THE DESIGN AND DIFFUSION OF IMPROVED COOKING STOVES

The poorer half of the world's people have long relied for theirenergy needs on woodfuels. Since the oil shocks of the 1970s,pressure on forest resources has increased and the costs oftraditional use of woodfuels have been growing—to thehouseholder, in cash or collection time, and to society in inefficientenergy use, deforestation, and local and global harm to healthand the environment. Modern, efficient stoves can alleviatesome of these problems; programs to design and disseminate themwould seem a worthwhile pursuit for development activity. But do such programs in fact warrant the investment? Why haveso many failed to catch on as expected? The authors find thatprograms have been most successful when targeted to specificareas where woodfuel prices or collection times are high. Fieldtesting, consumer surveys, and involvement of local artisansfrom the outset have been critical to the ultimate adoptionof the stoves. With these elements in place, external supportfrom governments and donors can be useful; lacking them, subsidiesmay succeed only in distributing stoves that ultimately molderaway unused. This article's review of what makes for successand failure is instructive for the design of stove programsin particular, and of development projects that propagate improvedmethods and technologies in general.      

INFLATION AND THE COSTS OF STABILIZATION: Historical and Recent Experiences and Policy Lessons

This article reviews various experiences with stabilization.It first examines stabilization programs in the context of hyperinflation—lookingat the experiences of Austria and Germany in the early 1920sand Bolivia in 1985—and then reviews and interprets theresults of orthodox stabilization plans (applied in Argentina,Chile, and Uruguay during the mid-1970s and early 1980s) andthose of heterodox programs (the austral plan in Argentina andthe cruzado plan in Brazil, with a glance at the Mexican andIsraeli experiences). The paper concludes with a discussionof conceptual issues and implications for the design of stabilizationpolicies.      

REFORM OF TRADE POLICY: Recent Evidence from Theory and Practice

In the 1980s many developing countries began to recognize thatrestrictive trade policies can constrain growth. To facilitatetrade and integration into the world economy, many countrieshave embarked on reform programs. This survey synthesizes theconclusions of the literature on trade policy reform with thoseof a recent study by the World Bank analyzing reforms in developingcountries, particularly those supported by adjustment lendingprograms. Its objective is to shed light on some of the questionsabout these programs to guide policymakers in the future. Thearticle reviews conditions in these countries before trade policyreforms were implemented and examines how much reform actuallytook place. It also examines the effects of the reforms on economicperformance and reviews the factors that constrained the reformprocess. The survey considers the most important issues in designingand implementing trade policy reforms and concludes that althoughpast reforms have had a positive impact, future programs shouldemphasize three elements: reducing the level of protection,maintaining macroeconomic stability, and accounting for theconflicts and complementarities with other policies.      

The Potential and Limitations of Self-Targeted Food Subsidies

Can self-selection ofsubsidized commodities be used as a mechanismto transfer income to the poor? Evidence from two self-targetingprograms, one in South Africa and one in Tunisia, shows thatalthough self-targeting can clearly improve the distributionof food subsidies to the poorest members of society, its powerto alleviate poverty and reduce income disparities is limitedby preference patterns, income inequality, and the size of theindividual subsidies. Self-targeting through quality and productdifferentiation can be a useful means to reform existing universalsubsidy schemes, but it should be considered a transitionaltool while the capacity for implementing more precise mechanisms is developed.      

The Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges

This article examines the evolution of policy recommendationsconcerning rural land issues since the formulation of the WorldBank's "Land Reform Policy Paper" in 1975. That paper set outthree guiding principles: the desirability of owner-operatedfamily farms; the need for markets to permit land to be transferredto more productive users; and the importance of an egalitarianasset distribution. In the 25 years since that paper was published,these guiding principles have remained the same, but it is nowrecognized that communal tenure systems can be more cost-effectivethan formal title, that titling programs should be judged ontheir equity as well as their efficiency, that the potentialof land rental markets has often been severely underestimated,that land-sale markets enhance efficiency only if they are integratedinto a broader effort at developing rural factor markets, andthat land reform is more likely to result in a reduction ofpoverty if it harnesses (rather than undermines) the operationof land markets and is implemented in a decentralized fashion.Achieving land policies that incorporate these elements requiresa coherent legal and institutional framework together with greaterreliance on pilot programs to examine the applicability of interventionsunder local conditions.      

Evaluating Retraining Programs in OECD Countries: Lessons Learned

Are retraining programs for the unemployed more effective thanjob search assistance? Governments of the member countries ofthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development haveconsiderable experience with retraining programs in a varietyof industrial settings. Evaluations of these programs show thatthe results are disappointing, however. This article discussesthe factors associated with retraining programs for two typesof workers: those laid off en masse and the long-term unemployed.Evaluations indicate poor results for both groups: retrainingprograms are generally no more effective than job search assistancein increasing either reemployment probabilities or postinterventionearnings, and they are between two and four times more expensivethan job search assistance.      

WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

From Government to Regulatory Governance: Privatization and the Residual Role of the State

This article reviews the state of thinking on the governancerole of public ownership and control. Optimal governance systemsdepend on the path of institutional development. Nevertheless,the transfer of operational control over productive assets tothe private sector often yields a desirable governance system,because it may be more difficult for citizens to constrain politicalabuse than for governments to regulate private activity. Inweak institutional environments, however, the process needsto be structured to avoid capture of the regulatory process.The speed of transfer should be matched to progress in developinga strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residualrights of intervention must be vested. After all, "institutions"are simply governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomyfrom both political and private interests. The gradual creationof institutions partially shielded from political power mustbecome central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatorygovernance. The article presents suggestions for establishingaccountability in regulatory governance, in particular by creatingan internal control system based on a rotating board with representativesof users, producers, and civil society, in a process involvingfrequent reporting and disclosure. JEL codes: G38, L33, L51     

Tight Money in a Post-Crisis Defense of the Exchange Rate: What Have We Learned?

Critics of the tight monetary policies pursued by some of thecountries hurt by the 1997 Asian financial crisis have questionedthe presumption that tight money can help sustain the valueof a currency. The issue is actually an empirical one becausetheory does not unambiguously predict the effect of tight moneyon the exchange rate under the circumstances faced by the crisiscountries. This article reviews the empirical research and showsthat the evidence does not yet support strong statements aboutpost-crisis links between monetary policy and the exchange rate.Proposed deviations from a sustainable medium-term monetarypolicy stance should thus be viewed with skepticism.      

Appraising Workfare

Workfare programs aim to reduce poverty by providing low-wagework to those who need it. They are often turned to in a crisis.This article offers some simple analytical tools that can beused to rapidly appraise the cost-effectiveness of an existingworkfare operation as a basis for deciding whether the programshould be expanded. For pedagogic purposes, two stylized versionsof a range of programs found in practice are analyzed: one fora middle-income country, the other for a low-income country.The cost of a given gain to the poor is about the same for bothprograms, although the components of that cost are very different,with implications for the timing of benefits. The author pointsto program design changes that could enhance the impact on poverty.      

THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: Finding a Cooperative Solution

When will villagers come together to supply themselves withgoods and services that they all need but could not providefor themselves individually? Can locally based collective actionbe a viable way to manage common property resources? Many writerson collective action and common property are pressimistic aboutthe ability of people who face problems with common propertyresources to organize sustainable patterns of use for themselves.Some writers favour privatization of the commons as the onlyviable solution; others, the imposition of state regulation.This article shows, with reference to Mancur Olson's "logicof collective action, " that the analytical basis for this pessimismis weak for the village-based use of common property resources.There can thus be no general presumption that collective actionwill fail in the management of common property resources, anymore than there can be a general presumption that it will work.The article suggests that the chances of success through collectiveaction depend on the characteristics of the resources, the usergroup, and group-state relations.      

A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF NUTRITIONAL PROGRAMS FOR ANEMIA REDUCTION

Using benefit-cost analysis, this article evaluates potentialprograms for reducing iron deficiency anemia, one of the mostprevalent nutritional disorders. It discusses the origins andprevalence of anemia and reviews the literature on consequencesof anemia for work capacity, output, learning, and other variables.Costs and benefits are estimated for two types of programs—medicinalsupplementation and fortification of food with iron—andfor three cases—Indonesia, Kenya, and Mexico. Estimatesof benefits are calculated to include the value of additionalwork output in labor-surplus societies. Under a wide range of assumptions, the benefit-cost ratios arefound to be substantially greater than 1: for dietary fortificationratios ranged between 7 and 70 for the three illustrative countries;for dietary supplementation, the range was from 4 to 38 on themost reasonable set of assumptions. The study concludes thatfield trials should be carried out to see if the findings ofthis study are supported in particular cases.      

THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Aside from revenue mobilization, one of the arguments for allowingthe private sector to assume a larger role in the provisionof education is that it would increase efficiency, as administratorsbecome more responsive to the needs of students and their parents.But what is the evidence? Based on case studies that compareprivate and public secondary education in Colombia, the DominicanRepublic, the Philippines, Tanzania, and Thailand, private schoolstudents generally outperform public school students on standardizedmath and language tests. This finding holds even after holdingconstant for the fact that, on average, private school studentsin these countries come from more advantaged backgrounds thantheir public. school counterparts. In addition, preliminaryevidence shows that the unit costs of private schools are lowerthan those of public schools. Although these results cannot,in themselves, be used as arguments for massive privatization,they indicate that governments should reconsider policies thatrestrain private sector participation in education. Furtherresearch is needed to determine whether some teaching and administrativepractices in private schools are applicable to public schools.      

Vouchers for Basic Education in Developing Economies: An Accountability Perspective

Advocates argue that voucher programs can correct the incentiveproblems of education systems in developing economies. An accountabilityperspective, based on a principal-agent framework, was developedto clarify the arguments for and against education vouchers.An assessment of findings on voucher programs in industrialcountries and a review of voucher or quasi-voucher experiencesin Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, and theCzech Republic support the usefulness of the analytic framework.The assessment concludes that the policy relevance of voucherprograms for developing economies remains uncertain. Major voucherinitiatives have been attempted only in countries with a well-developedinstitutional infrastructure. Some studies find favorable benefitsfor at least some population groups, but others find limitedeffects and evidence of increasing social stratification inschools. Whether vouchers lead to better outcomes or greaterstratification appears related to specific contexts, institutionalvariables, and program designs.      

Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transferprograms to increase investment in human capital has generatedconsiderable excitement in both research and policy forums.This article surveys the existing literature, which suggeststhat most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentiallyone of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalitiesexist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households.The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in someinstances there is tension between the efficiency and equityobjectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gainsand losses associated with each objective.      

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goodsand reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies,politicians often have incentives to divert resources to politicalrents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at theexpense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfectionsin political markets that are greater in some countries thanin others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on theimpact on political incentives of incomplete information forvoters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and socialpolarization. The analysis has implications for policy and forreforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.      

CREDIT POLICIES: LESSONS FROM JAPAN AND KOREA

The success of policy-based credit programs in Japan and theRepublic of Korea suggests that credit policy can be an effectiveinstrument for economic development. Why, then, have creditpolicies failed in so many countries, and what factors explaintheir relative success in Japan and Korea? Both economic and institutional factors appear to be importantin the success or failure of credit policies. Essential economicfactors include a reliance on the private sector, a bias towardindustrialization, an orientation toward export production,the encouragement of domestic competition, and a commitmentto price stability. Crucial institutional factors include extensiveand frequent consultation between government and the privatesector, effective monitoring systems, and, most important, aclear and credible plan for economic development. Although severalcountries have included one or more of these factors in theirprograms, the experience of Japan and Korea suggests that acomprehensive network combining all or most of these factorsmay be necessary for the successful implementation of creditpolicies.      

Cofinanced Public Extension in Nicaragua

How effective is agricultural extension? Is it worth the vastsums governments spend to provide it, mostly as a free service,to farmers worldwide? Relatively few studies exist that measureand compare the benefits of extension activities against theircosts. In the absence of such data, this pilot activity concentratedinstead on demand. Would demand for extension services be highif they were no longer free? The existence of solid demand wouldpresuppose some benefits from the service. Further, might chargingfor the service actually improve its quality and sustainability? The pilot program in Nicaragua described here set out to testwhether a truly demand—driven extension system aimed atfarmers with small-and medium-size holdings could be developed.The principal mechanism was a contribution by the farmer paidas a bonus to the extensionist: the aim was to introduce incentivesfor providers to improve the service through rewards linkedto the quality of their work and to establish direct accountabilityof extensionist to client. The outcomes showed that the cofinancingconcept can be successful. The article describes the design,implementation, and results in the expectation that the lessonslearned may be of interest elsewhere.      

THE DEBT CRISIS: WHERE DO WE STAND AFTER SEVEN YEARS?

The past seven years have seen little improvement in the worlddebt situation. During this period, policymakers have shiftedtheir attention from demand reduction by debtor nations to supplyexpansion. Most recently, debt reduction has become the principalissue. This article reviews various ways of resolving the debt problem.There is widespread agreement among competing proposals thatan efficient solution requires both debt reduction and economicgrowth in debtor countries. Disagreement arises over whetherthe necessary debt reduction and consequent adjustment in policiesin developing countries can be generated by market forces alone.The alternative is usually thought to be intervention by governmentsand commitment of public funds. This article groups and analyzesproposed solutions according to their relation to these twopositions. The survey concludes that there is no clear-cut solution tothe problem. Methods vary widely in their implications for efficiencyand equity as well as in their capacity to improve the situationand to do so quickly. Inevitably, official policy will continueto be determined less by economic ideals than by exigencies.The more urgent the problem becomes, the more likely the balanceis to swing from reliance on the market to direct intervention.      

Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey

What are the underlying rationales for industrial policy? Doesempirical evidence support the use of industrial policy forcorrecting market failures that plague the process of industrialization?This article addresses these questions through a critical surveyof the analytical literature on industrial policy. It also reviewssome recent industry successes and argues that public interventionshave played only a limited role. Moreover, the recent ascendanceand dominance of international production networks in the sectorsin which developing countries once had considerable successimplies a further limitation on the potential role of industrialpolicies as traditionally understood. Overall, there appearsto be little empirical support for an activist government policyeven though market failures exist that can, in principle, justifythe use of industrial policy.