The Losses Realized in Bank Failures

This paper examines the losses realized in bank failures. Losses are measured as the difference between the book value of assets and the recovery value net of the direct expenses associated with the failure. I find the loss on assets is substantial, averaging 30 percent of the failed bank's assets. Direct expenses associated with bank closures average 10 percent of assets. An empirical analysis of the determinants of these losses reveals a significant difference in the value of assets retained by the FDIC and similar assets assumed by acquiring banks.     

THE VALUE OF A REGULATORY SEAL OF APPROVAL

I investigate whether obtaining a regulatory seal of approval adds to firm value. For a sample of thirty-four firms that acquired the insured deposits of failed banks, I find a significantly greater price response for firms that could benefit from obtaining a regulatory seal of approval than for firms that had recently obtained a similar form of approval. Further, abnormal returns to winning bidders are significantly larger when a regulatory seal of approval is likely to be more valuable, i.e., when the industry faces severe economic problems. In addition, bidder gains are significant only in markets where regulatory certification of a firm's health is important—markets that have recently experienced several bank failures. Finally, wealth transfers from the FDIC insurance fund may contribute to bidder gains. The evidence suggests that obtaining a regulatory seal of approval can positively affect firm value.     

The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks

This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participate in the bidding for the failed bank. The paper provides new insights into the relation between disclosure and the reorganization of a banking system when the regulators' preferred plan of action is to promote the acquisition of undercapitalized banks by healthy ones. The results suggest that disclosure regulation policy influences the cost of resolution of a bank and, as a result, could be an important factor in the definition of the optimal resolution strategy during a banking crisis event.     

Open-bank assistance transactions and prompt corrective action

Open-bank assistance (OBA), provided to troubled banking institutions by the FDIC to prevent their failure, has been criticized extensively on grounds that closed-bank transactions, especially early closed bank transactions, are less expensive to the FDIC. This article analyzes a case in which OBA makes public policy sense, under conditions in which uncertainty is introduced into the valuation of a bank's nonperforming assets. Under such uncertainty, the FDIC may play a role by providing to the acquiror of the troubled institution essentially costless (to the FDIC) standby insurance on the ultimate workout values of the nonperforming assets. If properly structured, such an OBA transaction would meet critics' objections by minimizing FDIC cost and creating incentives for the early recapilization of troubled banks.     

Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior

This paper utilizes bank Call Report and FDIC receivership data from 1987 to 1991 to examine the impact of a failed bank acquisition on the growth rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending at the acquiring institutions. Using a two-stage least squares model with fixed effects, we find that banks acquiring a failed bank's assets experience a significant decline in both the growth rate of C&I lending and their capital asset ratios in the period of the acquisition. The results support anecdotal evidence that failed-bank borrowers may experience difficulties in accessing credit once their bank fails and underscores the importance of bank-borrower relationships in C&I lending. Finally, the paper provides an alternative explanation for banks' stagnant or declining business lending activity during this period of financial turmoil.     

When time is not on our side: The costs of regulatory forbearance in the closure of insolvent banks

In this paper, we empirically estimate the costs of delay in the FDIC's closures of 433 commercial banks between 2007 and 2014 based upon a counterfactual closure regime. We find that the costs of delay could have been as high as $18.5 billion, or 37% of the FDIC's estimated costs of closure of $49.8 billion. We think that these findings call for a more aggressive stance by bank regulators with respect to the provisions for loan losses and write-downs of banks’ non-performing assets. More aggressive (and earlier) provisions and write-downs, or adoption of a capital ratio that penalizes nonperforming loans, would allow the concept of “prompt corrective action” (PCA) to play the role that it was meant to play in reducing FDIC losses from insolvent banks.     

The effects of resolution methods and industry stress on the loss on assets from bank failures

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.     

Deposit Insurance and Risk Management of the U.S. Banking System: What is the Loss Distribution Faced by the FDIC?

We examine the question of deposit insurance through the lens of risk management by constructing the loss distribution faced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We take a novel approach by arguing that the risk management problem faced by the FDIC is similar to that of a bank managing a loan portfolio, only in the FDIC’s case the risk arises from the potential for loss of the individual banks in its portfolio. We explicitly estimate the cumulative loss distribution of FDIC insured banks using two variations of the Merton model and find that reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution, corresponding to about a BBB+ rating. However, under different stress scenarios (higher correlations, fat-tailed bank returns, increased loss severity) that level can be much lower: approximately 96% corresponding to about a B+ rating.JEL classification: G210, G280.Any views expressed represent those of the author only and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

Risk-weighted capital requirements and portfolio rebalancing

We use a 2013 Norwegian policy reform to study how banks react to higher capital requirements and how these adjustments transmit to the real economy. Using bank balance sheet data, we document that banks raise capital ratios by reducing risk-weighted assets. Most of the reduction in risk-weighted assets is accounted for by a reduction in average risk weights. Consistent with this reduction in risk, we document a substantial decline in credit supply to the corporate sector relative to the household sector. We also show that banks react to higher requirements by increasing interest rates, consistent with the reduction in corporate credit growth being supply driven. Using administrative loan level tax data, we document a reduction in lending on the firm level. This is robust to controlling for firm fixed effects, thereby accounting for potential firm-bank matching. Finally, we find that the reduction in bank lending has a negative impact on firm employment growth and that this effect is driven by small firms.     

The Winner's Curse and Bidder Competition in Acquisitions: Evidence from Failed Bank Auctions

This study examines the effect of bidder competition in acquisitions. We use predictions from auction theory to test whether acquirers of failed banks overpay (the “winner's curse”) when bidding in FDIC sealed-bid purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions (auctions). The empirical results indicate that winning bids tend to increase as the number of competitors increases, as predicted by theory. We also find that bid levels of all bidders increase with increased competition, which is consistent with bidders' failing to adjust for the winner's curse in a common value auction setting. However, additional tests using winning bids only are consistent with both a common value and a private values model, so this result should be interpreted with caution.