A note on work-related values, budget emphasis and managers’ organisational commitment

Managers’ work-related values (WRVs) have important implications for designing appropriate management accounting systems (MAS) in organisations. This paper examines the effect of the interaction between managers’ WRV for innovation and budget emphasis (an integral part of MAS) on their organisational commitment. The sample consisted of 109 managers from production, marketing and support departments within Australian manufacturing firms. Hypotheses were tested using both quantitative and qualitative data collected by a questionnaire survey and post-survey interviews. The results indicate that the adoption of low budget emphasis led to high organisational commitment when managers’ WRV for innovation was high, but not when managers’ WRV for innovation was low. The results also indicate that marketing managers held higher WRV for innovation than production managers. The post-survey interviews provide further insight into how a more customer- and competitor-focused subculture of marketing managers and a more technical- and efficiency-focused subculture of production managers may promote the difference in their WRV for innovation, and affect their attitudes towards budget emphasis. The findings of the study have implications for design of performance evaluation systems for managers in functionally differentiated organisations.     

Associations between strategic resource importance and performance measure use: The impact on firm performance

This study investigates the relation between managers’ perception of the importance of several types of performance measures and managers’ assessment about the importance of the firm's strategic resources that sustains its competitive advantage. Furthermore, it investigates whether there is a significant association between the importance of performance measures and firm performance, and thus, whether performance measures are mediating variables in the relation between the importance of strategic resources and performance. Using survey data from 107 companies, the results indicate that managers place importance on multiple measures and show some evidence that the importance of performance measures mediates the association between the importance of strategic resources and performance. Implications and insights are discussed, along with ideas for future research.     

TESTING THE CONTINGENCY «FIT» BETWEEN MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE: A RESEARCH NOTE ON THE MODERATING ROLE OF TOLERANCE FOR AMBIGUITY

This study examines the moderating effect of tolerance for ambiguity, a personality variable, on the relation between management accounting systems (MAS) design and managerial performance. MAS design was defined in terms of the extent to which managers» use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decision making. The responses of 63 managers, drawn from a cross-section of Australian manufacturing companies, to a questionnaire survey were analysed by using a multiple regression technique. The results indicate that the use of broad scope MAS information interact with tolerance for ambiguity to affect managerial performance. The results indicate that an appropriate «fit» between manager's personality variable of tolerance for ambiguity and the extent of use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions will lead to improved managerial performance.     

The effect of framing and negotiation partner’s objective on judgments about negotiated transfer prices

A common approach to set transfer prices is via intra-firm negotiation. However, Luft and Libby [Luft, J. L., & Libby, R. (1997). Profit comparisons, market prices and managers’ judgments about negotiated transfer prices. The Accounting Review, 72(2), 217–229] found that because of the existence of self-serving biases, negotiating managers have different expectations regarding what constitutes a ‘fair’ transfer price, leading to a less efficient negotiation process. In this study, we examine two factors that are expected to affect managers’ transfer price negotiation judgments, namely, framing as a gain or as a loss and the negotiation partner’s objective (whether the partner’s objective involves high or low concern-for-others). We propose that these two factors affect managers’ perceptions of the negotiation context, and thus the way they interpret the economic and social consequences of accounting information. Our results show that a loss frame (compared to a gain frame) exacerbates managers’ self-serving biases and increases the ‘transfer price expectation gap’ between buyers and sellers. Further, in our experiment where market price is higher than equal-profit price, we find that managers’ transfer price expectations are lower (and deviate more from the prevailing market price) when they are negotiating with a partner with high concern-for-others than with a partner with low concern-for-others. We discuss the broader implications of these results for the design of management accounting systems.     

An investigation of how the informal communication of firm preferences influences managerial honesty

This study investigates the effectiveness of informal firm communication at motivating managerial honesty. Specifically, it focuses on the effectiveness of informal cost targets, which communicate firms’ specific cost preferences to managers without tying managers’ compensation to reporting costs that meet those targets. I develop predictions about how the tightness of an informal cost target influences the effect that a cost target has on managers’ reporting honesty. Using an experimental setting, I examine three levels of target tightness—loose, moderate, and tight—within a uniformly distributed cost range and where participants’ financial incentives are to ignore the cost target and fully misreport their cost information. I find that both moderate and loose cost targets, on average, increase honesty relative to when the firm does not communicate a specific target or it communicates a tight target. Tight targets have no significant effect, positive or negative, on honesty. Whereas prior research focuses only on the potential benefits of firms communicating their general preferences, my study provides important insights regarding the potential incremental effectiveness of communicating specific preferences.     

Do changes in audit actions and attitudes consistent with increased auditor scepticism deter aggressive earnings management? An experimental investigation

Audits are claimed to not only enhance the detection of fraud but also the deterrence of fraud. This study examines whether different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management deter aggressive earnings management that may be fraudulent, and whether such different procedures and attitudes conveyed influence managers’ perceptions about the ethicality of any anticipated earnings management. In an experiment with 171 senior corporate managers, we find that compared to the condition where the audit proceeds the same as last year, managers anticipate that there would be less earnings management when the nature of evidence collected has increased probative value; and when the auditor conveys a more sceptical attitude via more critical inquiry combined with either an increase in the evidence extent (increased sample size) or the nature of the evidence. However, this reduction in anticipated earnings management is not found with either the increased extent of evidence collected alone or more critical inquiry alone, suggesting that a combination of action and attitude changes compared to a change in either action alone or attitude alone better signals to managers the heightened scepticism that enhances the effectiveness of auditor deterrence. We also find, after controlling for the underlying ethical disposition of managers, that the different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management affect managers’ perceptions of the ethicality of anticipated earnings management. Interestingly, the conditions that engender greater earnings management also paradoxically increase managers’ perceived unethicality of the anticipated earnings management. Together these findings have implications for how different changes in audit approaches may result in differential managerial responses about their intention to commit fraud and its appropriateness. This study is one of the first papers to provide experimental empirical evidence that specific audit actions conveying heightened scepticism have significant influence on managerial judgments and behaviours with respect to committing aggressive earnings management.     

The relation between cost-system design, managers’ evaluations of the relevance and usefulness of cost data, and financial performance: an empirical study of US hospitals

This study examines the association between cost-system functionality, managers’ beliefs about the relevance and usefulness of cost data, and actual financial performance using a sample of 277 US hospitals. Results indicate that managers’ evaluations of the relevance and usefulness of cost data are positively correlated with the extent to which systems can provide greater cost detail, better classify costs according to behavior, and report cost information more frequently. However, only the ability to supply cost detail is favorably associated with measures of financial performance, including operating margin, cash flow, and administrative expense. Interestingly, cost-system design was not associated with operating expense per admission, suggesting that accounting information had not yet been successfully used to manage clinical costs.     

Synthesizing enterprise data through digital dashboards to strategically align performance: Why do operational managers use dashboards?

Based on a cross-sectional field study, Reinking et al. (2019) propose a complex theoretical model for understanding the characteristics of dashboards that promote use and lead to individual and organizational performance gains. This study tests the theoretical model using survey data collected from 323 middle and upper level managers with experience using corporate dashboards. The data were analyzed using components based structural equation modeling, and the results provide strong support for the external validity of the Reinking et al. (2019) theoretical model. The results show that two primary constructs, strategy alignment and interactive management control, are important factors impacting the extent of dashboard use, perceived managerial performance, and perceived organizational performance. Prior research has expressed concerns over the tendency of managers to lose sight of strategic objectives (i.e., strategy surrogation) and focus solely on performance measures. However, our results indicate that operational managers perceive that dashboards focused on specifically tailored KPIs lead to both improved managerial and organizational performance. This study contributes to management control and strategy research in two important ways. While prior research has examined strategy in the executive level context through evaluations, changes, or initiative implementations, this study investigates strategy alignment at the operational levels of the organization. Second, the results suggest that intentional strategy surrogation may have beneficial effects at the lower operational levels in an organization.     

Application of the controllability principle and managerial performance: The role of role perceptions

The controllability principle stipulates that the evaluation of a manager should be based only on elements that are under the manager's control. Arguments for and against its application are theoretically well understood, but empirical evidence based on the evaluation of the perceptions of managers and their implications for managerial performance is scarce. By empirically analyzing the effects on managerial performance, this paper explores managers’ responses to the application of the controllability principle. We draw on role theory and analyze how role ambiguity and role conflict mediate this basic relationship. Moreover, we test whether application of the controllability principle equally affects role perceptions of top-level managers and those of lower and middle-level managers. Empirical analysis of survey responses from 440 managers reveals that role perceptions completely mediate the effect of application of the controllability principle on managerial performance. This effect is insignificant in the group of top-level managers, who appear to cope with uncontrollable factors more effectively.     

Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism

This paper examines the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on earnings conservatism. Using directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, we find that the higher the managerial liability coverage, which reduces the expected legal liability of managers, the less conservative the firm's earnings. We also find that managerial legal liability coverage has a stronger influence on earnings conservatism in a legal regime with higher litigation risk. Our results are consistent with the threat of litigation conditioning managers to practice conservative accounting.     

The growing role of informal controls: does organization learning empower or subjugate workers?

Several management theorists have called for organizations to incorporate organization learning, empowerment, open-book management, and similar initiatives to generate better value from an important strategic resource: employees. What does this mean for the controlled? Do extensions of the management control system’s ability to implement the strategy of the firm offer workers a more central role in creating their future? Or is this “progress" just another means to extract extra effort from workers for the benefit of owners? This paper is developed in two parts. The first argues that seeking better value from workers is here to stay, and that the implications for management control system bear consideration. In particular, the five disciplines of Senge’s (1990) Organization Learning are introduced to illustrate growing ways informal controls enhance workers’ knowledge contributions. The second half of the paper examines implications of this increasing control. Some argue that it is naive to expect organization learning will lead managers to willingly realign existing lopsided rewards. However, as a natural response to change, these controls are themselves dynamic and evolutionary. This paper suggests that the growing dependence on employee’s superior knowledge recalibrates power arrangements. Further there is a growing awareness that many managers’ self-interest is mitigated by their sense of fairness. Consequently, an increasingly shared authority combined with the self-reflection and transparency of organization learning raises the possibility of an environment where those who perform the work share more equally in its rewards.     

The marketability of bank assets, managerial rents and banking stability

Financial innovation and greater information availability have increased the tradability of bank assets and have reduced banks’ dependence on individual bank managers. We show that this can have two opposing consequences for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks’ capital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits – the most effective disciplining device – can be reduced, increasing banks’ resilience to adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers’ rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse implications for asset quality. Thus, the default risk of banks does not necessarily decline. We argue that this delivers a novel explanation for the origin of the recent subprime crisis.     

Shared interest and honesty in budget reporting

This study uses two experiments to investigate the honesty of managers’ budget reports when the financial benefit resulting from budgetary slack is shared by the manager and other non-reporting employees. Drawing on moral disengagement theory, we predict that the shared interest in slack creation makes misreporting more self-justifiable to the manager and, therefore, leads to lower honesty. Consistent with our prediction, the results of our first experiment show that managers report less honestly when the benefit of slack is shared than when it is not shared, regardless of whether others are aware of the misreporting. Our second experiment investigates whether the preferences of the beneficiaries of the slack affect managers’ honesty. We predict that managers’ honesty will be improved when the beneficiaries of the slack have a known, higher-order preference for truthful reporting. Consistent with our prediction, the results show that managers report more honestly when other employees have a known preference for honesty than otherwise. The implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed.     

The influence of self-interest and ethical considerations on managers’ evaluation judgments

Recent empirical studies support self-interest as the sole basis for economic decisions (as predicted by agency theory). However, cognitive moral development (CMD) theory suggests that decision makers will allow ethical/moral considerations to constrain their economic behaviour. The purpose of this study is to resolve the essential conflict between the tenets of agency theory and CMD theory. The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that both moral reasoning level and adverse-selection conditions (self-interest) can have a significant effect on managers’ project evaluation decisions. Specifically, managers are likely to continue a project that is expected to be unprofitable only when adverse selection conditions are present and moral reasoning level is low. Thus, agency theory may not be generalizable to accounting-based economic performance.     

Strategic organizational conditions for risks reduction and earnings management: A combined strategy and auditing paradigm

Business world is complex and fast changing. This paper brings strategy paradigms to the auditing domain in an attempt to advance existing understanding on the audit risk reduction and firms’ economic performance. Grounded in existing literatures, we establish some crucial convergence points between the external auditors’ audit processes and the firms’ strategic management agendas. A theoretical framework that embeds some proposed strategic organizational conditions, which align organizational internal and external effects for performance, and the theories of the firm is then presented. The literature review suggests that the integration of the audit processes and the organizational conditions is inherently beneficial to both auditors and firms. The routine from such integration can be a tacit knowledge asset or capability hard to be emulated. It shall reduce audit risks and sustain earnings performance. Hence, the practices and leveragabilities of such routine merit further managerial and research attention. We highlight at the end how our works can be tested in future research.     

The effect of comprehensive performance measurement systems on role clarity,psychological empowerment and managerial performance

This study examines how comprehensive performance measurement systems (PMS) affect managerial performance. It is proposed that the effect of comprehensive PMS on managerial performance is indirect through the mediating variables of role clarity and psychological empowerment. Data collected from a survey of 83 strategic business unit managers are used to test the model. Results from a structural model tested using Partial Least Squares regression indicate that comprehensive PMS is indirectly related to managerial performance through the intervening variables of role clarity and psychological empowerment. This result highlights the role of cognitive and motivational mechanisms in explaining the effect of management accounting systems on managerial performance. In particular, the results indicate that comprehensive PMS influences managers’ cognition and motivation, which, in turn, influence managerial performance.     

Managing budget emphasis through the explicit design of conditional budgetary slack

Budgetary slack plays an important role in the functioning of budgets in organizations. While theory has found negative as well as positive elements associated with its presence, the empirical literature has interpreted it as being dysfunctional to organizations. In this paper, we present empirical evidence on how a company purposefully budgeted additional financial resources with a motivation intention (Lukka. Budgetary biasing in organizations: Theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1998) 281–302) to facilitate the managers’ task in achieving the goals of the company. Using quantitative and qualitative data from four logistic sites of a disk drive manufacturer for 24 months, we examine how the company accepted more slack as the demand on business processes increased and goals other than budget targets––in particular, service quality––became harder to achieve. By allowing this practice, headquarters made it clear to local managers that product quality and service were at least as important as meeting budget objectives. We also find that not only was budgetary slack purposefully built during the budgeting process but also in the budgeting system itself through the underlying cost accounting assumptions. The results of this paper provide empirical evidence on the positive aspects of budgetary slack and on the role of cost accounting models used in the budgeting system to facilitate managerial work.     

Succeeding in managerial accounting. Part 2: a structural equations analysis

Does the type of knowledge, and levels of ability and experience needed, depend on rank in managerial accounting? Are the knowledge, ability, and experience needed for managerial accounting success, consistent with the Libby & Luft (L&L) model (1993) of the determinants of judgment performance in accounting? We explore these questions using structural equation models of the performance evaluations of 2941 practicing managerial accountants. Results indicate that technical managerial accounting knowledge, ability, and experience predict job performance success for junior managerial accountants; industry knowledge, tacit managerial knowledge (TMK) and experience predict success for seniors; and, industry and TMK predict success for managers. The results suggest significant (though not identical) commonality in the predictors of success in managerial accounting and the determinants of judgment performance identified in the L& L model.     

Goliath Corporation: An instructional case in transfer pricing policy

This case illustrates some of the issues associated with setting firms’ transfer pricing policies. The simulation requires students to assume the roles of top management and divisional management for Goliath Corporation in negotiating transfer prices. The student playing the role of top management first selects a transfer pricing policy from four possible mechanisms: market-based, cost-based, negotiated, and dual-pricing. Given the top manager’s policy choice, divisional managers are then constrained to use that policy as they decide whether to purchase internally or externally based on their respective negotiations. In each negotiation, there is an ex ante best decision for Goliath as a whole. The case is thus useful in demonstrating how managers’ transfer price policy choices can lead to bad sourcing decisions.     

Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.