Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market

De Meza and Webb (2001) indicated that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion would demand more insurance and invest in self-protection to reduce risk probability when both the preference type and investment in self-protection are hidden from insurers. They referred to the negative correlation between market insurance and risk type as advantageous selection. However, the relationship between risk type and the degree of risk aversion is debatable in both theoretical and empirical research. This paper therefore proposes that advantageous selection could be supported from another angle by directly examining the relationships that exist among market insurance, self-protection, and risk probability. By focusing on the commercial fire insurance market, information on the purchase of market insurance, investment in self-protection, and fire accident records is hand-collected by means of a unique survey. It is found that firms purchasing market insurance have a greater tendency to channel efforts into self-protection. It is also found that firms expending effort on self-protection are less likely to suffer a fire accident. Furthermore, it is found that firms with commercial fire insurance have less chance of suffering a fire accident than those without such insurance. Each of the above three findings jointly supports the view that advantageous selection could play a critical role in the commercial fire insurance market.     

Insider trading and shareholder investment horizons

This paper examines the effects of shareholder investment horizons on insider trading. We find that insiders are less likely to trade on private information and the profitability of insider trades is lower when shareholder investment horizons are longer. We further examine two channels through which shareholders with longer investment horizons can impede insider trading: direct monitoring and better information environment. Consistent with the direct monitoring channel, we show that insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to shift trades from the month right before earnings announcements to the month right after earnings announcements. Moreover, the impact of investment horizons are stronger in firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, with lower corporate governance quality, and that are not targets of hedge fund activists. Consistent with the information environment channel, we show that longer shareholder investment horizons increase the frequencies of information disclosure and insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to trade in an isolated manner rather than in sequences.     

Does Inefficient Risk Sharing Increase Public Self-Protection?

This paper studies how the risk of having an unequal distribution of income across the population affects the investment in a public self-protection policy, such as financial regulation or climate change mitigation. Two economies are compared. In the first economy, there is perfect risk sharing, i.e., individuals can credibly commit on a set of transfers that will remove ex-post inequalities in consumption. In the second economy, no risk sharing takes place. By referring to the literature on background risks, I determine some conditions in terms of change in risk aversion and prudence, which guarantee an increase in self-protection under inefficient risk sharing. Generally speaking, if self-protection reduces the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when either the probability of a catastrophic event and/or the risk of inequality are sufficiently low. If self-protection increases the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when both the probabilities of aggregate loss and the increase in the risk of inequality are sufficiently small.     

Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?

Consider an agent facing a risky distribution of losses who can change this distribution by exerting some effort. Should he exert more effort when he becomes more risk-averse? For instance, should we expect more risk-averse drivers to drive more cautiously? In this article, we give sufficient conditions under which the answer is positive, using results presented in Jewitt (1989). We first extend the standard models of self-insurance and self-protection and show that the comparative statics depends only on the effect of effort on the net loss. We then present conditions for the continuous case with applications.     

基金网络能够提高投资绩效吗？

基金网络在金融市场的信息流动中发挥着重要作用。本文利用基金共同持股关系构建了一个有效的基金网络数据集,以中国资本市场股票型基金2005-2018年季度数据为研究样本,考察基金网络是否以及如何影响投资绩效。结果表明,基金在基金网络中越处于网络中心地位,基金的投资绩效越高。使用基金家族网络作为工具变量缓解内生性偏误后,基金网络仍然对投资绩效具有显著的正向影响。进一步地,本文考察了基金网络影响投资绩效的渠道,结果表明,基金网络主要通过提高基金的选股技能、资产配置技能和管理技能影响投资绩效。最后,本文考察了基金网络对基金市场份额的影响,研究发现基金网络会显著提高基金的市场份额,对基金在市场上的占有率有积极的正向影响。     

Self-Protection in the expected-utility-of-wealth model: An impossibility theorem

We investigate the possibility of ordering expected utility-of-wealth maximizers according to their propensities to purchase self-protection. We define one agent as “more cautious” than another (toward a loss of specific size given a specific initial wealth) if the first agent would spend more on self-protection than the other, so long- as the technological relationship between spending and loss probability belongs to a broad class of functions. We show that the expected-utility-of-wealth model does not allow for the possibility that one agent could be “more cautious” than another.     

Does venture capital investment enhance corporate innovation? Evidence from Korea

We examine whether venture capital (VC) investment enhances corporate innovation in Korea. Using a matched sample of 802 firms from 1998 to 2012, we find that after the first round of VC investment, VC-backed firms are more innovative than non-VC-backed firms. Our results suggest that the positive influence of VC investment largely comes from the ability of VC firms to reduce information asymmetry between investors and ventures: VC funds managed by independent venture capitalists significantly enhance corporate innovation, whereas those managed by governmental venture capitalists do not. Furthermore, this positive influence becomes more pronounced where there is greater information asymmetry. Finally, we show that funds with profit-based compensation structures are more likely to encourage corporate innovation than those with fee-based compensation structures.     

Intangible capital and the investment-q relation

The neoclassical theory of investment has mainly been tested with physical investment, but we show that it also helps explain intangible investment. At the firm level, Tobin’s q explains physical and intangible investment roughly equally well, and it explains total investment even better. Compared with physical capital, intangible capital adjusts more slowly to changes in investment opportunities. The classic q theory performs better in firms and years with more intangible capital: Total and even physical investment are better explained by Tobin’s q and are less sensitive to cash flow. At the macro level, Tobin’s q explains intangible investment many times better than physical investment. We propose a simple, new Tobin’s q proxy that accounts for intangible capital, and we show that it is a superior proxy for both physical and intangible investment opportunities.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Investment and insider trading

We study insider trading in a dynamic setting. Rational, butuninformed, traders choose between investment projects withdifferent levels of insider trading. Insider trading distortsinvestment toward asset with less private information. However,when investment is sufficiently information elastic, insidertrading can be welfare-enhancing because of more informativeprices. When insiders repeatedly receive informations, theytrade to reveal it when investment is information elastic becausegood news increases investment and hence future insider profits.Thus, more information is revealed and uninformed agents areexploited less frequently by insiders. Both effects are Pareto-improving.Finally, we consider various insider-trading regulations.     

How Does Being Public Affect Firm Investment? Further Evidence from China

What role does the stock market play in the allocation of capital? Few studies have examined how being public affects firm investment in emerging markets. This study fills this gap by comparing investment behavior in public and private Chinese firms over the period 2004–2010. We find an overall improved capital allocation of public firms relative to private firms in China. By disentangling the financial constraints effect from the agency effect, we show that public firms are less likely to underinvest when there is cash flow insufficiency and more likely to overinvest when there is free cash flow. We conclude that both effects coexist and that whether or not being public improves investment behavior depends on the net effect of loosening financial constraints and worsening agency conflicts. Further examination shows that financial information plays a limited role in these effects, implying that the association between being public and firm investment may not be attributed to information asymmetry but, rather, institutional arrangement in China.     

Risk Aversion,Downside Risk Aversion and Paying for Stochastic Improvements

This paper considers the relationship between risk preferences and the willingness to pay for stochastic improvements. We show that if the stochastic improvement satisfies a double-crossing condition, then a decision maker with utility v is willing to pay more than a decision maker with utility u, if v is both more risk averse and less downside risk averse than u. As the condition always holds in the case of self-protection, the result implies novel characterizations of individuals’ willingness to pay to reduce the probability of loss. By establishing a general result on the correspondence between an individual's willingness to pay, and his optimal purchase of stochastic improvement when there is a given relationship between stochastic improvements and the amount paid for them, we further show that all results on the willingness to pay can be applied directly to characterize the conditions under which a more risk averse individual will optimally choose to buy more stochastic improvement. Generalizations of existing results on optimal choice of self-protection can be obtained as corollaries.     

How do suppliers benefit from customers’ voluntary disclosure? the effect of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency

We explore whether and how the issuance of customers’ financial forward-looking information affects the investment efficiency of their upstream firms. Using earnings guidance as a proxy for forward-looking information, we find that firms wherein customers disclose earnings forecasts invest more efficiently than those where customers withhold forward-looking information. Our findings hold after controlling for a set of firm characteristics, employing alternative model specifications and measurements, and using the 2011 Thailand flood as a quasi-experiment. Further analyses offer support that the positive impact of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency is stronger for customers issuing more informative, disaggregated, and accurate forecasts and suppliers with weaker bargaining power. We also observe an asymmetric response of suppliers’ investments toward customers’ good-news versus bad-news forecasts. Furthermore, by conducting a textual-based analysis, we find that suppliers’ investment efficiency increases with more embedded supply chain relevant information in customers’ earnings guidance reports. Overall, our findings suggest that suppliers benefit from customers’ earnings guidance to better assess their investment decisions, thereby achieving greater investment efficiency.     

Media coverage and investment efficiency

We examine the effect of media coverage on firm-level investment efficiency. We find that media coverage reduces under-investment but increases over-investment. The negative effect of media coverage on under-investment is more pronounced in firms affected by greater information asymmetry and poorer corporate governance. The positive effect of media coverage on over-investment is driven by media-induced CEO overconfidence. Additional results show that both investment- and non-investment-related news coverage decrease under-investment, while non-investment-related news coverage is more influential in increasing over-investment. In general, higher news optimism is associated with less under-investment but more over-investment. Moreover, media coverage affects investment efficiency through its information dissemination rather than information creation function. Collectively, our results suggest that firms’ media visibility promotes more over-investment than under-investment.     

Contagious synchronization and endogenous network formation in financial networks

When banks choose similar investment strategies the financial system becomes vulnerable to common shocks. We model a simple financial system in which banks decide about their investment strategy based on a private belief about the state of the world and a social belief formed from observing the actions of peers. Observing a larger group of peers conveys more information and thus leads to a stronger social belief. Extending the standard model of Bayesian updating in social networks, we show that the probability that banks synchronize their investment strategy on a state non-matching action critically depends on the weighting between private and social belief. This effect is alleviated when banks choose their peers endogenously in a network formation process, internalizing the externalities arising from social learning.     

Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments

In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.     

Online social networks and corporate investment similarity

This paper analyzes the relationship between online social networks and inter-firm investment similarity. Using mutual friendships of senior officers on Sina Weibo as proxies for online social connections, we find that companies, whose senior officers share online connections, exhibit more similar levels of capital investments. In addition, the baseline result is robust in subsamples of senior officers' first like on Weibo, and continue to hold for a battery of robustness and endogeneity tests. One possible underlying mechanism through which social networks influence corporate investment similarity is that senior officers learn privileged information from their social connections, which is supported by examining the interaction effect of analyst coverage and online social connections. We further show that this investment similarity is more pronounced in the condition that company pairs are connected by more reputable senior officers, or in the case of under-investing.     

Foreign institutional ownership externalities and supplier innovation

Many emerging markets allow foreign investment as a way to reform domestic markets. Extant studies have found a positive externality on innovation brought forth by foreign direct investment (FDI); however, we know very little about the externality of another form of foreign investment, ownership by foreign institutional investors (FII), on innovation. In this paper, we document one form of FII externality by showing that foreign institutional ownership of the customer firm results in higher supplier innovation. We also show that the FII externality on supplier innovation is stronger when customers have more influence on the suppliers and when the FIIs can facilitate information flow better. Our findings suggest that the real impact of FII can go beyond the underlying firms, and promoting FII may benefit firms, especially smaller firms in emerging countries that do not directly have foreign ownership.     

Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing

This paper examines how information becomes reflected in prices when investment decisions are delegated to fund managers whose tenure may be shorter than the time it takes for their private information to become public. We consider a sequence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits the portfolio of their predecessor. We show that the inherited portfolio distorts the subsequent manager's incentive to trade on long-term information. This allows erroneous past information to persist, causing mispricing similar to a bubble. We investigate the magnitude of the mispricing. In addition, we examine endogenous information quality. In some cases, information quality increases when the manager's expected tenure decreases.