银行风险承担行为的市场约束机理

市场约束是一种以市场为基础的限制银行风险承担行为的激励计划,但其作用的有效发挥取决于一系列的内外部条件,如国家隐性保险不仅可能鼓励了银行更大的风险承担行为,也降低了银行债权人的市场约束激励.结合我国银行业的制度与现实背景,通过分析市场约束对银行风险承担行为的作用机理,梳理出市场约束的相关作用机制及其环境依赖,并给出系统的研究框架,可以为隐性保险体制下的市场约束行为与机理研究指明方向.     

社会约束:构建激励相容银行监管体制的有效途径——基于对新加坡、阿根廷、香港经验的借鉴

近年来,我国银行业的发展相当迅速,但银行内部风险控制制度仍然欠缺,政府监管虽防止了大规模的银行危机,也有其局限性,因此,应完善和加强社会约束机制在我国银行监管中的作用,既提高银行外部监管的有效性,又促进银行业的发展。文章从弥补政府监管局限性的角度分析了社会约束在构建激励相容银行监管体制中的必要性,借鉴新加坡、阿根廷、香港在社会约束建设方面的经验,对我国社会约束建设提出了相应建议。     

论破产制度变迁中银行债权的法律保护

银行、企业和政府间的关系一直处于改革变动之中,改革的许多焦点在破产法律制度中得以体现,其间是以转移和牺牲银行利益为代价的.正式破产法基本结束了企业关闭破产的行政程序,在一定程度上有利于银行债权受偿率的提高.但司法实践层面卜银行仍面临担保物权合同制度设计、诉讼方式选择等方面的压力.作为一种司法干预机制,破产申请程序对市场风险具有再分配功能,并对银行自主经营和风险防范提出了更高的要求.     

抵押贷款风险成因及对策

商业银行抵押贷款存在问题：抵押物价不足,一物多押,虚拟抵押,无效抵押,银行管理松弛,市场配套措施不完善。抵押贷款风险原因：企业行为不规范,信贷管理松弛,银行约束机制不健全,社会保障制度改革滞后,法制约束不力。应健全信贷资产风险防范机制和风险监测管理机制．     

中国银行业市场约束状况及其对监管有效性的影响

市场约束对银行监管有效性具有重要的补充作用,银行业市场发育状况既受制于政府监管制度安排,又受制于银行自我约束能力,更受制于市场发展状况.本文从实证和理论两方面对我国银行业的市场约束状况进行了研究,并在此基础上进一步分析了市场约束对我国银行监管有效性的影响.     

潜力型小微企业主办银行制度的思考与实践

主办银行制度能够克服银企信息不对称问题,通过银企双方完全在自由选择、自主决定的基础上的制度安排,把握排他与合作的平衡、市场与政府的边界、权利与责任的对称,从而避免企业融资需求与银行资金供给的脱节与失衡,在解决小微企业融资问题方面具有诸多优势。主办银行制度设计应注重对银企合作关系形成制度激励约束,实现银企之间收益与风险的重新分配,促使银企形成收益共享、风险共担的利益共同体。同时,主办银行制度需要通过合理的制度设计来规避潜在的风险。     

我国银行监管有效性探讨

目前，我国银行监管有效性差，存在着一系列问题，主要表现在：监管重点不突出，忽视监管的成本与效益分析，缺乏强有力的市场约束机制，监管环境不健全，监管机制不协调，针对加入WTO后银行风险变化的新特点必须及时转变监管理念，转移监管重心，强化市场约束的监管作用，培育健康的银行监管环境，建立有效的银行监管协调机制，尽快培养一支高素质的监管队伍。     

提高资本信息披露标准

市场约束是银行监管的重要环节,是促进金融市场公平和效率的重要手段。有效的市场约束要求银行必须全面、真实、及时和持续地披露有关信息,使市场参与者能客观地判断银行抵御风险的能力,有利于从外部加强对银行的监管,促进银行不断健全公司治理结构和风险内控制度。     

政府监管、市场约束对商业银行风险承担行为的影响

在对中国银行业市场进行全面考察的基础上，本文以超额资本充足率和法定存款准备金率为政府监管度量指标，Lerner指数为银行市场约束度量指标，以中国14家上市银行2007年1月～2010年9月期间的季度数据为样本，实证研究了政府监管和市场约束对中国商业银行风险承担行为的影响。研究表明，超额资本充足率、市场约束和银行规模对中...     

利率市场化下我国影子银行风险及其防范

利率市场化会促进我国影子银行业务的创新,从而使本身风险很大的影子银行体系面临更多新风险。利率市场化下,我国影子银行将面临更大的业务转型风险、信用风险、市场风险、流动性风险及监管风险。建立影子银行与商业银行间的防火墙制度、营造公平的市场环境、建立影子银行自身的市场风险应对机制、加大流动性管理和监管力度是对影子银行以上风险的有效防范。     

Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.     

Market discipline,disclosure and moral hazard in banking

This paper examines empirically the hypothesis that market discipline is effective in providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of default, by holding capital buffers against adverse outcomes in portfolio risk. We have constructed a large cross-country panel data set consisting of observations on 729 individual banks from 32 different countries over the years 1993 to 2000. Theory implies that the strength of market discipline ought to be related to the extent of the government safety net, the observability of bank risk choices and to the proportion of uninsured liabilities in the bank's balance sheet. Using panel data techniques, we test whether these factors provide incentives for banks to hold larger capital buffers against adverse outcomes in portfolio risk. Our results suggest that government safety nets result in lower capital buffers and that stronger market discipline resulting from uninsured liabilities and disclosure results in larger capital buffers, all else equal. While our results therefore point to the effectiveness of market discipline mechanisms in general, we also find that the effect of disclosure and uninsured funding is reduced when banks enjoy a high degree of government support. Our results finally suggest that while competition leads to greater risk taking incentives, market discipline is more effective in curbing these incentives in countries where competition among banks is strong.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

政府扶持与中小银行发展

本文旨在分析我国政府在中小银行发展中的作用定位问题。首先 ,在现代市场经济条件下 ,中小银行要想获得长足发展 ,必须在充分发挥市场机制基础性资源配置作用的前提下 ,有效发挥政府对市场机制的“拾遗补缺”作用 ,矫正“市场失灵” ;其次 ,我国正处于经济起飞阶段 ,要在短时间内实现经济的跨越式发展 ,就必须借助于政府的力量 ,作为市场竞争弱势群体的中小银行的发展迫切需要政府予以适当的扶持 ;第三 ,在由传统计划经济体制向市场经济体制转轨的过程中 ,中小银行在产权、管理等制度安排上处于不断深化的过程中 ,需要政府提供适宜的制度环境。     

Internet finance development and banking market discipline: Evidence from China

Depositor discipline is the only viable and universal source of banking market discipline in China. This paper investigates whether the depositor discipline of banking works in the context of an emerging economy under financial repression and implicit government guarantee, such as the Chinese economy; how banking market discipline is affected by Internet finance development; and whether the impact of Internet finance development on market discipline changes across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that, in general, measures of bank risk are negatively associated with the growth of deposit volumes. Internet finance development alters the sensitivity of deposit growth ratios to some bank risk measures. For non-state-owned banks, fewer measures of bank risk are significantly negatively associated with the growth of deposit volumes, and the attenuation impact of Internet finance development on market discipline for bank capitalization instead relatively increases. For large banks, market discipline works significantly, except in the case of the bank capitalization variable; moreover, these significant market disciplines are strengthened with the development of Internet finance.     

银行资本监管与商业银行风险——对中国13家商业银行的实证研究

通过构建模型对2000～2005年我国商业银行风险与资本充足率变化进行实证检验,结果表明,我国实施银行资本监管能够促使已达到最低监管要求的银行提高资本充足率和降低银行风险,但对于达不到监管要求的银行,实施银行资本监管并不能促使其提高资本充足率和降低风险水平.实施银行资本监管不是我国商业银行风险降低的原因,资本监管在市场化程度较高的银行中会失效.市场及投资者并不因为银行资本充足率变化而对上市银行的收益或价值的评价产生变化.改革我国商业银行产权制度、建立显性的存款保险制度、加强市场约束是我国商业银行降低风险、提高资本监管有效性的基础.     

银行资本监管与商业银行风险——对中国13家商业银行的实证研究

通过构建模型对2000～2005年我国商业银行风险与资本充足率变化进行实证检验，结果表明，我国实施银行资本监管能够促使已达到最低监管要求的银行提高资本充足率和降低银行风险，但对于达不到监管要求的银行，实施银行资本监管并不能促使其提高资本充足率和降低风险水平。实施银行资本监管不是我国商业银行风险降低的原因，资本监管在市场化程度较高的银行中会失效。市场及投资者并不因为银行资本充足率变化而对上市银行的收益或价值的评价产生变化。改革我国商业银行产权制度、建立显性的存款保险制度、加强市场约束是我国商业银行降低风险、提高资本监管有效性的基础。     

Deposit insurance coverage,ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This “risk-minimizing” deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.     

次级债能发挥对银行风险承担行为的市场约束作用吗

关于次级债的既有文献基本都在实证研究其市场约束的存在性,而没有揭示次级债作为一种市场约束激励机制的有效程度或内在机理。本文则基于或有权估值理论,研究了次级债对银行风险承担行为的市场约束机理。我们的研究发现:当银行的资产负债水平处于一定的安全边界之内时,随着银行风险承担行为的提高,次级债债权人会在某种程度上补偿高级债债权人。在银行的负债结构中引入次级债,不一定能起到约束银行风险承担行为的目的,它取决于银行既有的资本充足水平。监管当局在允许或强制商业银行发行次级债时,应考虑到次级债市场约束与银行风险承担行为之间的内在关系。为增强市场对银行风险承担行为的约束作用,监管当局应强制资本相对充足的银行发行一定规模的次级债,但这种强制性要求不应覆盖到资本不足的银行。     

市场模式、政府模式与城商行流动性风险化解—一个三期博弈的分析框架

分析城商行流动性风险化解中的政府手段和市场机制,对于下一步规范城商行营商环境、化解流动性风险具有参考意义。本文首先通过银行间的博弈模型,发现政府持股比例越高会增加城商行同业负债比例,进而提高流动性风险发生的可能性;当经济处于下行周期时,全社会资金需求不足,大型银行资金投放的机会成本降低,有利于城商行获得同业负债,但却进一步积累了流动性风险。其次,通过系统GMM对2011—2018年80家城商行的非平衡面板数据进行分析,实证结果验证了理论假说。最后,结合理论与实证分析,进一步提出政府行为边界,破除隐性担保,建立城商行资金内部定价机制以及完善城商行监管体系等方面的政策建议。