不显著。     

风险投资声誉对上市公司IPO抑价和长期业绩的影响

本文以2006-2010年深圳中小板上市的风险投资支持企业为样本,实证研究了风险投资机构的声誉对其支持企业的IPO抑价以及上市后长期业绩的影响。研究结果显示：风险投资声誉对IPO抑价无显著影响．低声誉的风险投资存在着过早将所支持企业推向IPO市场的动机;风险投资声誉与被投资企业的长期业绩具有显著的正相关关系;风险投资支持的企业上市后的经营业绩均出现了下滑,但是高声誉风险投资支持的企业业绩下滑程度更小。     

创业投资对企业经营绩效的影响研究——基于中小板和创业板上市公司的实证分析

本文以2010-2013年间在深圳中小板及创业板上市的公司为样本,分阶段定量分析在公司上市前两年至后两年的时间段内,创业投资支持和退出对其经营绩效变化的影响,以及创业投资持股比例和联合投资机构数量等微观因素是否在被投资公司的绩效变化中发挥作用。研究发现,有创业投资支持的被投资企业在上市之前的经营业绩趋于下滑,而这种影响在上市之后并不显著,创投的退出对公司经营绩效的影响不显著。联合投资的创投机构数量在一定阶段对被投资公司的经营绩效产生负向影响,而创投机构的持股比例和创业投资时间的影响不显著。     

VC中的VC——专访IBM（中国）风险投资商务总监黎世彤

目前，在纳斯达克上市的企业中，有75％企业后面有风险投资；而这些企业的风险投资中有60％与IBM有关联。也就是说在纳斯达克上市的企业中，有45％企业后面有IBM投资的影子。根据本刊记者调查，IBM在全球投资超过80家VC基金，每年带给IBM高额的回报。在风险投资界大家都戏称IBM风险投资部是VC中的VC。对于这么一个庞大复杂的运作，对于一个和IBM的业务链如此密切相关的风险投资，IBM风险投资是如何做的?为什么会有人说它是VC中的VC?为此本刊记者专访了IBM风险投资商务总监黎世彤先生。     

创业板风险投资企业股权结构与企业绩效

风险投资的介入是创业板企业的重要特征,对创业板风险投资企业的股权结构进行分析,结合每股收益分析企业创始人持股比例、前十大股东持股比例以及VC持股比例与经营绩效的关系,以期给投资者和创业者提供参考。     

风险投资与IPO盈余管理程度的实证研究——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据

本文以2009年10月30日至2011年12月31日间在创业板上市的281家上市公司作为研究样本,以修正的Jones模型度量盈余管理的程度,检验风险投资对我国创业板上市公司IPO前的盈余管理程度的影响.本文的研究结果表明,与西方成熟的风险投资机构相比,我国的风险投资机构依然偏重投资于传统的制造业行业,以期在短时间获得高额投资回报,面对新科技和新商业模式的行业投资则相对偏少.同时相比无风险投资支持的公司,有风险投资支持的公司的盈余管理程度更低,并且风险投资机构持股比例越高,盈余管理程度越低.     

以退出机制为核心完善中国风险投资体系

风险投资制度与原理一、风险投资的内涵根据美国全美风险投资协会(N VCA)的定义,风险投资是由职业金融家投入到成长性好、有巨大竞争潜力的企业中的一种权益资本的行为;根据欧洲风险投资协会(EVCA)定义,风险投资是一种由专门的投资公司向具有巨大发展潜力的成长型、扩张型、重组型的未上市企业提供资金支持并辅之以管理参与的行为;联合国经济合作和发展组织在1983年召开的第二次投资方式研讨会上认为凡是以高科技与知识为基础,生产与经营技术密集的创新产品或服务的投资,都可视为风险投资;《关于尽快发展中国风险投资事业的提案》中认为…     

我国上市公司IPO效应研究

一、引言 首次公开发行股票(简称IPO)的公司,其经营业绩在上市前后会发生什么变化及导致这些变化的原因如何,是20世纪90年代以来财务学所关心的重要问题之一.从理论上来说,一方面,公司往往在进入快速成长阶段上市,公司上市时获得了一笔可观的股权资本,改善资本结构,提高了资信,等级,上市后还可以在资本市场上持续融资,增强了竞争环境下抵御风险的财务能力;同时从上市前的资本约束,投资不足状态中解脱出来,在把握战略投资机会资源方面处于有利的竞争地位,所以公司在上市后的三至四年内,应该实现与资产规模扩张速度一致甚至更高的经营目标.另一方面,由于股票市场关注每股收益,权益资本收益率等反映经营业绩的财务指标,上市公司为了保持持续股权融资能力,一般都有合法利用会计准则操纵公司会计账面以求达到股票市场认同的增发新股或其他再融资财务标准.因此,有理由认为,公司上市后三至四年内,经营业绩应该逐年高,而不是递减,但国外学者的实证研究表明,公司当年的经营业绩显著低于上市前一年.也就是说公司上市后难以维持其上市前的业绩水平,上市后经营业绩显著下降,本文称之为IPO效应.关于公司上市前后的业绩变化的理论预期与实证结果的背离,成为IPO研究领域新的困惑.     

联合投资对IPO抑价的影响——来自创业板上市公司的经验证据

文章以2009年10月至2014年10月在创业板上市的公司为样本,通过建立多元线性回归模型,并采用Heckman两阶段模型解决内生性问题,考察了联合投资及其相关特质对被投资企业IPO抑价的影响。研究发现:联合投资比单一风险投资更能降低IPO抑价率,主导风投持股比例和声誉与IPO抑价率显著负相关,主导风投对被投资公司的投资时间与IPO抑价率负相关,但不显著。本文研究细化了风险投资相关研究,丰富了相关研究文献,同时验证了联合投资的"认证理论"在创业板发挥了显著作用,为企业引入风险投资策略选择提供了有益借鉴。     

Coaches or Speculators? The Role and Impact of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

In this paper, we utilize a panel dataset that covers 1245 listed companies which accomplished their IPO during 2006 to 2014 in China to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) firms on executive compensation, equity incentive and pay-performance-sensitivity. We make several key findings: First, we find the presence of VCs can significantly raise the executive compensation. Second, high reputation VCs and private VCs increases the likelihood of granting executive equity incentives, whereas foreign VCs are significantly negatively related with executive equity incentive. Third, the pay-performance sensitivity of government VCs and foreign VCs is significant on stock return (RET) whereas insignificant on accounting performance (ROA). Moreover, the increasing VCs share in portfolio companies enhance the pay performance sensitivity on RET. Our results show that before VCs final exiting their post-IPO portfolio companies in China, VCs’ impact on executive compensation are more consistent with grandstanding theories and intending to provide higher cash compensation to encourage executives to raise the companies’ stock price, which is indicating VCs’ changing role from a coach into a speculator after the portfolio companies’ IPO.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Performance of Private to Public MBOs: The Role of Venture Capital

Abstract:   Using a unique dataset, we examine financial performance, and venture capital involvement in 167 MBOs exiting through IPOs (MBO‐IPOs) on the London Stock Exchange, during the period 1964 –1997. VC backed MBOs seem to be more underpriced than MBOs without venture capital backing, based on average value‐weighted returns. MBOs backed by highly reputable VCs tend to be older companies, and exit earlier than MBOs backed by less reputable VCs. The results contradict 'certification' and 'grandstanding' hypotheses supported by US data ( Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ; and Gompers, 1996 , respectively). We found no evidence of either significant underperformance, or that VC backed MBOs perform better than their non‐VC backed counterparts in the long run. However, MBOs backed by highly reputable venture capital firms seem to be better long‐term investments as compared to those backed by less prestigious venture capitalist firms. The results remain robust after using different methods to measure performance, and after controlling for sample selectivity bias.     

Economic freedom and cross-border venture capital performance

We investigate the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance using a large sample of 10,205 cross-border VC investments by 1906 foreign VC firms (VCs) in 6535 domestic portfolio companies. We focus on the impact of a domestic country's economic freedom on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using a probit model and the Cox hazard model. After controlling for other related factors of domestic countries, portfolio companies, VCs and the global VC market, as well as year and industry fixed effects, we find that a domestic country's economic freedom is crucial to cross-border VC performance. In particular, in a more economically free country, as measured by the raw values of, quartiles of or the ranking in the index of economic freedom (IEF), a foreign VC-backed portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through an IPO (initial public offering) or an M&A (merger and acquisition), and a foreign VC firm is likely to spend a shorter investment duration in the portfolio company. We also identify interesting evidence on the impact of many other level factors of domestic countries, portfolio companies, VCs and the global VC market on cross-border VC performance.     

What Matters in Venture Capital? Evidence from Entrepreneurs’ Stated Preferences

We study how entrepreneurs evaluate the ability of different US venture capitalists (VCs) to add value to start-up companies. Analyzing a large data set of entrepreneurs’ stated preferences regarding VCs, we demonstrate that entrepreneurs view independent partnership VCs more favorably than other VC types (e.g., corporate, financial, and government sponsored VCs). Although entrepreneurs are able to correctly identify VCs with better track records, they do not believe them to be more desirable investors. We also find that an entrepreneur's rankings are affected by their overall exposure to VCs, emphasizing the role of experiential learning in the venture capital market.     

Cross-border venture capital performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance in the Chinese VC market. We focus on the impact of foreign VC firms' (VCs') human capital and domestic entrepreneurs' experience on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using logit and Cox hazard models. After controlling for portfolio company quality, domestic VC industry development, domestic exit conditions and a number of other factors, little correlation was evident between VC performance and foreign VCs' human capital, such as experience, networks and reputation. In contrast, the domestic entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to VC performance. In particular, if an entrepreneur has more general experience in terms of the number of companies previously worked for or more special experience in terms of the number of companies previously served as a CEO or top manager, a portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through IPO or M&A, and the VCs are also likely to shorten their investment duration in the portfolio company.     

Start-up investment with scarce venture capital support

Venture capitalists, representing informed capital, screen, monitor and advise start-up entrepreneurs. The paper reports three new results on venture capital (VC) finance and the evolution of the VC industry. First, there is an optimal VC portfolio size with a trade-off between the number of companies and the value of managerial advice. Second, advice tends to be diluted when the industry expands and VC skills remain scarce in the short-run. The delayed entry of experienced VCs eventually restores the quality of advice and leads to more focused company portfolios. Third, as a welfare result, VCs tend to provide too little advisory effort and to invest in too few companies. Testable implications are also discussed.     

Venture capitalists and portfolio companies’ real activities manipulation

I study the relation between venture capitalists’ (VCs) presence and real activities manipulation (RM). I find that compared to non-venture-backed companies, venture-backed companies show significantly less RM in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust after controlling for the VC selection endogeneity. This is consistent with the argument that VCs do not inflate earnings when they exit the IPO firm but instead exercise a monitoring role to reduce the RM by other insiders. By the end of the second post-IPO fiscal year when VCs exit the portfolio companies, their impact on portfolio companies’ RM decreases dramatically. This suggests that the impact of VCs on portfolio companies is mainly through direct monitoring rather than through the establishment of a governance structure. A partitioned sample analysis indicates that VCs lapse their control and do not restrain RM during the Internet Bubble. VCs also tighten their control and reduce significantly RM in technology companies where managers engage in more aggressive RM, but they have no influence on RM in non-tech companies. Furthermore, using alternative VCs’ reputation proxies, I find that portfolio companies’ RM is negatively associated with VCs’ reputation.     

Investment risk allocation and the venture capital exit market: Evidence from early stage investing

This study provides evidence on how venture capitalists’ (VCs’) allocations of capital to riskier investments, as measured by the proportion of early versus late-stage investment in an industry, are linked to exit market conditions. Prior research has primarily focused on how VCs adjust aggregate investment to public equity market conditions. We develop a more inclusive measure of exit market conditions that accounts for recent secular changes that have affected the industry return structure, specifically, the sharp rise in the number of failures and M&A relative to IPO exits. We show that the dollars gained relative to dollars lost in recent exits and failures are significantly positively related to VCs’ allocations to early-stage companies over the period 1990–2008. The changes in allocations are large enough to have an effect on the availability of funding for early stage companies. In sum, our evidence shows that exit market conditions have a significant and economically meaningful influence on VCs’ allocations to riskier investments.     

Investor abilities and financial contracting: Evidence from venture capital

Using a large, new database of contractual provisions governing the allocation of cash flow rights in venture capital (VC) financings, we investigate how contract design is related to VC abilities to monitor and provide value-added services to the entrepreneur. We find that more experienced VCs, who have superior abilities and more frequently join the boards of their portfolio companies, obtain weaker downside-protecting contractual cash flow rights than less experienced VCs. Several pieces of evidence suggest that this relation is unlikely to be driven by selection effects. The results suggest that VCs with better governance abilities focus less on obtaining downside protections, which entail risk-sharing costs, and more on other aspects of the contract (such as obtaining board representation) during negotiations with entrepreneurs. The results also imply that previous estimates of the amount entrepreneurs pay for affiliation with high-quality VCs are overstated.