Abnormal trading volume,news and market efficiency: Evidence from the Jamaica Stock Exchange

This paper investigates market efficiency of the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE). Together, weak and semi-strong form efficiency claim that historical and newly released public information do not predict future stock price movement. We test both forms of market efficiency by analyzing stock price behavior during times of abnormal trading volume and around the release dates of earnings information. Abnormal trading volume may be driven by liquidity demand or reflect new or private information flow to the market. Using JSE data over the period 2000 to 2021, we find price dynamics consistent with price pressure as firms experience negative abnormal returns on the day of abnormal trading activity but offsetting positive abnormal stock returns on the following day. Further findings show post earnings announcement drift on the JSE. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests violations of market efficiency and has implications for capital allocation in this emerging market.     

The Impact of Publication of Analysts' Recommendations on Returns and Trading Volume

Publication of security analysts' recommendations in the column “Inside Wall Street,” which is published in Business Week, induces abnormal returns on the publication day and the following day. The abnormal returns are robust to the use of alternative samples and methodologies. The publication increases trading volumes for the securities that are recommended to be purchased, but not for securities that are recommended to be sold. The abnormal returns and trading volumes support the view that stock prices do not adjust instantaneously when new information arrives, and that the time pattern of price adjustment depends on the time pattern of the accessibility of the information. The authors find no statistically significant difference between the average abnormal returns that are induced by recommendations that appear at the beginnings of “Inside Wall Street” columns (and are covered more extensively than others) and the average abnormal returns induced by other recommendations.     

Prebid Run‐Ups Ahead of Canadian Takeovers: How Big Is the Problem?

This paper studies the price‐volume dynamics ahead of takeover announcements for 399 Canadian firms from 1985 to 2002. I find evidence consistent with insiders trading illegally, creating both abnormal returns (ARs) and abnormal turnover (AT) ahead of the announcement. The rise in AT begins far ahead of the actual announcement, accompanied by ARs in the last five trading days, consistent with more informed trading. Data on disclosed insider trading indicate a sharp increase in volume prior to the takeover announcement, suggesting that insiders make use of private information. This study confirms the importance of AT for triggering an insider trading investigation.     

Investor activism and takeovers

Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent. Firms targeted by activists are more likely than control firms to get acquired. Finally, activist investors’ portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover interest declined.     

A test of the Investor's Daily stock ranking system

This paper examines the profitability of trading strategies derived from stock rankings published in Investor's Business Daily. The best system provides market-adjusted abnormal monthly returns of 1.81% from buying S&P 500 stocks, and a 3.18% abnormal return on an arbitrage portfolio. Stocks selected for trading have above average volatility, but a portion of abnormal return may be a reward for identifying stocks with short-run sustainable price momentum. Results seem indicative of market inefficiency, but the phenomena may be temporary since abnormal returns are lower during the second half of the data set.     

FT coverage and UK target price run-ups

We focus on the market expectation hypothesis to explain the increase in share prices and trading volume of target firms before their merger announcements that have conventionally been attributed to either insider trading or market expectation. We use Financial Times (FT) coverage as a proxy of merger expectation and search for relevant articles for 783 UK target firms between 1998 and 2010. We identify a total of 1049 rumour articles and find that the FT market expectation proxy explains a small percentage of the target price run-ups. Results are strong during the sample period, even though the magnitude for both returns and trading volume tends to decrease within recent years. There is also a strong contemporaneous relation between abnormal returns and trading volume. Unexplained increases in target prices and trading volume may be attributed to insider trading.     

Abnormal Returns from Takeover Prediction Modelling: Challenges and Suggested Investment Strategies

While takeover targets earn significant abnormal returns, studies tend to find no abnormal returns from investing in predicted takeover targets. In this study, we show that the difficulty of correctly identifying targets ex ante does not fully explain the below‐expected returns to target portfolios. Target prediction models’ inability to optimally time impending takeovers, by taking account of pre‐bid target underperformance and the anticipation of potential targets by other market participants, diminishes but does not eliminate the potential profitability of investing in predicted targets. Importantly, we find that target portfolios are predisposed to underperform, as targets and distressed firms share common firm characteristics, resulting in the misclassification of a disproportionately high number of distressed firms as potential targets. We show that this problem can be mitigated, and significant risk‐adjusted returns can be earned, by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and liquidity.     

Abnormal returns and asymmetric information surrounding strategic and financial acquisitions

Using takeover bids from the United States, we investigate the importance of information asymmetry in self-selection when evaluating the abnormal returns of financial versus strategic takeover targets during a period of possible informed trade. Sample selection bias due to differences in financial versus strategic takeover bid information environments is controlled for using Heckman's model. Results show that takeover announcements are not randomised, indicative of timed announcements, and further that private equity firms exhibit lower price impact post-announcement. We conclude that the long-term financial motive of private equity takeovers, coupled with higher private information pre-announcement, leads to lower abnormal returns post-announcement.     

The Performance of the European Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the Fifth Takeover Wave

This paper presents an in‐depth analysis of the performance of large, medium‐sized, and small corporate takeovers involving Continental European and UK firms during the fifth takeover wave. We find that takeovers are expected to create takeover synergies as their announcements trigger statistically significant abnormal returns of 9.13% for the target and of 0.53% for bidding firms. The characteristics of the target and bidding firms and of the bid itself are able to explain a significant part of these returns: (i) deal hostility increases the target's but decreases bidder's returns; (ii) the private status of the target is associated with higher bidder's returns; and (iii) an equity payment leads to a decrease in both bidder's and target's returns. The takeover wealth effect is however not limited to the bid announcement day but is also visible prior and subsequent to the bid. The analysis of pre‐announcement returns reveals that hostile takeovers are largely anticipated and associated with a significant increase in the bidder's and target's share prices. Bidders that accumulate a toehold stake in the target experience higher post‐announcement returns. A comparison of the UK and Continental European M&A markets reveals that: (i) the takeover returns of UK targets substantially exceed those of Continental European firms. (ii) The presence of a large shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on takeover returns in the UK and a negative one in Continental Europe. (iii) Weak investor protection and low disclosure in Continental Europe allow bidding firms to adopt takeover strategies enabling them to act opportunistically towards the target's incumbent shareholders.     

Empirical Identification of Non-Informational Trades Using Trading Volume Data

This paper empirically identifies non-informational and informational trades using stock returns and trading volume data of the U.S., Japanese, and U.K. stock markets and five individual firms. We achieve the identification by imposing a restriction from theoretical considerations. Our results show that trading volume is mainly driven by non-informational trades, while stock price movements are primarily driven by informational trades. We also find that, around the 1987 stock market crash, trading volumes due to non-informational trades increased dramatically, while the decline in stock market prices was due mainly to informational trades. Increases in volatilities both in returns and in trading volumes during and after the crash are mainly due to non-informational trades. Regarding the trading volume-serial correlation in the stock returns relationship, we find evidence that is consistent with theoretical predictions that non-informational components can account for high trading volume accompanied by a low serial correlation of stock returns.