Optimal income transfers

A substantial literature addresses the design of transfer programs and policies, including the negative income tax, other means-tested transfers, the earned income tax credit, categorical assistance, and work inducements. This work is largely independent of that on the optimal nonlinear income tax, yet formulations of such a tax necessarily address how low-income individuals should be treated. This paper draws on the optimal income taxation literature to illuminate the analysis of transfer programs, including the level and shape of marginal tax rates (including phase-outs), the structure of categorical assistance, and the role of work inducements in an optimal income transfer scheme. JEL Classification H21 · H53 · I38     

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28     

Disability insurance and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. JEL Classification H55 · H23 · E62     

BAD taxation: Disintermediation and illiquidity in a bank account debits tax model

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the economic effects of bank account debits (BAD) taxation. Australia and various Latin American countries have levied or levy BAD taxes. Aspects such as financial disintermediation, market illiquidity, and impacts on dividend and interest rates are considered. Part of the BAD tax revenue may be fictitious, due to increased interest payments on government debt. The Brazilian BAD tax (CPMF) experience is evaluated. The empirical analysis confirms some theoretical predictions. Incidence base over GDP appears to be sensitive to the tax rate, possibly engendering a Laffer curve. The tax may also cause real interest rates to increase. Furthermore, the deadweight losses are relatively large, even if revenues are small. The theoretical and empirical results suggest that the BAD tax is not adequate for revenue collection. JEL Code E62 · H20     

Optimal taxation and public provision for poverty reduction

The existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes there exists a capacity to implement complex tax schemes, which is not necessarily the case for many developing countries. We examine the determinants of optimal redistributive policies in the context of a developing country that can only implement linear tax policies due to administrative reasons. Further, the reduction of poverty is typically the expressed goal of such countries, and this feature is also taken into account in our model. We derive the optimality conditions for linear income taxation, commodity taxation, and public provision of private and public goods for the poverty minimization case and compare the results to those derived under a general welfarist objective function. We also study the implications of informality on optimal redistributive policies for such countries. The exercise reveals non-trivial differences in optimal tax rules under the different assumptions.     

Optimal tax policy when firms are internationally mobile

The standard tax theory result that investment should not be distorted is based on the assumption that profits are locally bound. In this paper, we analyze the optimal tax policy in a model where firms are internationally mobile. We show that the optimal policy response to increasing firm mobility may be taxation, subsidization, or non-distortion of the marginal investment, depending on whether the mobile firms are more or less profitable than the average firm in the economy. Our findings may contribute to understanding recent tax policy developments in many OECD countries.     

Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income

A Norwegian tax reform committee recently proposed a personal tax on the realized income from shares after deduction for an imputed risk-free rate of return. This paper describes the design of the proposed shareholder income tax and shows that it will be neutral with respect to investment and financing decisions and decisions to realize capital gains, provided that full loss offsets are granted. Thus the tax allows some non-distortionary double taxation of corporate equity income. With an appropriate choice of tax rates, it also solves the problem of income shifting under a dual income tax. JEL Code: H24, H25     

Do tax sparing agreements contribute to the attraction of FDI in developing countries?

Measuring the effects of taxation on FDI in developing countries requires consideration of the tax sparing provision. This provision signed between developed and developing countries protects host country fiscal incentives for FDI. This paper estimates the impact of tax sparing provisions on Japanese outbound FDI between 1989 and 2000. We find evidence that the tax sparing provision influences positively the location of Japanese FDI, even after having taken into account reversal causality. JEL Classification F23 · H25 · H32 We Thank Michael Devereux, Edward Graham, Robert Lipsey, David Margolis, Claudia Rivas, Deborah Swenson, anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Franco-Korean conference in Seoul, and at the Western Economic Association conference in Vancouver for helpful discussions.     

Profit tax competition and formula apportionment

We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas. JEL Classification H77 · H25 · F23     

A growth oriented dual income tax

This paper proposes a growth oriented dual income tax by combining an allowance for corporate equity with a broadly defined flat tax on personal capital income. Revenue losses are compensated by an increase in the value added tax. The paper demonstrates the neutrality properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and organizational choice. Tax rates are chosen to prevent income shifting from labor to capital income. The reform decisively strengthens investment of domestically owned firms as well as home and foreign based multinationals and boosts savings. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland indicate that the reform could add between 4 to 5 percent of GNP in the long-run, depending on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it imposes considerable costs in the short-run. We consider a tax smoothing scenario to offset the intergenerationally redistributive effects. JEL Classification: D58, D92, E62, G32, H25