Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises

We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank‐specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis.     

Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator's competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behavior can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators' ability to stem panics ex post.     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

Banks and bubbles: How good are bankers at spotting winners?

This paper examines the bank lending relations of a large sample of technology and nontechnology firms that went public during the 1996–2000 period. We use a unique hand-collected data set to examine the characteristics of firms that establish pre- Initial Public Offering (IPO) bank lending relations and whether post-IPO performance is related to the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. We find that the majority of IPO firms have banking relations before they go public. Firms with banking relations are older, more profitable or, in the case of tech firms, have lower losses, and are more likely to have funding from venture capitalists than firms without banking relations. We also find that banks lent aggressively to technology firms in the sense that current earnings and cash flows were significantly less important in determining banking relations for technology firms than for nontechnology firms. Consistent with the importance of so-called soft information in lending decisions, we find that, controlling for ex ante observable risk measures, there is a positive and significant relation between improvements in post-IPO operating performance and the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. Overall, our results indicate that firms with the best current and future prospects establish banking relations. Our findings provide an explanation as to why investors could interpret lending relations as a positive signal of firm quality.     

Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy

A basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority. Research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects. In contrast, this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders. Such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice—increasing the equityholders' incentive to favor risky projects—as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions.     

Bank failures and bank fundamentals: A comparative analysis of Latin America and East Asia during the nineties using bank-level data

This paper uses bank-level data from recent banking crises in East Asia and Latin America to address the following two questions: (1) To what extent did individual bank conditions explain the failures? (2) In terms of their fundamentals, was it mainly the weak banks ex ante that failed in the crisis countries? The results show that for the two regions, bank-level fundamentals significantly affect the likelihood of collapse for these banks. Systemic shocks (both macroeconomic and liquidity) that triggered the crises mainly destabilized the weak banks ex ante, particularly in East Asia, which raises questions about the role that regional differences play for the degree of banking sector resilience to systemic shocks in the financial and macroeconomic environment.     

Central bank intervention and the volatility of foreign exchange rates: evidence from the options market

This paper tests the effects of central bank intervention on the ex ante volatility of $/DM and $/yen exchange rates between 1985 and 1991. In contrast to previous research which employed GARCH estimates of conditional volatility, we estimate ex ante volatility using the implied volatilities of currency option prices. We also control for the effects of other macroeconomic announcements. We find little support for the hypothesis that central bank intervention decreases expected exchange rate volatility. Instead, central bank intervention is generally associated with a positive change in ex ante exchange rate volatility, or with no change.     

Distance to default,subordinated debt,and distress indicators in the banking industry*

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of present supervisory arrangements to identify reliable ex‐ante indicators of banking distress. For a sample of US bank holding companies, we analyse the extent to which distance to default based on market data can be explained using accounting‐based indicators of risk. We show that a larger number of bank fundamentals help predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. For banks that issue sub‐debt, we find that higher charter values and low bank capitalizations further increase the power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk.     

Conflict of Interest in Commercial Bank Equity Underwriting

This paper examines the pricing characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. Assuming IPO underpricing is directly related to ex ante uncertainty, if the market rationally perceives these commercial banks to have a conflict of interest, these securities should have more underpricing than non-commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings (all else being equal). On the other hand, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality, less underpricing should be observed. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999. We find that the underpricing of commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings in which the firm had a previous banking relationship with the underwriter is significantly less than those underwritten by investment banks.     

The Fisher puzzle,real rate anomaly,and Wicksell effect

We study the relationships between interest and inflation rates using a recursive equation approach that takes into account both Fisher and Wicksell effects. Extending previous work, a state–space representation is used to estimate time-varying ex post Fisher and Wicksell equation effects. We subsequently recover ex ante interest and inflation rate series. Using these ex ante rate series, we estimate an ex ante Fisher equation, including both time-varying intercept estimates of the ex ante real interest rates and time-varying Fisher coefficients. Our results for the U.S. and three other countries support the Fisher propositions after taking into account Wicksell effects.     

Capital Markets Regulation: How Can Accounting Research Contribute?

In examining the possible contribution that accounting research can play in ensuring effective and efficient regulation of securities markets, two principal opportunities stand out. First, the role of research in informing debate about proposed regulatory intervention (ex ante contribution to regulatory debate). Second, the ability of research to inform analysis as to the effectiveness of previously implemented regulatory changes (ex post contribution to regulatory debate). In the ex ante case, there is a natural tension between the way in which regulatory initiatives often arise quickly and the inevitable passage of time required to fully appreciate the degree to which underlying problems have been correctly characterised and can be framed in a manner suitable for addressing via rigorous analytical and empirical research. It is also impossible to empirically assess the effect of regulatory intervention that has not yet occurred. Finally, if data are simply not available, then research is limited to analytical analysis and prediction. In the ex post case, there is often a natural reluctance to subject regulatory intervention to mandatory analysis, and even when a statutory requirement exists for such analysis and review, the time horizon is often far too short for meaningful analysis. In both the ex ante and ex post cases, what is unavoidable is that regulation can only be legitimately informed by research that is sufficiently rigorous so as to have robust conclusions. Assessing research on these dimensions means that transparency is required so as to allow researchers to engage in meaningful debate about the validity of the conclusions. This inevitably means that research needs to be a partnership between regulatory agencies and academia, and that when research is used to justify regulatory interventions it must be publicly available and subject to robust debate.     

Financial Sector transparency and net interest margins: Should the private or public Sector lead financial Sector transparency?

This study examines the effect of private and public sector led financial sector transparency on bank interest margins across eighty-six economies. Using a two-step dynamic system generalized method of moments, least square dummy variables, fixed effects and bootstrap quantile panel models between 2005 and 2016, the findings of the two-step GMM are reported as follows. First, results reveal that financial sector transparency whether led by private or public sector reduces interest margins. Second, while no statistical evidence was found on which of the two (private or public sector led transparency) is more effective in dealing with bank interest margins, public sector-led financial transparency is found to be more consistent in reducing bank interest margins across many more economies. Third, the study shows that the effect of financial sector transparency is visible at lower and middle levels of bank interest margins implying that economies with lower and moderately high bank interest margin level can benefit more from policies targeted at improving transparency in the financial sector. These findings imply that the sampled countries must enact policies and laws that deepen and expand financial sector transparency in order to potentially reduce bank interest margins for the good of banking market participants and society at large.     

Correlated bank runs,interbank markets and reserve requirements

This article extends the application of global games of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to account for correlation in the quality of banks’ long term investment, when banks are linked through cross deposits and there is a central bank. The goal is to study how these elements affect the deposit contract that banks offer to depositors and the ex ante probability of a bank run. We show that the coexistence of a central bank, which determines banks’ reserve requirements, and an interbank market, which redistributes reserves, leads to a smaller probability of a bank run and to fewer inefficient bank runs, relative to the case with no central bank and no interbank market. By adequately choosing the level of reserves to store, the central bank can improve the equilibrium outcome and allow banks to offer a higher interim payment to depositors, relative to the situation with no cross deposits.     

CORPORATE BOARDS AND BANK LOAN CONTRACTING

We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance‐pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.     

Zur Bedeutung der sekundären Prämiendifferenzierung bei Unisex-Tarifen in der Krankenversicherung

In the German and European legislation there is a trend to prohibit gender-based premiums in the private insurance sector. Compared with other insurance sectors the private health insurance can not only differentiate the premiums ex ante but also ex post (secondary premium differentiation). A change in ex ante differentiation must result in a change in ex post differentiation. It is shown that an extended secondary premium differentiation can compensate the effects of the prohibition of gender-based premiums if we consider not only the premiums but also premium refunds and own contributions.     

Intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation

This paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors (or deposit insurer): limited liability makes risk-shifting lucrative. We show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions – i.e. bank’s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long-term loans and is thus gradually renewed – may solve the incentive problem of risk-shifting. A new (or expanding) bank sets a high-equity level and acquires depositors’ confidence. Subsequently, it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level. Depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post; they do not have to monitor bank’s lending choices ex ante. Maturity mismatch – illiquidity of long-term loans and liquidity of deposits – is optimal. The analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower–lender relationship.     

Optimal Bank Transparency

Increasing transparency is recurrently offered as a centerpiece of bank regulation. We study a competitive banking sector whose illiquid assets are funded by short‐term debt that must be refinanced. We show that welfare is a nonmonotonic function of the level of transparency: Increasing transparency fosters efficient liquidation but has an adverse effect on rollover risk given the level of risk. Banks may compensate this adverse effect by taking more risk. These offsetting effects render an intermediate level of transparency optimal. Moreover, the existence of negative social externalities of bank failures calls for making banks more opaque rather than more transparent.     

Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information

Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower–lender relations that are relatively unknown to the lender.     

Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies

We analyze the competitive effects of government bail-out policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that bail-outs lead to higher risk-taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of transparency. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, which intensifies competition in the deposit market, depresses other banks’ margins, and thereby increases risk-taking incentives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, protected banks may take lower risks when transparency in the banking sector is low and the deposit supply is sufficiently elastic.     

Scale economies,bank mergers,and electronic payments: A spline function approach

This paper demonstrates the importance of using a flexible cost function specification when analyzing economies of scale and estimating the cost effect of banking mergers. The inflexibility of the translog cost function is illustrated and results are compared to more flexible spline and Fourier cost functions. Using these different approaches we predict the ex ante effect on average cost from mergers over 1987–1998 using a balanced panel of 130 Norwegian banks. On average mergers are predicted to lower costs. Predictions using the Fourier or spline approach are in overall agreement with computed actual average merger-cost changes ex post. Cost effects of electronic payments are also estimated and exceed cost reductions associated with mergers.