浅析利益相关者合作逻辑下的企业财务目标

一、利益相关者对企业财务管理的影响何谓企业的利益相关者?中外学术界有多种不同的看法,归纳起来,主要有三种:一是认为,凡是能够影响企业活动或被企业活动所影响的人或团体都是企业的利益相关者,包括股东、债权人、雇员、供应商、消费者、政府、相关的社会组织和社会集团、周边的社会成员等;二是认为,凡是与企业有直接关系的人或团体都是企业的利益相关者,该定义排除了政府、社会组织及社会团体、社会成员等与企业没有直接关系的利益相关者;三是认为,凡是向企业投入了专用性资产的人或团体都是企业的利益相关者。笔者     

我国金融企业承担环境责任平衡性分析——基于利益相关者视角下的联盟博弈

根据利益相关者理论,将金融企业的利益相关者分为支持型利益相关者、威胁型利益相关者、利弊兼有型利益相关者、无关紧要型利益相关者四类。通过构建联盟博弈模型,以这四类利益相关者作为参与者,对我国金融企业承担环境责任适度的平衡性进行分析,试图证明它的存在。根据博弈模型的结论,并结合我国金融企业承担环境责任的现状,从政府、市场、金融企业内部等方面对我国金融企业更好的承担环境责任提出建议。     

基于社会责任的利益相关者贡献表编制研究

从社会责任角度出发,研究企业对股东、政府、员工等利益相关者的贡献的大小和比重来衡量企业对各个利益相关者的贡献以及承担由于社会责任是国内外近几年的研究热点。本文试图通过建立利益相关者贡献表进行研究,希望通过该表清晰地展示企业对利益相关者的贡献。     

利益相关者理论下的会计政策选择研究

利益相关者理论是在契约理论的基础之上丰富和发展起来的,其根基并没有超脱企业契约的范畴,是环境推动的结果.企业之所以能够存在,不仅与股东和经理人员有关,而且与消费者、债权人、供应商、员工和政府等紧密相关.企业是利益相关者结成的关系契约,利益相关者的价值最大化是利益相关者理论下的会计政策选择的目标.会计政策选择权属于企业的剩余控制权,从利益相关者理论角度看,会计政策选择权应属于利益相关者.利益相关者通过不同的方式影响着企业,进而通过相应的公司治理结构和具体运行机制进行会计政策选择,并受到一定外在约束机制的制约.以利益相关者理论为基础,遵守会计政策选择的原则、在相应会计政策选择的内外约束机制下,达成利益相关者的价值最大化目标.     

浅析企业社会责任与公司价值的关系——基于资本利益相关者视角

本文基于资本利益相关者的视角通过阐述企业的财务资本利益相关者、人力资源资本利益相关者、社会资本利益相关者、市场资本利益相关者、生态资本利益相关者与公司价值的关系,说明社会资源是一个整体的大资本,企业是其中的中心资本,为了使中心资本不断地壮大企业就要非常重视与其他社会资本的关系.     

会计目标定位的再思考——基于利益相关者理论

根据利益相关者理论,企业是利益相关者组成的企业,各个利益相关者向企业投入一定的专用性投资,就必定要分享相应的经营成果,这里的利益相关者不仅包括股东、债权人,还包括供应商、职工、政府等,企业只有充分关注相关者的利益要求,才能持续地发展。然而,现行的会计目标"受托责任观"和"决策有用观"均侧重于向股东提供会计信息,忽略了其他利益相关者对信息的需求。本文认为,基于利益相关者理论的考虑,企业的会计目标应定位于为各利益相关者提供信息。由此,本文对会计目标进行重新定位,提出了利益相关者"权益保护观"。     

基于利益相关者视角下会计信息需求的分析

随着企业的组织结构和经济关系的不断发展变化,企业的利益相关者也在发生着变化,从而影响着他们对企业的会计信息的需求。因此,本文从利益相关者的视角来对企业会计信息的需求进行分析,首先是对利益相关者的理论阐述,其次是对会计信息进行概述,再次分析了利益相关者与会计信息之间的关系,最后对不同的利益相关者对会计信息的需求进行分析。     

建立高效的会计信息质量检查机制

一、会计信息质量低下的原因(一)利益相关者的有限理性根据现代企业理论,企业是由一系列契约组成的,包括正式契约和非正式契约。这些契约关系所涉及到的契约关系人即为企业的利益相关者,如企业的股东、债权人、管理者、员工、供应商、顾客、政府以及企业所在社区等。一方面,     

充分发挥内部审计在公司治理中的作用

公司治理的概念应从两个角度来理解。广义的“公司治理”，是指股东和其他利益相关者（包括债权人、供应商、雇员、政府和社区等与公司有利害关系的其他集团）对经营者的一种监督和制衡机制，即通过建立一套包括正式与非正式的、内部与外部的制度和机制来协调企业与所有利益相关者之间的利益关系。狭义的“公司治理”，仅指所有者（主要是股东）对经营者的一种监督和制衡机制，[第一段]     

公司治理:股东至上还是利益相关者至上?

“股东至上”和“利益相关者至上”是两种争议的代表性治理观点。“股东至上”治理主义以股东价值最大化为公司治理目标,以“资本雇用劳动”、代理理论为理论基础,以股东单边治理为主。而“利益相关者至上”治理主义以利益相关者利益最大化为公司治理目标,以利益相关者理论为基础,倡导利益相关者共同治理。本文从企业所有权、理论基础、会计上从利润的计算和分配过程、利益获得的确定性和公司运营等五个方面剖析了两种治理观点之间的关系,说明这两种观点其实并不冲突,是相容的。上市公司的治理目标应该是满足其他利益相关者利益基础上的股东财富最大化。     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

Complicating the current corporate governance controversy is a major disagreement about the fundamental purpose of the corporation. There are two main views on what should constitute the principal goal of the firm. Most economists tend to endorse value maximization—that is, maximization of the value of the firm's debt plus equity—or a version of value maximization known as “value‐based management” (VBM) that aims to maximize shareholder value. The main challenger is “stakeholder theory,” which argues that the corporation exists to benefit not just investors but all its major constituencies—employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and the federal government, as well as shareholders. Thus, whereas the success of a corporation under VBM could be assessed simply by its long‐run return to shareholders, under stakeholder theory a company's success would be judged by taking account of its contributions to all its stakeholders. Using statistical analysis of various measures of corporate success in satisfying non‐investor stakeholders, the author investigates whether a broader focus on multiple stakeholders is necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of long‐term shareholder value. His main findings in fact suggest just the opposite—namely, that long‐term value creation appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. More specifically, the author's study shows that companies with higher levels of value creation tend to have stronger reputations for treating stakeholders well while companies that create little value end up shortchanging not just their shareholders but all their constituencies. For profitable companies that have previously failed to devote the optimal level of resources to their non‐investor stakeholders, the message of this article is that investing in stakeholders can add value—and, in fact, it pays for companies to spend an additional dollar on stakeholder relationships as long as the present value of the expected (long‐run) return is at least a dollar.     

政府掠夺、内部人合谋与公司治理——兼论中小投资者保护

通过建立一个综合考虑法律、股权结构、大股东监督、经理人激励和证券监管、政府掠夺在内的分析大股东和经理人合谋侵权的委托—代理模型,运用标准逆向归纳法分析不同法律环境保护下利益相关者之间的利益关系。结果显示,法律对中小投资者保护至关重要;在中等或弱法律保护下,应提高证券监管和执法效率;在强法律保护下,证券监管效率对公司价值没有影响,政府管制应该逐渐淡出证券市场。不管法律保护水平如何,都应该坚持改善政府治理水平,提高政府运行效率,减少对企业的掠夺,从而达到提高公司价值和保护中小投资者权益的目的。     

以企业价值最大化为导向的企业绩效评价体系——基于利益相关者理论

企业拥有众多的利益主体,企业管理目标应该与企业利益主体有关,各个利益主体的目标都可以折衷为企业长期稳定发展和企业总价值的不断增长。企业的经营绩效应以最大限度地实现各利益主体的目标为已任, 企业绩效评价以企业价值最大化为核心符合现代企业管理方向。     

劳动关系学科方向发展定位与专业设计

从社会需求导向来看,构建和谐的劳动关系已成为全社会的基本共识;从学科背景、知识结构及专业设置等方面来看,劳动关系与社会保障互相扶持,缺一不可。因此,在"复合型"立体式公共管理类人才培养模式下,劳动与社会保障专业应该设置社会保障、劳动关系两个方向,然后从教学模式、教学内容、教学方法和实践教学体系四个方面进行整体设计,从而形成该专业人才培养独特的品牌和价值观,破解该专业缺乏"异质性"的发展困境。在未来条件许可的情况下,可以将劳动关系设为独立专业,实现该专业和学科的发展壮大。     

政府董事选任机制比较分析及其启示

政府董事是公司制国企中经国家股权支持委派或当选的董事。各国实践表明,政府董事虽具公司法上董事的外在形式,但实质为公职人员。政府董事的双重身份决定了其选任不能纯粹遵循私法的逻辑,需综合考虑公私法上双重因素。我国政府董事存在选任主体多元、标准不明、选任方式与程序不规范等问题。建议借鉴国外有益经验,在政府层面设立政府董事提名委员会,建立任职资格制度和董事池,优化提名、考察及任免等程序,并由政府与选定的政府董事签订聘任合同,将其纳入聘任制公务员管理。     

Corporate Governance and Labor Relations*

This article begins with the premise that since the corporation involves a symbiotic relationship between labor and capital, a single‐minded focus on shareholder value is likely to be shortsighted, and some degree of employee influence on corporate governance has the potential to increase an organization's efficiency and value. But the set of findings and implications that emerge from the author's analysis is a complicated one. On the one hand, “moderate” levels of employee ownership (for example, the 6% ownership of the average American ESOP) are associated with increases in corporate productivity and values as well as worker morale and productivity. On the other hand, majority employee ownership and corporate ownership and governance systems like “co‐determination” that give labor a major say on governance issues often lead to worker‐management alliances that end up hurting the firm's investors—and, in the longer run, the workers themselves— by reducing competitiveness. The author ends with a call for a balanced governance system that, while aiming to maximize the total value of the enterprise, seeks to encourage the participation and emotional allegiance of workers—and indeed all important corporate stakeholders.     

Perceptions and attitudes toward corporate website presence and its use in investor relations in the Jordanian context

This study reports the results of semi-structured interviews conducted to explore the factors affecting Jordanian listed firms' decisions on whether or not to have a corporate website and, if so, whether or not to use it in investor relations activities. Corporate interviewees noted that the decision to have an online presence was motivated by a desire to enhance the company's image and reputation, and the need to re-brand the company was often a key event triggering website adoption. Particularly important here were international influences, whether international partners, shareholders or competitors. However, in all cases, top management support was essential and played a key role in influencing the ways in which companies use their website both in general and for investor relations activities in particular. Results also revealed that the key factor explaining the lack of a corporate website was the attitude or belief of management. Of key importance was their belief that stakeholders, including Jordanian stock market participants, are not yet ready or willing to use the internet to acquire information about the company. Some interviewees similarly concluded that there is no demand for investor relations information on corporate websites because the Jordanian Securities Commission publishes all listed companies' annual reports on its own website. Other factors explaining the lack of a corporate website were management change, absence of competition and having been listed on the Jordanian stock exchange for a long period. This research extends our understanding of disclosure on the internet by considering a different research setting, namely Jordan, and also by extending the theoretical framework used.     

American Enterprise Institute Roundtable: Was Milton Friedman Right about Shareholder Capitalism?*

In this look back at Milton Friedman's famous essay in The New York Times 50 years ago organized by the American Enterprise Institute, three well‐known panelists discussed whether executives should continue to be guided by Friedman's oft‐cited statement that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its own profits.” One pretext or prompt for this discussion is the Business Roundtable's recent rethinking of the corporate mission, with its emphasis on all corporate stakeholders, employees and local communities as well as shareholders. Among the panelists, Marty Lipton takes the most enthusiastic view of this alternative to shareholder primacy. Now often identified as “stakeholder capitalism,” this alternative is embraced by Lipton as part of a “New Paradigm” in which large, universal owners act more or less in concert to pressure private companies to play a greater role in protecting the environment and lifting people out of poverty. By contrast, fund manager Cliff Asness and former Bush advisor and Columbia Business School dean Glenn Hubbard find considerable relevance and resilience in the old shareholder paradigm. Hubbard, for example, emphasizes the impossibility of maximizing long‐run value in highly competitive product and labor markets without taking care of all important stakeholders. And while sympathetic to the intent of the Business Roundtable—and the value of ensuring enough investment in corporate stakeholders—both Hubbard and Asness are troubled by the prospect of a corporate governance system trying to hold corporate managers accountable in a stakeholder‐centric world.     

网络信息内容生态共同治理的法治保障

在平台革命引发的政府管理困境下,网络信息内容生态的恶化让网络平台公司参与治理成为全球共识。为了打破既有法律对网络平台公司积极管理的阻碍,中、美两国分别通过设立内容监管义务与创设法律责任豁免的改革方式,推动了网络信息内容生态的共同治理。但现有的法律改革仅仅止步于鼓励网络平台公司的积极管理,并未通过统一的法律规则协调政府与网络平台公司相异的管理模式,这导致了政府与网络平台公司之间的权力纷争。为了构建起支撑网络信息内容生态共同治理的法治体系,法律应当通过程序规则将网络平台公司的商业管理手段转化为正式的公共管理机制,并调整政府的管理职责和网络平台公司的责任认定标准,使得两者的管理模式能够运转自如。     

基于分工理念的开发性普惠金融：功能定位与比较优势

开发性普惠金融建立在不同层次经济主体之间的产业链分工合作基础之上。经济思想史的研究表明,人类每一次分工形式的变化,都带来了经济发展质的飞跃。分工促进经济增长、劳动分工促进规模农业发展以及金融影响劳动分工的思想能够成为开发性普惠金融的理论基础。为了解决经济发展不平衡、不充分问题,应将普惠金融纳入基于供给侧结构性改革的新的劳动分工范畴,在农村及欠发达地区建立新型集体化生产经营方式。为欠发达地区、欠发达产业特别是农村经济的转型升级提供金融支持是开发性普惠金融的功能定位。开发性普惠金融的比较优势在于：促进欠发达地区产业兴旺,从根本上改善城乡收入不平等状况,缓解农户和农村小微企业的融资约束,有助于金融机构实现风险控制与收益的有机统一。