WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

STABILIZATION POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The article focuses on the design of stabilization measuresto correct excessive balance of payments deficits and moderatethe rate of inflation. It distinguishes three sources of balanceof payments difficulties—excessively expansionary aggregatedemand policies; domestic supply shocks stemming, for example,from increases in real wages in excess of productivity growth;and external terms of trade shocks. It also analyzes the effectsof devaluations. The second part of the article discusses policiesaimed at reducing the rate of inflation and summarizes the theoreticalliterature on the dynamics and the transitional costs of adjustmentto lower rates of inflation in closed economies. Evidence onthe adjustment costs of disinflationary policies is reviewed,and the discussion is extended to some recent analysis of adjustmentin open economies.      

An Institutional Analysis of the Design and Sequence of Trade and Investment Policy Reform

Countries vary in their political commitment to change and inthe capability of their bureaucracies. Policies vary in theirorganizational and political demands. These institutional variationscan be incorporated into the design of trade and investmentpolicy reform. In virtually all countries the presumption shouldbe for reforms to dismantle—not reconfigure—restrictiveentry rules and dysfunctional discretionary investment incentives.But there is no single approach, common across countries, throughwhich trade policy reform should proceed. Countries with weakadministrative capabilities should push import liberalizationto the limits. But politically constrained countries with astronger administrative capability might consider roundaboutreforms that secure outward orientation without full-scale,prior import liberalization.     

Diversification of Macroeconomic Risk and International Integration of Capital Markets: The Case of Mexico

This article tests the arbitrage pricing theory in the contextof the unstable macroeconomic years in Mexico, 1977–87.Using information on returns on assets available to domesticinvestors—primarily stocks traded at the local stock exchange—anattempt is made to ascertain the extent to which these assetshave offered premia for a set of proposed sources of risk. Thepervasive factors that play an important role in asset pricingin Mexico are unexpected inflation, unexpected money growth,innovations in the Standard & Poor's 500 price series, andinnovations in the dollar oil price. A residual market factoris obtained, using the McElroy and Burmeister model. Given thatthese risks get premia over and above the riskless rate, expectedrates of return in Mexico have been higher during the yearsof erratic macroeconomic conditions. Mexico is not consideredto be well integrated with the international capital marketsbecause local sources of risk—such as inflation—arenot priced in the United States, whereas international sourcesof uncertainty—such as oil price shocks—are pricedlocally but not in the United States.     

Patterns of Transition from Plan to Market

The transition from a planned economy to a market economy involvesa complex process of institutional, structural, and behavioralchange. This article develops an index of economic liberalizationand analyzes its interaction with growth and inflation, usingdata from twenty-six transition countries for 1989–94.The article reveals two paradoxes of transition. First, theattempt to maintain output by subsidizing enterprises resultsin larger declines in output than occur under a policy of reducingsubsidies. Second, price liberalization results in lower inflationthan occurs under a policy of continued price controls. Strong common patterns exist among countries at similar stagesof reform. The common legacy and the associated changes thatresult from initial disruptions in the socialist economic coordinatingmechanisms and subsequent liberalization measures go a longway toward explaining the transition experience. Because stronginteractions between liberalization and stabilization are likely,stabilization becomes a priority for the resumption of growth.     

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: The Effect on the Poor

Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation andcommercialization in agriculture work their way through to thepoor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But thisview is not universal: some hold that these forces for changecan interact with, or even induce, institutional and marketfailure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instancesin which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or evenhave lost, from the technological change or commercialization.Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostlyattributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features;often, when technology or commercialization has been blamedfor the decline in income of the poor, other—not necessarilyconnected—policies have in fact been responsible for thedamage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large,correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulateagricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expandfood supply—all central to the alleviation of poverty.The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extensionof this view—that through "social engineering" the benefitsfrom technology and commercialization can easily be targetedtoward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targetingshould of course be seized.      

INFLATION AND THE COSTS OF STABILIZATION: Historical and Recent Experiences and Policy Lessons

This article reviews various experiences with stabilization.It first examines stabilization programs in the context of hyperinflation—lookingat the experiences of Austria and Germany in the early 1920sand Bolivia in 1985—and then reviews and interprets theresults of orthodox stabilization plans (applied in Argentina,Chile, and Uruguay during the mid-1970s and early 1980s) andthose of heterodox programs (the austral plan in Argentina andthe cruzado plan in Brazil, with a glance at the Mexican andIsraeli experiences). The paper concludes with a discussionof conceptual issues and implications for the design of stabilizationpolicies.      

Infrastructure Privatization and Regulation: Promises and Perils

Infrastructure is crucial for generating growth, alleviatingpoverty, and increasing international competitiveness. For muchof the twentieth century and in most countries, the networkutilities that delivered infrastructure services—suchas electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railroads,and water supply—were vertically and horizontally integratedstate monopolies. But this approach often resulted in extremelyweak services, especially in developing and transition economiesand especially for poor people. Common problems included lowproductivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue,and shortfalls in investment. Over the past two decades manycountries have implemented far-reaching institutional reforms—restructuring,privatizing, and establishing new approaches to regulation.This article identifies the challenges involved in this massivepolicy redirection within the historical, economic, and institutionalcontext of developing and transition economies. It also reviewsthe outcomes of these policy changes, including their distributionalconsequences—especially for poor households and otherdisadvantaged groups. Drawing on a range of international experiencesand empirical studies, it recommends directions for future reformsand research to improve infrastructure performance.      

Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence

Political influence on the central bank is measured here bylooking at the probability that a central bank governor willbe replaced shortly after a political change of government.The governor changes about half the time within six months ofa nonconstitutional or other radical change of government—amilitary coup or a restoration of democracy. The governor ismuch less likely to change within six months following a routinechange in the head of government—about one-fourth of thetime in developing countries and one-tenth in industrial countries.These indicators vary across countries and correlate statisticallywith inflation and its variability and with real growth andreal interest rates. Differences in the vulnerability of thecentral bank to political instability, in political instabilityitself, and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periodsseem to be a major part of the explanation for why developingcountries have, on average, higher and more variable inflationthan industrial countries do.     

Economic, Demographic, and Institutional Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption across Countries

Life insurance has become an increasingly important part ofthe financial sector over the past 40 years, providing a rangeof financial services for consumers and becoming a major sourceof investment in the capital market. But what drives the largevariation in life insurance consumption across countries remainsunclear. Using a panel with data aggregated at different frequenciesfor 68 economies in 1961–2000, this article finds thateconomic indicators—such as inflation, income per capita,and banking sector development—and religious and institutionalindicators are the most robust predictors of the use of lifeinsurance. Education, life expectancy, the young dependencyratio, and the size of the social security system appear tohave no robust association with life insurance consumption.The results highlight the importance of price stability andbanking sector development in fully realizing the savings andinvestment functions of life insurance in an economy.     

Competition and Scope of Activities in Financial Services

This article analyzes the costs and benefits of different degreesof competition and different configurations of permissible activitiesin the financial sector and discusses the related implicationsfor regulation and supervision. Theory and experience demonstratethe importance of competition for efficiency and confirm thata competitive environment requires a contestable system—meaningone that is open to competition—but not necessarily alarge number of institutions. A competitive banking system canimprove the distribution of consumer credit, enhance the corporatesector's access to financing, and mitigate the risks of financialcrises. In an open market, in which services and products areprovided in response to market signals, financial institutionsrespond by offering a wider scope of financial services. Theoptimal institutional design for supervisory functions is lessobvious.      

Tipping

We investigate the trading of institutions immediately beforethe release of analysts’ initial buy recommendations.We document abnormally high institutional trading volume andbuying beginning five days before recommendations are publiclyreleased. Abnormal buying is related to initiation characteristicsthat would require knowledge of the content of the report—suchas the identity of the analyst and brokerage firm, and whetherthe recommendation is a strong buy. We confirm that institutionsbuying before the recommendation release earn abnormal profits.Our results are consistent with institutional traders receivingtips regarding the contents of forthcoming analysts’ reports.(JEL G14, G18, G24)     

Is Disinflation Good for the Stock Market?

The stock market appreciates by an average of 24 percent in real dollar terms when countries attempt to stabilize annual inflation rates that are greater than 40 percent. In contrast, the average market response is 0 when the pre–stabilization rate of inflation is less than 40 percent. These results suggest that the potential long–run benefits of stabilization may dominate short–run costs at high levels of inflation, but at low to moderate levels of inflation, benefits may be offset by costs in a present value sense. Stock market responses also help predict the change in inflation and output in the year following all 81 stabilization efforts.     

HOW WELL CAN METHOD SUBSTITUTE FOR DATA? FIVE EXPERIMENTS IN POVERTY ANALYSIS

No one doubts that good data are essential to sound policymaking.Alas, data are invariably faulty. Methodological solutions todata inadequacies have often been proposed and implemented,but they have been tested only rarely. Yet the methods thatare used may well determine the direction of policy. For example,the particular survey method used—and the way nonsurveydata are interpreted—may be critical in assessing whethera country's strategy for reducing poverty is working. This articleshows how counterfactual experiments can help test the reliabilityof various methods of dealing with common data problems. Well–designedmethods—and they need not be very complicated—canhelp get around the problem, although it appears that substitutingmethod for data is a long way from being perfect.      

Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy

This article addresses the issues of incomplete markets andimperfect information in the context of credit markets in ruralnorthern Nigeria. In much recent theoretical literature, theproblems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed tobe decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions. Incontrast, it is found that in the four villages surveyed credittransactions take advantage of the free flow of informationwithin rural communities. Information asymmetries between borrowerand lender are unimportant, and their institutional consequences—theuse of collateral and interlinked contracts—are absent.Credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk betweenhouseholds through the use of contracts in which the repaymentowed by the borrower depends on the realization of random productionshocks by both the borrower and the lender.     

Paths of Institutional Development: A View from Economic History

This article surveys an influential new research program onhistorical paths of institutional development and their consequencesfor growth. The research program exploits the experience ofEuropean colonialism as a kind of "natural experiment" whoseresults bear on the way institutions affect development. Thecentral hypothesis of this research is that societies that beganwith more extreme inequality were more likely to develop institutionsallowing much of the population only limited access to economicopportunities. The research has uncovered a striking reversalof fortune among the areas colonized by Europe; those that wererelatively rich in the 1600s are today far poorer than the areas(such as the United States and Canada) that initially were viewedas relatively undesirable. The timing of the reversal—atthe onset of the Industrial Revolution, when there was probablya premium on broad participation in commercial activity—suggeststhat institutions associated with high inequality may be a causalfactor in low aggregate incomes. This research program is stillin its early stages. But studies of institutions in India usingdata rich enough to permit hypothesis-testing provide evidencesupporting the hypotheses developed in the analysis of the Europeancolonial experience.      

Inflation targeting in Brazil: constructing credibility under exchange rate volatility

This paper assesses the challenges faced by the inflation-targeting regime in Brazil. The inflation-targeting framework has played a critical role in macroeconomic stabilization. We stress two important challenges: construction of credibility and exchange rate volatility. The estimations indicate the following results: (i) the inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations; (ii) the Central Bank has reacted strongly to inflation expectations; (iii) there has been a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence; and (iv) the exchange rate pass-through for “administered or monitored” prices is two times higher than for “market” prices.     

Managing Oil Price Risk in Developing Countries

This article presents a simple framework for understanding theimpact of oil dependence on growth in terms of an optimal savingsand investment strategy. Among the more important factors underlyingthis strategy is the extent to which oil price changes are temporaryor permanent. This in turn determines whether a country shouldrely on stabilization and savings funds or the use of financialinstruments to manage oil revenues—or both. Country experienceswith stabilization and savings funds are surveyed, and the caseis presented for using financial instrument to manage oil pricerisk. Policy implications for enhancing the use of financialinstruments are explored, including an expanded role for internationalfinancial institutions.      

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.      

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.