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1.
Managerial risk preferences have considerable impacts on a firm’s cost management through committed resource adjustment decisions. We investigate whether a firm’s cost behaviour is influenced by managers’ risk appetite and find that cost stickiness increases with managers’ risk-seeking. The positive relationship between risk-seeking and cost stickiness is weaker for firms with higher levels of manager capacity. We further find that the moderating effect of managerial capacity is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, in less competitive industries, and in areas with lower degrees of marketisation. These results suggest that managers’ personal characteristics are key factors that affect sticky cost behaviour. 相似文献
2.
We examine whether stock liquidity exacerbates or mitigates managerial short-termism. Utilizing earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism, we establish three major findings. First, firms with liquid stocks engage in less accrual-based and real earnings management. Second, the effect of stock liquidity on earnings management is amplified for firms with high levels of managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. Third, the positive association between the intensity of earnings management and firm cost of capital is evident only for firms with low stock liquidity. Our findings are consistent with the threat of blockholder exit as the main governance channel through which stock liquidity discourages opportunistic earnings management and mitigates managerial short-termism. 相似文献
3.
论高校科研经费的管理 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
随着我国政府对科技强国战略的进一步强化,高校所承接的科研项目和获得的科研经费均有了较大幅度的增长,科研资金的来源渠道也越来越广,科研经费的核算和管理已成为高校财务管理的重要组成部分.但是,通过调查发现,一些高校在科研项目经费管理中存在不同程度的问题,有些问题甚至明显偏离科研服务社会、服务经济的宗旨.文章从部分高校在使用... 相似文献
4.
We examine how corporate insiders pledging their equity stakes to collateralise personal loans influences firm cost of debt. Pledging enables managers to diversify personal holdings, potentially increasing risk‐taking incentives. However, exposure to contingent risks creates potentially stronger risk‐reducing incentives. Using hand‐collected data with OLS, difference‐in‐differences, and instrumental variables models, we find significant decreases in yield spreads associated with executive share‐pledging. Reductions in spreads surrounding share‐pledge disclosures suggest investors update their risk assessment to reflect pledging managers’ risk‐taking incentives. Consistent with risk‐reducing incentives, firms with share‐pledging executives subsequently reduce leverage. 相似文献
5.
Maria A. Leach-López William W. Stammerjohan Frances M. McNair 《Advances in accounting, incorporating advances in international accounting》2008,24(1):49-64
This study extends the stream of participative budgeting literature by introducing a new variable, Budgetary Participation Conflict (BPC). BPC occurs when the level of budget participation experienced by a manager differs from a desired level. We propose a model where BPC is the independent variable to further evaluate the effect of budget participation on job performance. Using path analysis, we measure the direct effect of BPC on job performance, and the indirect effects between BPC and performance that run through job satisfaction and job tenure in two countries, Mexico and the US.While the results do not indicate that BPC either directly or indirectly affects the performance of US managers, the results indicate that BPC negatively affects the job performance of Mexican managers indirectly through the effects of BPC on job satisfaction and job tenure. The relationship between tenure and performance is much stronger among the Mexican managers than among their US counterparts, which is the largest single difference between the Mexican and US results. 相似文献
6.
我国部门预算编制过程中的交易成本分析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
部门预算编制过程中的交易成本属于事前交易成本.由于各参与主体行为目标的差异及信息不对称必然导致交易成本产生.因此,应加强基础性制度构建,使财政部门与其它部门的工作规则制度化,建立预算资金使用的激励机制. 相似文献
7.
Daniel E. O'Leary 《International Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance & Management》2010,17(2):111-126
This paper analyses how information about managers and technology can be used to provide those managers with a system that is congruent with their needs. In particular, using McGregor's Theories X and Y philosophies, managerial needs are elicited and then contemporary knowledge management technologies, including intelligent agents, and the way they are implemented, are analysed to determine how they meet those manager needs. Different knowledge management technologies are found to be important to manifesting the requirements of particular management philosophies. For example, ‘Theory X’ appears consistent with use of intelligent agents to ‘monitor’ behaviour. This leads to the concept of ‘technology congruence’, where the choice of the technology ultimately is tied to which view of the world the manager employs. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
8.
This study explores the causes or antecedents of budget participation to understand more fully the role of participation in the workplace. The study focuses on the reasons why superiors encourage the budget participation of their subordinates and draws upon several theoretical perspectives including leadership theory, agency theory and organizational justice. To examine the issues, a survey was administered to managers and supervisors in several companies. Results of path analysis suggest that superiors encourage subordinate participation when the superior's leadership style is considerate. This implies that budget participation may mediate the relation between leadership style and work outcomes. Results also suggest that superiors encourage participation when budget goals are used in the performance evaluation of subordinates, in which case, the study argues, the superiors encourage participation because of concerns about organizational justice. This finding implies that budget participation may mediate the relation between the evaluative use of budget and those work outcomes that prior research has linked to organizational justice. The proposed relation between information asymmetry and budget participation is not supported. 相似文献
9.
Managerial ownership and firm performance: A re-examination using productivity measurement 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
The role of productivity in firm performance is of fundamental importance to the US economy. Consistent with the corporate finance approach, this paper uses the ownership stake of a firm's managers as an argument in estimating the firm's production function. Accordingly, this paper brings together the corporate finance and productivity literature. Using a large sample of randomly selected manufacturing firms that does not suffer from any survivorship or large firm size biases, we find that managerial ownership changes are positively related to changes in productivity. We also find a higher sensitivity of changes in managerial ownership to changes in productivity for firms who experience greater than the median change in managerial ownership. These results are robust to including lagged estimates of production inputs, year dummies and separate dummies for each firm to control for unobservable firm characteristics. In addition, we find that the stock market rewards firms with increases in firm value when these firms increase their level of productivity. 相似文献
10.
三聚氰胺事件、长春长生疫苗事件等安全事件警醒我们,公共安全是企业管理会计的核心社会责任.企业有效履行公共安全责任,是多元共治的一项系统工程.企业管理会计从构建企业公共安全战略、加强公共安全预算管理、强化公共安全绩效考核和增强公共安全决策能力等方面履行公共安全责任.社会管理者应该从完善法规、健全制度,绩效引导等方面加强对... 相似文献
11.
This paper examines the relationship between the firm's governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders’ wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions. 相似文献
12.
Stefania P.S. Rossi Markus S. Schwaiger Gerhard Winkler 《Journal of Banking & Finance》2009,33(12):2218-2226
The aim of this paper is to analyze how diversification of banks across size and industry affects risk, cost and profit efficiency, and bank capitalization for large Austrian commercial banks over the years 1997–2003. Employing a unique dataset, provided by the Austrian Central Bank, we test for several different types of managerial hypotheses, formalized according to a modified version of the Berger and DeYoung model [Berger, A.N., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 849–870]. We find that, although diversification negatively affects cost efficiency, it increases profit efficiency and reduces banks’ realized risk. Finally, diversification seems to have a positive impact on banks’ capitalization. 相似文献
13.
本文从管理者能力的视角出发,选取2010-2018年沪、深A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了管理者能力对债务契约的影响及其影响路径。研究证明:管理者能力越强,企业的债务期限结构越短、债务融资成本越低。进一步研究发现,在不同的法制环境中,二者的关系存在异质性,即管理者能力对债务期限结构、债务融资成本的影响在法制环境较高的地区较为显著。本文丰富了企业债务契约的影响因素,探寻了管理者能力影响债务期限结构、债务融资成本的路径。 相似文献
14.
资本结构理论所研究的基本问题是企业资本结构与企业价值的关系。西方经济学界围绕这一基本问题展开了全面深入的研究,形成了许多不同的资本结构理论。20世纪70年代以来,随着信息经济学、委托代理理论等现代分析工具引入资本结构分析,资本结构理论研究获得了新的发展,一系列解释资本结构问题的新观点便应运而生,其流派众多,具有代表性的理论有以下几种:代理成本理论、信号传递理论和优序融资理论等。 相似文献
15.
David Johnstone 《Abacus》2020,56(2):268-287
The firm's operating leverage is its ratio of fixed to variable costs. It is widely understood that production settings with higher fixed costs and lower variable costs are high risk. Well-rehearsed CAPM arguments show how the firm's beta and cost of capital is higher when its proportion of fixed costs is higher. Importantly, that generalization holds under CAPM if expected total costs are constant and merely re-apportioned between fixed and variable, but does not hold if expected total costs change. In actual business contexts, higher fixed costs are intended to bring lower unit variable costs and often lower expected total costs. Allowing for such efficiency gains, the firm's risk-adjusted cost of capital might typically fall despite the higher operating leverage. Formal proof follows directly from the payoffs or ‘certainty equivalent’ expression of CAPM. The CAPM insights and new CAPM equations brought to light in this proof are surprising and useful. 相似文献
16.
Public agencies in the UK and elsewhere are increasingly required to set outcome targets as a strategy for improving their services. A crucial element of this ‘results orientation’ is a clear definition of the desired outcomes and a specification of appropriate performance indicators. A recent example of this policy in the UK—Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs)—is examined in this article. The authors’ analysis of the first generation of LPSAs shows that just under half of the indicators used were measures of outcome. The authors explain the ‘wicked’ issues in outcome measurement that emerged from the research. 相似文献
17.
Dina El Mahdy 《Accounting & Finance》2020,60(4):3493-3526
I investigate the impact of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on managerial ability and predict that clawback provisions will motivate managers to exert more efforts following the adoption of clawback and these efforts will be in the form of an increased managerial efficiency. Using a propensity score matched sample of firms, I find a significant positive association between voluntary clawback adoption and the change in both rank and score of managerial ability. My study highlights the unintended consequences of clawback provisions on CEO's behavior and contributes to the on-going debate on the importance of proactively and carefully drafting clawback policies, further signifying the importance of the SEC's efforts (Rule 10D-1) to enforce clawback policies. 相似文献
18.
This instructional case is designed to achieve four educational objectives: (1) to give students a more complete appreciation of the importance of considering accounting information along with marketing and economics-related information, avoiding a myopic focus on accounting data, (2) to give students practice in pricing, cost volume profit analysis (CVP) and outsourcing decisions, (3) to help students learn to build spreadsheets that are capable of what-if analysis, and (4) to provide an active learning experience that engages introductory accounting students. The Bakery is a non-profit organization whose primary function is to sell baked goods and beverages to students in a large campus residence hall complex. In completing the case, students utilize information provided about the costs and previous pricing structure of The Bakery, along with information they collect about competitors' product offerings, prices, and accompanying services, and their own knowledge of The Bakery's customers, college students and their parents, as a basis for making pricing decisions. Once they have completed the pricing analysis, students use the resulting variable costing income statement to perform CVP and to analyze a decision to potentially outsource The Bakery's operations. 相似文献
19.
论企业预算管理的作用及其强化 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
韩Yuan 《中央财经大学学报》2001,(8):44-47
预算管理是企业内部控制的手段之一,是经营者履行受托责任的保证,也是建立企业内部激励机制的前提。由于我国预算管理起步较晚,在企业实际应用中还存在着许多问题,为了更好地发挥预算管理的作用,企业应树立以人为本、系统管理等全新的预算管理理念,根据组织结构的不同,合理划分责任中心,建立科学的预算控制体系和完善的预算管理评价体系。 相似文献
20.
Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family‐concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership. 相似文献