互联网消费金融中的逆向选择和道德风险研究——基于信号传递和重复博弈的视角

采用博弈论的方法——信号传递模型和无限重复博弈模型,对互联网消费金融中由于信贷双方信息不对称而产生的逆向选择和道德风险问题进行了理论分析。结合互联网消费金融的自身特点,引入信用共享机制,分析得出了不同参数变化对博弈均衡的影响。结果表明当单次贷款的利率越低,单次信贷额度越低,低收入消费者的伪装成本越高和对消费者违约的信用惩罚越重时,可以有效地防止逆向选择的发生,使信用贷款流入高收入群体;而随着信息共享程度越深,消费金融服务的频次越高,由消费者主观意愿导致的道德风险就会越低,互联网消费金融活动开展就越顺利。     

企业并购决策信号传递博弈分析——有效并购博弈均衡的实现

并购作为企业之间的一种产权交易行为,实质上是企业并购双方在不完全信息情况下追求各自利益最大化的信号传递博弈过程。信号传递博弈是研究逆向选择的一个重要模型,在不完全信息条件下的非合作博弈中,它是一种具有广泛现实与应     

基于信号传递博弈的融资租赁市场均衡分析

融资租赁作为一种新的金融工具,已被诸多经济发达的国家普遍采用,并成为其金融市场的重要组成部分。在我国中小企业融资难的情况下,融资租赁也不失为中小企业融资的一种可供选择的方式。本文借鉴斯宾塞劳动力市场信号传递模型,构建一个符合我国中小企业融资市场实际状况的融资租赁市场调控模型。研究结果表明:融资租赁市场的均衡既取决于承租方的装裱成本,也取决于不同类型承租方的租金差异、低营运能力承租方的项目投入的成功率及低营运能力承租方的信用程度(即履约率)。     

保险市场逆向选择与顺向选择共存研究

保险市场存在着逆向选择。经典逆向选择模型认为,风险高的人会购买更多的保险,但大多数实证研究表明保险市场还存在顺向选择。本文认为,逆向选择和顺向选择虽然对立,但共存于保险市场,在此基础上构建保险市场均衡模型,并进行了仿真研究。     

浅析家装行业中的逆向选择问题

近些年来,我国家庭装修行业的迅猛发展,但是目前家装市场上企业水平良莠不齐,行业呈现混乱现象,由此产生逆向选择问题。本文基于信息经济学的视角,用信号传递和信息甄别理论分析我国家装市场上出现的逆向选择问题,并针对此问题提出解决办法。     

信贷市场的逆向选择风险与银行贷款策略的博弈分析

在信贷市场中企业比银行掌握了更多的投资项目信息,这种信息不对称性将会导致逆向选择风险,加大不良贷款产生的可能性。由于抵押贷款能降低企业的逆向选择行为,银行普遍将抵押贷款作为主要的信贷手段来保障信贷资金安全,提高银行预期利润。从博弈论的角度来讲,逆向选择是在既定的博弈规则安排下,借款人所做出的最佳选择。     

股票市场的逆向选择

本文依据旧车市场的逆选择原理,讨论了股票市场的逆向选择问题,分别阐述了逆向选择的成因和效率,最后提出了解决逆向选择问题的对策。     

上市公司和监督者关于信息披露行为的信号博弈

本文是在有效市场假设条件下,应用不完美信息信号博弈模型对参与者的行为进行博弈,分析上市公司和监管者基于自身利益最大化时的信号博彝,用以对我国证券市场监管者提供决策信息。     

社会保险市场上的逆向选择与公共政策干预:国际研究动态述评

随着社会经济的进步与发展,提供社会保险日益成为现代政府的重要任务,而信息不对称带来的逆向选择这一市场失灵问题是政府提供社会保险的主要经济依据之一。由此,近年来国际学术界涌现出一大批关于社会保险市场上逆向选择与公共政策干预问题的研究文献,在将理论与数据相结合以分析公共政策的福利影响方面出现了很多研究进展。本文就尝试对这一领域的研究进行总结与分析,为国内学术研究的开展与公共经济政策的设计提供有益借鉴。     

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Yaari's Dual Theory of Risk

Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.     

深市买卖价差逆向选择成分的估算与分析

本文以深市150家上市公司为样本，估算买卖价差逆向选择成分，研究逆向选择成分与公司特征之间的关系，并探讨其日内变化模式。研究发现信息不对称对深市买卖价差的贡献度为39％。公司规模越大，其股票的逆向选择成分越小；逆向选择成分随着交易量水平的上升而降低；高价股的逆向选择成分比低价股低。总体而言，逆向选择成分在早市呈现“倒U”型，在午市呈现“L”型。逆向选择成分与公司特征之问的关系及逆向选择成分的日内变动模式的实证分析结果，符合信息不对称与公司特征之问的逻辑关系及信息不对称的日内变动模式。     

Mortgage Refinancing,Adverse Selection,and FHA's Streamline Program

When interest rates decline, borrowers whose houses have appreciated significantly refinance out of FHA, while those whose houses have not do not. We provide evidence of the negative impact of regular (nonstreamline) refinancing in the mid-1980s on the average quality of FHA's surviving business. We demonstrate this adverse selection both informally and econometrically. We also argue that the sharp reduction in the cost of streamline refinancing (limited documentation, no required appraisal, and so on) in FHA's streamline refinance program in 1992 likely reduced the level of adverse selection in the FHA portfolio during the 1993 to 1994 refinancing boom, and we provide quantitative estimates of the resultant reduction in claim rates. While this reduction in cost almost certainly increased the financial viability of FHA during the middle 1990s, it may not in the long run.     

中国健康险市场逆向选择和正向选择并存现象的研究

本文以中国的健康险市场为例,考察不对称信息的影响。通过考察投保人投保金额以及附加险选择和索赔情况的相关关系,论文发现事后出现索赔的投保人,事前往往会选择购买附加险,但是投保金额却相对较低。结合理论模型分析,论文认为投保人在财富、风险偏好等方面的异质性以及信息不对称的存在是导致市场同时出现逆向选择和正向选择的主要原因。     

关于构建我国药品不良反应保险救济机制问题的研究

2006年上海试点的“严重药品不良反应综合保险”初探市场,未能实现药企蜂拥而至的期望局面,而是十分落寂地收场。药品不良反应保险救济机制一直未能实现,已成为我国医药业一大难题。本文通过对药品不良反应定义的分析,探析了我国建立药品不良反应保险救济机制的可行性,再结合近期的“严重药品不良反应综合保险”的失败经验,提出了完善救济制度、累积相关数据、建立鉴定委员会、政府补贴并强制购买等相关的政策与建议。     

Firm Characteristics as Cross‐sectional Determinants of Adverse Selection

Abstract:   We analyze the role of firm characteristics in determining the extent of adverse selection, and therefore liquidity, in securities markets. After controlling for the effects of the well‐established determinants of adverse selection, we find evidence that a firm's ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total book assets and its status as a public utility have additional explanatory power. To the extent that these variables are reasonable proxies for the firm's transparency of assets and regulatory environment, we assert these factors contribute to the adverse selection cost of transacting for our sample of NYSE listed S&P 500 firms.     

论存款保险制度下的风险防范

存款保险制度是一种金融保障制度。建立存款保险制度有利于降低金融风险,防止挤兑发生及危机扩散。当个别银行出现流动性风险时,存款人因为有了相关的法律制度作保证,不再产生巨大的恐惧心理,能避免发生挤兑风潮。同时,建立存款保险制度有利于保护存款人的利益。在投保银行面临支付危机时提供救助,在投保银行破产倒闭时依法清偿存款人的存款,从而保护了存款人的利益。     

Is the Adverse Selection Component Really Higher on the NYSE/Amex than on the Nasdaq?

Affleck–Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is higher for NYSE and Amex stocks than for Nasdaq stocks. Using the model of Huang and Stoll (1997), we revisit their study and find the opposite to be true – the adverse selection component is actually higher for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE and Amex stocks. The economic magnitude of this additional adverse selection cost is very significant. Our results have important implications for the understanding of information production in dealer versus auction markets, and the costs of trading on such markets.     

The Effect of Decimalization on Trade Size and Adverse Selection Costs

Abstract:   We examine adverse selection costs around NYSE decimalization. Further, we analyze the relation between adverse selection costs and trade size. We find a significant increase in the percentage adverse selection cost and a reduction in dollar adverse selection cost (percentage adverse selection multiplied by the spread) following complete decimalization on the NYSE. On estimating the adverse selection components by trade size classes, we find a decline in dollar adverse selection costs in trades of all sizes, with the strongest evidence coming from medium size trades, followed by small and large size trades. One implication of our findings is that there appears to be less stealth trading following complete decimalization and less institutional trading overall.