互联网金融对中国商业银行系统性风险的影响——基于SVAR模型的实证研究

首先运用主成分分析法测算我国商业银行的系统性风险,接着运用突变分析和 SVAR 模型等计量方法实证互联网金融对我国商业银行系统性风险的影响。结果表明：互联网金融发展影响商业银行系统性风险的路径为：“互联网金融—商业银行的资产负债结构—商业银行的成本收入比—商业银行的系统性风险”,且它对银行系统性风险的影响存在“期限结构效应”,即互联网金融在短期内会增加我国银行系统性风险,但从中长期来看,对我国银行系统性风险的影响并不大,两者可作为互利共生的事物共同发展。互联网金融的存在对我国金融改革有很好的倒逼作用,能在一定程度上促进金融监管的创新。     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

Corporate Taxes and Securitization

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.     

Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

In this paper, we explore the relation between the banking sector's risk-taking and a firm's investment (“corporate investment”). Specifically, we ask whether firms' cash holdings moderate the effect of the banking sector's risk-taking on corporate investment. Based on a panel sample of publicly listed non-financial firms in 15 EU countries during the period 1990–2015, we document several key findings. First, both cash holdings and the banking sector's risk-taking are positively associated with corporate investment. Second, bank loan growth, which roughly captures the supply of bank credit, is not related to corporate investment. Third, firms with smaller cash holdings disproportionately invest more than do firms with larger cash holdings during periods of higher risk-taking by the banking sector.     

Banking system reform and investment–cash flow relation: Case of a small transition economy

This research examines the effect of banking system reform which is measured by foreign bank's presence on investment–cash flow relation in a context of a small transition economy. The U-shape relation between investment and cash flow is found. We also find evidence that the presence of foreign banks in Vietnam results in decreasing in dependence on local banks and has changed corporate investment behaviors. Company investments are less reliant on internal cash flow in the post reform period. Although overinvestment of state controlled firms is not reduced but underinvestment problem of non-state-controlled listed firms is mitigated due to better accessibility to bank loans. The investigated relation between investment and leverage is robust for this conclusion.     

Are Investment Banks Special Too? Evidence on Relationship‐Specific Capital in Investment Bank Services

The question of whether optimal provision of these services comes mainly from established relationships between banks and client firms or can result from arms'‐length market transactions has been the topic of considerable recent debate. This discussion has paralleled the debate in the commercial banking literature on the “specialness” of banks and whether lending can and should be relational or purely transactional. Whether the provision of investment bank services is relationship‐based or transactional is especially relevant now thanks to recent trends that have blurred the distinction between commercial and investment banks, and changed the competitive landscape for investment bank services. In their study summarized in this article, the authors examine whether investment bank‐client relationships create valuable relationship‐specific capital using stock market evidence from the period surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Specifically, they studied the effect of the Lehman collapse on companies that used Lehman for (1) underwriting equity offerings, (2) underwriting debt offerings, (3) advice on mergers and acquisitions, (4) analyst research services, and (5) market‐making services. The study addressed two specific questions. First, which investment bank services, if any, are associated with the creation of relationship‐specific capital; and second, what are the value drivers of this relationship capital? The authors report finding that companies that used Lehman as lead underwriter for public equity offerings experienced significantly negative abnormal stock returns in the days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy announcement. By contrast, they find no significant reaction to the announcement for Lehman's debt underwriting clients or any of the other client categories they examine. While most of these investment bank services have at least the potential to create relationship‐specific capital, the authors' findings suggest that except for equity underwriting, all the other investment bank services appear to be transactional rather than relationship‐based, at least in the average case. Moreover, the authors report significant differences even among different groups of Lehman's equity underwriting clients. An equity underwriting relationship with Lehman appears to have been especially valuable for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms—those firms which presumably had a high degree of dependence on Lehman to access the capital market.     

BANKING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE EFFECT OF MONITORING ON LOAN PRICING

In a sample of bank loans to small firms we find a positive relation between the bank's monitoring effort and the loan's interest rate. We also observe an inverse relation between the closeness of banking relationships and interest rates. Further, we see that banks less frequently monitor firms with whom they have closer relationships. We conclude that banking relationships are valuable because firms can significantly reduce their costs of capital by establishing and maintaining close ties to a particular bank. As firms successfully complete loan transactions with banks, banks monitor them less frequently and, ultimately, charge them lower interest rates.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Banks as lenders and shareholders: Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the effects of the main bank's equity–debt structure, (i.e., equity stakes and debt claims) on firm performance and financial policies in Japan over the period 1977–1987. Results show that firms with main bank equity stakes have lower performance than those without. However, among firms with main bank equity stakes, the equity–debt structure of claims has a positive effect on firm performance. The positive effect of the main bank's equity–debt structure is found to be greater in group-affiliated firms than in independent firms. The main bank maximizes its own interests by charging a higher interest rate when its equity stakes are relatively less than its debt claims and by prompting firms to pay more dividends when its equity stakes are relatively high.     

On the effects of banks�� equity ownership on credit markets

Recent deregulation of the banking sector in the US and in Europe allows commercial banks to hold equity in non-financial firms. We develop a model to investigate the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on credit market competition. The main result is that an equity stake confers a competitive advantage to the holding bank, which in equilibrium results in decreased competition in credit markets and higher interest rates being charged to firms. However, regulatory limits on the size of a bank’s stake may, under certain conditions, be counterproductive: they could actually strengthen the equity-owning bank’s competitive advantage. Our findings shed new light on the role of equity in lending relationships, and highlight that, in addition to the well-known prudential aspects, there is an antitrust dimension in the separation of banking and commerce.     

The market structure effects of commercial bank entry into underwriting: Evidence from the league tables

This study investigates the market structure effects of the deregulation of the US underwriting industry that allowed commercial banks to expand into investment banking activities. Specifically, it analyses the gains of commercial banks in market rankings and market share, the market position of the traditional top-ranked firms and changes in market concentration. The overall evidence suggests that (a) commercial banks were successful in gaining market share in underwriting, especially in debt offerings; (b) the commercial bank entry into underwriting eroded the dominance of bulge-bracket firms in debt underwriting, but not in equity offerings, where their dominance intensified; and (c) the commercial bank entry helped reduce market concentration in debt but not in equity underwriting. Finally, the study finds that the market share of commercial banks in equity offerings increases when equity underwriting volume rises, whereas market concentration in debt offerings increases when debt underwriting volume falls.     

Bank Competition: Measurement,Decision‐Making,and Risk‐Taking

This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.     

Bank systemic risk and corporate investment: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model in which a bank’s investment (e.g., loans) is influenced by short-term financing and a probability of a financial crisis. When banks ex ante expect to be bailed out during financial crises, they do not necessarily internalize the cost of financial crises and invest more. We argue that the level of systemic risk in the banking sector is largely driven by (1) the way in which banks finance their investment (e.g., loans) using more short-term debt and/or (2) the increase in asset commonality amongst banks. We use three measures that arguably capture two dimensions of “bank systemic risk”, namely, (1) bank funding maturity and (2) bank asset commonality, to empirically test whether bank systemic risk has a positive effect on corporate investment. We document that in a sample of publicly listed firms in the United States over the period 1991–2013, bank systemic risk is positively associated with the firm-level investment ratio after controlling for a large set of country- and firm-level variables. In addition, we show that a firm's leverage strengthens the positive effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment, suggesting that more financially constrained firms experience a larger effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment than less financially constrained firms.     

Banking System Bailout-Scandinavian Style

During the Scandinavian banking crisis in the early 1990s, Norway and Sweden chose somewhat different routes to crisis resolution, though both involved government intervention and both proved effective. The Norwegian government injected a hybrid debt-equity form of capital into the largest commercial bank, though only after first extinguishing old equity claims. The Swedish government issued a system-wide debt guarantee and allowed shareholders to maintain their equity stakes, provided they also contributed new equity capital to the banks. In the (single) case where equityholders refused to participate, the government took over the bank and divided it into a “good” and “bad” part, with the latter holding the non-performing loans. The resolution of banking system problems in Scandinavia provides a useful precedent for the recent “bailout” of the U.S. banking system, which, after some initial trial and errors, also involved government ownership of shares in financial institutions. As the author notes in closing, the Scandinavian experience is also relevant for addressing the question of how the U.S. government, having effectively become “owner of last resort” in key financial institutions, should handle its controlling equity stakes.     

Industrial Loan Companies: Where Banking and Commerce Meet

Should commercial firms be prohibited from owning banking institutions? Should the United States remain the only G20 country opposed to the “mixing of banking and commerce”? These questions have assumed new urgency as the Dodd Frank Act of July 2010 imposed a moratorium on the commercial ownership of industrial loan companies (ILCs), which was the last remaining entry point for commercial firms into banking. This paper specifically examines the role of ILCs in America's financial system from its beginnings in 1910 to the present. Special attention is paid to the performance of commercially owned ILCs prior to, during and after the most recent financial crisis. The examination is based upon both survey data and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data, which represents a database of the ILC industry that is the most comprehensive one available to date. The paper also reviews the laws and regulations regarding the mixing of banking and commerce, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of allowing commercial ownership of banks.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator's competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behavior can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators' ability to stem panics ex post.     

Information from Relationship Lending: Evidence from Loan Defaults in China

Using a proprietary database from a large Chinese state‐owned bank, we examine whether information evolved from banking relationships predicts commercial loan default by industrial firms. We find that the bank's relationship information is significantly linked to the incidence of default, and that its contribution to prediction accuracy is larger than any hard information. Furthermore, the effect of relationship information is stronger among firms that have a more sustained banking relationship. Our findings indicate that, at least in the emerging markets, a bank's relationship information still matters for large firms, despite the fact that hard information for such firms is abundant.