When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.     

Market reaction to announcements of legislative changes and Canadian bank takeovers of Canadian investment dealers

This study examines the market reactions of Canadian banks and investment dealers to regulatory changes regarding the ownership of investment dealers and to announcements of bank takeovers of investment dealers. The statistically significant and negative abnormal returns for the acquiring banks suggest that any potential benefits from economies of scope in joint bank/brokerage activities were totally reflected in the offering prices banks paid to target investment dealers. Consistent with the literature on mergers, positive and statistically significant excess returns are exhibited by the acquired investment dealers prior to takeover announcements. In-play and out-of-play rival (nontarget) investment dealers exhibit statistically significant positive and no abnormal returns, respectively. The findings of this study are consistent with competition in the market for the corporate control of investment dealers, and not with decreased competition in the brokerage industry. The findings imply that consumers of brokerage services are not harmed by takeovers. These findings may be useful to participants in the U.S. and Japanese financial markets as these countries undergo reforms similar to those recently experienced in Canada.     

Heterogeneous real-time trading strategies in the foreign exchange market

The foreign exchange (FX) market is worldwide, but the dealers differ in their geographical locations (time zones), working hours, time horizons, home currencies, access to information,transaction costs, and other institutional constraints. The variety of time horizones is large: from intra-day dealers, who close their positions every evening, to long-term investors and central banks. Depending on the constraints, the different market participats need different strategies to reach their goal, which is usually maximizing the profit, or rather a utility function including risk. Different intra-day trading strategies can be studied only if high-density data are available. Oslen & Associates (O & A) has collected and analysed large amounts of FX quotes by market makers around the clock (up to 5000 non-equally spaced prices per day for the German mark against US$). Based on these data, a set of real-time intra-day trading models has been developed. These models give explicit trading recommendations under realistic constraints. They are allowed to trade only during the opening hours of a market, depending on the time zone and local holidays. The models have been running real-time for more than three years, thus leading to an ex ante test. The test results, obtained with a risk-sensitive performance measure, are presented. All these trading models are profitable, but they differ in their risk behaviour and dealing frequency. If a certain profitable intra-day algorithm is tested with different working hours, its success can considerably change. A systematic study shows that the best choice of working hours is usually when the most important markets for the particular FX rate are active. All the results demonstrate that the assumption of a homogeneous 24-hour FX market with identical dealers, following an identical ‘rational expectation’, is far from reality. To explain the market dynamics, a heterogeneous model of the market with different types of dealers is more appropriate.     

The Value Relevance of Risk Disclosure: An Analysis of the Banking Sector

Abstract

The aim of this study is to test whether financial risk disclosures required by IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 are value relevant for investors to support them in their investment decisions. The sample in the study consists of banks listed on the London, Paris, Frankfurt, Madrid, and Milan Stock Exchanges over an 8-year period, from 2007 to 2014. Based on the aforementioned standards, we built financial risk disclosure indexes and distinguished different risk categories, qualitative and quantitative, as well as credit, liquidity, and market risk. Our analyses confirm that there is a positive association between bank value and several categories of established risk disclosures. Furthermore, it suggests that disclosure adds value to more traditional risk value measures. Besides, our results suggest that investors pay attention to the strength of the bank authority when using risk disclosures.     

Banks’ Governance and Innovation: Evidence from the Listed Firms in China

ABSTRACT

The article investigates the relationship between banks, agency costs, and innovation ability of listed firms. The role of banks in affecting innovation is a very important topic especially in China where banks play more important roles than equity markets. We find that banks providing short-term funds to listed non-high-tech firms dampen their innovation ability significantly. However, the relationship between short-term loans and innovation ability in high-tech firms is insignificant. The effects of short-term loans on innovation ability are significantly different between high-tech and non-high-tech firms. Further examination shows that high-tech firms with more short-term bank loans have significantly less abnormal management expenses than non-high-tech firms in the next year. The reduced abnormal management expenses in the next year significantly enhance the innovation ability in the year after next.     

Reprint of: Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.     

Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.     

Does Risk Sharing Motivate Interdealer Trading?

We use unique data from the London Stock Exchange to test whether interdealer trade facilitates inventory risk sharing among dealers. We develop a methodology that focuses on periods of "extreme" inventories—inventory cycles. We further distinguish between inventory cycles that are unanticipated and those that are anticipated because of "worked" orders. The pattern of interdealer trade during inventory cycles matches theoretical predictions for the direction of trade and the inventories of trade counterparts. We also show that London dealers receive higher trading revenues for taking larger positions.     

Profit Multiplier in Covered Currency Trading with Leverage

Currency trading, fully hedged with forward contracts and propelled by leverage, is enunciated within a microstructure of trade in foreign exchange with real-time data from Reuters data banks, and verified with banks and exchange dealers, first without and then with transactions costs. It is shown that iterative trading operations compound net profits significantly, and the existing academic maxim on arbitrage is thus raised to a new height—both in terms of theory and practice.     

A study on foreign exchange dealers' bid–ask spread quote behavior

Based on a questionnaire surveying dealers in the Taipei inter-bank foreign exchange market that was conducted in March 2001, I attempted to answer the question of who initiated the wider currency spread. It was found that the risk-averse dealers of small banks quoted wider spreads in order to conceal their inferior positions regarding information and inventory or to avoid market volatility risk. Some of the dealers of large multinational banks in major financial centers who normally quote conventional spreads were found to quote wider spreads in response to the request for quotations by small Taiwanese bank dealers who widened their spread quotes.     

Semi‐transparency,dealership market,and foreign exchange market quality

This paper examines the effects of a semi-transparency event, the introduction of the electronic trading system (EBS), on the market quality of a typical dealership market – the FX market. We find that increasing transparency leads to smaller quote disagreement among dealers and higher trading volume, but the beneficial effects are bigger for uninformed dealers than informed dealers. We also find that information efficiency improves overall in the semi-transparent system; however, informed dealers are found to quote less aggressively in the more transparent market. We conclude that semi-transparency raises market quality in general, but that it is the uninformed dealers who benefit more from this increased quality.     

The Market Quality of Dealer versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of Moderately Liquid Securities

Abstract:  Over the last decade, electronic limit-order trading systems have been sweeping securities exchanges around the world. This paper studies a transitional case, namely, the commencement of trading of a group of moderately liquid stocks on SETS of the London Stock Exchange. The evidence reveals that the liquidity of those stocks dropped substantially after the introduction of the limit order book and the removal of the market makers' obligations. This transition provides an example that a hybrid market with a limit order book and voluntary dealers may not perform as well as a dealership market with obligatory market makers.     

Effect of Internationalization on the Cost Efficiency of Taiwan’s Banks

Abstract:

We focus on the effect of internationalization on the cost efficiency of banks by studying Taiwan as a sample for developing countries. We find that (1) increasing overseas businesses and foreign exchange deposits increases cost efficiency; (2) expanding offshore banking units increases bank efficiency; and (3) the profitability of a bank’s overseas branch is not a critical factor behind the differences in cost efficiency across both financial holding company (FHC) banks and non-financial holding company (non-FHC) banks. Finally, our metafrontier empirical results illustrate that FHC banks in Taiwan show better technical performance in cost control than non-FHC banks.     

Agency Problems and the Performance of Venture-backed IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies,Lock-up Periods,and Bank Ownership

Abstract

The agency problems for initial public offerings are well documented in the literature. The objective of this research is to investigate the potential conflicts of interest for the ‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany. Of special interest are venture-backed IPOs and those in which banks acted as venture capitalist, underwriter, and provided analyst recommendations. High initial returns and outperformance are observed over the first 6 months of trading, which decreases significantly over the subsequent 18 months. The individual performance depends on the VC's underwriter and bank affiliation, exit behaviour, and lock-up commitment. Venture capitalists, and especially banks, timed their exit well. This indicates some serious agency problems in the German IPO market.     

Do European Primarily Internet Banks Show Scale and Experience Efficiencies?

Empirical evidence shows that Internet banks worldwide have underperformed newly chartered traditional banks mainly because of their higher overhead costs. European banks have not been an exception in this regard. This paper analyses, for the first time in Europe, whether this is a temporary phenomenon and whether Internet banks may generate scale economies in excess of those available to traditional banks. Also do they (and their customers) accumulate experience with this new business model, allowing them to perform as well or even better than their peers, the traditional banks? To this end, we have generally followed the same analytical framework and methodology used by DeYoung (2001, 2002, 2005) for Internet banks in the USA although the limitations in the availability of data, as well as the existence of different regulatory frameworks and market conditions, particularly in the retail segment, in the 15 European Union countries have required some modifications to the methodology. The empirical analysis confirms that, as is the case for US banks, European Internet banks show technologically based scale economies, while no conclusive evidence exists of technology based learning economies. As Internet banks get larger, the profitability gap with traditional banks shrinks. To the extent that Internet banks are profitable, European authorities may encourage a larger number of consumers to use this delivery channel, by tackling consumers security concerns. This would allow Internet banks to capture more of the potential scale efficiencies implied in our estimations.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

Indexing government stock: A fund manager's view

Two major changes affecting local authorities in London are scheduled to be implemented in the next couple of years, namely the poll tax and the abolition of the Inner London Education authority. Some inner London authorities will be worse off as a result.     

Crossborder financial contagion to Germany: How important are OTC dealers?

We examine crossborder contagion from a number of financial systems to the German financial system using the information content of CDS prices in a GARCH model. After controlling for common factors which may cause comovement in security prices, we find evidence for contagion from the US and European financial systems. Assessing contagion for dealer and non-dealer banks suggests that contagion from dealer banks is the most prominent source of contagion to the German financial system. While German non-dealer banks are affected both by European and US dealers, only US dealer banks have a contagion effect to German dealer banks.     

Herding and the information content of trades in the Australian dollar market

This study shows that the information content of FX transactions depends on the identity of market participants. Using spot FX transactions of a major Australian bank, we find that central banks have the greatest price impact, followed by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as hedge funds and mutual funds. Trades by non-financial corporations have the least impact on dealer pricing. In the interbank market, dealers with greater private information tend to choose direct trading which has lower post-trade transparency. Indirect trading via brokers is partially revealed to the market and has little price impact. The price impact largely comes from institutions in the top quartile of the trading volume. Furthermore, NBFIs have the greatest propensity for herding, followed by interbank dealers. Non-financial corporations do not herd in their trades. Except for central banks, the differential impact of market participants can largely be explained by their propensity for herding.     

Information Asymmetries and Security Market Design: An Empirical Study of the Secondary Market for U.S. Government Securities

This paper examines the empirical implications of an information asymmetry between primary and secondary dealers in the U.S. Government Securities market. This asymmetry arises because primary dealers are permitted to trade through all brokers operating in the marketplace while secondary dealers are restricted to trade through only a subset of brokers. Brokers distribute valuable information over video screens to their trading clients including dealers' up-to-date bid-ask spreads and recent transaction prices. As such, all brokers' video screen information is available to primary dealers, while only a subset of brokers' information is available to secondary dealers. Empirical analyses detect the resulting information asymmetry.