管理会计中的一个新理论——代理者理论

自七十年代以来,西方会计界和经济学界对经济组织中的奖励性条款和风险分担等的性质及改进途径等展开了热烈的讨论。他们把所探讨的问题称为:主管者和代理者之间的关系问题(Principal-Agent Relationship),并将研究成果整理、概括,在此基础上,提出了一个新的理论:代理者理论(Agency Theory)。 代理者理论认为,只要有一个组织(或一些主管者),需要雇佣另外一个组织(或一些代理者)来开展某项服务,并且,这些主管者赋予代理者某些特定的权限,希望代理者为主管者的利益开展工作时,就存在主管者和代理者的关系问题。从会计的角度来说,这种关系出     

从委托代理理论看会计监督

委托代理理论是西方经济学中一个重要的理论,从委托代理的角度对现有的会计监督体系进行分析研究,能找到这一体系存在的动因及体系中各构成要素之间的相互关系,也为切实加强会计监督提供了新的思路。一、委托代理理论及其代理问题委托代理理论,即通过委托人和代理人共同认可契约来确定它们各自的权利和责任,委托人为实现既定的目标,通过一系列激励机制使代理人与委托人的利益尽可能趋于一致,以促使代理人会像为自己工作一样去采取行动,最大限度地增进委托人的利益。这也是一种均衡的委托代理关系。但在实际经济活动中,这种均衡状态下的委托代理关系存在着四个方面的非均衡性:①利益的非完全一致性,委托人的主要目标是自身利益(包括资本保值增值和出资收益)的最大化,但代理人的主要目标是代理利益(包括经营业绩和代理收益)的最大化,双方存在着潜在的利益冲突;②风险     

管理会计理论框架的研究

本文针对管理会计的理论框架问题进行了深入探讨,提出管理会计理论的框架应以管理会计目的为逻辑起点,管理会计理论框架主要包括管理会计基本理论、管理会计概念结构、管理会计应用理论及管理会计行为主体理论.     

会计控制的委托代理分析

会计控制本质上所体现出的就是一种委托代理关系。本文从委托代理角度分析了广义会计控制,认为企业内外部的会计监督与财务控制（包括国有资产监管）,都可以归结为会计管理问题。基于这种会计管理的三层次会计控制体系具有自身特定的内涵。     

委托代理下高校后勤实体会计控制研究

现阶段我国高校与后勤实体间的关系,可以用委托代理理论、会计控制理论来解释,并分析存在的高校后勤实体委托代理问题.在委托代理观指导下,高校应建立由会计组织结构及运行机制、资金监控机制、财务预算项目管理机制三大要素构成的会计控制模式,将会计控制纳入解决高校后勤实体委托代理问题的途径.     

管理会计在货物运输代理行业的应用研究

随着市场精细化分工的发展,货物运输代理行业改变了传统企业包揽服务模式,在市场经济当中扮演者重要的角色,然而由于货物运输代理行业涉及多个相关方、服务手续相对复杂,因此对自身的财务管理提出了更高的要求.管理会计作为企业财务会计的一个重要分支,是加强企业内部控制、提升企业经济效益的一种重要工具.把管理会计融入到货物运输代理行业对于行业发展价值巨大.     

委派双管代理是乡镇会计管理的最优模式

委派双管代理是乡镇会计管理的最优模式乡镇会计管理站是乡镇会计工作的主管部门，如何适应新时期会计工作形势，探索乡镇会计管理的最优途径，笔者认为：必须结合乡镇实际，实行委派、双管、代理三结合的管理模式。一、对行政及部分事业单位的会计管理工作实行委派制。即...     

我国管理会计理论研究展望

由于诸多原因,当前国内管理会计理论研究较为薄弱,这是值得重视并亟待解决的问题,本文分析了我国管理会计研究存在的问题,并对加强管理会计的研究提出了建议。     

从管理会计研究的演进特征看管理会计在权变环境下的竞争优势

本文以管理会计研究的各阶段特征分析为始,借助近二十年来西方管理会计研究成果的梳理具体阐述了权变环境下管理会计研究在研究内容、理论来源、研究方法和所用研究的人员构成等四方面的变化,探讨了管理会计在不断变化的经济环境中所能体现的竞争优势,并对其在学术思想、权变理论的运用、对企业革新的战略支持和顾客关注这几个方面的发展做了趋势分析。     

浅谈管理会计理论及实践

由于管理会计在我国起步较晚,我国对管理会计的理论研究和实践应用还不够成熟.本文从管理会计在我国的研究和实践现状出发,分析管理会计理论研究和实践中存在的不足和缺陷,提出几点加强管理会计研究与应用的方案.     

Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look

This paper surveys the recent agency literature, emphasizing its managerial accounting implications. The paper first describes and compares three branches of the agency literature. Attention is paid to the assumptions, focus, contributions and criticisms of each branch. Empirical tests of implications of the agency model are reviewed. Recent theoretical agency papers with managerial accounting implications are then discussed. The last section of the paper discusses possible directions in future research which may increase the insights which the agency paradigm can bring to managerial accounting research.     

On the Optimal Relation between the Properties of Managerial and Financial Reporting Systems

We develop a theoretical model of the firm that links properties (stewardship vs. valuation focus) of financial reporting regimes with the informational properties of optimal managerial accounting systems. We show that, contrary to the standard textbook proposition, properties of management and financial accounting systems are not independent. Significantly, we provide an explicit connection between exogenous and observable properties of a firm's financial reporting system and the quality of the managerial accounting system on which manager(s) base real economic decisions. As the quality of those economic decisions can also be inferred from publicly available data, our theory generates new opportunities for empirical managerial accounting research on large nonproprietary samples. Further, by being able to identify enhanced performance due to improved managerial accounting information, our theory provides opportunities to gain a better understanding of the link between particular managerial accounting practices and the quality of the information produced.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firms

We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.     

Nine ways for a decision maker to use theoretical notions,with special reference to teaching agency theory for management accounting

Management accounting curricula can be made more practical by including additional coverage of theory. When considering both theory and application as parts of management accounting curricula we ought, however, to give attention to the dissimilar ways in which the two are connected. In this note, nine ways in which a decision-maker might use theory are discerned. Each of these nine ways of applying theory is illustrated with examples from agency theory. As management accounting is concerned with providing information for decision making, the nine ways to apply theory should be incorporated in management accounting curricula. A teaching tool is presented using agency theory as an example.     

Auditors’ Economic Incentives and the Sensitivity of Managerial Pay to Accounting Performance

The use of managerial incentives to manage earnings in order to enhance accounting performance‐based compensation is greater when auditors have economic incentives to compromise their independence. Hence, compensation committees face more difficulties in determining cash compensation when earnings quality declines. This study investigates whether boards of directors can mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders by being aware of the opportunistic earnings management encouraged by auditors’ economic incentives and actively adjusting performance‐based compensation for the reduced earnings quality. To this end, it examines how auditors’ economic incentives affect the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance. The findings show a negative association between the client's economic importance to the auditor and the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance, with this association more pronounced for firms that opportunistically inflate earnings, suggesting that boards mitigate agency problems by actively intervening to modify performance‐based compensation schemes for the reduced earnings quality. Additional analyses show that board effectiveness in determining compensation depends on its characteristics. These results suggest the urgent need to oblige companies to establish compensation committees, particularly in countries that lack such a mandatory requirement or where few companies have such committees.     

Managerial Private Benefits and Overinvestment

According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value.     

The rise and fall of WebTrust

While prior research mainly focused on the impact of third-party-certified web assurance seals on consumers' perceptions and purchasing behaviors, little research has been conducted on the managerial decision-making process about the selection, implementation, and the abandonment of such seals. Of particular interest here is the WebTrust seal, jointly developed by the AICPA and the CICA. We take a qualitative case study approach to understand the motivations and rationale of a large North American telecommunications firm's management behind the decisions about the selection, implementation, and abandonment of its WebTrust seal. Our case firm was one of the first to obtain the seal on its online shopping website. Semi-structured interview results suggest that the implementation and the subsequent abandonment of WebTrust may be explained by several theoretical frameworks — the managerial accounting perspective, organizational slack theory, innovation theory, and institutional theory. First, the case firm's leader attitude in innovation, its extra resources available, coupled with the endorsement of the accounting profession led to the implementation of WebTrust. Second, when the benefits of WebTrust versus its costs were questioned and other companies increasingly abandoned the seal, our case firm decided to follow this trend.     

The effect of cost management knowledge on the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance

This study investigates the relationship between budget participation (BP), cost management knowledge and managerial performance. It draws on relevant previous research in the theory of work performance and accounting to formulate the research questions. Eighty-three managers from Finnish companies participated in the study. Data were collected from the managers using a mail questionnaire. The results indicate that managers’ cost management knowledge, and especially the balanced perspective of cost management knowledge, moderates the effect of BP on self-perception of managerial performance. It was specifically found that the effect of BP on perceived managerial performance becomes more positive when managers’ cost management knowledge increases. High perception of managerial performance is obtained when both the BP and managers’ cost management knowledge are high. Our results suggest that organizations should improve the cost management knowledge of managers who participate in the budgeting process.     

PHYSICIANS AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING AND NON-ACCOUNTING CONTROLS

Prior research has identified the difficulties associated with encouraging physicians to 'take resource management to their hearts' and has questioned the efficacy of implementing management accounting systems (MASS) in the health care setting. Although physicians are now being integrated into management structures, they typically do not identifjr with managerial values and goals. This creates a potential impediment to the effective implementation of accounting-based controls. No prior research has, however, assessed if this impediment is equally significant in the effective implementation of other non-accounting forms of control. This paper builds on prior research and assesses the extent to which a physician manager's managerial orientation significantly influences the effectiveness of both accounting and non-accounting forms of control. The paper contributes to the literature by simultaneously assessing the effect of managerial orientation on the use and relative importance of three forms of control. The results confirm the importance of an identification with managerial values and norms for the effective implementation of management accounting systems. This orientation, did not, however, appear to be important for the effective implementation of non-accounting forms of control. These findings have direct implications for the design of effective management control systems in hospitals and other organizations dominated by professionals.