Auditors’ going concern reporting accuracy during and after the global financial crisis

Motivated by concerns that one of the reasons for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is poor quality auditing, this study examines the accuracy of going concern modifications for a sample of United States (U.S.) companies in the pre-GFC (2005–2006), GFC (2007–2008), and post-GFC (2009–2010) periods. The results show that the type I misclassification is lower during the GFC but not different in the post-GFC period compared with the pre-GFC period. The type II misclassification is not significantly different in the GFC and post-GFC periods compared with the pre-GFC period. Additionally, the results suggest that non-Big 4 auditors, compared with Big 4 auditors, have become more conservative on clients’ going concern problems in the post-GFC period, which reduces their type II misclassification.     

Is there a bright side to government banks? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.     

How resilient and countercyclical were emerging economies during the global financial crisis?

By studying the cross-country incidence of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, we document a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging economies suffered growth collapses (relative to the pre-crisis levels) comparable to those experienced by developed economies, even when they continued growing. Afterwards, most economies returned to their pre-crisis growth rates. Although emerging economies were not able to avoid the collapse originated in the U.S. and then transmitted across countries, they were more resilient during the global crisis than during past crises. Namely, they resumed their higher growth rates earlier and converged more quickly to their pre-crisis growth trend. Moreover, breaking with the past, emerging economies did not fall more than developed economies during the global crisis and were able to conduct countercyclical policies, thus becoming more similar to developed economies.     

Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeoff between lending market competition and financial fragility. Such a tradeoff may not emerge either when banks compete by conditioning interest rates on investment volumes irrespectively of whether credit rationing takes place or not.     

What explains global exchange rate movements during the financial crisis?

A striking and unexpected feature of the financial crisis has been the sharp appreciation of the US dollar against virtually all currencies globally. The paper finds that negative US-specific macroeconomic shocks during the crisis have triggered a significant strengthening of the US dollar, rather than a weakening. Macroeconomic fundamentals and financial exposure of individual countries are found to have played a key role in the transmission process of US shocks: in particular countries with low FX reserves, weak current account positions and high direct financial exposure vis-à-vis the United States have experienced substantially larger currency depreciations during the crisis overall, and to US shocks in particular.     

Has the global financial crisis produced a New World Order?

Described by Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as the worst financial crisis in global history, the economic impact of the global financial crisis would have been much worse had it not been for Asia (excluding Japan). In broad terms, the crisis has accelerated the secular emergence of Asia, whereas the US recovery is weak by historical standards and problems in Europe continue. What accounts for this two-tier pattern of world growth? Does this juxtaposition signal a permanent re-ordering of world business - in other words, a New World Order?     

Returns and volatility spillover in the European banking industry during global financial crisis: Flight to perceived quality or contagion?

This paper empirically investigates return, volatility and leverage spillover effects between banking industrial stock markets of the major economies (ME) (Germany, UK and US) and the smaller stressed European Union countries (SE), (Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) from 2002 to 2014 which includes the global financial crisis period (2007–2014). Thus the paper investigates the influence of the global crisis on the spillover between the banking industrial stock markets of Europe and the US. We apply a multivariate GARCH–GJR framework to investigate the effects of the financial crisis with respect to spillover. Our results indicate an increase in both means and volatility spillover between the major economies and the stressed EU economies from the pre-crisis to the crisis period. During the pre-crisis period there is ample evidence of spillover from Germany, UK and the US to the smaller EU economies. Little evidence of a significant spillover from the smaller economies to the major economies is found during this period. We find that return and volatility transmission mechanisms between the major economies and the smaller EU countries are asymmetric during the crisis period. During the crisis, the level and amount of spillover from the major economies increase. But now there is also clear evidence of spillover from smaller EU economies to the major economies, this is especially true for Germany and the UK. Evidence of spillover effects suggests the existence of exploitable trading strategies and has important implications to investors in the areas of option pricing, portfolio optimization and risk management.     

Are safe haven assets really safe during the 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic?

This study evaluates the safe-haven role of twelve assets against the US stock market during the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that silver and the Islamic stock index were safe havens during the 2008 GFC, and the Islamic stock index and Tether have been safe havens during COVID-19. We observe that the Islamic stock index and Tether have emerged as strong new safe havens. However, our supplementary analysis reveals that gold and Bitcoin still exhibit safe-haven behavior during severe market downturns. Overall, our findings suggest that safe-haven assets may vary over time.     

Is the realized volatility good for option pricing during the recent financial crisis?

The contributions of this paper are threefold. The first contribution is the proposed logarithmic HAR (log-HAR) option-pricing model, which is more convenient compared with other option pricing models associated with realized volatility in terms of simpler estimation procedure. The second contribution is the test of the empirical implications of heterogeneous autoregressive model of the realized volatility (HAR)-type models in the S&P 500 index options market with comparison of the non-linear asymmetric GARCH option-pricing model, which is the best model in pricing options among generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic-type models. The third contribution is the empirical analysis based on options traded from July 3, 2007 to December 31, 2008, a period covering a recent financial crisis. Overall, the HAR-type models successfully predict out-of-sample option prices because they are based on realized volatilities, which are closer to the expected volatility in financial markets. However, mixed results exist between the log-HAR and the heterogeneous auto-regressive gamma models in pricing options because the former is better than the latter in times of turmoil, whereas it is worse during the rather stable periods.     

Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?

This study examines the impact of corporate boards on firm performance during the current financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the crisis to measure firm performance, we find that board independence, as traditionally defined, does not significantly affect firm performance. However, when we redefine independent directors as outside directors who are less connected with current CEOs, a measure we call strong independence, there is a positive and significant relationship between this measure and firm performance. Second, outside financial experts are important for firm performance. We find that the positive impact of outside financial experts on firm performance is more significant than that of strong independence. Overall, our results suggest that firm performance during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate boards.     

How did a domestic housing slump turn into a global financial crisis?

The global financial crisis clearly started with problems in the U.S. sub-prime sector and spread across the world from there. But was the direct exposure of foreigners to the U.S. financial system a key driver of the crisis, or did other factors account for its rapid contagion across the world? To answer this question, we assessed whether countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and were highly dependent on dollar funding experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the crisis. We found little evidence of such direct spillovers from the United States to abroad. Although CDS spreads generally rose higher and bank stocks generally fell lower in countries with more exposure to U.S. MBS and greater dollar funding needs, these correlations were not robust, and they fail to explain the lion’s share of the deterioration in asset prices that took place during the crisis. Accordingly, less tangible channels of contagion may have played a more important role in the global spread of the crisis: a generalized run on global financial institutions, given the opacity of their balance sheets; excessive dependence on short-term funding; vicious cycles of mark-to-market losses driving fire sales of MBS; the realization that financial firms around the world were pursuing similar (flawed) business models; and global swings in risk aversion. The U.S. sub-prime crisis, rather than being a fundamental driver of the global crisis, may have been merely a trigger for a global bank run and for disillusionment with a risky business model that already had spread around the world.     

Is M&A different during a crisis? Evidence from the European banking sector

The financial crisis has affected the landscape of the banking sector around the world. We use a sample of transactions carried out by European acquirers in 2007–2010 to study the acquirer’s stock price market reaction to both announcements and completions of acquisitions. At the aggregate level, we find that there are no significant abnormal returns around the announcement of an acquisition while there are positive abnormal returns at completions. We study the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns and find that announcement returns are mainly explained by the acquirer bank characteristics, while completion returns mainly depend on opacity of the target and on the drop in idiosyncratic volatility associated with a reduction of uncertainty.     

The cost of firms’ debt financing and the global financial crisis

We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premium paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5500 issues over the period 2005–2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005–2007 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010–2012 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms received a discount of 40 basis points.     

International income risk-sharing and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the degree of international income and consumption risk-sharing among industrial economies using returns on cross-border portfolio holdings (e.g., debt, equity, FDI). We split the returns from the net foreign holdings as receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows) to investigate which of the two sides exhibited the greater resilience for income risk-sharing during the recent crisis. First, we find that debt delivered better risk-sharing than equity, mainly reflecting the deficit deterioration in EMU countries during the post-crisis period. FDI, by contrast, did not correspond to noticeable risk diversification. Second, separating output shocks into positive and negative components reveals that debt holding receipts (equity liability payments) performed better under negative (positive) realizations of the shock variable. Third, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt liability channel in the new EU countries.     

How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?

This paper empirically investigates the incidence of regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis. Using an option pricing technique in concert with valuation data gathered from failed bank sales, I find that failed banks consistently underreported the level of impairment in loan portfolios during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010, helping these market value insolvent banks to report adequate capital for regulatory purposes. Impairment-adjusted capital ratios provide evidence of regulatory forbearance for up to 18 months prior to seizure. Analyses of bank coverage ratios reveal that coverage ratios are negatively and significantly related to impairment levels and are significantly lower for banks with critically low levels of capital.     

Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

Euro money market spreads during the 2007–? financial crisis

In the paper we investigate the empirical features of euro area money market turbulence during the recent financial crisis. By means of a novel Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive model, we find evidence of a deterministic level factor in the EURIBOR-OIS (OIS) spreads term structure, associated with the two waves of stress in the interbank market, following the BNP Paribas (9 August 2007) and Lehman Brothers (16 September 2008) “shocks”, and two additional factors, of the long memory type, bearing the interpretation of curvature and slope factors, respectively. The unfolding of the crisis yields a significant increase in their persistence and volatility. We also find evidence of a declining trend in the level and volatility of OIS spreads since December 2008, associated with ECB liquidity policies.     

Does the stock market reward innovation? European stock index reaction to negative news during the global financial crisis

This study uses data on 27 European stock indices over the period from January 2007 to December 2012 to investigate the relationship between innovations and the market reaction to negative news during the financial crisis. We use the bivariate BEKK-GARCH approach to estimate time-varying betas and abnormal returns. We show that index prices of countries in the high (low) innovation groups experience significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns on and following the negative news announcement dates. We also find that index beta changes following the arrival of bad news is negatively associated with a country's innovativeness. This finding suggests that innovations promote economic stability and enhance investors' confidence in a country's ability to cope during difficult times. Thus, policy makers who are concerned with sustainable growth should encourage R&D investments by adopting effective policies and avoid unnecessary cuts in R&D expenditures even during times of crisis. A study of the pre-crisis period from January 2001 to December 2006, using the same methods, indicates that investors value innovation more during difficult times.     

The global financial crisis—Market misconduct and regulation from a behavioral view

This paper explores the problem of the global financial crisis of 2008–9, using a behavioral perspective to examine in some detail the issue of governance failures. These failures are evident in the inadequate oversight/regulation provided by US financial market regulators, as well as the inability of financial market participants to adequately judge and assign risk measures to key financial instruments. In total, five elements of behavioral finance are shown to characterize the crisis. The paper shows how specific adjustments in government policy (dealing with market structural imperfections) and company governance (dealing mainly with risk management) can respond to the key elements of the crisis. It also points out that future financial crises cannot be avoided, so that mitigation is the only remedy to deal with such phenomena.     

Central bank financial strength and inflation: Is there a robust link?

Central bank financial strength has not been a fundamental issue for a substantial period of time. However, recent theoretical and empirical studies argue that central banks need to maintain a sufficient level of financial strength to perform their functions effectively and to achieve monetary policy objectives. In this study, we examine the empirical relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation using an unbalanced panel data set for a sample of selected advanced and emerging countries. We observe a statistically significant and robust negative relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation. This relationship is robust in the presence of other determinants of inflation and for alternative estimation methods. Our results have important implications for policy makers and central bankers. Particularly, our results suggest that avoiding persistent losses and maintaining the health of the central bank balance sheet remain vital pre-conditions for desirable policy outcomes of a central bank.