我国审计市场竞争态势:完全竞争还是垄断竞争?

本文从经济学视角对我国审计市场竞争态势进行了深入分析。研究发现:目前我国审计市场竞争态势为垄断竞争的市场态势。为提高我国审计市场运行效率、促进审计行业健康有序发展,本文提出进一步优化国内事务所审计市场结构、严格市场准入、促进事务所间的合并重组、形成各类事务所各得其所、协调发展的良性发展格局的政策建议。     

中国注册会计师协会关于坚决打击和治理注册会计师行业不正当低价竞争行为的通知

一、把打击和治理不正当低价竞争作为当前和今后一个时期行业监管的重点工作.各级注册会计师协会要充分认识不正当低价竞争对行业的严重危害,不正当低价竞争是行业发展诸多矛盾的重要诱因,不利于事务所提高鉴证服务的质量,不利于事务所培育核心竞争力,不利于形成公平合理的行业竞争环境.各级注册会计师协会要将治理不正当低价竞争作为当前和今后一个时期行业监管工作的重中之重,作为深化行业诚信建设的重要领域,坚决打击和治理行业不正当低价竞争行为.     

会计师事务所的地区竞争优势与审计质量

本文研究会计师事务所的地区竞争优势与审计质量之间的关系。文章以2002—2009年为样本区间,以会计师事务所在某一地区的市场份额来衡量其地区竞争优势,以操纵性应计的绝对值和正向、负向水平衡量审计质量。研究发现,会计师事务所的地区竞争优势越大,操纵性应计的绝对值以及正向应计的水平越低,而会计师事务所的地区竞争优势对于负向应计的影响程度较弱。本文的研究表明,会计师的地区竞争优势越大,审计质量越高。     

竞争压力、规模经济性与会计师事务所行业专长溢价

本文使用中国上市公司2001-2011年数据,从区域层面考察了外部竞争压力与内部规模经济性对会计师事务所行业专长溢价的影响。研究结果表明:会计师事务所在区域层面的行业专长具有显著的审计收费溢价。外部竞争压力使得会计师事务所不得不让渡一部分行业专长溢价,外部竞争压力与内部规模经济性对行业专长溢价的影响表现出此消彼长的替代效应。克服内生性问题的工具变量回归以及相关稳健性测试都得到一致的研究结果。本文结论对于理解垄断竞争型审计市场中会计师事务所的行业专长溢价及其决定因素具有意义。     

我国民间审计独立性因素分析

独立性是影响民间审计质量的直接因素，而上市公司治理结构、注册会计师行业管理体制、市场监督体系和法律约束体系、会计师事务所组织形式、会计师事务所规模、注册会计师行业内部竞争等因素都将影响我国民间审计的独立性。     

内地事务所参与H股审计问题研究——基于内地事务所国际化战略与H股审计市场格局

2010年12月,首批12家获推荐从事H股审计的会计师事务所名单公布,除国际四大外,亦有8家内地本土事务所获得H股审计的入场券,标志着内地会计师事务所的国际化取得重大进展。从会计师事务所国际化的动因、模式和路径,以及我国会计师行业发展的特点看,进入香港审计市场对我国内地本土会计师事务所具有特殊意义。分析H股审计市场的基本格局和竞争状况,以及内地事务所参与香港审计市场的现状,可以发现规模、人力资源、市场信任等因素影响内地会计师事务所的竞争力,并导致内地会计师事务所面临国际四大垄断市场的挑战,但参与H股审计为内地会计师事务所提供了重要的发展机会。因此,充分利用自身比较优势和有利条件,确保审计质量提升,立足于国际化长远目标并适时调整发展战略,是内地会计师事务所参与H股审计的基本策略。     

基于超效率模型的中国会计师事务所效率研究

会计师事务所的运营效率是事务所竞争力和可持续发展能力的集中体现,是衡量事务所经营业绩的重要标准。效率值的高低可以反映会计师事务所的资源利用效果以及整体经营状况。因而效率分析本身也就成了事务所做大做强业绩评价的一种有效方法。目前我国有关研究会计师事务所效率的文献大都从审计表现的市场效率入手,关注如何使事务所提供高质量的审计服务,进而获得相应的审计溢价。笔者认为,会计师事务所的竞争优势并不仅仅体现在外在的市场效率,本着成本效益原则,事务所的竞争优势很大程度上需要在保证一定市场效率的同时提高其获取利润的能力,从效率的层面看就是要最大限度地节约成本或促使收益最大化。基于这样的考虑,本文应用DEA(数据包络分析)方法并引入了DEA"超效率"模型,从投入产出的角度整体评估了我国会计师事务所的运营效率。     

我国审计市场的竞争状况分析

审计行业的特殊性决定了其不能像普通服务行业那样依靠价格竞争来达到社会福利的最大化。过度竞争会损害事务所的独立性 ,进而影响到审计质量。本文分析了我国审计市场的审计费用水平 ,并分析了判断市场竞争程度的三个重要指标 :市场集中度、行业平均劳动生产率和平均利润率。不同的证据都表明我国审计市场上存在激烈的竞争。本文认为审计行业自身的激烈竞争是造成我国事务所独立性不高 ,违规操作频频出现的原因之一。     

税收筹划——会计师事务所多元化服务的重要内容

经过近20年的发展,审计服务市场已经相对成熟,市场份额比较稳定,竞争也日益激烈.如何发展多元化服务,成为当前我国会计师事务所扩大规模、提高竞争能力、增强服务水平亟待解决的问题.而在传统的审计服务的基础上,从提供税务咨询服务开始,进而拓展到其他领域,是国外知名会计师事务所发展多元化服务的普遍经验.     

中注协提示相关事务所进一步抵制不正当低价竞争

近日,中注协以“抵制行业不正当低价竞争”为主题,在京约谈大华会计师事务所、天津倚天会计师事务所,就会计师事务所规范自身审计服务投标行为,保障招投标项目审计服务质量进行风险提示.北京注册会计师协会、天津市注册会计师协会相关负责人参加约谈.     

The effect of audit firm size on audit prices: A study of the Australian Market

The effect of audit firm size on prizes is a complex function of competition in the market for audit services, product differentiation, and scale economics to large firms. In this study, a competitive market is supported in Australia with product differentiation to Bif Eight accounting firms. Specially, Big Eight accounting firms have significantly higher audit prices than non-Big Eight firms. This results holds for ‘large’ and ‘small’ auditees. A test is also made of price cutting in the Australian market. Price cutting is defined as lower initial audit fees than continuing engagement fees for a comparable audit. Test results do not evidence price-cutting behavior by accounting firms. There is in fact weak evidence that initial audit fees are higher than continuing engagement fee levels. Higher initial fees suggest that accounting firms may recover at least some of the audit start-up costs immediately.     

The effect of small audit firms’ failure to remediate the PCAOB’s quality control criticisms on audit market segmentation

This paper examines the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) quality control inspection program on market segmentation of small firms’ audit services. Specifically, we investigate how non-remediation of quality control criticisms (QCCs) affects the supply and demand of low-quality audits. We find that remediation of QCCs improves audit quality for small accounting firms. However, some small accounting firms do not remediate QCCs (NR firms) and continue to provide low audit quality. We investigate how NR clients react to the disclosure of non-remediation of QCCs. We find that NR clients with low agency costs are more likely to retain NR firms after the disclosure of non-remediation. This finding is consistent with our expectation that voluntary QCC remediation creates a low-quality audit market segment for NR firms. Our findings suggest that the public disclosure of QCCs is not sufficient to remove low-quality auditors. Instead, NR clients use the disclosure of non-remediation of QCCs as a signal to sort themselves into segments based on their demand for audit quality. We are the first to study and find that PCAOB inspections, and specifically the voluntary nature of remediation and public disclosure of lack of remediation, create market segmentation.     

我国注册会计师行业发展状况的分析与研究:成就与意义、问题与挑战、启示与建议

本文利用我国注册会计师行业的历史数据,系统研究了我国注册会计师行业发展问题。研究发现,我国注册会计师行业在促进我国社会经济发展过程中发挥了积极作用,做出了显著贡献。与此同时,也存在因不当审计行为招致的行政处罚、诉讼仲裁案件趋于增长和近年来屡屡遭遇声誉危机事件等问题,未来发展也面临行业过度竞争、薪酬竞争力不足、事务所分所管理和质量控制不力、行业数字化转型迟缓等诸多挑战。笔者建议:(1)厘清财务报告的会计责任与审计责任,明确注册会计师法律责任,促成社会各界对注册会计师审计形成合理期望;(2)会计师事务所必须转变发展理念,着力做强做优,严守职业道德底线,完善事务所治理结构,改进分所管理和质量控制,大力推进数字化转型,持续提升审计质量和服务效率;(3)积极而有效地改善注册会计师行业发展环境,尤其是要通过进一步优化审计服务招投标制度,适当降低价格因素在注册会计师选聘中的权重,逐步扭转行业过度竞争局面;(4)通过更为及时和更大力度的监管检查,进一步加强和完善行业监管,对事务所及时进行风险提示。     

Transaction costs and competition among audit firms in local markets

We develop a measure to capture an audit firm's competitive position in a local audit market based on the transaction costs of changing audit firms included in DeAngelo's (1981) multi-period audit pricing model. Our competition measure reflects the size difference between the largest audit firm in a market specified by client industry at the city level and the other audit firms operating in that market. We find that audit fees of a client decrease as this size difference increases. This result suggests that smaller audit firms charge lower audit fees because of their competitive disadvantage to the local largest firm.     

非审计业务对审计市场绩效的影响——基于会计师事务所业务结构的角度

以审计质量和审计收费作为审计市场绩效的衡量指标,从会计师事务所业务结构角度来考察我国注册会计师行业拓展非审计业务对审计市场所带来的影响。实证检验发现,相对于其他事务所而言,非审计业务规模越大和当年非审计业务规模较上年扩大的事务所,其审计质量越好,审计收费也越高。这说明在目前审计服务市场容量有限,竞争过于激烈的环境下,拓展非审计业务有利于增强审计独立性和提高审计收费,是改善行业执业环境的一个重要途径。     

会计师事务所虚假陈述行政法律责任研究

会计师事务所被誉为证券市场的“经济警察”,其对被审单位审计报告关系到投资者的切身利益。会计师事务所在证券市场的虚假陈述行为不仅破坏了金融市场秩序同时还会引起投资者合法权益的损害,因此《证券法》规定了会计师事务所及注册会计师虚假陈述时因承担的民事责任和行政责任。然而,在现行法?律框架之下行政责任的认定往往是民事责任的前提,就我国目前实践而言,行政责任的认定存在诸多不足,注册会计师基于其专业性及公众的合理信赖而对审计业务负有合理的注意义务,法律要求注册会计师在从事审计义务时要勤勉尽责,故细化勤勉尽责义务、完善行政责任构成要件是研究会计师事务所虚假陈述法律责任的重点。     

发审委身份公开、会计师事务所声誉与IPO公司盈余质量

本文以我国2000至2007年期间IPO公司财务报告为样本,以2003年我国由证监会遴选执业会计师出任股票发行审核委员会(简称"发审委")委员的身份公开为背景,研究被证监会遴选执业会计师出任股票发审委委员的会计师事务所是否有动机提高审计质量,以维护来自政府认可的信任声誉。实证研究发现,这些会计师事务所审计的IPO公司财务报告的盈余质量,无论横向比较还是纵向比较均有显著提高。据此推论,来自政府认可的会计师事务所声誉与源于市场口碑的会计师事务所声誉一样,对享有这些声誉的会计师事务所提高审计质量有明显激励作用。     

The dark side of audit market competition

This paper examines the relation between audit market competition and audit quality. We use the staggered introduction of bullet trains in different Chinese cities as shocks to travel time between audit clients and prospective audit firms, which increases the threat of competition for incumbent audit firms. The inception of bullet train connectivity leads to a 4.5 percentage point (pp) increase in the probability of GAAP violations and a 1.7 pp decrease in the probability of modified audit opinions for clients headquartered in connected cities. Bullet train connectivity is also followed by a 1.6 pp decrease in income-decreasing audit adjustments but no change in income-increasing audit adjustments. The negative relation between bullet train connectivity and audit quality is 1) stronger when bullet trains put greater competitive pressure on incumbent auditors and 2) weaker when clients demand high audit quality. Our paper provides plausibly causal evidence that competition lowers audit quality.     

Agency costs and product market competition: The case of audit pricing in Greece

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.     

A content analysis of CPA firms’ correspondence following PCAOB inspections: 2004–2010

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has conducted well over 1000 inspections of public accounting firms since 2004, the year their inspections began. The PCAOB inspections are mandated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and are designed to promote high professional audit standards and improve the audit quality of registered public accounting firms (U.S. House, 2002). Since then, a growing body of research has emerged focusing on the process, results, and decision implications of the inspections. Most of the research to date has focused on determining the impact of the inspection regimen from the perspective of regulators, clients, or markets, but there has been very little research focused on the effect of inspections on the accounting firms themselves.We evaluate the letters provided by triennial audit firms (100 or fewer issuer clients) to the PCAOB in response to their inspections. The response letters provide insight into what the firms themselves think about the value of the inspection and the results of the inspections. Our study and its findings are particularly timely in light of the PCAOB Chairman James Doty’s recent speech (Doty, 2011) in which he claimed that deficiencies were concrete instances of audit failure, and sharply criticized the responses of many audit firms who received inspection deficiency reports, most of whom maintain that their deficiency finding resulted from either differences in professional judgment or inadequate documentation, or both (but not audit deficiencies).We find that a majority of firms writing response letters (1) state they support the PCAOB’s objective of improving audit quality and (2) believe the inspection process will lead to higher audit quality. However, a substantial majority of firms that had an audit engagement deficiency disagreed with the PCAOB’s evaluation, citing differences in professional judgment and/or documentation issues. Our findings do not support but run counter to the PCAOB Chairman’s criticisms and insistence that inspection deficiencies are not attributable to professional judgment differences.