机构投资者在上市公司治理结构中的角色分析--基于盈余稳健性的视角

本文选取我国沪深两市A股上市公司2009-2013年之间的非金融类上市公司作为研究样本,通过非平衡面板数据和固定效应回归模型进行实证分析。研究发现,机构投资者持股比例对公司盈余稳健性呈负相关关系,即机构投资者对上市公司并没有发挥监督治理效应。     

机构投资者在上市公司治理结构中的角色分析——基于盈余稳健性的视角

本文选取我国沪深两市A股上市公司2009—2013年之间的非金融类上市公司作为研究样本,通过非平衡面板数据和固定效应回归模型进行实证分析。研究发现,机构投资者持股比例对公司盈余稳健性呈负相关关系,即机构投资者对上市公司并没有发挥监督治理效应。     

机构投资者的治理效应研究述评:盈余管理视角

本文在综合分析了国内外学者对公司治理、机构投资者和盈余管理三者关系的基础上,认为机构投资者在一定程度上参与了公司治理,其持股比例越高则在公司治理中发挥的作用越大,越有助于提高公司治理水平。在公司治理水平高的公司,盈余管理行为受到有效的监督;而公司治理水平低的公司则为盈余管理提供了环境和机会。     

社保基金持股对上市公司盈余管理的治理效应

社保基金作为证券市场上主要的机构投资者之一,能否发挥机构投资者对上市公司的治理效应,实现其社会效应愈发被社会各界所关注。本文从社保基金持有上市公司股票前后公司盈余管理变化的角度来衡量社保基金持股对上市公司的治理效果。研究结果表明社保基金与其他投资机构者一样发挥了监督作用,能够积极参与公司治理,有效抑制盈余管理,提高公司的治理水平,同时发现,国有持股比例、公司规模对社保基金的这种治理效应也有一定影响。     

机构投资者、信息披露与盈余管理

本文以反映公司治理效率的信息披露与盈余管理作为关注要点,深入研究了机构投资者持股的治理效果问题.本文研究表明,机构投资者持股公司的盈余管理程度显著低于无机构投资者持股公司,并且盈余管理程度随着机构投资者持股的增加而显著降低.本文还检验了机构投资者持股能否有效提高公司信息披露的质量,发现机构投资者持股公司的信息披露质量显著高于无机构投资者持股公司,而且信息披露质量随着机构投资者持股的增加而提高.本文还发现,机构投资者持股公司信息披露对于盈余管理的监控作用更为显著,并且随着机构投资者持股的增加促进作用更为明显.以上发现意味着目前我国机构投资者已经参与到公司治理中,并在一定程度上发挥了积极的治理作用.     

异质机构投资者持股对上市公司盈余持续性的影响研究

通过对我国A股市场数据的实证检验和分析,检验不同类型的机构投资者持股行为对公司盈余持续性的影响.研究发现,我国A股市场上市公司存在盈余持续性,并且现金流量的持续性要高于会计应计的持续性;机构投资者持股比例越高,公司盈余持续性越强;独立机构投资者持股比例大的公司盈余持续性较强,非独立机构投资者持股比例对上市公司盈余持续性无显著影响;机构投资者持股集中度越高的公司盈余持续性越强.     

公司治理对公司绩效的影响研究——以房地产上市公司为例

本文以2015年126家上市房地产公司为样本,从内外部公司治理角度,对影响中国房地产上市公司绩效因素进行实证研究。结果发现:房地产企业股权比较集中;第一大股东持股比例与高管前三名薪酬水平对公司绩效呈现正相关关系;企业的负债水平与公司绩效呈负相关关系;公司绩效水平与独立董事比例、董事会规模及机构投资者持股比例没有显著关系。以此分析结论为依据,为我国房地产市场发展提供相应的参考建议。     

大股东与盈余管理程度的实证研究

大股东是公司治理的重要主体,第一大股东的性质和持股比例的不同会对盈余管理行为产生不同的约束力。本文以2003～2005年的上市公司为样本,基于分行业修正的琼斯-现金模型研究了第一大股东的性质及其持股比例与盈余管理程度相关关系。研究结果表明:国有股似乎更能控制盈余管理行为;第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理程度之间呈线非线性关系,从大体上看呈近似U型曲线结构,以40%～60%这个区间的盈余管理程度比较轻也比较稳定。     

机构投资者持股与会计盈余宣告的信息含量

本文以我国2001—2004年机构投资者持股的上市公司为样本，从机构投资者对上市公司信息利用状况的视角出发，分析了机构投资者持股与会计盈余宣告信息含量的关系，研究结果发现：机构投资者能够相对较早地解读会计盈余信息，其持股比例越高，盈余宣告后的市场反应越小．会计盈余宣告的信息含量越低。在会计盈余宣告前，机构投资者的持股比例高低与市场的累计超额回报正相关；而在盈余宣告后，机构投资者待股公司的市场累计超额回报出现反转。     

机构投资者空间集中度、外部监督与上市公司盈余管理

基于2007-2018年沪深A股上市公司样本,利用手工收集的投资者与上市公司之间的地理距离数据和投资者持股比例数据,本文实证检验了机构投资者空间集中度对上市公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,机构投资者空间集中度越大,公司盈余管理行为受到的抑制作用越大,且这种影响存在显著的异质性特征。进一步的机制分析发现,机构投资者空间集中度能够通过审计监督、分析师关注对公司盈余管理形成显著的中介因子效应。总体而言,本文结果认为机构投资者彼此之间的空间关系能够对公司盈余管理行为进行一定程度的解释,这为资本市场发展机构投资者,释放监督作用提供了政策制定的经验证据。     

内部控制与异质机构持股的治理效应

本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。     

机构投资者的治理角色——过度投资视角

本文以2007~2009年我国上市公司的过度投资行为为背景,考察机构投资者持股对过度投资的治理角色。研究结果表明,机构的期末持股比例、长线型机构投资者尤其是长线型基金与过度投资显著负相关,表现为有效监督者的角色;短线型机构投资者则缺乏公司治理的意愿和动机,表现为利益攫取者的角色。研究结果意味着,我国的机构投资者同时具备有效监督者和利益攫取者的角色,何时表现出何种角色取决于持股比例以及持股时间。     

Institutional Ownership Type and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran

Institutional ownership is an important factor in corporate governance. Institutional investors play important roles in firms because of their substantial shareholdings and their capability to monitor managers. However, the question is whether they are capable of monitoring the managers. The literature has provided different evidence for the monitoring role of institutional investors. This study attempts to provide insights into the monitoring roles of institutional investors by examining the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Institutional investors are classified into two groups, namely active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, based on their monitoring power in Iran. A multidimensional method is used to measure the various aspects of earnings quality, such as earnings response coefficient, predictive value of earnings, discretionary accruals, conservatism, and real earnings management. The results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership has positive effects on proxies of earnings quality. Nonetheless, passive institutional ownership does not have any power to affect earnings quality. Moreover, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that institutional ownership leads to more earnings quality and not the reverse.     

Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance

This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.     

Making honest men of them: Institutional investors,financial reporting,and the appointment of female directors to all-male boards

In this paper, we theorize that dedicated institutional investors are more likely than transient institutional investors to appoint female directors to investee firms with all-male boards, particularly those with high opacity. We conjecture that dedicated investors appoint female directors as a governance mechanism to improve the financial reporting quality of these investee firms. Specifically, we find that through the appointment of female directors, dedicated institutional investors trigger the release of stockpiled negative accounting information, thereby increasing the likelihood of a stock price crash risk. We also show that dedicated investors, through the appointment of female directors, improve investee firms' corporate disclosure environment by decreasing earnings management. Finally, we find that through continued service on investee firms' boards, female directors reduce the future likelihood of a stock price crash.     

Financial institutional blockholders and earnings quality: Do blockholders contestability and countries' institutions matter?

We examine the relationship between financial earnings quality and block ownership by institutional investors. This relation is vital given the tremendous growth of institutional ownership and the significant influence of large institutional blockholders on financial earnings quality. Our findings indicate that the presence of institutional blockholders drives higher financial earnings quality. Results from an instrumental variable (IV) approach suggest our documented effects are directional. Next, cross-sectional tests prove that the relationship is more pronounced among firms adopting IFRS and those in countries with minority shareholder protection. Moreover, our results reveal that property rights and the lack of contestability partially mitigate the positive association between institutional ownership and earnings quality. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the influence of institutional ownership on earnings, which institutional and regulatory dimensions affect earnings, and through what channels these effects run. Overall, our results suggest that beyond corporate governance practices that enhance financial earnings quality, different countries' institutions and regulations settings influence the relation of institutional ownership to earnings quality.     

Institutional investor type,earnings management and benchmark beaters

This paper classifies institutional investors into transient or long-term by their investment horizons to examine the association between institutional investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings – firms that (do not) use accruals to meet/beat earnings targets. The results support the view that long-term institutional investors constrain accruals management among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. This suggests long-term institutional investors can mitigate aggressive earnings management among these firms. Transient institutional ownership is not systematically associated with aggressive earnings management and is evident only among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat their earnings benchmarks. This indicates transient institution-associated managerial myopia may not be as prevalent as posited by critics. This study highlights the importance of explicitly considering the type of institutional investor and the specific setting when investigating the association between institutional ownership and corporate earnings management.     

On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings management in Australia

This study examines the association between institutional ownership and Australian firms' aggressive earnings management strategies. In contrast to similar studies, this study does not assume that the two views on how institutional ownership associates with firms' earnings management behaviour are mutually exclusive. The association between institutional ownership and firms' income increasing discretionary accruals is expected to vary as the level of institutional ownership increases. The results support the predicted non-linear association between institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary accruals. In particular, a positive association is found at the lower institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that transient (short-term oriented) institutional investors create incentives for managers to manage earnings upwards. On the other hand, a negative association is found at the higher institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that long-term oriented institutional investors' monitoring limits managerial accruals discretion. These findings suggest that institutional investors can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating myopic aggressive earnings management by corporations when they have a sufficiently high ownership level.     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.