Equity‐based incentives and shareholder say‐on‐pay

We study the relationship between CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, pay‐risk sensitivity, and shareholder voting outcomes as part of the “say‐on‐pay” provision of the 2010 US Dodd‐Frank Act. Consistent with our hypothesis, we provide evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation packages that are more sensitive to changes in stock price (pay‐performance sensitivity). Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that outside owners approve of equity incentives as a means of aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders. We also document that future changes to equity‐based incentives are related to voting outcomes and that shareholders incorporate CFO incentives into their votes. Collectively, these results provide evidence of the importance of equity‐based incentives from the perspective of those most concerned with firm value and of the effectiveness of say‐on‐pay as a governance mechanism.     

It's OK to pay well,if you write well: The effects of remuneration disclosure readability

We examine whether, and how, shareholders’ votes in the Say-on-Pay (SOP) are affected by the readability of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A). Despite the SEC's Plain English requirement, qualitative disclosures on executive remuneration are generally long and complex. Extant evidence on whether low readability results in higher or lower shareholder dissent in the SOP, however, is ambiguous. We resolve this debate by demonstrating that the effects of readability on SOP voting are heterogeneous; while obfuscation may reduce dissent when CEO compensation is close to “normal” levels, diminished readability results in increased scepticism when pay levels are clearly excessive. The moderating role of readability is most pronounced for firms with less sophisticated shareholders, consistent with readability acting as a heuristic cue. Our results are robust to propensity score matching, and are less pronounced (1) when shareholders have less time to review the CD&A, and (2) when shareholders are distracted by competing AGMs, suggesting they are driven by readability, directly. Overall, our results highlight that greater use of Plain English in remuneration disclosures can have a substantial persuasive impact on shareholders.     

Women in leadership: an analysis of the gender pay gap in ASX‐listed firms

This study provides evidence that after several decades of fighting for equal pay for equal work, an unexplained gender pay gap remains amongst senior executives in ASX‐listed firms. After controlling for a large suite of personal, occupational and firm observables, we find female senior executives receive, on average, 22.58 percent less in base salary for the period 2002–2013. When executives are awarded performance‐based pay, females receive on average 16.47 percent less in cash bonus and 18.21 percent less in long‐term incentives than males. The results are robust to using firm fixed effects and propensity‐score matching. Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition results show that the mean pay gap cannot be attributed to gender differences in attributes, including job titles. Instead, the results point to differences in returns on firm‐specific variables, in particular firm risk.     

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.     

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.     

Perils of limiting the coverage of mandatory pay disclosure: The Korean experience

In 2013, Korea adopted a mandatory pay disclosure rule applicable only to board members paid above a certain threshold (KRW 500 million, roughly equal to USD 5 million). In this study, we find evidence of Korean executives avoiding disclosure through director deregistration, that is, stepping down from the board, but retaining a non-registered executive position in the same company. This tendency is stronger when deregistration cost is low (in case of family executives), and benefit is high (in case of high executive-to-worker pay ratios). We also find that family executives choose pay cuts over deregistration as means of avoidance when their income loss from pay cuts is relatively low. Last, we find that disclosure avoidance prompts negative share price reactions, leads to higher dividend payouts (in case of large pay cuts) and results in smaller board sizes (in case of family deregistration).     

Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform

Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. Exploiting the staggered reporting of pay ratios, we find little evidence that total CEO compensation changes in response to pay ratio disclosure reform. However, we do find that boards significantly adjust the mix of compensation awarded by reducing the sensitivity of CEO pay to equity price changes, particularly when the CEO is likely to garner media scrutiny, and by reducing reliance on stock-based and other compensation components that are most susceptible to media coverage surrounding the pay ratio disclosure. Firms ultimately disclosing higher pay ratios garner more media coverage around the filing of their proxy statement, and more negative-toned coverage in the subsequent month. Finally, we find evidence that greater pay disparity is associated with greater selling activity by retail investors and more negative say-on-pay votes following pay ratio reform, consistent with a broad set of investors responding to public scrutiny resulting from pay ratio disclosures.     

Pay me a single figure! Assessing the impact of single figure regulation on CEO pay

In this paper, we examine the relation between quantitative disclosure of CEO pay and the optimality of pay structure in terms of 1) level of pay, 2) pay-performance relationship, and 3) CEO-to-employee pay ratio. We use the new reporting regulation in 2013, requiring large and medium-sized companies and groups in the UK to report a single figure of total pay, as an exogenous shock to pay disclosure. Our results are based on a hand-collected sample of FTSE 100 firms over the period of 2010–2017. The main findings are threefold: Firstly, we find that CEO total pay stays roughly the same before and after the new regulation. In addition, firms that voluntarily adopt the regulation early have higher pay increases than their counterparts that do not adopt early in univariate tests. Secondly, pay-performance sensitivity actually declines after the new regulation by more than 50%. This effect is particularly evident in firms with weak corporate governance. Thirdly, the effect of the reform on the CEO-to-employee pay ratio is minimal, whereby it declined slightly following the reform, but this is only significant in univariate tests. Our results suggest that the 2013 regulation which increases the reporting transparency has limited impact on total pay and pay-performance in the UK.     

Remuneration committees,shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Extreme Uncertainty and Forward‐looking Disclosure Properties

This study investigates the effect of extreme uncertainty on disclosure behaviour by analyzing the quality and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures during the global financial crisis and pre‐crisis periods, controlling for other determinants of disclosure behaviour. Prior research has struggled to distinguish between the quality and quantity dimensions of forward‐looking disclosures. Also, the impact of the recent financial crisis on these forward‐looking disclosure attributes has not yet been examined systematically. We address this gap by exploiting the unique setting of German publicly traded firms. These firms must provide forward‐looking information within their audited financial statements, although relevant regulation is sufficiently vague to allow great variation in the quality, scope and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures actually observed. Using hand‐collected data from 2005 to 2009, we provide evidence of a significantly negative association between crisis and disclosure quality. This finding is robust to several different disclosure quality proxies and regression specifications. In contrast, we find no negative significant relation between crisis and disclosure quantity; rather, there is evidence that reported volume increases during the crisis. Our results are consistent with extreme uncertainty, as occurring during times of crisis, negatively affecting the quality of voluntary disclosures, while firms maintain or increase disclosure quantity, ultimately diluting the information density of forward‐looking disclosures.     

Corporate diversification,refocusing and shareholder voting

We examine if shareholders' attitude towards firm diversification strategy is revealed in their votes on management-initiated acquisition and divestment proposals using data on voting by shareholders of UK public firms between 1997 and 2019. We find that voting dissent is higher for diversifying acquisitions and lower for refocusing divestments, especially when these involve diversified firms. We also find a negative relationship between diversification premium and voting dissent. Our results provide evidence that diversification characteristics of firms and deals have a significant impact on shareholders' dissent in acquisitions and divestments.     

The real effects of financial reporting on pay and incentives

This paper discusses two real effects of financial reporting on pay and incentives: (1) Better earnings leads to better incentives, and (2) If pay is mismeasured, pay can be misused. The first real effect follows from the fact that incentives are often based on earnings, and the effectiveness of earnings-based incentives is positively related to the quality of earnings. Greater use of earnings in incentives provides better incentives at a lower cost. The second real effect has to do with how well the accounting system measures the expense of various pay components. Complex calculations are required to value complex pay components such as options, post-employment benefits, and performance-vested equity, and these calculations have historically not been done correctly. The incorrect accounting leads to these pay components being misused. I conclude by discussing how accounting and disclosure of pay and incentives can be improved.     

Disclosure,shareholder oversight and the pay–performance link

This paper investigates the effect of increased shareholder oversight and disclosure about executive remuneration on the pay–performance relation, while controlling for contemporaneous changes in corporate governance practice. Our sample consists of 240 ASX-listed firms with annual reports available for each year over the period 2001–2009, a period which straddles the timing of regulatory change. We initially document the conjectured improvements in remuneration disclosure and shareholder oversight in the form of the advisory vote on the remuneration report. Following, we find as predicted a general strengthening of the pay–performance relation over the study period, with the increased sensitivity of reported CEO remuneration to firm performance being primarily related to enhanced remuneration disclosure and the non-binding shareholder vote on the remuneration report. Our results lead us to conclude that enhanced oversight over executive remuneration arrangements brought about by regulatory change has positively impacted the executive remuneration process by strengthening the pay–performance relation and making the process appear more accountable.     

Compensation consultants and CEO pay

The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than one compensation consultant. An increase in the number of compensation consultants is also associated with an increase in CEO equity-based pay, whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation consultant are positively related to CEO equity-based pay.     

Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector

We examine 533 CEO severance contracts for financial services firms from 1997 to 2007 and find that ex ante severance pay is positively associated with risk-taking after controlling for the incentive effects provided by equity-based compensation. We report a positive causal relation between the amount of severance pay and risk-taking using popular market-based risk measures as well as the distance-to-default and the Z-score. We also find that severance pay encourages excessive risk-taking using metrics such as tail risk and asset quality. Our results are consistent with the risk-shifting argument and provide support for recent reforms on severance pay in the financial sector.     

Charitable inclination and the chief executive officer's pay package

Using chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) lifetime nonemployment experience in prominent charitable organizations to create a proxy for CEO charitable inclination, I find that charitably inclined CEOs receive a significant pay premium. The pay premium sensitivity to CEO charitable inclination is particularly pronounced for male, external, and specialist CEOs who are employed at firms that are undiversified, larger, less debt reliant, poor performing, facing high product‐market competition, and that keep nonmanipulative financial statements and demonstrate high inclination to social responsibility in the area of diversity, employee relations, and internal governance. This research contributes to the broader debate on labor market pricing of CEO characteristics.     

Say on Pay: Is It Needed? Does It Work?

A leading compensation practitioner reviews “Say on Pay” rules, those corporate practices giving shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. The assumption behind “Say on Pay” is that managers may be overpaid because directors fail to provide adequate oversight. O'Byrne questions this underlying assumption. He provides substantial evidence that directors do a poor job overseeing executive pay and that directors have weak incentives to pursue shareholder interests in executive pay. He also finds that “Say on Pay voting is sensitive to differences in pay for performance, but so forgiving that extraordinary pay premiums are required to elicit a majority ‘no’ vote”; and “that three quarters of institutional investors have lower SOP voting quality… than the average investor and almost all have a short‐term focus, with much greater vote sensitivity to current year grant date pay premiums than to long‐term pay alignment and cost.” The common corporate practice of providing competitive target compensation regardless of past performance leads to low alignment of pay and performance. Unfortunately, directors have little incentive to protect shareholder interests “because they are paid labor providers, just like management, not stewards of substantial personal capital.”     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

Asymmetric effects of voluntary disclosure on stock liquidity: evidence from 8‐K filings

This paper examines whether the change in stock liquidity subsequent to voluntary disclosure is different between good news and bad news. Using voluntary 8‐K filings, we find that the increase in stock liquidity is more pronounced for firms with good news disclosure than for firms with bad news disclosure. In addition, such findings are stronger when a firm is less visible and when the short‐selling costs are high, suggesting that these two factors play an important role in increasing stock liquidity. Overall, this paper provides evidence that the tone of voluntary 8‐K news is an important determinant of stock liquidity.