Does privatization reform alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from the Split-share structure reform in China

This paper investigates the institutional origins of ownership discrimination in bank lending through a staggered quasi-natural experiment: China's Split-share Structure Reform. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have an advantage over non-SOEs in securing external financing to protect investment opportunities from cash flow fluctuations. This financing privilege declined significantly after the reform, which mandatorily converted SOEs' non-tradable state-owned shares into tradable shares, sharply increasing the likelihood of further privatization. Consistent evidence also exists in terms of bank lending behaviors. Further, we show both direct and indirect evidence that the effects were more pronounced among SOEs under higher threats of privatization (e.g., firms with larger increases in tradable shares, smaller workforce, and in industries peripheral to national strategy). The evidence suggests that banks proactively prefer SOEs for the perceived safety of loans under implicit government guarantee; when this privilege disappeared after the reform, banks reacted by allocating credits more fairly. This paper provides new evidence on the bright side of share structure reforms in mitigating credit misallocation and enlightens policy makers to practical resolutions to the financing inefficiency in emerging capital markets.     

Ownership change,institutional development and performance

This paper conducts a cross-country empirical study of the impact of institutions and agency conflicts on ownership reforms and their implications for changes in performance and efficiency. We examine two main questions. First, we evaluate the effects of certain property rights and institutional quality measures on performance and efficiency. We find that property rights and contracting rights protections contribute to stronger post-privatization performance. Second, we ask whether sectors undergoing changes from state to private ownership exhibit better or worse performance than sectors remaining public. We find an insignificant effect of privatization in ordinary least squares estimates and a negative short-term effect after correcting for endogeneity of privatization decisions that disappears in the long run, consistent with recently privatized enterprises facing short-run costs of restructuring and the challenges of mitigating agency and expropriation concerns.     

房地产上市公司融资模式对投资行为的影响

借鉴 Aivazianetal 简化投资模型建立了融资模式对投资行为影响的理论模型,基于1998~2012年的面板数据,实证研究不同产权属性和不同规模房地产上市公司融资模式对投资行为的影响。研究发现：房地产上市公司的债务融资会促使投资增长,而股权融资会减少投资,内源性融资与投资行为的相关性并不显著;国有房地产上市公司的投资行为更加积极;大规模房地产上市公司受外部融资约束更强。为此,应完善房地产上市公司治理结构、拓宽融资渠道。     

Investment Horizons and Information

We examine the relation between institutions' investment horizons on firms' financing and investment decisions. Firms with larger short‐term institutional ownership use less debt financing and invest more in corporate liquidity. In contrast, firms with larger long‐term institutional ownership use more internal funds, less external equity financing, and preserve investments in long‐term assets. These results are primarily driven by the variation in informational preferences of different institutions. We argue that short‐term (long‐term) institutions collect and use value‐neutral (value‐enhancing) information.     

Does easing access to foreign financing matter for firm performance?

The literature shows that rigid capital control policies adversely influence international trade, leading to external financial reforms in terms of greater cross-border access to financing, which, in turn, can stimulate aggregate productivity. However, the literature overlooks the relationships among access to external financing, firm-level productivity, and exporting performance. We fill this research gap by using a rich dataset of 11,612 Indian firms over the period 1988–2014 and study how a unique financial policy intervention affects firm performance. We establish a significant effect of capital-account liberalization through an export-oriented policy initiative on firms' productivity and, consequently, on their exporting activity. Finally, we find that the benefits of the policy reform are more pronounced for financially vulnerable firms characterized by either high debt or low liquidity.     

Pyramidal ownership and the creation of new firms

We study the role of pyramidal ownership structures in the creation of new firms. Our results suggest that pyramids arise because they provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash flows to outside financiers is limited. Parent companies supply inside funds to new firms that, due to large investment requirements and low pledgeable cash flows, cannot raise enough external financing. The financing advantage of pyramidal structures is pervasive in many countries, exists regardless of whether new firms are set up by business groups or by smaller organizations, and is an important underpinning of entrepreneurial activity.     

Sources of Corporate Financing and Operating Performance: The effects of strategic ownership and financial restatements

Using a sample from European markets this study documents that changes in external financing, both in the form of equity and debt, can predict future operating performance (profitability and cash flows). In terms of future profitability, increases in equity (debt) financing particularly benefit large-size growth firms (large-size value firms). It is notable that a firm environment of low information quality, indicated by the presence of accounting restatements, intensifies the association between external financing and operating performance, due to the heightened scrutiny investors/lenders apply to firms that have recently restated their financials. In addition, strategic ownership in the firm has no significant effect on the financing – operating profitability association but may amplify the positive effects of equity financing on future operating cash flows. Moreover, financial analysts' forecasts of operating profitability and operating cash flows reflect the impact of external financing changes on future operating performance but exhibit a financing-related systematic inefficiency particularly for firms that have recently announced a material restatement of their prior financial results. Finally, controlling for information contained in analyst forecast surprises, the market is efficient overall and incorporates the effects of equity and debt financing changes into stock prices.     

Post-privatization performance and organizational changes: Case studies from Ghana

A significant number of less developed countries (LDCs), including Ghana, have embraced the World Bank/IMF led economic reforms. Ghana has been implementing these reforms since the early 1980. One of the conditions of the reforms is the privatization of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Such privatization activities have however generated debates among academics, practitioners, and policy makers. Research findings so far have been mixed. This paper analyzes the performance of two large privatized companies in Ghana. Both companies have been paraded by the Ghanaian authorities and the international financial community as success stories of privatization. Our objective is to examine how and why these firms have been claimed to be successful. Drawing on the dimensions of the balanced scorecard, we examine the performance of the firms from five main perspectives—financial, customers, internal business process, learning and growth, and the community. The analysis is based on data gathered from diverse sources, namely, semi-structured interviews and discussions with managers of the selected companies and with personnel from key government departments, and analysis of internal and external documents. We conclude that, overall the performance of both organizations improved after privatization under all the performance dimensions examined. These improvements were also accompanied by certain organizational changes, including changes in the accounting and control systems. However we are not claiming that all privatization programs in Ghana have been successful. In fact there are stories in the Ghanaian media of several other privatization failures in the country. Instead what we have demonstrated is the need to explain the performance of privatized firms beyond the myopic macro-level and financial analysis which has been widely adopted by the international financial community and policy makers and we encourage other researchers to adopt such multidimensional approaches.     

Privatization,coordination and agency costs: The case for participation in Eastern Europe

In the paper, the interdependency between privatization and the growth of a new private sector is examined. While the dismantling of the omnipotent economic role of the state is a sine qua non for massive private investment, a vigorous private sector is needed to reduce unemployment and thus make further privatization possible. Since privatization is a lengthy process associated with a medium-term goal, while getting private investment started is important at the very beginning of the transition, this linkage constitutes a serious dilemma for the transformation. Multiple expectational equilibria arise and appropriate beliefs are crucial for the success of the reforms. Voucher schemes are shown to reduce agency costs of private investment and in this way may help to ensure coordination on the optimistic equilibrium.     

Investment and financing constraints in China: Does working capital management make a difference?

We use a panel of over 116,000 Chinese firms of different ownership types over the period 2000–2007 to analyze the linkages between investment in fixed and working capital and financing constraints. We find that those firms characterized by high working capital display high sensitivities of investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS) and low sensitivities of investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FKS). We then construct and analyze firm-level FKS and WKS measures and find that, despite severe external financing constraints, those firms with low FKS and high WKS exhibit the highest fixed investment rates. This suggests that an active management of working capital may help firms to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on fixed investment.     

Does financing influence the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility?

Research shows that asset tangibility substantially impacts firms’ cash levels and investment. Using the deregulation of equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, we investigate the influence of financing on the dependence of cash and investment on asset tangibility. We show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility, and promotes investment and firm growth. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S. benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.     

Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation

This study extends the works of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) by incorporating a regime-dependent earnings-based bonus into managerial compensation. Examining the individual effects of ownership shares and earnings-based bonus compensation, we find that the former provides managers with incentives to issue debt, whereas the latter induces the opposite result, although consistent impacts are found for the two types of compensation on both agency costs and the optimal investment decisions of managers. When managerial compensation comprises both ownership shares and an earnings-based bonus, there are significant differences in the effects of these two types of performance compensation on managers’ optimal investment and financing decisions, agency costs, optimal debt ratios and credit spreads, as a result of the specific interactions between the investment and financing decisions.     

SHORT‐TERM EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON OPERATING PERFORMANCE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In this article I use a sample of 178 Czech firms that were in the first wave of voucher privatization to test changes in efficiency and profitability. Based on a previous study's methodology, nonparametric tests reveal that efficiency and profitability decreased immediately following privatization. This is in contrast to earlier studies that find privatization increases these measures. Changes in firms' operations do not vary significantly by size or ownership but do vary by industry type, with nonmanufacturing firms having more positive (or less negative) changes after privatization. Evidence indicates that in spite of the disappointing findings, positive operating performance changes are taking place, such as a decrease in employment. JEL classification: G32, L33, 052     

Investment and financing activity following calls of convertible bonds

The staged financing hypothesis of Mayers [Mayers, D., 1998. Why firms issue convertible bonds: The matching of financial and real investment options. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 83–102] predicts that investment and financing activity will increase following in the money convertible bond calls. The prediction for out of the money convertible calls is different: no increase is expected. We study the rate of both corporate investment and external financing around forced conversions using benchmarks that are analogous to those recommended by Barber and Lyon [Barber, B., Lyon, J., 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359–400]. We also examine the cross-section of changes in investment and financing activity. Conversion-forcing firms exhibit an increase in both capital expenditures and debt financing around the year of the convertible bond call; however, the same result holds for the sample firms that conducted out-of-the-money convertible calls. Further, there is no relation between changes in investment activity and changes in debt issuance at the firm level. The evidence is inconsistent with the notion that forced conversions serve as a catalyst for staged financing and investment.     

Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria

We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990–2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively better performance.     

Conglomerate investment under various capital market conditions

This paper studies the investment of diversified and focused firms under various capital market conditions. When external capital becomes more costly at the aggregate level, investment declines in focused firms but remains unchanged in diversified firms. This investment advantage enjoyed by diversified firms could attribute to both their easy access to external capital and their ability to substitute internal capital markets for costly external markets. Consistent with the internal capital market argument, our findings show that the investment advantage exists for diversified firms even after we control for their easy access to external markets. We also find that the role of internal markets in financing investment is more important for diversified firms that are more financially constrained in external markets. Finally, we find that the segment-level investment becomes more efficient in conglomerates’ internal capital markets under depressed external capital market conditions. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital allocation functions as a valuable and efficient substitute for diversified firms in a tightened external capital market.     

Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships

This paper examines long-term block ownership by corporations and performance changes in firms with corporate block owners. We also examine potential reasons for corporate ownership including benefits in product market relationships, alleviation of financing constraints, and board monitoring by corporate owners. We find the largest significant increases in targets' stock prices, investment, and operating profitability when ownership is combined with alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relationships between purchasing and target firms, especially in industries with high research and development. Our findings are consistent with the conclusion that block ownership by corporations has significant benefits in product market relationships.     

Organizational Restructuring, Equity Valuation, and Limited Partnerships

This research investigates common equity price reactions to announcements of limited partnerships (LPs) in which parent firms retain general partnership interests. On average, prices react positively to these announcements, which suggests that creating LPs is a marginally effective method of separately financing investment projects. This study provides evidence that the systematic variation in prediction errors across announcements is positively related to the percent ownership retained in the LP by the parent, which suggests that ownership retention signals information about the value of the LP, the costs of controlling the LP, and the amount of external financing needed for the LP.     

Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions

We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.     

Law,Stock Markets,and Innovation

We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long‐run rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.