Earnings quality and the heterogeneous relation between earnings and stock returns

We adopt a heterogeneous regime switching method to examine the informativeness of accounting earnings for stock returns. We identify two distinct time-series regimes in terms of the relation between earnings and returns. In the low volatility regime (typical of bull markets), earnings are moderately informative for stock returns. But in high volatility market conditions (typical of financial crisis), earnings are strongly related to returns. Our evidence suggests that earnings are more informative to investors when uncertainty and risk is high which is consistent with the idea that during market downturns investors rely more on fundamental information about the firm. Next, we identify groups of firms that follow similar regime dynamics. We find that the importance of accounting earnings for returns in each of the market regimes varies across firms: certain firms spend more time in a regime where their earnings are highly relevant to returns, and other firms spend more time in a regime where earnings are moderately relevant to returns. We also show that firms with poorer accrual quality have a greater probability of belonging to the high volatility regime.     

The value relevance of earnings in a transition economy: The case of Romania

We investigate the value relevance of earnings on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. We find that the association between accounting earnings and stock returns is comparable to the levels reported by studies conducted on more mature markets, and that it is higher for securities issued by small companies. Excluding losses from the analysis increases the value relevance of earnings, which confirms the transitory nature of negative earnings, already documented by prior studies. We also find that the regression coefficient of earnings changes is negative and we provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that it is a consequence of the relative inefficiency of the market. Finally, the “prices lead earnings” hypothesis formulated for more mature markets is not supported by our results.     

Earnings management in the pre-IPO process: Biases and predictors

We analyze a sample of 3,293 IPOs from 29 countries to investigate the firm, industry, and country characteristics related to earnings management during the IPO process. We find that IPO firms tend to have significantly positive discretionary accruals (DCA) both prior to and after the IPO, suggesting that IPO firms tend to engage in pre-IPO earnings management. However, we also find that using a proxy for earnings management in the IPO year may lead to biased conclusions concerning pre-IPO earnings management. Firms that are more likely to need access to capital markets in the future (firms with high leverage, and firms backed by a venture capitalist) are less likely to engage in pre-IPO earnings management. Firms operating in countries with a superior rule of law are also less likely to engage in earnings management. Lastly, we find that firms may engage in pre-IPO earnings management in part to avoid returning to the capital markets to raise more funds (capital market staging). This result is robust to possible endogeneity bias stemming from management self-selection.     

Does the executive labor market discipline? Labor market incentives and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of outside options in the executive labor market on earnings management decisions. To proxy for executives’ outside options, we use the number of times other firms cite the executive’s firm as a compensation peer. We find that executives with more citations conduct less earnings management. Exploiting the 2006 SEC requirement for compensation peer disclosure as a quasi-natural shock to executives’ awareness of outside options, we show that the executives who should be more responsive to outside options significantly reduce earnings management. Cross-sectional tests support a labor market discipline channel of outside options. Finally, we exploit state-level recognition of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and enforcement of non-compete agreements as cross-sectional restrictions on labor mobility and show that the impact of peer citations on reducing earnings management is stronger when there are fewer restrictions on mobility.     

Pension roulette: have you bet too much on equities?

In the 1990s, funding pension obligations by investing in stocks looked smart. By 1999, the bull market had poured a collective $260 billion surplus into the pension coffers of the S&P 500, permitting the companies to record the year-to-year increases as additional income. But just two years later, the bear market had obliterated those gains, replacing them with a cavernous $240 billion deficit--which had to be offset by the unlucky firms' ongoing cash flows, wreaking havoc on their earnings, debt levels, and stock prices. Corporate executives may be blamed for this debacle. But they were only following the rules. Current accounting guidelines keep companies from recording pension liabilities and assets on their balance sheets, instead relegating them to the footnotes. That makes it hard to see the risk that market drops expose companies to. Board members and top executives need to look beyond distorted accounting numbers to the economic realities of pension plans. Once they do, they may be surprised to find that they would gain far greater value and flexibility by passively investing their pension funds entirely in bonds. A bond portfolio can be designed to meet precisely, and with virtual certainty, a company's pension obligation, thus eliminating the chance of a funding gap. The predictability of bond investments also stabilizes earnings and cash flow. The expanded corporate debt capacity that results can then be used to fuel growth or reduce the firm's overall cost of capital. Even without an overhaul of today's misguided accounting rules, there's little reason for companies' pension funds to hold anything other than bonds.     

How loss averse are investors in financial markets?

We investigate loss aversion in financial markets using a typical asset allocation problem. Our theoretical and empirical results show that investors in financial markets are more loss averse than assumed in the literature. Moreover, loss aversion changes depending on market conditions; investors become far more loss averse during bull markets than during bear markets, indicating their more profound disutility for losses when others enjoy gains. Contrary to most previous results, we find that investors are more sensitive to changes in losses than changes in gains.     

Firm-specific determinants of continuous corporate disclosures

Continuous disclosure is the immediate release of material information by issuers within a regulatory and information dissemination framework. Under such a regime, the market is informed at all times and no investor is disadvantaged by lack of access to information. We attempt to identify the firm-specific determinants of these disclosures.We examine the frequency and regularity of online announcements on the stock exchange websites of companies included in the Morgan Stanley Capital Index for small-cap firms in eight developed markets in Asia and Europe. We find that firms with higher information asymmetry have a higher frequency and regularity of continuous online reporting. Our results also show that the frequency and regularity of online disclosure is positively associated with agency costs, earnings, and analyst following and is inversely related to the length of the product cycle of a firm. Our results are more robust for discretionary disclosures. We also find variations in the frequency of disclosures by countries, some of which are explainable by the online disclosure settings of the countries.     

Product Market Competition,Information and Earnings Management

We study theoretically the effect of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation, and we show how manipulating earnings is particularly rewarding in more competitive markets since the boost in market value of reporting good earnings is especially important. Using a panel dataset of about 70,000 observations spanning the period 1989–2011, we document that the competitive environment is an important determinant of Jones type discretionary accruals and it also affects real earnings management. In additional analysis, we find that the effect of competition on earnings manipulation is particularly important for companies that seem to be underperforming their competitors and that the competition‐earnings management linkage is moderated by the degree of information visibility at the industry level.     

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.     

Market uncertainty and the importance of media coverage at earnings announcements

We investigate whether increased investor demand for financial information arising from higher market uncertainty leads to greater media coverage of earnings announcements. We also investigate whether greater coverage during times of higher uncertainty further destabilizes financial markets because of greater attention-based trading or, alternatively, improves trading and pricing by lowering investor acquisition and interpretation costs. When uncertainty is higher, we find evidence of greater media coverage of earnings announcements and that the greater coverage leads to improvements in investor informedness, information asymmetry, and intraperiod price timeliness, and greater trade by both retail and institutional investors. In contrast to the media serving an expanded role in improving capital markets during more uncertain times, we fail to find that changes in firm-initiated disclosures lead to similar improvements and find that less frequent analyst forecast revisions exacerbate problems in capital markets during earnings announcements.     

Roundtable on Corporate Disclosure

In an article published in this journal two years ago titled "Just Say No to Wall Street," Harvard's Michael Jensen and The Monitor Group's CEO Joseph Fuller urged companies to put an end to what they called the "earnings guidance game." Instead of earnings forecasts, Jensen and Fuller recommended that companies provide investors with information about their strategic goals and value drivers, and about the risks associated with carrying out those goals and management's plans to manage those risks.
In this roundtable, a group of corporate executives, equity analysts, and academics explore the possibility that companies can increase their values by resisting the temptation to "manage" earnings, committing to expanded disclosure, and engaging investors in a more strategic dialogue. By establishing such a dialogue, companies may be able to break out of the current "bad equilibrium" in which markets distrust managers and managers distrust markets.     

Is There a Size Effect in the Pricing of Stocks in the Chinese Stock Markets?: The Case of Bull Versus Bear Markets

Size effect studies generally suggest that a return premium exists for small firms. While the size effect has mostly disappeared in recent years in mature markets (e.g., US and UK), it remains mostly strong in developing markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between firm size and excess stock returns in the Chinese stock markets, and to examine this effect in both a bull and bear market. No studies have previously examined these relationships in the Chinese markets. The results of the study indicate that a size effect exists in the Chinese stock markets over the 6-year period from 1998 to 2003. We find small firms have significantly greater excess returns than large firms. Moreover, small firms are found to have a stronger reaction to the direction of the market than large firms. Small firms have significantly greater positive excess returns than large firms during the bull market. However, small firms have significantly greater negative returns (using total market value), or no significant difference in returns (using float market value) during the bear market period.     

US and Domestic Market Gains and Asian Investors’ Overconfident Trading Behavior

We find that subsequent to both US and domestic market gains, both Asian individual and institutional investors increase their trading and that this effect is more pronounced in bull markets, in periods of relatively favorable investor sentiment, in periods of extremely high market returns, and in markets with short‐sale constraints. We also find that individual investors trade more in response to market gains than institutional investors. Moreover, we find that further integration of Asian stock markets with US stock markets after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 is an important reason for Asian investors’ response to US market gains.     

Earnings Virality

We examine the determinants and market consequences associated with earnings announcements going viral on social media, a phenomenon we label “earnings virality.” Using a comprehensive panel of historical Twitter data, we find that the typical earnings announcement receives relatively little social media coverage, but others go viral on social media, quickly reaching the feeds of millions of people. We find that viral earnings announcements generally have Twitter content that is more extreme in tone and contains less unique content. Further, earnings virality is positively associated with revenue surprises, investor recognition, retail investor ownership, and retail investor trading around the announcement. Earnings virality appears to be detrimental to markets, as it coincides with lower market liquidity and slower price formation. Overall, our evidence suggests that user-driven dissemination through social media platforms, when amplified and taken to extreme levels, may be harmful to markets.     

The earnings game. Everyone plays, nobody wins.

Quarterly earnings numbers dominate the decisions of executives, analysts, investors, and auditors. Yet for all the attention paid to these numbers, they're not much use in predicting a company's future performance and cash flows. Even economists are unanimous in their view that these numbers say next to nothing about a company's prospects beyond the next quarter. Nonetheless, meetings analysts' expectations that earnings will rise in a smooth, steady, unbroken line has become, at many corporations, a game whose imperatives override even the imperative to deliver the highest possible return to shareholders. The fetishistic attention paid to this almost meaningless indicator might be cause for amusement, except for one thing: the earnings game does real harm. It distorts corporate decision making. It reduces securities analysis and investing to a guessing contest. It compromises the integrity of corporate audits. Ultimately, it undermines the capital markets. As market participants increasingly come to view the quarterly number as a sort of collective fiction, offered and received in a spirit of mutual cynicism, they lose faith in the numbers affected by quarterly earnings--including stock prices themselves. And no market can survive long if its participants see no connection between prices and the intrinsic value of the goods on offer. In this article, HBR senior editor Harris Collingwood takes an in-depth look at these effects, examining the intricacies of the earnings game and why companies believe they have no choice but to play it. Until more corporate executives change their practices, he explains, the earning game will never lack for players.     

Co-movements of sector index returns in the world's major stock markets in bull and bear markets: Portfolio diversification implications

In this paper, principal components analysis and Granger causality tests are used to study the portfolio diversification implications of the co-movements of sector indexes in the US, UK, German, French, and Japanese stock markets in bull and bear markets. We find that, in a bull market, investors can obtain more benefit with global diversification than with domestic diversification even if they invest in the same sector in different countries as opposed to investing in different sectors within the same country. In a bear market, the sectors of different countries tend to be more closely correlated and country diversification opportunities are limited.     

盈余持续性、审计师类型对盈余持续性的影响及资本市场反应

以我国2002~2008年期间A股上市公司为研究对象,延续Sloan的方法,利用mishkin检验来考察公司盈余持续性、审计师类型对盈余持续性的影响及股票市场反应。发现公司盈余中应计成分持续性低于现金流量成分;四大审计客户的盈余持续性要高于非四大审计的客户;与公司盈余中现金流量成分相比,四大审计师更显著提高公司盈余中应计成分的持续性;股票价格中所包含的公司盈余预期不能反映公司盈余中应计成分和现金流量成分持续性的差别;股票价格中包含的盈余预期可以总体上反映四大与非四大审计师对公司盈余持续性影响的差异,但股票价格中包含的盈余预期不能反映四大与非四大审计师对公司盈余中应计成分和现金流量成分持续性影响的不同,市场符合＂幼稚投资者＂假说。     

Earnings management in Malaysian IPOs: The East Asian crisis, ownership control, and post-IPO performance

We find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in Malaysian IPOs, which occurs primarily for IPOs during a period of severe economic stress (the East Asian crisis). Within the high-ownership-concentration Malaysian market, post-IPO control concerns also appear to constrain IPO earnings management: owners seem willing to accept reduced IPO proceeds and signaling opportunities to increase the likelihood of retaining control of the company post-IPO. The requirement to provide a profit guarantee does not seem to greatly affect earnings management. IPO companies engaging in aggressive income-increasing earnings management have significantly worse market-based performance than their more conservative counterparts, but again only for IPOs issued during the economic crisis period. Overall, the results suggest that personal liquidity concerns are an important factor in IPO decisions during the economic crisis.     

Information content of credit ratings in pricing of future earnings

This paper examines whether credit ratings convey information about the firm’s future earnings to the capital markets. Using the future earnings response coefficient methodology, we find that the current stock returns of rated firms reflect more future earnings than do the stock returns of non-rated firms. We also find that the market reflect more future earnings in current returns for higher-rated firms. In addition, we present evidence that returns impound future earnings to a greater extent after a ratings initiation or upgrade. We empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by earnings smoothing, market liquidity or omitted default risk factors associated with ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for potential omitted variables, endogeneity bias, loss versus profit firms, and serial correlation of error terms. Overall, the evidence suggests that credit ratings help disseminate private information to reduce information uncertainty about the firm’s future profitability among market participants.     

IT internal control weaknesses and firm performance: An organizational liability lens

The information systems literature and the public press have called for organizations to more closely scrutinize their information technology (IT) controls; however, little more than anecdotal evidence exists on the business value of quality IT internal control, beyond regulatory compliance. In this paper, we (a) advance an organizational liability perspective to the question of IT internal control value; and (b) use the unique setting provided by the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to investigate the relationship between IT internal control weaknesses (ICWs) and both accounting earnings (a contemporaneous measure of firm performance) and market value (a forward looking, risk-adjusted measure of firm performance). Using a data set that provides audited annual assessments of the effectiveness of both IT and non-IT internal controls for a cross-section of companies as mandated by SOX, we find that firms that report an IT ICW have lower accounting earnings compared to firms with strong IT internal controls. We also find that IT ICW moderates the association between accounting earnings and market valuation, with firms reporting weak IT internal controls having a lower earnings multiple. These results are sustained even after controlling for non-IT ICWs and firm-specific factors that are known determinants of ICWs, and are reinforced using an inter-temporal changes analysis in which we use each firm as its own control at a different point in time. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence which suggests that IT internal controls are a strategic necessity and that information systems risk is priced by the capital markets. The implications of these findings for theory and practice are discussed.