Industry specialist auditors, outsider directors, and financial analysts

This study investigates the relationships among industry specialist auditors, outside directors, and financial analysts. Specifically, we examine the effect of analyst coverage on the association between auditor industry specialization and outside directorship. We find that outside directors are less likely to hire industry specialist auditors for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings suggest that analyst coverage moderates outside directors’ demand for industry specialist auditors, that is, financial analysts may compete with industry specialist auditors to some extent in monitoring financial reporting process.     

On the Feasibility of Automated Market Making by a Programmed Specialist

Securities trading is accomplished through the execution of orders. Admissible orders (e.g., market orders, limit orders) give rise to discontinuous aggregate demand functions, composed of many “steps.” Demand smoothing, or the balancing of excesses due to such discontinuities via intervention, is one of the most basic functions that could be assigned to a “specialist.” When the specialist's “affirmative obligation” is fully specified, his or her activity can in principle be automated. This paper is an attempt to assess, via simulation, some of the ramifications of using a “programmed specialist,” whose automated market making is limited to demand smoothing. A number of alternative rules of operation are simulated. Several of the rules performed well, especially the extremely simple rule that calls for the (computerized) specialist to minimize new absolute share holdings in each security at each trading point via “total” (as opposed to “local”) demand smoothing. Our results indicate that the underlying costs of demand smoothing are on the order of a fraction of a penny per share traded even in relatively thin markets.     

Hybrid markets, tick size and investor trading costs

This paper shows how the tick size affects equilibrium outcomes in a hybrid stock market such as the NYSE that features both a specialist and a limit order book. Reducing the tick size facilitates the specialist's ability to step ahead of the limit order book, resulting in a reduction in the cumulative depth of the limit order book at prices above the minimum tick. If market demand is price-sensitive, and there are costs of limit order submission, the limit order book can be destroyed by tick sizes that are either too small or too large. We show that trading cost is minimized at larger tick sizes for larger market orders, creating an incentive to submit smaller orders when tick size is reduced. With a smaller tick size, specialist participation increases and specialist profit increases slightly for small market orders, and considerably for large market orders.     

Disease‐Specific Moral Hazard and Optimal Health Insurance Design for Physician Services

This article analyzes disease‐specific moral hazard effects in the demand for physician office visits and explores whether optimal insurance for physician services should be designed to have disease‐specific cost sharing. Generalized method of moments is implemented to address the endogeneity of private health insurance, and the nonnegativity and the discreteness of physician services use. The results indicate that the moral hazard effect varies considerably across disease‐specific specialist care. The strongest moral hazard (for no‐condition related specialist visits) is almost twice the moral hazard effect of the weakest (for chronic condition related specialist visits). Although the findings indicate some variation in the moral hazard effect across disease‐specific general practitioner visits, the variation is less considerable. The main policy implication is that optimal insurance for physician services should be designed to have differential cost sharing based on disease status rather than to have uniform cost sharing.     

The Pricing of When-Issued Securities

The observed pricing of when-issued securities would seem to violate the law of one price in financial economics. Generally, when-issued shares sell at a premium over the original shares during the short time when both are traded. This paper examines whether this observed premium could be due to a nonsynchronous trading problem, to the intensity of trading, to the exchange on which the shares are traded, to whether the shares are traded pre-or-post -negotiable commissions, or to the nature of the demand for when-issued relative to the price setting of the specialist. Results indicate that most orders for when-issued securities are buys, that these orders typically take place at the specialist's ask price, and that accounting for this trading mechanism explains the positive premium on when-issued securities.     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

An International Examination of Assurance Practices on Carbon Emissions Disclosures

This paper provides a detailed examination of the assurance practices for carbon emissions disclosures for an international sample of 3008 companies across 43 countries between 2006 and 2008. The demand for such assurance services was found to be mainly from companies in Europe and companies from carbon intensive industries, with a majority of these engaging specialist assurers. The results reported reflect the growth and evolving nature of this emerging market. Through providing an understanding of current practice in this dichotomous market our study provides important information for standard setters and regulators as they work towards establishing guidelines and standards to regulate this market.     

Loan Covenants and Relationship Banking in MBOs

This paper examines the role of accounting-based covenants and other sources of information in signalling financial distress in UK MBOs. Using an in-depth questionnaire and follow-up interviews to investigate the perceptions of senior UK MBO lenders, we find that: MBO loan agreements contain more covenants than general corporate lending agreements; monthly management accounts and telephone communication are more frequent first indicators of distress than are accounting-based covenant breaches; lenders with specialist MBO lending units are more likely to waive covenant breaches and less likely to recall loans in default than those without such units; syndicate members find both information flows prior to breach and subsequent action taken to be less effective than do syndicate leaders or sole lenders; and the presence of a specialist MBO lending unit provides the skills and reputation needed to establish a high degree of trust between the banks on the one hand and the MBOs and the equity houses on the other, but there is wide variety in the ways that banks manage these relationships. These findings confirm the expectation that the relatively more acute adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in MBO lending increase the demand for monitoring via covenants, and that the closer the lender/borrower relationship, the more effective the monitoring.     

Cleaning house: Stock reassignments on the NYSE

A frequently occurring, yet unexplored, phenomenon of the New York Stock Exchange specialist system is that of reassignments of stocks by specialist firms on the floor of the Exchange. These events change the portfolios at the individual specialist level by reassigning one or more stocks from one individual specialist portfolio to another. We find that reassigned stocks have unusually wide spreads before reassignments and experience a decline in spreads to levels comparable to matched stocks after the reassignment. This improvement in liquidity is associated with a reduced cost of capital for the reassigned firms. We find that portfolio size, and industry and size concentration of the individual specialist portfolios are associated with the decision of specialist firms to reassign stocks.     

Does the Specialist Matter? Differential Execution Costs and Intersecurity Subsidization on the New York Stock Exchange

This article tests for differences in execution costs among specialist firms for New York Stock Exchange listed securities. Execution cost differences provide a measure of the relative performance of specialist firms. We find a substantial difference in effective spreads and order processing costs across specialist firms, controlling for stock characteristics. While economically significant, the differences in execution costs between specialist firms are much smaller than the cross-market differences reported by Huang and Stoll (1996). Within a specialist firm, there is a positive relation between order processing costs and trading activity that is consistent with the hypothesis that active stocks subsidize inactive stocks.     

An Analysis of Individual NYSE Specialist Portfolios and Execution Quality

The value of specialist assistance to the trading of low-volume stocks has important implications in exchange design. We study the relation between the structure of individual specialist portfolios and the transitory volatility of low-volume stocks in these portfolios under the traditional NYSE auction-dealer market structure. We find that the trading quality for inactive stocks is positively related to the trading volume of active stocks in the same specialist portfolios. These results are consistent with specialist subsidization of low-volume stocks in their portfolios and suggest that specialists provide important support to the trading of inactive stocks if they have the resources.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

Evaluating the effect of industry specialist duration on earnings management

This study examines whether auditor industry specialist duration (i.e., the cumulative number of years an audit firm can be deemed an industry specialist) affects earnings management. Using a sample of 17,546 observations during the period of 2006 to 2014, we find that audits performed by firms with longer industry specialist durations are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This finding enhances the industry specialization literature by showing that, in the long run, specialist auditors constrain the accrual management activities of their clients. However, we also find that audits performed by firms with longer industry specialist durations are associated with greater levels of real earnings management. In turn, this is consistent with real earnings management surfacing as an unintended consequence of specialist auditors being able to better constrain the accrual management activities of their clients (Chi, Lisic, & Pevzner, 2011).     

Mutual Fund Growth in Standard and Specialist Market Segments

This paper is concerned with differences in the performance-flow relationship (PFR) between standard and specialist market segments of the mutual fund industry. We expect differences in this relationship because investor characteristics might vary across different segments. Our results show that the PFR is more convex in standard segments than in specialist segments. Furthermore, investors in standard segments are less risk-averse and invest more in high-load funds than investors in specialist segments. Our findings are consistent with investors in standard segments being less sophisticated than investors in specialist segments and relying more heavily on the advice of financial brokers, which is compensated for by load fees.     

Affirmative obligations and market making with inventory

Existing empirical studies provide little support for the theoretical prediction that market makers rebalance their inventory through revisions of quoted prices. This study provides evidence that the NYSE's specialist does engage in significant inventory rebalancing, but only when not constrained by the affirmative obligation to provide liquidity imposed by the Price Continuity rule. The evidence also suggests that such obligations are associated with better market quality, but impose significant costs on the specialist. The specialist mitigates these costs through discretionary trading when the rule is not binding. These findings shed light on how exchange rules affect market makers’ behavior and market quality.     

The strategic specialist and imperfect competition in a limit order market

The empirical literature suggests that the limit order book contains information that might be used by the specialist to his own advantage. I develop a model where there is a strategic specialist who competes against a limit order book and has information about supply. The presence of a strategic specialist in an imperfectly competitive limit order book market induces non-monotonicity of market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Moreover, the existence of private information about supply significantly affects market performance as it induces, among other effects, lower market liquidity. Finally, this model suggests another link between Kyle’s (1985, 1989) [Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1336, Kyle, A., 1989. Informed speculators with imperfect competition. Review of Economic Studies 56, 317–356] and Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) [Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed markets. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71–100] models by allowing for strategic behaviour of the specialist.     

The Trades of Market Makers: An Empirical Analysis of NYSE Specialists

This paper presents a transaction-level empirical analysis of the trading activities of New York Stock Exchange specialists. The main findings of the analysis are the following. Adjustment lags in inventories vary across stocks, and are in some cases as long as one or two months. Decomposition of specialist trading profits by trading horizon shows that the principal source of these profits is short term. An analysis of the dynamic relations among inventories, signed order flow, and quote changes suggests that trades in which the specialist participates have a higher immediate impact on the quotes than trades with no specialist participation.     

Time Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market-Maker Inventories and Revenues

We show that market-maker balance sheet and income statement variables explain time variation in liquidity, suggesting liquidity-supplier financing constraints matter. Using 11 years of NYSE specialist inventory positions and trading revenues, we find that aggregate market-level and specialist firm-level spreads widen when specialists have large positions or lose money. The effects are nonlinear and most prominent when inventories are big or trading results have been particularly poor. These sensitivities are smaller after specialist firm mergers, consistent with deep pockets easing financing constraints. Finally, compared to low volatility stocks, the liquidity of high volatility stocks is more sensitive to inventories and losses.     

The portfolio of knowledge required by industry specialist auditors

While a number of studies have shown the superior performance of industry specialist auditors, prior research has not examined the underlying knowledge categories reflective of a specialist. This study aims to identify the range of knowledge required to be a successful industry specialist auditor, and the ways in which this knowledge is and might best be acquired. A multi-method approach was employed, including the use of a free-list task to identify important categories of knowledge, and a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire examined several issues including current knowledge of specific items, extent to which specialist knowledge is reflected in the firm's support systems, and methods by which this knowledge was, and could be, acquired. Participants, designated insurance industry specialists from a Big 4 firm, identified a large range of knowledge items, and there was a large degree of consensus between the results arising from the two knowledge identification research methods utilised. The results also revealed a number of perceived deficiencies in the level of current knowledge and the extent to which specialised knowledge is reflected in support systems. Few differences were found in the knowledge requirements of the two industry sub-specialisations, life insurance, and property and casualty insurance. Except for industry and economic factors, on-the-job experience was found to be the most prevalent method of gaining industry specialist knowledge. However, there was support for greater formal training and improved firm support systems for several specific knowledge items.     

Credit Management: An Examination of Policy Choices, Practices and Late Payment in UK Companies

A central element in developing credit management policy involves design choices on the extent to which credit activities are best managed internally or through specialist market intermediaries. This paper draws on the findings of a survey on the credit management practices and policies of large UK companies to: (1) Examine the type of firm most likely to enter into specialist external credit management structural arrangements; and (2) Identify contextual and credit policy choices influencing the credit period taken and late payment of debts. The study found that specialist intermediaries are not particularly common in large firms. The paper also identifies a number of contextual and policy variables that help explain variation in debtor days and late payment by customers.