中行转债投资价值分析

可转债就是指在一定条件下可以被转换成公司股票的债券。可转换债券除了债权之外,它包含着很多的期权。本文研究具体的可转债—中行转债,分析其投资价值,详尽分析相关的条款,最后分析投资中行转债潜在的风险。     

中行转债投资价值分析

可转债就是指在一定条件下可以被转换成公司股票的债券.可转换债券除了债权之外,它包含着很多的期权.本文研究具体的可转债—中行转债,分析其投资价值,详尽分析相关的条款,最后分析投资中行转债潜在的风险.     

可转换债券投资价值和投资策略的简要分析

可转换债券是一种在规定条件下可转换为普通股的企业债券.它具有在获得债券保底收益的同时,分享企业增长成果的特点.纯债券价值和期权价值构成了可转换债券价值的主要部分,其中期权价值显得尤为重要.对于投资价值的分析,企业基本面的分析应作为重点,优秀的企业在未来将会获得较多的成长机会;相应地,可转换债券的持有者能分享到成长的果实.     

可转换债券风险价值衡量及影响因素分析

可转换债券的价值包括债券价值和期权价值两部分,而短期内债券价值保持稳定,可转换债券价值的波动仅取决于期权部分价值的波动。本文借助期权价值与发行公司股票价格的关系,将风险价值的概念应用到可转换债券风险的度量之中,并利用蒙特卡罗模拟法计算出招行转债的风险价值,最后通过建立计量经济学模型,对可转换债券风险价值的影响因素进行了分析。     

我国可转换债券的投资价值分析模式初探和案例研究

一、引言可转换公司债券于1843年发源于美国。它是一种衍生的、复合型的证券品种,具有债券、股票和期权的多重特性,这种特性使其兼具投资和避险等多重功能,因而从产生之日起就备受投资者的青睐。本文接下来将从介绍可转换债券的特点、定义入手,来揭示可转换债券对投资者的独特吸引力,进而从我国实际出发将可转换债券条款的设计、理论价值的确定、基本面和技术面的分析相结合来介绍可转换债券投资价值分析的方法,为我国投资者进行可转换债券投资价值的分析提供一个较好的模式。二、可转换债券投资的分析方法可转换债券(以下简称可转债),是指…     

我国企业债券市场发展对策研究

按照资本结构理论，企业的融资结构影响着企业的市场价值，在税收不为零的情况下，由于债券有“税盾”作用，企业通过债券融资可以增加企业的价值。根据“啄木顺序理论”，企业理性的融资顺序应首先是内部股权融资(即留存收益)，其次是债务融资，最后才是外部股权融资。但是我国的融资体系中，间接融资一直占据着主导地位．直接融资发展缓慢，而直接融资中企业债券融资的比重更是微不足道。     

试论可转换债券的评估

本文从分析可转换债券的价值构成入手,提出了评估可转换债券的思路,即可转换债券的价值应由纯债券价值及期权价值共同构成,在评估期权价值时,引入国际公认的Black-Scholes定价模型,并对该模型在我国使用的前提条件、限制因素以及计算结果的调整进行了简单的分析,试图从理论上描绘可转换债券的评估方法。     

实物期权理论在灾后重建投融资风险分担中的运用

灾后重建中,自然、经济环境和次生灾害所带来的不确定性风险较高,可能会导致投融资主体所负担风险过大,利用实物期权理论分散这些投、融资风险是文章研究的主题。文章从实物期权理论角度,研究灾后重建中在融资租赁、债券融资、PPP融资、信托融资中的风险分担问题。     

可转换债券定价问题浅析

可转换债券是一种极其复杂的信用衍生产品。其价值主要分为由纯债券价值和转换期权价值两部分有机地构成。利用无套利定价方法来确定可转换债券的定价,通过分别求纯债券价值与转换期权价值的总和来确定可转换债券的定价。     

可转换债券定价问题浅析

可转换债券是一种极其复杂的信用衍生产品。其价值主要分为由纯债券价值和转换期权价值两部分有机地构成。利用无套利定价方法来确定可转换债券的定价,通过分别求纯债券价值与转换期权价值的总和来确定可转换债券的定价。     

Covenants in convertible bonds: Boon or boilerplate?

This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.     

Risk Changes around Calls of Convertible Bonds

We examine changes in equity and asset betas around convertible bond calls and report two major findings. First, calling firms exhibit an increase in asset betas following the call. We argue that the finding is consistent with the implications of the sequential financing theory but not of the backdoor equity financing theory. Second, abnormal returns at call announcements are negative only for the subsample of firms that also exhibit an increase in equity beta. We conclude that risk changes help explain the market reaction to convertible bond calls.     

我国资本市场可转债定价及后市走势研究

从1992年发行第一只可转换公司债券(以下简称“可转债”)至今,中国可转债市场已经历了二十多年的发展。自诞生以来,中国监管机构对可转债的发行要求不断明确,配套监管措施不断完善,可转债市场迅速发展,发行规模不断提高。然而,在2017年以前,虽然可转债的发行规模增长迅速,但其融资总额占资本市场股权产品总融资规模的比重仍处于较低水平。究其原因,一方面是因为可转债的发行主体仅限于上市公司,股权融资存在较大的不确定性;同时可转债的定价条款过于复杂,市场接受程度较低。随着2017年证监会对可转债产品的审核标准进一步明确,可转债发行规模高速增长,目前已成为资本市场上不可忽视的品种。为确定可转债定价方式,本文以“广汽转债”历年来的市场价格为数据基础,以B-S模型为分析模型,通过实证分析寻求影响可转债定价的主要因素,对未来可转债定价的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。     

可转换债券对目标资产负债率动态调整的研究

静态权衡理论认为,公司存在一个适度的目标资产负债率,当公司的资产负债率达到这一点时,公司价值最大。公司选择融资工具的目的之一是优化资产负债率,而可转换债券是调节公司资产负债率的理想工具。从理论分析和实证检验两个方面的研究表明,公司利用可转换债券融资能够实现对目标资产负债率动态调整的目的。更确切地说,是可转换债券转股率的变化导致了公司目标资产负债率的动态调整。     

CONVERTIBLE BONDS: MATCHING FINANCIAL AND REAL OPTIONS

For companies whose value consists in large part of “real options”‐ growth opportunities that may (or may not) materialize‐convertible bonds may offer the ideal financing vehicle because of the matching financial options built into the securities. This paper proposes that convertible debt can be a key element in a financing strategy that aims not only to fund current activities, but to give companies access to low‐cost capital if and when their real investment options turn out to be valuable. In this sense, convertibles can be seen as the most cost‐effective solution to a sequential financing problem‐how to fund not only today's activities, but also tomorrow's growth opportunities (some of them not yet even foreseeable). For companies with real options, the ability of convertibles to match capital inflows with corporate outlays adds value by minimizing two sets of costs: those associated with having too much (particularly equity) capital (known as “agency costs of free cash flow”) and those associated with having too little (“new issue” costs). The key to the cost‐effectiveness of convertibles in funding real options is the call provision. Provided the stock price is “in the money” (and the call protection period is over), the call gives managers the option to force conversion of the bonds into equity. If and when the company's investment opportunity materializes, exercise of the call feature gives the firm an infusion of new equity (while eliminating the debt service burden associated with the convertible) that enables it to carry out its new investment plan. Consistent with this argument, the author's recent study of the investment and financing activities of 289 companies around the time of convertible calls reports significant increases in capital expenditures starting in the year of the call and extending three years after. The companies also showed increased financing activity following the call, mainly new long‐term debt issues (many of them also convertibles) in the year of the call.     

Investment and financing activity following calls of convertible bonds

The staged financing hypothesis of Mayers [Mayers, D., 1998. Why firms issue convertible bonds: The matching of financial and real investment options. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 83–102] predicts that investment and financing activity will increase following in the money convertible bond calls. The prediction for out of the money convertible calls is different: no increase is expected. We study the rate of both corporate investment and external financing around forced conversions using benchmarks that are analogous to those recommended by Barber and Lyon [Barber, B., Lyon, J., 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359–400]. We also examine the cross-section of changes in investment and financing activity. Conversion-forcing firms exhibit an increase in both capital expenditures and debt financing around the year of the convertible bond call; however, the same result holds for the sample firms that conducted out-of-the-money convertible calls. Further, there is no relation between changes in investment activity and changes in debt issuance at the firm level. The evidence is inconsistent with the notion that forced conversions serve as a catalyst for staged financing and investment.     

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Do Convertible Bond Issuers Cater to Investor Demand?

We examine the impact of fluctuations in investor demand for convertible securities on convertible bond issue volumes, pricing, and design. We find evidence of a positive impact of investor demand proxies on convertible bond issue volumes. We also document significantly lower convertible bond underpricing in periods with higher investor demand. The results hold in a variety of specifications, and are robust to controlling for firm‐specific and macroeconomic financing cost proxies. However, we obtain only limited evidence that issuers adjust the design of their convertible bond offerings in response to investor demand.     

中美可转换债券比较研究

通过对中国和美国的可转换债券市场的规模、条款、风险收益特征和套利机会进行对比分析,结果表明中国可转债市场规模仍远不及美国,尤其对创新性中小企业融资需求的支持上差距更大。中国可转债的条款设计更多替发行人考虑,而较少关注投资者的需求,具有明显的扩股融资动机。从风险收益特征和套利机会来看,发现美国可转换债券市场的债性凸显,股性较弱,而中国可转换债券市场具有偏股性。     

上市公司可转换公司债券融资决策研究

基于全流通背景和上市公司集中的股权结构特征,从理论和实证两方面分析了中国上市公司可转债融资决策机制,结果表明在股权流通的背景下,通过可转债方式融资并成功转股,需要上市公司具有较高的盈利前景,否则融资后会降低控制性股东的融资收益,这一条件使得可转债融资方式失去了原有的吸引力。但可转债灵活的条款设计和转股前较低的资金使用成本受到了一些暂时难以进行增发融资的上市公司青睐——可以通过缩短初始转股期、降低初始转股价、放松向下修正转股价条款、严格赎回条款与回售条件等手段,提高可转债转股的可能性,从而间接地实现股权融资的目的。