Overvaluation and earnings management: Does the degree of overvaluation matter?

We examine whether the choice of earnings management strategies employed by managers of overvalued firms depends on the degree of market overvaluation. By distinguishing between substantially overvalued (SOV) and relatively overvalued (ROV) firms, we find that SOV firms significantly inflate earnings using both accruals-based and real earnings management. In contrast, managers of ROV firms do not engage in accruals-based earnings management and their firms’ accounts tend to report higher discretionary expenses. The reported higher discretionary expenses of ROV firms are comparable to the discretionary expenses of firms in the expanding stage of their business life cycle, a pattern consistent with ROV firms increasing discretionary expenses to finance growth and hence justify the high market valuation. Overall, we show that the existing evidence on income-increasing earnings management by overvalued firms is mainly driven by the pressure to sustain the high market valuation of firms that are substantially overvalued.     

US oil companies’ earnings management in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita

This study examines earnings management by US-based oil companies in the period immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We show that large petroleum refining firms – but not the smaller crude oil and natural gas production companies – recorded significant abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the fiscal quarter immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Q4 of 2005). In addition, we show that these results are driven by abnormal current accruals. Prior studies show that some firms respond to periods of heightened political scrutiny by recording abnormal income-decreasing accruals (e.g. [Cahan, S., 1992. The effect of antitrust investigation on discretionary accruals: a refined test of the political cost hypothesis. The Accounting Review 67 (1), 77–96; Han, J., Wang, S., 1998. Political costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. The Accounting Review 73 (1), 103–118]). Our results add to this stream of research by examining a political cost-increasing event that occurred after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The results suggest that in the post-SOX period managers continue to engage in income-decreasing earnings management during periods of heightened political cost sensitivity, at least in the case of large petroleum refining firms.     

On-market share buybacks, exercisable share options and earnings management

Chan et al. (2006b ) suggest that managers might announce a share buyback to manipulate investors’ perceptions and capitalize on the positive price reaction usually associated with the announcement. The incentive to do so is greater when managers have exercisable options. Prior studies document that managers engage in upwards earnings management for opportunistic reasons related to option holdings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). We examine the association between earnings management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms to investigate if earnings management in the pre‐buyback period is greater for firms with equity incentives to increase share price. Our results, using 138 buybacks over the period 1996–2003, support our prediction. We find that buyback firms with both exercisable options that are in‐the‐money prior to the buyback announcement as well as options that are exercised in the buyback period have higher discretionary current accruals than buyback firms with no exercisable options, unexercised options or with out‐of‐the‐money options. Overall, our results are consistent with buyback firms with exercisable options using earnings management and buyback announcements to maximize option payoffs, and buyback firms without exercisable options signalling undervaluation.     

Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts

This paper examines the performance consequences of cutting discretionary expenditures and managing accruals to exceed analyst forecasts. We show that firms that just beat analyst forecasts with low quality earnings exhibit a short-term stock price benefit relative to firms that miss forecasts with high quality earnings. This trend, however, reverses over a 3-year horizon. Additionally, firms reducing discretionary expenditures to beat forecasts have significantly greater equity issuances and insider selling in the following year, consistent with managers understanding the myopic nature of their actions. Our results confirm survey evidence suggesting managers engage in myopic behavior to beat benchmarks.     

Abnormal real operations,real earnings management,and subsequent crashes in stock prices

We study the impact of firms’ abnormal business operations on their future crash risk in stock prices. Computed based on real earnings management (REM) models, firms’ deviation in real operations (DROs) from industry norms is shown to be positively associated with their future crash risk. This association is incremental to that between discretionary accruals (DAs) and crash risk found by prior studies. Moreover, after Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, DRO’s predictive power for crash risk strengthens substantially, while DA’s predictive power essentially dissipates. These results are consistent with the prior finding that managers shift from accrual earnings management to REM after SOX. We further develop a suspect-firm approach to capture firms’ use of DRO for REM purposes. This analysis shows that REM-firms experience a significant increase in crash risk in the following year. These findings suggest that the impact of DRO on crash risk is at least partially through REM.     

Information Uncertainty,Earnings Management,and Long‐run Stock Performance Following Initial Public Offerings

We examine how information uncertainty surrounding IPO (initial public offering) firms influences earnings management and long‐run stock performance. For low‐information‐uncertainty issuers, at‐issue earnings’ management is positively related to subsequent unmanaged earnings and has no relationship to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offering. For high‐information‐uncertainty issuers, however, at‐issue earnings’ management is unrelated to subsequent unmanaged earnings and negatively related to market reaction to earnings announcement and long‐run stock performance following the offer. The evidence suggests that, on average, managers in low‐information‐uncertainty firms tend to engage in earnings’ management for informative purposes, while managers in high‐information‐uncertainty firms engage in earnings’ management for opportunistic purposes.     

Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relation between discretionary accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The analyses also show that firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items. In particular, evidence shows that negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment. Finally, the research indicates that the association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. This study contributes to the literature on earnings management from an international comparative perspective since most previous studies on earnings management and executive compensation have focused on U.S. firms.     

Empirical Investigation of the Ability of Sensitivity of Stock Prices to Earnings News in Predicting Earnings Management and Management Forecast Errors

This paper presents an evidence that a firm’s Sensitivity of Stock Price to Earnings News (SSPEN), as measured by surplus stock demand over its supply, affects on incentives to manage earnings and, in turn, Management Forecast Errors (MFE). In particular, we find a tendency for firms rated a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income-decreasing Earnings Management (EM), indicating that they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives to create accounting reserves especially in the form of earnings baths than other firms. In contrast, firms rated a Buy (Sell) are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than management forecasts. The result of empirical evidence from Iranian firms in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) showing the existence of a meaningful relationship between SSPEN and EM. Generally, SSPEN can be used to predict EM and Forecast Errors (FEs).     

Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance

Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.     

Stock market listing status and real earnings management

This study analyzes real earnings management among privately held versus publicly listed firms. Our first finding is that public firms engage in more earnings management through operating activities. When a clear incentive to manage earnings in a specific direction is present we continue to find that public firms manage their earnings more than private firms. We reason that capital market pressure and ownership characteristics drive our results. Additional analyses reveal that public firms employ more real earnings management as a proportion of the total earnings management strategy. Furthermore, we find that mitigating factors of real earnings management have stronger impact in public firms. This study contributes to literature on non-accrual earnings management and to the broader understanding about the private vis-à-vis public firm reporting and operating behavior. Finally, we contribute by identifying an important societal cost of stock market listing, which is the increase in potentially value-destroying real earnings management.     

Gauging the effects of stock liquidity on earnings management: Evidence from the SEC tick size pilot test

This paper studies whether stock market liquidity has a causal effect on real earnings management. We introduce a new and cleaner identification of liquidity shock - the 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program - to show that firms with less liquid stocks are more likely to engage in real earnings management. We provide direct evidence that stock liquidity helps to deter real earnings management via enhancing governance by long-term institutional investors through trading and direct intervention, and via facilitating short selling to discipline managers. The effect is stronger in firms that do not pay dividends.     

Earnings Quality in a Bubble Period: The Case of Construction Activity Firms in Spain

Housing bubbles may result in deep crises that affect all economic systems. This study investigates how the recent housing bubble in Spain has affected earnings quality during the whole bubble. To this end, we use data on mostly private construction activity firms in Spain, that is, construction and real estate companies. Earnings quality is studied by means of the predictive ability of earnings, conservatism, discretionary accruals and real earnings management. The results indicate a progressive decrease in the quality of financial reporting as the bubble develops, as managers try to conceal an underlying downward trend. We further show that earnings quality continues to decline even after the bubble bursts. Overall, this contribution, together with those of other environments, may suggest that, in a bubble context, we have to take care of firms’ earnings quality even some years before the crisis comes to the fore.     

Cash from operations and earnings management in Korea

Our study investigates the relationship between the operating performances of Korean industrial firms and the behavior of discretionary accruals during the period 1994-1997. We hypothesize that the degree of earnings management will depend on the firm operating performances. We construct 10 “cash from operations (CFO)” portfolios to test if there are systematic differences in discretionary accruals across portfolios.Four test methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change test) are used to investigate if operating performances affect discretionary accruals differently. We compare three accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary accruals and total accruals) in testing the earnings management hypotheses.The results support the hypothesis that Korean industrial firms manage earnings. When operating performance is poor, the firms tend to choose income-increasing strategies. In addition, when operating performance is extremely poor, some firms tend to take a big bath, while some of the exceptionally well-performing firms tend to select income-decreasing strategies.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual‐based earnings management, real activities‐based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following, we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to hold in‐the‐money stock options, as rational expected utility maximizers should exercise early to avoid overexposure to company idiosyncratic risks. The results show that before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), companies of overconfident CEOs were more likely than other CEOs to engage in managing earnings through accelerating the timing of cash flow from operations and achieving analyst forecast benchmarks. After SOX, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have income‐increasing discretionary accruals. They remain more likely to engage in real activities management through abnormally high cash flows, and also have abnormally low discretionary expenses. These results are consistent with overconfident CEOs feeling less constrained by SOX, and suggest that this individual characteristic works against regulators’ attempts to constrain earnings management by corporate executives. In contrast, we find that the tendency of overconfident CEOs to manage to targets decreases after SOX, perhaps due to changes in investor behavior in the new regulatory environment.     

Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.     

Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment

During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one‐third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short‐sale price tests. Pilot firms’ discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre‐experiment levels when the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.     

Political corruption and accounting choices

We examine how political corruption affects firms’ accounting choices. We hypothesize and find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts manipulate earnings downwards, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Our finding is robust to alternative corruption measures, alternative discretionary accrual measures, alternative model specifications, the instrumental variable approach and difference-in-differences analyses based on firm relocation and high profile cases. We find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts prefer income-decreasing accounting choices and exhibit higher conservatism. Finally, we find that the effect of corruption on earnings management is more pronounced for geographically concentrated firms, for firms without political connections, for firms in politically sensitive industries, for firms with lower transient institutional investor ownership and for firms with less analyst coverage. In sum, our findings suggest that firms respond to corruption by lowering their accounting earnings.     

Earnings management and initial public offerings: Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper presents one of the first studies of earnings management by initial public offering (IPO) firms in a European country. Using a sample of 64 Dutch IPOs, we investigate the pattern of discretionary current accruals (DCA) over time. We find that managers manage their company's earnings in the first year as a public company but not in the years before the IPO. We also examine the impact of earnings management on the long-run stock price performance of IPOs. We find a negative relation between the size of the DCA in the first year as a public company and long-run stock price performance over the next 3 years. A number of additional tests support these findings.     

Deregulation and earnings management: The case of the U.S. airline industry

This paper examines earnings management dynamics in the airline industry during the airline industry deregulation of 1978. We expect that earnings management would increase after deregulation, since industry deregulation generally increases managerial discretion, whereas internal corporate governance systems are sluggish in adapting to newly changed environments. As corporate governance structures become more effective in tempering highly discretionary managers, and as capital markets learn more about how to design better management incentive systems, managers’ incentives and capacity to engage in earnings management will diminish. Based on industry data, we find that the magnitude of absolute values of discretionary accruals increase significantly in the post-deregulation period. Managers in the airline industry were inclined to engage in income increasing earnings management after deregulation. However, the increased level of earnings management then decreased to return close to the level seen during the regulation period. The findings support the predicted deregulation impact on earnings management dynamics.     

Earnings management of seasoned equity offering firms in Korea

We investigated 249 Korean seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms during the period 1995-1997 to determine if the SEO firms manage earnings in the year before a planned issue of seasoned equity stocks. Using three test methods (accrual difference, correlation, and sign-change), we found that the Korean firms contemplating SEOs in the following year do manage earnings particularly when their relative performances have been poor. The results are robust irrespective of control samples. Analysis of operating performances around SEOs shows that SEO firms tend to increase reported earnings in the year immediately preceding and the year of SEOs, but no differences were found in operating cash flows between the SEO firms and the control firms. By using a regression analysis for discretionary accruals, we found that SEO firms are more likely to manage earnings if the operating performances are poor and if the offer sizes are relatively large. Association tests between stock returns and discretionary accruals indicate that the market reacts positively to net income but negatively to discretionary accruals. The results indicate that the market correctly analyzes the cash flow implications of the SEO firms' opportunistic use of discretionary accruals.