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1.
以经济增加值为核心的绩效评价体系,以风险调整的收益作为其核心价值管理理念,以资本成本来约束业务的盲目扩张并将超出一定资本回报要求的价值创造部分作为激励和考核各层级管理人员乃至一般员工工作成绩并与收入挂钩的标准,已为国外很多企业所应用。实践证明,它的实旌有助于企业实现对风险的管理和控制,  相似文献   

2.
经济资本管理是当代银行业顿应国际金融监管要求,在金融市场高度发达和面临风险日趋复杂的现实下,注重内部资本管理,并超越资本监管要求而产生的全新管理理念,是加强商业银行内部资本管理和风险管理的重要手段。强化基层银行经济资本管理,对促进基层银行转变经营管理理念和模式,在业务发展和资产扩张的同时,有效控制风险,实现风险管理与价值创造的有机统一;推动优化资源配置,合理利用经济资源;建立科学考评体制及激励约束机制具有重要意义。  相似文献   

3.
农业银行实施经济资本管理,建立资本约束基础上的业务增长模式.对于管理水平的提高和竞争能力的增强具有重要的作用。一是有利于优化业务结构。实施经济资本管理,可以区别资产业务品种的风险差异度,有的放矢地开展业务,推进低风险业务和中间业务的发展,进一步优化业务结构。二是有利于优化资源配置效率。以经济资本回报这一实际的价值创造作为考核依据,可以引导经营行将有限的资源配置到低风险、高回报的业务、产品、客户上。三是有利于降低经营风险。  相似文献   

4.
近年来,随着国有商业银行的陆续改制上市,创造价值、回报股东的理念日益深入人心,并逐步体现在商业银行各项经营管理中。同时为适应推进价值管理的需要,商业银行纷纷开发运用了许多先进的管理方法和工具,其中,经济资本管理作为价值管理的核心工具,在商业银行中得到了高度重视,并在银行经营管理诸多领域特别是在绩效考评方面发挥出重要  相似文献   

5.
实施新资本协议是中国银行一项具有战略意义的重要工作,也是朝着建设国际一流银行目标迈进的重要举措。中国银行的新协议实施工作既要适应境内外监管要求,又要适应中国银行业务和管理实际,为银行的经营管理创造价值。为此,中国银行  相似文献   

6.
一、流程银行是银行发展的必由之路 流程银行是通过更新构造银行的业务流程、组织流程、管理流程以及文化理念,全盘改造传统的银行模式,形成以流程为核心的全新银行模式."流程银行"是相对于传统的"部门银行"概念而提出的一种全新的银行模式.它的特点是构建于"以客户为中心"的理念之上,通过流程和组织的重构,打破了传统的部门壁垒,打造以客户为中心,业务垂直运作管理,前中后台分离,后台业务集中处理的扁平化、专业化、信息化,以资本回报和股东价值最大化为驱动的现代化银行企业.  相似文献   

7.
近年来,国内银行业加快融入国际金融市场的步伐,并逐渐引入、建立起以经济资本管理为核心的全面风险管理体系。经济资本管理已逐渐成为我国商业银行进行风险管理、实现价值创造的重要工具。但是,相比国际领先银行的管理水平、新资本协议的管理要求,我国银行业的经济资本管理在理念更新、方法探索、数据积累等方面还存在  相似文献   

8.
周行健 《海南金融》2009,(12):17-20
经济资本管理在实践中已成为国际先进银行经营管理的基础和主轴.但其能否实现价值创造尚未有理论上的答案。本文在新制度经济学视角下,对经济资本管理与价值创造的关系从理论层面进行了诠释。由于现实世界中,代理成本和交易成本广泛存在,银行经济资本管理确实能够创造价值。降低违约可能性是核心理由,降低代理成本和交易成本是两条具体路径。  相似文献   

9.
王文胜 《中国外资》2011,(10):161-161
传统以会计利润为基础对企业的评价,没有考虑股东的最低收益,不利于企业以价值创造为终极目标。必须引入EVA,即经济增加值概念,并以此为基础对企业进行考核,这既是资本的本质要求,也将带动企业提高经营管理水平,向创造价值转变。  相似文献   

10.
商业银行经济资本管理应用的国际比较   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
经济资本是当代银行业顺应国际监管要求,超越资本监管要求而产生的一种全新管理理念,它能够引导银行实现风险防范和价值创造,作为重要管理工具在国际银行业得到了广泛应用。本文将在介绍经济资本概念及意义的基础上,对目前国际上银  相似文献   

11.
A growing number of companies use EVA or related measures of economic profits as metrics for corporate planning and executive compensation. Unlike traditional accounting measures of performance, EVA attempts to measure the value that firms create or destroy by subtracting a capital charge from the cash returns they generate on invested capital. For this reason, EVA is seen by its proponents as providing the most reliable year-to-year indicator of a market based performance measure known as market value added, or MVA. Although EVA and MVA have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been little empirical study of these performance measures—and what studies have been produced have provided mixed results. This study joins the debate over EVA vs. conventional accounting measures by asking a different question: Which performance measures do the best job of explaining not only stock returns, but the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance? Using a sample of 452 firms during the period 1985–1994, the authors report that EVA has a somewhat stronger correlation with stock price performance than conventional accounting measures such as ROE and ROA. But, of greater import, EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover than conventional accounting measures.  相似文献   

12.
已有的分客户的盈利评价方法大多局限于计算分客户的会计利润,本文提出的商业银行分客户的EVA评价模型通过计量分客户的收入、分客户的成本以及分客户的经济资本成本,获得商业银行分客户盈利评价的EVA值.与以往的盈利评价方法相比,该模型考虑了对客户经营的风险因素以及资本成本,既可用于对客户的服务定价,也可用来确定各客户的EVA值,还可用来区分不同的客户类型,针对不同客户(群)实施差异化的经营策略,从而提高资源的配置效率,提升零售业务的市场竞争力.最后,文章指出该模型的实施需要商业银行具备较强的支撑平台.  相似文献   

13.
Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.  相似文献   

14.
The study of companies using EVA and EVA-like systems discussed in the previous article provides evidence of changes in managerial behavior, such as reduced capital expenditures, increased share repurchases, and increased residual income, but stops short of concluding that such changes have increased shareholder value. This article presents evidence that directly addresses the issue: Do companies adopting EVA add more value for their shareholders than their industry competitors? The author reports that U.S. companies adopting EVA during the period 1987–1996 outperformed the median firms with the same SIC codes by 28.8% during the four-year period including and following the year of adoption. This paper also provides evidence of significant operating improvements that help explain such increases in shareholder value. But, in contrast to the finding of the Wallace study cited above, the capital expenditures of EVA companies increase (although at a slower rate than for S&P 500 companies) after going on to EVA.  相似文献   

15.
Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.  相似文献   

16.
本文以我国上市的商业银行作为考察样本,对经济增加值(EVA)和商业银行市场增加值(MVA)之间的关系做实证分析。结论发现,EVA与商业银行价值创造有着很强的相关性,并且具有一定的解释力。但是在我国证券市场不够成熟的大环境下,EVA对价值创造的解释度和其他的会计指标有重叠。因此,评价商业银行价值创造时,应该将EVA和传统的会计指标结合使用。  相似文献   

17.
This article argues that the Expectations‐Based Management (EBM) measure proposed by Copeland and Dolgoff (in the previous article) is essentially the same measure that EVA companies have used for years as the basis for performance evaluation and incentive compensation. After pointing out that the analyst‐based measures cited by Copeland and Dolgoff do not provide a basis for a workable compensation plan, the authors present the outline of a widely used expectations‐based EVA bonus plan. In so doing, they demonstrate the two key steps in designing such a plan: (1) using a company's “Future Growth Value”—the part of its current market value that cannot be accounted for by its current earnings— to calibrate the series of annual EVA “improvements” expected by the market; and (2) determining the executive's share of those improvements and thus of the company's expected “excess” return. One of the major objections to the use of EVA, or any single‐period measure, as the basis for a performance evaluation and incentive comp plan is its inability to reflect the longer‐run consequences of current investment and operating decisions. The authors close by presenting a solution to this “delayed productivity of capital” problem in the form of an internal accounting approach for dealing with acquisitions and other large strategic investments.  相似文献   

18.
Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.  相似文献   

19.
Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.  相似文献   

20.
Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.  相似文献   

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