Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with staggered wage and price contracts

We study optimal monetary policy for a small open economy in a model where both domestic prices and wages are sticky due to staggered contracts. The simultaneous presence of the two forms of nominal rigidities introduces an additional trade-off between domestic inflation and the output gap. We derive a second-order approximation to the average welfare losses that can be expressed in terms of the unconditional variances of the output gap, domestic price inflation, and wage inflation. As a consequence, the optimal policy seeks to minimize a weighted average of these variances. We analyze welfare implications of several alternative simple policy rules, and find that domestic price inflation targeting generates relatively large welfare losses, whereas CPI inflation targeting performs nearly as well as the optimal rule.     

Implications of habit formation for optimal monetary policy

We study the implications for optimal monetary policy of introducing habit formation in consumption into a general equilibrium model with sticky prices. Habit formation affects the model's endogenous dynamics through its effects on both aggregate demand and households’ supply of output. We show that the objective of monetary policy consistent with welfare maximization includes output stabilization, as well as inflation and output gap stabilization. We find that the variance of output increases under optimal policy, even though it acquires a higher implicit weight in the welfare function. We also find that a simple interest rate rule nearly achieves the welfare-optimal allocation, regardless of the degree of habit formation. In this rule, the optimal responses to inflation and the lagged interest rate are both declining in the size of the habit, although super-inertial policies remain optimal.     

Inflation targeting and nominal-income-growth targeting: When and why are they suboptimal?

We compare optimal and simple interest-rate rules. Our model features optimizing agents, monopolistic competition in both product and labor markets, and one-period nominal contracts (for wages alone or for both wages and prices) signed before shocks are known. Exact solutions ensure that we obtain correct welfare rankings. Optimal rules maximize the unconditional expected utility of the representative agent with commitment subject to the information set of the policymaker. Even with monopolistic distortions, the optimal full-information rule makes the economy mimic the hypothetical full-flexibility equilibrium. Strict versions of inflation targeting, nominal-income-growth targeting, and other such simple rules are suboptimal under both full and partial information but flexible versions are optimal under certain partial-information assumptions. Nominal-income-growth targeting dominates inflation targeting for plausible parameter values.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching

A growing body of evidence finds that policy reaction functions vary substantially over different periods in the United States. This paper explores how moving to an environment in which monetary and fiscal regimes evolve according to a Markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks. In one regime monetary policy follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt; in another regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous. An example shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment. A computational model illustrates that because agents' decision rules embed the probability that policies will change in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth effects. When it is possible that fiscal policy will be unresponsive to debt at times, active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule) in one regime is not sufficient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand effects of tax shocks. The paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical issues.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.     

Optimal monetary policy with durable consumption goods

We document that the durable goods sector is much more interest-sensitive than the nondurables sector, and then investigate the implications of these sectoral differences for monetary policy. We formulate a two-sector general equilibrium model that is calibrated both to match the sectoral responses to a monetary shock derived from our empirical VAR and to imply an empirically realistic degree of sectoral output volatility and comovement. While the social welfare function involves sector-specific output gaps and inflation rates, the performance of the optimal policy rule can be closely approximated by a simple rule that targets a weighted average of aggregate wage and price inflation. In contrast, a rule that stabilizes a more narrow measure of final goods price inflation performs poorly in terms of social welfare.     

Tax distortions and the case for price stability

We investigate the case for price stability in the general version of the New Keynesian (NNS) model with capital and several shocks. The model includes, in addition to the standard imperfect competition and monetary frictions, a non-trivial, endogenous tax distortion. We find that the case for perfect price stability is not significantly weakened. Optimal policy tolerates a small amount of output gap and price variability by reacting less strongly to supply and fiscal shocks in comparison to a policy that aims at perfect price stabilization.     

Information variables for monetary policy in an estimated structural model of the euro area

A small scale new keynesian model for the euro area is estimated with maximum likelihood under the assumptions of imperfect information and discretionary monetary policy. The estimated parametrization of this widely used dynamic stochastic model unveils the monetary authorities’ objectives and the information content of two indicator variables: monetary aggregates and real unit labour costs. The results highlight a significant policy concern about interest-rate smoothing and inflation; almost no concern for output gap stabilization emerges. Regarding indicator variables, unit labour costs provide information on potential output that is helpful for stabilization policy; no useful information role emerges for monetary aggregates.     

Optimal monetary policy with international trade in intermediate inputs

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a two-country New Keynesian model with international trade in intermediate inputs. We derive the loss function of a cooperative monetary policymaker and find that the optimal monetary policy must target intermediate-goods price inflation rates, final-goods price inflation rates, final-goods output gaps, and relative-price gaps. We use the welfare loss under the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to evaluate the welfare implications of three Taylor-type monetary policy rules. A main finding is that the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate-goods production is a key factor to determine which policy rule should be followed. Specifically, when the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate-goods production is high, the policymaker should follow intermediate-goods PPI-based Taylor rule, whereas CPI-based Taylor rule should be followed when the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate-goods production is intermediate or low.     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops

This article investigates the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on output growth during sudden-stop balance of payments crisis in emerging markets and developing countries. Sudden stops in capital flows, and subsequent deep recessions, are a frequent occurrence in these countries but there is no professional consensus, and little systematic empirical evidence, shedding light on the macroeconomic policy mix most likely to limit output losses during these episodes. To address this issue, we investigate 83 sudden-stop crisis in 66 countries using a baseline empirical model to control for the various determinants of output losses during sudden stops. We measure the marginal effects of policy on output losses, and find strong evidence that monetary tightening (rise in the discount rate or unsterilized rise in international reserves) and discretionary fiscal contraction are significantly correlated with larger output losses following a sudden stop. Fiscal expansion is associated with smaller output losses following a sudden stop, but monetary expansion has no discernable effect. The macroeconomic policy mix associated with the least output loss during a sudden-stop financial crisis is a discretionary fiscal expansion combined with a neutral monetary policy.     

货币、财政和宏观审慎政策的协调搭配研究

本文通过构建包含多部门和多元宏观政策的DSGE模型,对货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策的最优反应规则及其协调组合问题进行了分析。分析结果显示:(1)从社会福利最大化的角度,货币政策可继续盯住通胀和产出的稳定,政府支出和税收政策可分别重点盯住产出稳定和债务稳定,而宏观审慎政策则可重点关注以信贷利差和信贷波动为代表的关键金融变量;(2)货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策,通过合理的搭配和组合使用,能比任何单一政策工具都具有更好的经济金融稳定效应;反之,政策之间的不协调将显著削弱彼此的调控效应,加大经济和金融波动,从而导致显著的社会福利损失;(3)从多种政策协调搭配产生“合力”的内在机制来看,财政政策主要通过增加对产出、通胀、就业和债务等变量的稳定效应,对货币政策产生额外助力,而宏观审慎政策则主要通过稳定金融体系和降低金融风险对货币政策产生助力。上述结论表明,在多种经济金融政策并存的情况下,基于良好设定的政策规则,同时加强政策各部门之间的协调合作,是确保多元政策产生积极合力的重要基础。     

International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms’ markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-à-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.     

Monetary policy and distribution

A segmented markets model of monetary policy is constructed, in which a novel feature is goods market segmentation, and its relationship to conventional asset market segmentation. The implications of the model for the response of prices, interest rates, consumption, labor supply, and output to monetary policy are determined. As well, optimal monetary policy is studied, as are the costs of inflation. The model features persistent nonneutralities of money, relative price effects of increases in the money supply, persistent liquidity effects, and a negative Fisher effect from a money supply increase. A Friedman rule is in general suboptimal.     

Global liquidity trap

How should monetary policy respond to a “global liquidity trap,” where the two countries may fall into a liquidity trap simultaneously? Using a two-country New Open Economy Macroeconomics model, we first characterize optimal monetary policy, and show that the optimal rate of inflation in one country is affected by whether or not the other country is in a liquidity trap. We next examine how well the optimal monetary policy is approximated by relatively simple monetary policy rules. The interest-rate rule targeting the producer price index performs well in this respect.     

Identifying the Stance of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Markov‐Switching Estimation Exploiting Monetary‐Fiscal Policy Interdependence

In this paper, I propose an econometric technique to estimate a Markov‐switching Taylor rule subject to the zero lower bound of interest rates. I show that linking the switching of the Taylor rule coefficients to the switching of the coefficients of an auxiliary uncensored Markov‐switching regression improves the identification of an otherwise unidentifiable prevalent monetary regime because of the presence of the zero lower bound. Using a Markov‐switching fiscal policy rule as the auxiliary regression, I apply the estimation technique to U.S. data. Results show evidence of monetary and fiscal policy comovements, with monetary policy reacting weakly to inflation when fiscal policy is focused on real activity as opposed to debt stabilization, and vice versa.     

A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy

I show that multiple equilibria are a general property of economies under full monetary policy discretion. Three simple conditions are sufficient to rule out, generically, a unique equilibrium in a static economy. The key departure from Barro and Gordon (1983) is to consider bounded welfare costs of inflation. I also show that in a two Markov equilibrium economy the inflation response to certain perturbations is, generically, qualitatively different in each equilibrium. Finally, I discuss some evidence on inflation dynamics that supports the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was caught in an expectation trap during the high inflation episode of the 1970s.     

Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions under Implementable Monetary Policy Rules

This paper examines the implications of forward- and backward-looking monetary policy rules in an environment with monetary–fiscal interactions. We find that the unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is always non-Ricardian under simple implementable monetary policy rules.