The labour theory of value,risk and the rate of profit

The paper extends Marx's law of value to include the effects of risk. It shows how risk has its origins in the labour process and is transferred between labour and capital on an unequal basis and between capitals on a zero sum basis. An empirical test is then presented, which shows that the employment of labour increases risk from the point of view of the investing capitalist. The conclusion is that the employment of labour is a curate's egg from capital's point of view. On the one hand it is essential for the production of sustainable surplus value and therefore for competitive advantage and capital accumulation. On the other hand employment of labour renders such accumulation inherently risky and therefore commensurately more costly to the rational capitalist investor.     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 3: Adam Smith,the rise and fall of socialism,and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting

A previous paper (Part 1) rejected the conventional wisdom that America was ‘born capitalist’ and the historians’ consensus that it had become capitalist by the early-19th century; another (Part 2) rejected Chandler's thesis that the ‘modern business enterprise’ brought a ‘new form of capitalism’ to America from the 1840s. The accounting evidence suggests that America began to make the transition to capitalism around 1900 in a period of intense conflict between ‘capital and labour’ generated by ‘big business’ from the 1880s, a process not completed until the 1920s. This paper (Part 3) examines the consequences for America's political ideology and financial accounting theory. America's exceptional transition, it argues, explains the history of its political ideology, and this history explains Irving Fisher's theory of accounting. Section A argues that America lagged behind Britain because it started from a society of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists, which created an exceptional ideological problem for its ruling elite. Big business generated hostility from workers, farmers and small employers – expressed in labour movements, ‘populism’, socialism, and ‘progressivism’ – and created an ideological problem by contradicting the ‘independent producer’ ideology of workers and farmers, and the ‘individual liberalism’ of small manufacturers and merchants, both underwritten by Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The paper argues that Smith's theory of price articulates as semi-capitalist accounting, which explains his popularity in America until the appearance of big business in the 1880s. Socialism and progressivism became political forces in America from 1900 to around 1920. Progressivism produced ‘corporate liberalism’, the ideological counter to socialism that corporations could be made ‘socially responsible’ by government regulation and ‘publicity’ to ensure they earned only ‘fair’ returns, but this left two problems. First, socialists argued that no profit was ‘fair’, and second, fear of the ‘labour danger’ made American financial reports secretive and conservative. Section B argues that Irving Fisher responded to these problems with a theory of accounting, which he developed as a refutation of Marx and the American brand of socialism advocated by Eugene Debs, the threateningly successful presidential candidate of the Socialist Party of America. An important but neglected reason for socialism's abrupt collapse around 1920, it argues, was that the socialists lost the intellectual argument with the middle classes, and that Fisher's theory played an important role in this defeat. Fisher was a vigorous self-publicist, strongly influenced the teaching of economics and accounting in the universities and, the paper argues, changed the language of American accounting. Fisher claimed that accounting practice supported his theory of ‘capital’ and ‘income’, but the paper shows he did not understand double-entry bookkeeping or the accountants’ ‘cost theory of value’, and therefore divorced accounting from the reality of business transactions. As his theory underlies the FASB's framework, the paper concludes that Fisher's legacy to the world is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 2: The ‘modern business enterprise’, America's transition to capitalism,and the genesis of management accounting

The paper uses accounting evidence to explore when and how capitalism came to America. It continues the search for capitalists in American history begun in ‘Americanism and financial accounting theory. Part 1: Was America Born Capitalist?’ Part 1 concluded that America was not ‘born capitalist’ in Marx's sense, and that the capitalist mentality had not appeared in farming even by the late 19th century, on southern slave plantations by the Civil War, or in manufacturing enterprises by the 1830s. This paper (Part 2) challenges Alfred Chandler's thesis that the ‘modern business enterprise’ brought ‘a new type of capitalism’ from around the mid-19th century. It re-examines accounting evidence from the Boston textile mills, the railroads, and the iron and steel industry. It concludes that the Boston Associates who historians often see as ‘proto-capitalists’, the ‘managerial capitalists’ Chandler sees on the railroads, and the ‘entrepreneurial capitalists’ he sees in the iron and steel industry and elsewhere, remained semi-capitalists because their capitals and workers were not ‘free’. The paper re-examines the ‘costing renaissance’, the introduction and spread of product costing, standard costing, ROI and flexible budgets, and the evidence in Chandler's and Johnson and Kaplan's studies of the DuPont Powder Company and General Motors. This suggests that capitalism only appeared in America by around 1900, after more than two decades of intense conflict between ‘capital and labour’, and became established by the 1920s. This is the critical turning point in American business history, not the appearance of ‘managerial capitalism’, the paper argues. It concludes that America did not catch up with British capitalism until the late 1920s because its ruling elite faced an ideological problem created by its exceptional transition from a society of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists, particularly the threat of popular socialism. The final paper, Part 3: ‘Adam Smith, the rise and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting’, argues that Fisher made a seminal contribution to solving this problem, but his legacy is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

Accounting comparability and relative performance evaluation by capital markets

This paper examines how accounting comparability affects the monitoring role and the risk allocation role of capital markets. We develop the statistical and informational properties of accounting reports under varying degrees of comparability. A perfectly comparable accounting information system enables investors to perfectly infer the difference between any two firms' future cash flows although investors remain uncertain about either firm's cash flow. Comparability alleviates entrepreneurs' moral hazard problem by strengthening the price response to the relative accounting performance, but can induce excessive price risk as well as residual systematic cash flow risk. Unlike the investors (users) who earn their surplus by bearing the residual systematic risk, the entrepreneurs (preparers) do not find perfect comparability desirable. Hence, a standard setter would mandate higher comparability than preferred by preparers, but not perfect comparability.     

CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: A COMMENTARY ON BRYER'S “A MARXIST CRITIQUE OF THE FASB'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK”1

Bryer (1999) reiterates criticisms of the “balance-sheet” approach underlying the FASB's conceptual framework as failing either to explain or guide the development of financial accounting practice, and aims to demonstrate how operational and objective principles of financial accounting can be derived from Marx's labour theory of “surplus-value”. However, the potentially conflicting objectives of “Marxist” accountings remain unresolved, and Bryer's attempted derivation of accounting rules for individual business enterprises appears to misunderstand the rationale of Marx's detailed examination of the circuits of capital in Parts One and Two of Volume II of @9pCapital@2p and to offer no critical foundation for Praxis. It is argued here that the focus of a critical Marxist accounting would more appropriately shift to recognising the extraction of surplus-value from labour and its addition to the value of inventory during the process of production (rather than reporting profit as the result of sale). However, the practical application of such a principle would still require the use of convention-based allocations at least as arbitrary as those of conventional financial accounting and, more fundamentally, such a change of accounting principle could not in itself be sufficient to “force the secret of profit making” under the capitalist mode of production. The accounting would still be consistent with both Marxist and neoclassical economic theories of the nature of capitalism. Bryer's approach to deriving Marxist accounting rules cannot help us to understand the problematic nature of the power of modern financial accounting.     

Risk Management and the Cost of Capital for Operating Assets

This article attempts to clarify the effect of risk management on a company's cost of capital in the spirit of the traditional M&M/CAPM model. The traditional cost of capital model can and should be used to find the hurdle rate for a company's operating assets, since it can be applied regardless of the composition of the firm's non‐operating assets or its risk management policy. The author's main message is that if a firm manages idiosyncratic risk, the correct cost of capital for the operating investment is not the firm's enterprise WACC, but rather the required return on the assets being funded. Using the case of a company with a single line of business that is evaluating an investment opportunity, the author demonstrates how to adjust the firm's overall WACC to find the cost of capital for the operating assets to be acquired.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Domesday book: An early fiscal,accounting narrative?

Domesday Book is one of the most important documents in English history. It has been much studied by social, economic and institutional historians. At its heart it is an accounting document. Domesday Book of 1086 is regarded as a landmark in accounting history, primarily because it heralded a written system of government accounting in England. It introduced an administrative framework from which eventually the English Exchequer and charge and discharge accounting evolved. Domesday Book was compiled during one of the most significant periods in English History just after the Conquest of England by William I. It reflected new King's need to consolidate his power. The purpose of this article is to examine Domesday Book as an historical accounting record, concentrating in particular, on one shire: Herefordshire. It shows how Domesday Book provided the king with comprehensive information about individual landowning and taxable capacity. In addition, Domesday Book is contextualised within the social and economic conditions of the time. Domesday Book is shown to be a device for royal consolidation, a political expression of royal power and a vehicle to raise taxes. It also provided the administrative and territorial basis upon which the Exchequer's embryonic disciplinary power could be developed.     

Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital

In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 1: Was America born capitalist?

This paper (Part 1), and two related papers (Part 2: The ‘modern business enterprise’, America's transition to capitalism, and the genesis of management accounting; and Part 3: Adam Smith, the rise and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting), explore historical links between American ideology and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting. They explain Fisher's theory as the product of America's exceptional transition to capitalism and the ideological consequences. Part 1 uses Marx's theories of the transition in England, of colonisation, and of ideology, to construct an accounting history model of America's transition to capitalism that identifies the dominant social relations of production and calculative mentalities, and uses them to predict the accounting signatures and political ideologies we should observe if the theories are correct. Parts 1 and 2 test the model. Part 3 explores the ideological consequences of America's transition, for America and financial accounting. Scholars generally assume that America was ‘born capitalist’; historians argue it became capitalist sometime from the late 18th to early 19th centuries. The model, however, identifies early farmers as ‘simple commodity producers’ who, it predicts, kept only single entry accounts of debt, and had a ‘producer’ ideology of ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’. It identifies planters and manufacturers as ‘semi-capitalists’ – part merchant capitalist and part simple commodity producer – who it predicts calculated ‘profit’ as consumable surplus, pursued the ‘simple rate of profit’, controlled only prime costs, and had an ideology of ‘individualism’ that combined the producers’ ideology with the merchants’ ‘laissez-faire’. Part 1 re-examines evidence from accounts to around the mid-19th century, which confirms that farmers were not capitalists and that even the most advanced merchants, manufacturers and planters were semi-capitalists. Part 2 searches for capitalists in the second half of the 19th century. It re-examines evidence from the accounts of the Boston Associates who historians have seen as ‘proto-industrial capitalists’; from the railroads heralded by Chandler as the beginning of ‘managerial capitalism’; and from ‘entrepreneurial capitalists’ like Andrew Carnegie who created the large corporations that conquered America from the 1880s. Their financial accounts and cost management systems reveal the same semi-capitalist mentality found in the early 19th century. Re-examination of the ‘costing renaissance’ in the 1890s and evidence from the DuPont Powder Company and General Motors from 1900 to 1920, suggests that only from around 1900, after escalating conflict between ‘capital and labour’, did the capitalist mentality appear in new management accounting systems focused on ‘return on investment’. Part 3 shows that the accounting evidence closely correlates with the history of American political ideology. It argues that Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations dominated American politics until the late 19th century because it theorised a nation of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists. It explains the delay in America's transition compared to Britain's, and the decline in the popularity of laissez-faire from the 1880s, as consequences of this exceptional starting point. ‘Big business’ capitalism created an ideological problem for America's ruling elite, particularly the threat of socialism from around 1900 to 1920. Part 3 argues that Fisher's neoclassical theory of ‘capital’ and ‘income’, designed as a critique of Marx, responded to this problem and played an important role in undermining middle class support for socialism. Fisher said he based his theory on accounting practice, particularly double entry bookkeeping, but Part 3 shows he did not use or understand it, which divorced his accounting from reality. American history's legacy to the world, the papers therefore conclude, is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

Accounting for Risk and Return in Equity Valuation

Standard valuation models forecast cash flows or earnings, add a growth rate, and discount the cash flows to their present value with a discount rate that typically reflects the cost of capital. But as the author argues, projecting the long‐term growth rate is essentially speculative; and along with uncertainty about the growth rate, analysts generally do not have a good grasp of the discount rate either. Thus, instead of reducing uncertainty, these two features effectively compound uncertainty in valuations in the sense that slight changes in the growth rate or discount rate can change the valuation considerably. In this article, the author proposes an alternative approach that views the investor's problem as one of challenging the speculations that are built into the current market price, particularly the speculation about growth. Rather than building in a speculative growth rate (and thereby treating it as if it were a certainty), the author's approach turns the problem on its head by using an accounting analysis of the firm's current earnings and cash flows that provides a basis for recognizing the speculative component of the current stock price. More specifically, the author's analysis identifies the future earnings growth path that is implied by the market price, which can then be evaluated with the question: Do I want to pay for this growth? Because growth expectations are risky, additional analysis can be used to provide an understanding of the risk and return to buying growth, and of the upside and downside if risk growth expectations are not realized. By taking such an approach, investors incorporate their understanding of risk not by increasing the discount rate, but by recognizing that the primary risk in investing is the risk of overpaying for growth.     

DEVOLUTION, ACCRUALS ACCOUNTING AND ASSET MANAGEMENT IN NHS WALES

This paper describes how a strategy for health services has been developed for NHS Wales and examines the role of accruals accounting in asset management and development. It uses archival investigation as well as interviews and a questionnaire. The role of accruals accounting in the operation of the service, particularly as it relates to the capital asset base of the Trusts and how these are managed, is discussed in the context that Trusts are autonomous units that develop services, and hence their capital asset base, through their own internal planning structure. It is found that, on devolution, there was a lack of consistent information about the stock of capital assets and that capital charges, based on accruals accounting, were not penetrating asset management within individual Trusts. Although strategies were being developed centrally, their implementation at a Trust level can be impeded as a consequence of accruals accounting.     

The social risk–rent thesis: A reply to Harney

The paper responds to Stefano Harney's critique, ‘Accounting, Risk and Revolution’ and in doing so offers a further extension of Toms, 2006, Toms, 2010 perspective on labour rents and capitalist risk. Harney's challenge, to ask what is left out of critical accounting's account of risk, is an important one. Therefore the social rent–risk (SRR) hypothesis extends the analysis of critical accounting from systematic risk to include firm specific risk and primitive accumulation risk. It is argued that the SRR approach provides a generalised method of accounting for social relations of production and the necessary conditions of social transformation.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.     

EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

会计师事务所内部治理：理论基础与机制创新

声誉、客户资源以及人力资本是会计师事务所的关键资源,也是事务所治理的主要对象.进入权是审计师控制和使用自身人力资本及其关键性非人力资本的能力.关键资源的控制和保留机制是事务所内部治理的关键所在,这一机制主要包括:决策权配置机制、剩余收益分配机制、授权机制以及合伙人遴选与退出机制.模型分析进一步表明,以进入权为基础的治理机制有利于事务所内部资源的优化配置,能够对审计师专用性人力资本投资形成有效激励.