终极控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构

从终极产权的视角,以我国沪、深两市公司为研究对象,考察了终极股东控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构的关系。发现:终极股东现金流权水平越高,其掠夺外部投资者的成本也就越高,债务融资的代理成本降低,银行等金融机构愿意为公司提供更多较长期限的债务资金,终极控制股东现金流权对公司债务期限结构具有显著正向影响。而终极股东控制权与现金流权分离程度越高,其越有可能掠夺外部投资者,增大了公司与债权人的代理冲突,导致较高的债务融资代理成本,银行等金融机构倾向于为其提供更多的短期资金来约束终极控制股东。     

公司债务期限结构的理论假说述评

债务融资对降低融资成本、改善管理者的经营激励、提高公司的业绩有着深远的影响。本文讨论了国外研究中关于债务期限结构的六个假说:代理成本假说、信息不对称假说、税收假说、发行成本假说、利息率风险假说和期限匹配原则假说,并根据这些理论假说分析了相关因素与债务期限结构的联系。     

债务融资期限结构与融资效率的实证研究

企业的融资效率分为资金筹集过程中的宏观融资效率和资金使用过程中微观融资效率.从债务融资期限差异的角度出发,通过实证检验不同期限的银行信贷资金对企业微观融资效率的影响可以发现.短期债务资金和融资效率显著负相关,并低于长期债务资金的融资效率,不支持委托代理理论认为的短期债务资金能更有效地降低代理成本、提高资金使用效率的结论.     

企业战略激进程度与债务期限结构北大核心CSSCI

本文以2005-2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验企业战略激进程度对债务期限结构的影响及其影响机理。结果发现,在不同战略下,企业债权人、股东和管理层对债务期限结构的偏好具有明显差异,债务期限结构是各方博弈的结果:企业战略越激进,债务期限结构越短;这一决策以增加流动性风险为代价降低企业信息不对称程度和代理成本,同时也有助于企业在激进战略下灵活调整资本结构和降低融资成本。     

法制环境、管理者能力与企业债务契约

本文从管理者能力的视角出发,选取2010-2018年沪、深A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了管理者能力对债务契约的影响及其影响路径。研究证明:管理者能力越强,企业的债务期限结构越短、债务融资成本越低。进一步研究发现,在不同的法制环境中,二者的关系存在异质性,即管理者能力对债务期限结构、债务融资成本的影响在法制环境较高的地区较为显著。本文丰富了企业债务契约的影响因素,探寻了管理者能力影响债务期限结构、债务融资成本的路径。     

浅析企业债务期限结构对企业价值的影响

资金不仅是企业发展过程中必不可少的元素,也是生产经营活动的核心要素。在资本市场发展日趋成熟的今天,筹措资金的方式越发多样化,而债务融资依旧是企业最为重要的融资方式之一。但是,债务资金的引入也不是万能的,融资方式不同,债务期限的长短也不同;债务期限结构不同,对企业发展的影响程度也会不同,债务期限结构对公司价值的影响主要是通过企业融资成本、财务风险、融资结构弹性和投资行为等方面而产生的。因此,本文主要从这几方面探讨了企业债务期限结构对企业价值的影响。     

债务结构优化与企业创新——基于企业债券融资视角的研究

本文在我国保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景下,从债券融资的视角,探讨债务结构优化对企业创新的影响。研究发现,债券融资与企业创新之间显著正相关,表明债券融资优化企业债务结构、提升企业创新能力的积极作用占据主导地位。进一步研究表明:(1)债券融资能够通过降低整体债务融资成本并延长整体债务期限促进企业创新;(2)债券融资对于银行贷款存在溢出效应,即企业通过债券融资,还能降低银行贷款利率、延长银行贷款期限,进而促进企业创新;(3)产品市场竞争和代理问题会在一定程度上削弱债券融资对企业创新的促进作用;(4)不同类型的债券对企业创新能力的作用存在异质性,债券发行的便利性是其影响企业创新的一个重要因素。     

减税政策对小微企业债务期限结构的影响

本文主要探讨减税政策对小微企业债务期限结构的影响。理论上,减税政策对企业债务期限结构产生两种方向相反的效果:一是减税后企业盈利状况改善,激励银行通过延长债务期限以争取企业客户;二是减税后企业可支配现金流增加,加剧银行与企业间的委托代理问题,促使银行缩短债务期限以便加强企业监督。本文以所得税减半征收政策作为自然实验,基于全国税收调查数据库(2010-2015)考察了减税政策对小微企业债务期限结构的影响。实证结果显示:减税后企业的债务期限整体得以延长;如果减税后企业的盈利状况改善更多,或可支配现金流增长更缓,企业债务期限延长幅度更大。此外,本文发现在快速扩张行业、有产能过剩风险行业以及房地产上下游关联行业中的企业往往会因为较强的代理成本效应而面临减税后债务期限的边际缩短。本文研究结论对改善企业融资结构,特别对提高小微企业获取中长期贷款能力,有一定的参考意义。     

房地产企业债务期限结构及其优化研究——以沪深A股市场上市公司为例

基于债务融资成本理论,以沪深证券市场A股房地产上市公司为研究样本,实证考察债务融资期限结构对企业价值的影响,进而探讨债务期限结构的优化以实现企业价值的提升。通过逐步回归模型的实证分析结果表明,房地产企业债务期限结构与企业价值之间呈倒U型关系,行业最优债务期限结构比例均值为36.4929%,且抽样分析检验给出的最优长期债务比例区间为34%~38%。     

债务期限结构理论研究综述

先前的公司融资决策研究主要集中在债务和权益融资之间的选择上（即资本结构）,试图建立一个最优的融资结构;最近,注意力转移到债务融资的特征上,尤其是公司债务期限结构。本文对权衡理论、代理成本理论、税收假说和信息不对称假说（信号传递和流动性风险假设）等公司债务期限结构理论进行了系统综述和总结,以为解释公司债务期限结构选择提供理论依据。     

Asset Maturity, Debt Covenants, and Debt Maturity Choice

The existing research on debt‐maturity under asymmetric information has focused on the impact of differential information regarding asset quality on the debt maturity decision. This research has generally indicated the optimality of short‐term debt financing as a vehicle of mitigating the adverse selection problem. In this paper, I consider the impact of information asymmetry regarding the maturity structure of cash flows on the debt maturity decision. In this context, long‐term debt is generally the form of debt financing most effective in alleviating the adverse selection problem. I also show that costs of adverse selection may induce some mismatching of debt maturity and asset maturity in the presence of significant transaction costs.     

企业发债和贷款期限的差异化:基于增量法的实证研究

已有文献主要从资产负债表法来实证研究企业负债期限结构的影响因素,本文以我国企业在1998～2008年企业发行的各类债券和银行贷款为研究对象,运用增量法从企业财务特征和债务契约属性等方面对企业增量债务期限的影响因素进行实证研究,采用了GMM计量方法,并通过对比分析筛选出了影响企业发债和贷款期限差异化的关键因素。研究表明:企业规模越大,利润率越高,具备担保,信用评级和授信比率越高,其债务期限越长。企业若选择发债,债务期限会延长,而选择银行贷款则企业债务期限会缩短。     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance: A System-Based Model

We examine the determinants of corporate debt maturity while taking into account the interdependent relation between maturity and leverage. We do this by estimating a simultaneous-equations model on debt maturity and leverage for a sample of bond-issuing firms. To compare with previous studies, we also estimate a single-equation model on debt maturity using OLS. We define debt maturity as either the maturity of bonds at issuance (incremental approach), or the percentage of a firm's total debt that matures in more than three years (balance-sheet approach). Corroborating the findings of many previous studies, our single-equation OLS results support the underinvestment hypothesis purporting that firms with greater growth opportunities have shorter-term debt. However, under the simultaneous-equations model, the negative relation between a firm's debt maturity and its growth opportunities ceases to hold. Instead, it is the leverage decision that is influenced by growth opportunities. This suggests that existing models may overestimate the effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity.     

控制权竞争和公司债务期限结构研究

基于2004-2015年中国上市公司数据,实证检验控制权竞争是否影响公司债务期限结构。结果发现：控股股东持股比例与债务期限显著负相关;多个大股东并存会提高公司长期债务比例;股权竞争性越强,长期债务比例越高。这些结论与理论假设相符,既证实了内外部公司治理的密切联系,也说明控制权竞争有助于形成更为合理的债务期限结构。     

An empirical analysis of corporate debt maturity structure

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the maturity structure of corporate debt. A dynamic model is estimated by GMM estimation procedure using data for an unbalanced panel of 429 non-financial UK firms over the period of 1983–96. The evidence provides strong support for the hypotheses that firms with more growth opportunities in their investment sets tend to have more shorter-term debt and firm size exerts a negative impact on debt maturity structure. The results also support the maturity-matching hypothesis that firms match the maturity structure of their debt to the maturity of their assets. There is less support for the view that firms use their debt maturity structure to signal information to the market. We do not find evidence for a negative correlation between taxes and debt maturity. Our results also suggest that firms have long-term target ratios and they adjust to the target ratio relatively fast, which might indicate that the costs of being away from target ratios are significant for firms.     

中国民营上市公司债务融资破产威胁功效的实证研究

以2002～2007年陷入财务危机的民营上市公司（ST公司）为研究样本．通过相关分析实证检验了中国债务融资的破产威胁功效.研究发现，中国民营上市公司债务融资总体上对财务状况恶劣的公司起到了债务治理作用，发挥了破产威胁功效。短期债务能够对陷入财务危机的民营上市公司起到改善业绩的作用，较好地发挥破产威胁功效，而长期债务未能发挥破产威胁作用。银行贷款能够促进陷入财务困境的民营上市公司改善业绩，发挥破产威胁功效，而商业信用却没能发挥破产威胁功效。     

Managerial ability and debt maturity

We examine whether and how managerial ability affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The demand for shorter maturity debt is expected to be higher in firms operated by high-ability managers, who possess the superior skills needed to anticipate firms’ economic prospects and communicate their private information, thereby alleviating information asymmetry and bolstering their reputation. We document that firms with high ability managers are associated with more short-term debt financing. The effect becomes stronger for firms facing severe information asymmetry problems, unconstrained firms or high quality firms. Supportive evidence is found from the analysis of short- and long-term debt issuance activity. Our findings remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and debt maturity choice, and are not driven by omitted variable bias, endogeneity concerns or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the signalling theory for debt maturity structure and contributes to the literatures on managerial ability.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.     

Idiosyncratic risk and debt maturity dispersion

We investigate the relation between idiosyncratic asset risk and debt maturity dispersion. Idiosyncratic asset volatility represents significant risk, which can impede the ability to obtain or maintain external debt financing necessary for business operations, and is difficult to control given its unpredictable nature. We find that this risk is managed through the maturity structure of debt: firms with higher idiosyncratic asset volatility also have more dispersed maturity structures. Consistent with active management of rollover risk, this relation is weaker for younger firms and stronger for firms without significant credit lines.