Are you a good boss--or a great one?

Private moments of doubt and fear come even to managers who have spent years on the job. Any number of events can trigger them: an initiative going poorly, a lukewarm performance review, a daunting new assignment. HBS professor Hill and executive Lineback have long studied the question of how manager grow and advance. Their experience brings them to a simple but troubling observation: Most bosses reach a certain level of proficiency and stay there--short of what they could and should be. Why? Because they stop working on themselves. The authors offer what they call the three imperatives for managers who seek to avoid this stagnation. First, manage yourself--who you are as a person, the beliefs and values that drive your actions, and especially how you connect with others all matter to the people you must influence. Second, manage your network. Effective managers know that they cannot avoid conflict and competition among organizational groups; they build and nurture ongoing relationships. Third, manage your team. Team members need to know what's required of them collectively and individually and what the team's values, norms, and standards are. The authors include a useful assessment tool to help readers get started.     

Are you a strategist or just a manager?

Perhaps the greatest strategist of all time was not a business executive but a general. Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian and German general staffs from 1858 to 1888, issued "directives" to his officers rather than specific commands. These guidelines for autonomous decision making encouraged Moltke's subordinates to show individual initiative. In this article, Hans Hinterhuber and Wolfgang Popp translate Moltke's example into business terms. According to Moltke, strategy is applied common sense and cannot be taught. The authors suggest that good entrepreneurs and managers--along with generals--are born with the qualities that make them successful. But even if managers have the potential to be good strategists, they must develop and hone their natural talents. And CEOs and top management can help by identifying and promoting such talents in their employees. Hinterhuber and Popp have created a questionnaire that helps measure strategic management competence. Managers and entrepreneurs take this test themselves, answering ten questions such as, "Do I have an entrepreneurial vision?", "Do I have a corporate philosophy?", and "Do I have competitive advantages?" Using the questionnaire, company management can evaluate managers being considered for a promotion. At the same time, those who take the test can use it to determine their own performance as strategists. Strategic managers provide subordinates with general guidelines, just as Helmuth von Moltke issued directives to his officers. And outstanding entrepreneurs create a corporate culture in which their vision, philosophy, and business strategies are implemented by employees who think independently.     

How did a domestic housing slump turn into a global financial crisis?

The global financial crisis clearly started with problems in the U.S. sub-prime sector and spread across the world from there. But was the direct exposure of foreigners to the U.S. financial system a key driver of the crisis, or did other factors account for its rapid contagion across the world? To answer this question, we assessed whether countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and were highly dependent on dollar funding experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the crisis. We found little evidence of such direct spillovers from the United States to abroad. Although CDS spreads generally rose higher and bank stocks generally fell lower in countries with more exposure to U.S. MBS and greater dollar funding needs, these correlations were not robust, and they fail to explain the lion’s share of the deterioration in asset prices that took place during the crisis. Accordingly, less tangible channels of contagion may have played a more important role in the global spread of the crisis: a generalized run on global financial institutions, given the opacity of their balance sheets; excessive dependence on short-term funding; vicious cycles of mark-to-market losses driving fire sales of MBS; the realization that financial firms around the world were pursuing similar (flawed) business models; and global swings in risk aversion. The U.S. sub-prime crisis, rather than being a fundamental driver of the global crisis, may have been merely a trigger for a global bank run and for disillusionment with a risky business model that already had spread around the world.     

What's a business for?

In the wake of the recent corporate scandals, it's time to reconsider the assumptions underlying American-style stock-market capitalism. That heady doctrine--in which the market is king, success is measured in terms of shareholder value, and profits are an end in themselves--enraptured America for a generation, spread to Britain during the 1980s, and recently began to gain acceptance in Continental Europe. But now, many wonder if the American model is corrupt. The American scandals are not just a matter of dubious personal ethics or of rogue companies fudging the odd billion. And the cure for the problems will not come solely from tougher regulations. We must also ask more fundamental questions: Whom and what is a business for? And are traditional ownership and governance structures suited to the knowledge economy? According to corporate law, a company's financiers are its owners, and employees are treated as property and recorded as costs. But while that may have been true in the early days of industry, it does not reflect today's reality. Now a company's assets are increasingly found in the employees who contribute their time and talents rather than in the stockholders who temporarily contribute their money. The language and measures of business must be reversed. In a knowledge economy, a good business is a community with a purpose, not a piece of property. If, like many European companies, a business considers itself a wealth-creating community consisting of members who have certain rights, those members will be more likely to treat one another as valued partners and take responsibility for telling the truth. Such a community can also help repair the image of business by insisting that its purpose is not just to make a profit but to make a profit in order to do something better.     

What makes a leader?

Superb leaders have very different ways of directing a team, a division, or a company. Some are subdued and analytical; others are charismatic and go with their gut. And different situations call for different types of leadership. Most mergers need a sensitive negotiator at the helm, whereas many turnarounds require a more forceful kind of authority. Psychologist and noted author Daniel Goleman has found, however, that effective leaders are alike in one crucial way: they all have a high degree of what has come to be known as emotional intelligence. In fact, Goleman's research at nearly 200 large, global companies revealed that emotional intelligence--especially at the highest levels of a company--is the sine qua non for leadership. Without it, a person can have first-class training, an incisive mind, and an endless supply of good ideas, but he still won't make a great leader. The components of emotional intelligence--self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill--can sound unbusinesslike. But exhibiting emotional intelligence at the workplace does not mean simply controlling your anger or getting along with people. Rather, it means understanding your own and other people's emotional makeup well enough to move people in the direction of accomplishing your company's goals. In this article, the author discusses each component of emotional intelligence and shows through examples how to recognize it in potential leaders, how and why it leads to measurable business results, and how it can be learned. It takes time and, most of all, commitment. But the benefits that come from having a well-developed emotional intelligence, both for the individual and the organization, make it worth the effort.     

Quantitative easing in an open economy—Not a liquidity but a reserve trap

Expansionary monetary policy is ineffective in a liquidity trap. In another case, which we call a “reserve trap,” money supply increase is trapped in bank reserves; there is no credit expansion through the banking system. In such case, quantitative easing (QE) will not boost credit to the real sector and revitalize the economy. To analyze a reserve trap, we modify the open economy model to include multiple interest rates. Trade is included since exports can be financed externally even during domestic credit constriction. We show the conditions under which QE can lead to currency depreciation and trigger an export-led recovery.     

Takeover motives in a weak regulatory environment surrounding a market shock: a case study of New Zealand with a comparison of Gondhalekar and Bhagwat’s (2003) US findings

We examine the motives for takeovers in New Zealand surrounding the 1987 stock market crash and compare with the US findings of Gondhalekar and Bhagwat (2003). There are a number of structural differences between the New Zealand and US markets that could impact on merger motives. Compared with the US, New Zealand is a small capital market; with weak takeover regulation and a prolonged aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash. Consistent with US research, we find evidence of synergy and hubris motivations in New Zealand takeovers although we find the synergy motivation is stronger. Contrary to expectations we find no evidence of agency motivated takeovers.

New development: Where there's a will,there's a way—acting beyond cutbacks

A sustainable solution to the recent financial crisis requires a sea-change in governments' thinking, rather than just cutting expenses. Governments need to re-examine the managerial and cultural factors that lie beyond the crisis: the way budgets are prepared, the (lack of) strategic management, the limited room left for innovation, and excessive reliance on public entities for the solution of social problems.     

Is momentum a self-fulfilling prophecy?

The author shows in a simple framework that momentum trading can exist in equilibrium and that momentum trading is profitable. A property of the model is that the relation between risk, reward, and the intensity of momentum trading provides a natural limit to the amount of momentum trading that will exist in equilibrium. Properties of the model fit the empirics well. First, the model captures in a parsimonious manner both short-term overreaction and long-term reversals. Second, it predicts that momentum and long-term reversals should be observed in any market where there is noise. Thus, the model gives theoretical support to the empirical evidence that these anomalies are not artifacts of data snooping and to the extant empirical evidence that these anomalies are pervasive. Momentum traders observe noise shocks and trade on it as information. This trading incorporates a predictive role to the noise. That is, if agents believe a past price change to be informative of future price changes and act on this belief, it will be true and trading on this belief will be profitable. Thus, momentum trading is a self-fulfilling action.     

Is management still a science?

New technologies are transforming products, markets, and entire industries. Yet the more science and technology reshape the essence of business, the less useful the concept of management itself as a science seems to be. On reflection, this paradox is not so surprising. The traditional scientific approach to management promised to provide managers with the capacity to analyze, predict, and control the behavior of the complex organizations they led. But the world most managers currently inhabit often appears to be unpredictable, uncertain, and even uncontrollable. In the face of this more volatile business environment, the old-style mechanisms of "scientific management" seem positively counterproductive. And science itself appears less and less relevant to the practical concerns of managers. In this article, science journalist David Freedman argues that the problem lies less in the shortcomings of a scientific approach to management than in managers' understanding of science. What most managers think of as scientific management is based on a conception of science that few current scientists would defend. What's more, just as managers have become more preoccupied with the volatility of the business environment, scientists have also become preoccupied with the inherent volatility--the "chaos" and "complexity"--of nature. They are developing new rules for complex behavior in physical systems that have intriguing parallels to the kind of organizational behaviors companies are trying to encourage. In fact, science, long esteemed by business as a source of technological innovation, may ultimately prove of greatest value to managers as a source of something else: useful ways of looking at the world.     

Is yours a learning organization?

An organization with a strong learning culture faces the unpredictable deftly. However, a concrete method for understanding precisely how an institution learns and for identifying specific steps to help it learn better has remained elusive. A new survey instrument from professors Garvin and Edmondson of Harvard Business School and assistant professor Gino of Carnegie Mellon University allows you to ground your efforts in becoming a learning organization. The tool's conceptual foundation is what the authors call the three building blocks of a learning organization. The first, a supportive learning environment, comprises psychological safety, appreciation of differences, openness to new ideas, and time for reflection. The second, concrete learning processes and practices, includes experimentation, information collection and analysis, and education and training. These two complementary elements are fortified by the final building block: leadership that reinforces learning. The survey instrument enables a granular examination of all these particulars, scores each of them, and provides a framework for detailed, comparative analysis. You can make comparisons within and among your institution's functional areas, between your organization and others, and against benchmarks that the authors have derived from their surveys of hundreds of executives in many industries. After discussing how to use their tool, the authors share the insights they acquired as they developed it. Above all, they emphasize the importance of dialogue and diagnosis as you nurture your company and its processes with the aim of becoming a learning organization. The authors' goal--and the purpose of their tool--is to help you paint an honest picture of your firm's learning culture and of the leaders who set its tone.     

What Makes a Better Annuity?

Given costly and limited annuity products, we investigate how annuity market innovation could improve participation and increase individual welfare. We find that participation gains are most likely with new annuity products that concentrate on late‐life payouts. Our welfare analysis suggests that annuity innovation should focus on adding survival contingencies to assets commonly held by individuals. Finally, in a complete market setting, we find demand only for those annuity contracts with a significant time gap between purchase and payout (a rarity in current contracts). Overall, our analysis indicates ample opportunity for innovation to spur annuity demand and improve individual welfare.     

What is a global manager?

To compete around the world, a company needs three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency, local responsiveness, and the ability to leverage learning worldwide. No single "global" manager can build these capabilities. Rather, groups of specialized managers must integrate assets, resources, and people in diverse operating units. Such managers are made, not born. And how to make them is--and must be--the foremost question for corporate managers. Drawing on their research with leading transnational corporations, Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal identify three types of global managers. They also illustrate the responsibilities each position involves through a close look at the careers of successful executives: Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble. The first type is the global business or product-division manager who must build worldwide efficiency and competitiveness. These managers recognize cross-border opportunities and risks as well as link activities and capabilities around the world. The second is the country manager whose unit is the building block for worldwide operations. These managers are responsible for understanding and interpreting local markets, building local resources and capabilities, and contributing to--and participating in--the development of global strategy. Finally, there are worldwide functional specialists--the managers whose potential is least appreciated in many traditional multinational companies. To transfer expertise from one unit to another and leverage learning, these managers must scan the company for good ideas and best practice, cross-pollinate among units, and champion innovations with worldwide applications.     

Are you a collaborative leader?

Social media and technologies have put connectivity on steroids and made collaboration more integral to business than ever. But without the right leadership, collaboration can go astray. Employees who try to collaborate on everything may wind up stuck in endless meetings, struggling to reach agreement. On the other side of the coin, executives who came of age during the heyday of "command and control" management can have trouble adjusting their style to fit the new realities. In their research on top-performing CEOs, Insead professors Ibarra and Hansen have examined what it takes to be a collaborative leader. They've found that it requires connecting people and ideas outside an organization to those inside it, leveraging diverse talent, modeling collaborative behavior at the top, and showing a strong hand to keep teams from getting mired in debate. In this article, they describe tactics that executives from Akamai, GE, Reckitt Benckiser, and other firms use in those four areas and how they foster high-performance collaborative cultures in their organizations.     

Small-time ruin for a financial process modulated by a Harris recurrent Markov chain

We consider a nonstandard ruin problem where: (i) the increments of the process are heavy-tailed and Markov-dependent, modulated by a general Harris recurrent Markov chain; (ii) ruin occurs when a positive boundary is attained within a sufficiently small time. Our main result provides sharp asymptotics for the small-time probability of ruin, viz., P(sup? _{n≤δ u} S _n ≥u), where {S _n } denotes the discrete partial sums of the process and δ∈(0,1/μ), where μ is the mean drift. We apply our results to obtain risk estimates which quantify, e.g., repetitive operational risk losses or the extremal behavior for a GARCH(1,1) process.     

What is a global manager?

Riven by ideology, religion, and mistrust, the world seems more fragmented than at any time since, arguably, World War II. But however deep the political divisions, business operations continue to span the globe, and executives still have to figure out how to run them efficiently and well. In "What Is a Global Manager?" (first published in September-October 1992), business professors Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal lay out a model for a management structure that balances the local, regional, and global demands placed on companies operating across the world's many borders. In the volatile world of transnational corporations, there is no such thing as a "universal" global manager, the authors say. Rather, there are three groups of specialists: business managers, country managers, and functional managers. And there are the top executives at corporate headquarters who manage the complex interactions between the three--and can identify and develop the talented executives a successful transnational requires. This kind of organizational structure characterizes a transnational rather than an old-line multinational, international, or global company. Transnationals integrate assets, resources, and diverse people in operating units around the world. Through a flexible management process, in which business, country, and functional managers form a triad of different perspectives that balance one another, transnational companies can build three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency and competitiveness; national-level responsiveness and flexibility; and cross-market capacity to leverage learning on a worldwide basis. Through a close look at the successful careers of Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble, the authors illustrate the skills that each managerial specialist requires.     

Do you have a well-designed organization?

For most companies, organization design is neither a science nor an art; it's an oxymoron. Organizational structures evolve in fits and starts, shaped more by politics than by policies. Although most executives can sense when their organization designs are not working well, few take meaningful action, partly because they lack a practical framework to guide them. The authors of this article provide just such a framework; they present nine tests that can be used to either evaluate an existing organization design or create a new one. Four "fit" tests offer an initial screen: The market advantage test asks whether a design directs sufficient management attention to the company's sources of competitive advantage; the parenting advantage test determines whether the design gives enough attention to the corporate-level activities that provide real value to the company; the people test shows whether the design reflects the employees' strengths; and the feasibility test looks at constraints that may impede implementation. Five "good design" tests can help a company refine its prospective design. The specialist cultures test ensures that there's sufficient insulation for units that need to be different from the prevailing culture; the difficult-links test determines whether a design offers solutions for potentially problematic unit-to-unit links; the redundant-hierarchy test asks whether the design has too many parent levels; the accountability test looks at whether every unit has suitable controls; and the flexibility test ensures that the design lets the company adapt to change. Once a design is altered, the tests should be repeated. Organizational decisions are inevitably complex, and tweaking one part of the design may produce unanticipated consequences elsewhere.     

Is gold a safe haven or a hedge for the US dollar? Implications for risk management

We assess the role of gold as a safe haven or hedge against the US dollar (USD) using copulas to characterize average and extreme market dependence between gold and the USD. For a wide set of currencies, our empirical evidence revealed (1) positive and significant average dependence between gold and USD depreciation, consistent with the fact that gold can act as hedge against USD rate movements, and (2) symmetric tail dependence between gold and USD exchange rates, indicating that gold can act as an effective safe haven against extreme USD rate movements. We evaluate the implications for mixed gold-currency portfolios, finding evidence of diversification benefits and downside risk reduction that confirms the usefulness of gold in currency portfolio risk management.