Measuring Asset Values for Cash Settlement in Derivative Markets: Hedonic Repeated Measures Indices and Perpetual Futures

Two proposals are made that may facilitate the creation of derivative market instruments, such as futures contracts, cash settled based on economic indices. The first proposal concerns index number construction: indices based on infrequent measurements of nonstandardized items may control for quality change by using a hedonic repeated measures method, an index number construction method that follows individual assets or subjects through time and also takes account of measured quality variables. The second proposal is to establish markets for perpetual claims on cash flows matching indices of dividends or rents. Such markets may help us to measure the prices of the assets generating these dividends or rents even when the underlying asset prices are difficult or impossible to observe directly. A perpetual futures contract is proposed that would cash settle every day in terms of both the change in the futures price and the dividend or rent index for that day.     

Stock market short-termism—an international perspective

This study uses a VAR approach with a time-varying risk premium to see if stock market investors are short-term oriented, placing too much weight on current and near cash flows. Using aggregate stock market data for Australia, Germany, Japan, USA and UK markets (1977–1999), we find the degree of persistent under-valuation of future cash flows is far higher in the UK relative to the other countries in our sample, and is market-wide. Also, over the period, US investors appear to have consistently underestimated long horizon cash flows in current stock market valuations relative to a rational valuation model.     

Understanding Stock Price Volatility: The Role of Earnings

In an efficient capital market, asset prices vary when investors change their expectations about cash flows, discount rates, or both. Using dividends to measure cash flows, previous research shows that the aggregate dividend‐price ratio varies due to changes in expected discount rates (returns) rather than expected cash flows. In contrast, using accounting earnings instead of dividends as a measure of cash flows, this paper shows that as much as 70% of the variation in the dividend‐price ratio can be explained by changes in expected earnings. Moreover, the paper documents a significant negative correlation between expected returns and expected earnings, suggesting that variations in a common factor to both may generate significant price volatility. The results are consistent with the dividend‐policy irrelevance hypothesis.     

What’s wrong with Pittsburgh? Delegated investors and liquidity concentration

What makes an asset institutional quality? This paper proposes that one reason is the existing concentration of delegated investors in a market through a liquidity channel. Consistent with this intuition, it documents differences in investor composition across US cities and shows that delegated investors concentrate their investments in cities with higher turnover. It then estimates a search model showing how heterogeneity in liquidity preferences makes some markets more liquid, even when assets have identical cash flows. The paper provides evidence for clientele equilibria arising in frictional asset markets and suggests that a liquidity channel may explain divergent paths in city development.     

The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets

A series of experiments illustrate that relaxing short‐selling constraints lowers prices in experimental asset markets, but does not induce prices to track fundamentals. We argue that prices in experimental asset markets are influenced by restrictions on short‐selling capacity and limits on the cash available for purchases. Restrictions on short sales in the form of cash reserve requirements and quantity limits on short positions behave in a similar manner. A simulation model, based on DeLong et al. (1990) , generates average price patterns that are similar to the observed data.     

Managerial hedging,equity ownership,and firm value

Suppose risk‐averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash‐flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm‐specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm‐specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such forms of moral hazard give rise to excessive aggregate risk in stock markets. In this context, optimal managerial contracts induce a relationship between managerial ownership and (i) aggregate risk in the firm's cash flows, as well as (ii) firm value. We show that this can help explain the shape of the empirically documented relationship between ownership and firm performance.     

Spanning and efficiency in an economy with collective and individual risks

Much of the literature on incomplete markets emphasizes the study of conditions under which security market returns, either with or without derivative securities, span some exogenous set of cash flows. It is argued here that the only set of exogenous cash flows to which this literature is applicable are those that are contingent on existing assets' returns. The reason for this is that cash flows created by firms' production decisions are likely to be influenced by individual (unique) risk that is not incorporated into the market's existing information structure. The results of this article show that, if individual risk is pervasive, efficient allocation is likely to be achieved only in a large asset market which allows for the diversification of individual risk. The conditions for such diversification are derived and their implications discussed.     

Discount-Rate Risk in Private Equity: Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions

Measures of private equity (PE) performance based on cash flows do not account for a discount-rate risk premium that is a component of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) alpha. We create secondary market PE indices and find that PE discount rates vary considerably. Net asset values are too smooth because they fail to reflect variation in discount rates. Although the CAPM alpha for our index is zero, the generalized public market equivalent based on cash flows is large and positive. We obtain similar results for a set of synthetic funds that invest in small cap stocks. Ignoring variation in PE discount rates can lead to a misallocation of capital.     

Real Asset Valuation: A Back‐to‐basics Approach

Different valuation methods can lead to different corporate investment decisions, and the conventional “static, single discount rate” DCF approach in particular is biased against many of the kinds of decisions that corporate managers tend to view as “strategic.” Reducing the bias from valuations involves two main tasks: treating risk in a way that is consistent with observed market pricing, and accounting for the ability of companies to make decisions “dynamically” over time. The authors propose two separate tools, market‐based valuation and complete decision tree analysis, for accomplishing these two improvements in valuation. The authors also suggest working with the full distribution of future cash flows, one possible realization at a time, rather than working with the aggregate measure of expected cash flow. From a technical perspective, it is necessary to work with the full distribution to value real options properly. Valuing the cash flows one realization at a time also leads to a much better understanding of the interaction between economy‐level, systematic risks and local asset‐level, technical risks. Just as important, the proposed approaches support an effective division of labor between local asset managers, who are better positioned to model technical considerations and other asset specifics, and the central finance staff, who can ensure the consistent treatment of economy‐wide risk and to create the rules of engagement for evaluating opportunities. After presenting an overview of both the valuation and the organizational issues, the authors present a case involving a corporate investment in carbon capture and storage that illustrates both the application of the proposed methods and the various sources of bias in the typical DCF analysis.     

The Relationship between Investment and Asset Life

Optimal investment in an asset and its optimal life are shown to be interrelated through operating cash flows and depreciation allowance, as well as book and salvage values upon termination; thus they are determined simultaneously. Asset life and investment are positively (negatively) related if delaying abandonment increases (reduces) the benefit of marginal investment. If investment and asset life are positively related, increased debt financing or allowable depreciation positively impact on them; otherwise, the impact is ambiguous in sign. Further, investment in a zero salvage value asset and its holding period increase with depreciation or leverage when (1) its cash flows form an annuity or (2) the firm employing it is tax-exempt.     

Cream‐Skimming in Financial Markets

We propose a model in which investors may choose to acquire costly information that identifies good assets and purchase these assets in opaque (OTC) markets. Uninformed investors access an asset pool that has been cream‐skimmed by informed investors. When the quality composition of assets for sale is fixed, there is too much information acquisition and the financial industry extracts excessive rents. In the presence of moral hazard in origination, the social value of information varies inversely with information acquisition. Low quality origination is associated with large rents in the financial sector. Equilibrium acquisition of information is generically inefficient.     

Feedback Effects and Asset Prices

Feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented. This finding raises a question for asset pricing: How are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price? In this environment, by buying assets that others are buying, investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves. Hence, investors have an incentive to coordinate, which may generate self‐fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria. Using insights from global games, we pin down investors' beliefs, analyze equilibrium prices, and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility.     

Cash Flow Volatility, Prices and Price Volatility: An Experimental Study

The value of an asset is equal to the present value of its expected future cash flows. It is affected by the magnitude, timing and riskiness, or volatility, of the cash flows. We hypothesize that if the expected values of two assets?? cash flows are equal, the value of the asset with more volatile cash flows will be lower. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the volatility of cash flows on the volatility of prices. We consider a simple experimental environment where subjects trade in an asset which provides dividends from a known probability distribution. The expected value of the dividends is identical in all experimental treatments. The treatments vary with respect to the volatility of dividends. We find that when dividends are more volatile, transaction prices are lower. We also find that the volatility of prices is lower in the treatment with highly volatile dividends. In addition, as expected, trading volume is lower when cash flows are less volatile.     

Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms

There is growing interest in the use of markets within firms. Proponents have noted that markets are a simple and efficient mechanism for allocating resources in economies in which information is dispersed. In contrast to the use of markets in the broader economy, the efficiency of an internal market is determined in large part by the endogenous contractual incentives provided to the participating, privately informed agents. In this paper, we study the optimal design of managerial incentives when resources are allocated by an internal auction market, as well as the efficiency of the resulting resource allocations. We show that the internal auction market can achieve first‐best resource allocations and decisions, but only at an excessive cost in compensation payments. We then identify conditions under which the internal auction market and associated optimal incentive contracts achieve the benchmark second‐best outcome as determined using a direct revelation mechanism. The advantage of the auction is that it is easier to implement than the direct revelation mechanism. When the internal auction mechanism is unable to achieve second‐best, we characterize the factors that determine the magnitude of the shortfall. Overall, our results speak to the robust performance of relatively simple market mechanisms and associated incentive systems in resolving resource allocation problems within firms.     

Is Country Diversification better than Industry Diversification?

In this paper, we develop a framework in which one can examine the source of industry and country diversification by examining their underlying return components. We find that the global cash flow factor explains on average 39% of the variation of country cash flows and global discount rates explain 55% of the variation of country discount rates. These are much less than the explanatory power of the two factors over industry cash flow and discount rate variations, which are 72% and 78% respectively. This suggests that global factors are much less important for return components at country level than at the industry level. As a result, both better diversification of expected returns and cash flows across countries determine the larger benefits of country diversification versus industry diversification. Moreover, emerging markets tend to have much smaller co‐movements of both dividends and expected returns with those of the world, suggesting a lower degree of integration with the world goods and financial markets. Our results cast doubt on the prevailing wisdom that country diversification should be replaced by industry diversification.     

The Lead‐Lag Relationship Between Cash and Stock Index Futures in a New Market

This paper investigates the lead‐lag relationship in daily returns and volatilities between price movements of the FTSE/ATHEX‐20 and FTSE/ATHEX Mid‐40 stock index futures and the underlying cash indices in the relatively new futures market of Greece. Empirical results show that there is a bi‐directional relationship between cash and futures prices. However, futures lead the cash index returns, by responding more rapidly to economic events than stock prices. This speed is much higher in the more liquid FTSE/ATHEX‐20 market. Moreover, results indicate that futures volatilities spill information over to the corresponding cash market volatilities in both investigated futures markets, but volatilities in the cash markets have no effect on the volatilities of futures markets. Overall, it seems that new market information is disseminated faster in the futures market compared to the stock market. This implies that the futures markets can be used as price discovery vehicles, providing further evidence that derivatives markets contribute to completing and stabilising capital markets in Greece. A further finding of this study is that futures volume and disequilibrium effects between cash and futures prices are important variables in the explanation of volatilities in cash and futures markets.     

Asset Maturity, Debt Covenants, and Debt Maturity Choice

The existing research on debt‐maturity under asymmetric information has focused on the impact of differential information regarding asset quality on the debt maturity decision. This research has generally indicated the optimality of short‐term debt financing as a vehicle of mitigating the adverse selection problem. In this paper, I consider the impact of information asymmetry regarding the maturity structure of cash flows on the debt maturity decision. In this context, long‐term debt is generally the form of debt financing most effective in alleviating the adverse selection problem. I also show that costs of adverse selection may induce some mismatching of debt maturity and asset maturity in the presence of significant transaction costs.     

Discounting Mean Reverting Cash Flows with the Capital Asset Pricing Model

Discounting cash flows requires an equilibrium model to determine the cost of capital. The CAPM of Sharpe and the intertemporal asset pricing model of Merton (1973) offer a theoretical justification for discounting at a constant risk adjusted rate. Two problems arise with this application. First, for mean reverting cash flows the risk adjustment is unknown, and second, if the present value is compounded forward then the distribution of future wealth is likely right skewed. I develop equilibrium discount rates for cash flows whose level or growth rate is mean reverting. Serial correlation also largely eliminates the skewness problem.     

Asset Valuation and Performance Measurement in a Dynamic Agency Setting

This paper examines the choice of asset valuation rules from a managerial control perspective. A manager creates value for a firm through his effort choices. To support its operating activities, the firm also engages in financing activities such as credit sales to its customers. Since such financing activities merely change the pattern of cash flows across periods, an optimal compensation scheme must shield the manager from the risk associated with the financing activities. We show that residual income combined with fair value accounting for receivables eliminates this risk and provides an optimal performance measure. In contrast, compensation schemes based only on realized cash flows can be optimal only under exceptional circumstances. We also consider a setting in which there is sufficiently disaggregated information about periodic cash flows so as to eliminate not only the risk associated with financing activities but also the risk associated with customer defaults. The principal then wants to depart from fair value accounting.     

Leverage Choice and Credit Spreads when Managers Risk Shift

We model the debt and asset risk choice of a manager with performance‐insensitive pay (cash) and performance‐sensitive pay (stock) to theoretically link compensation structure, leverage, and credit spreads. The model predicts that optimal leverage trades off the tax benefit of debt against the utility cost of ex‐post asset substitution and that credit spreads are increasing in the ratio of cash‐to‐stock. Using a large cross‐section of U.S.‐based corporate credit default swaps (CDS) covering 2001 to 2006, we find a positive association between cash‐to‐stock and CDS rates, and between cash‐to‐stock and leverage ratios.