Should Venture Capitalists Put All Their Eggs in One Basket? Diversification versus Pure‐Play Strategies in Venture Capital

Managing the different companies in which they invest while at the same time performing portfolio optimization for themselves, venture capitalists position themselves as a pure-play or diversified conglomerate through their cumulative portfolios. I examine the effects of two investment strategies of venture capitalists:  1)  a specialist "pure-play" strategy that maximizes venture capital involvement and  2)  a more generalist strategy of diversification at the "firm" level that minimizes portfolio risk. I find that neither strategy optimizes both venture capital growth and time to entrepreneurial exit, which highlights a need for institutional investors to clarify fund objectives at the time a fund is established.     

Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.     

Exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios

I explore the prevalence of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios. I show that after companies join investors’ portfolios, several proxies of exchanges between them and portfolio companies (relative to matched nonportfolio companies) increase by an average of 60%. The increase holds when joining events are plausibly exogenous and when VCs’ bargaining power and potential conflicts of interest are low. Three novel mechanisms are supported: carve-outs, spawning, and recycling, whereby entrepreneurs divest innovation units, start new ventures, and reuse assets in other portfolio companies, respectively. Results suggest that returns to innovation are higher in venture capital portfolios.     

Do organizational life-cycle and venture capital investors affect the management control systems used by the firm?

This paper investigates how the organizational life-cycle stage of the firm and the existence of venture capital investors affect the use of management control systems. The study consists of three types of management control systems, i.e. business planning, budgeting and management control techniques. Our empirical analyses are based on a survey questionnaire of 105 Finnish firms operating in all industries at different life-cycle stages. The results indicate that the business planning and use of management control techniques differ between the organizational life-cycle stage of the firm and the existence of venture capital investors. However, the existence of venture capital investors is also essential in maturity and revival firms while the earlier literature emphasizes their role in start-up and growth firms. Our results remain the same after conducting various robustness checks.     

Venture capital investment practices in Europe and the United States

This article focuses on the investment practices and contract behavior of venture capitalists in relation to their portfolio companies. Using a unique self-collected data set, we provide new evidence on the venture capital industry in Europe and the United States. Important differences are identified between the two, particularly with respect to the use of convertible securities, replacement of former management, stage financing, deal syndication, and duration of exit stage. The most striking difference involves the use of convertible securities, which are used far less often in Europe than in the United States. These differences suggest that European venture capitalists engage in less monitoring and thus adopt a more hands-off approach to their portfolio companies as compared to US venture capitalists.

Venture capital budgeting — Carry and correlation

We analyze venture capital budgeting in a model with agency conflicts among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investors. Our three-player setting is crucial for the analysis of compensation to venture capitalists. We focus on the venture capitalist's decision to invest in correlated enterprises, and we emphasize the importance of information and the venture capitalist's role in resolving adverse selection on the entrepreneurial side. The importance of information increases the minimum carried interest offered to the venture capitalist, whereas correlated projects decrease it. The carried interest is determined by the size and level of correlation in his portfolio. Our analysis provides predictions in line with a number of empirical observations, e.g. that venture capitalists typically receive a carried interest which is “sticky” around a 20% level.     

When U.S. venture capital ventures abroad

Older, more experienced and smaller U.S. venture capital firms are most probable to sacrifice proximate distance for new opportunities in foreign, and mostly mature, portfolio companies. These companies are treated differently than the domestic ones, as U.S. venture capital firms collaborate with and delegate monitoring to foreign partners, rather than stage or syndicate. Successful outcomes mostly occur in more mature, non‐hi‐tech, portfolio companies that receive more financing per round. Our results are robust to the investee country's openness and industry classification, stage of the investment and possible sample selection problems.     

Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital

This paper examines bank behavior in venture capital. It considersthe relation between a bank's venture capital investments andits subsequent lending, which can be thought of as intertemporalcross-selling. Theory suggests that unlike independent venturecapital firms, banks may be strategic investors who seek complementaritiesbetween venture capital and lending activities. We find evidencethat banks use venture capital investments to build lendingrelationships. Having a prior relationship with a company inthe venture capital market increases a bank's chance of subsequentlygranting a loan to that company. Companies can benefit fromthese relationships through more favorable loan pricing.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Who are the active investors? : Evidence from venture capital

This paper examines the determinants and consequences of investor activism in venture capital. Using a hand-collected sample of European venture capital deals, it shows the importance of human capital. Venture capital firms with partners that have prior business experience are more active recruiting managers and directors, helping with fundraising, and interacting more frequently with their portfolio companies. Independent venture capital firms are also more active than ‘captive’ (bank-, corporate-, or government-owned) firms. After controlling for endogeneity, investor activism is shown to be positively related to the success of portfolio companies.     

Venture Capital in Canada: Lessons for Building (or Restoring) National Wealth

Canadian policymakers and regulators have been praised for avoiding many of the policy blunders that, when combined with excessive risk-taking by the banks, nearly brought down the U.S. financial sector. But, as the global economy begins to recover, policymakers everywhere need to find ways to stimulate the creation of new ventures.
On that score, Canada's record is not encouraging. The returns on Canadian venture capital investment have been dismally low, particularly in its government-run funds. In a recent survey, 40% of U.S. venture capital partners identified Canada as having the least favorable treatment of investors of any country they had dealings with. And perhaps most troubling, half of the Canadian corporate executives responding to another survey cited "inability to retain talent" as the biggest threat to their firms.
The authors begin by suggesting that these findings are all related. Without investors and the know-how and networks they bring with them, a country's ability to attract, develop, and retain top talent—business and managerial talent in particular—is significantly reduced. And as the authors go on to argue, the key to building a successful venture capital industry is to match talent with capital in such a way that all three parties—talent, capital providers, and the "matchmakers" who bring together talent and capital—are rewarded for superior performance and held accountable for failure.     

再融资监管促进企业理性投资了吗？——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以2007-2016年的A股上市公司为样本,实证检验中国再融资监管制度是否促进了企业的理性投资行为。研究发现:上市企业投资决策符合资本成本约束的理性准则,表明中国权益市场中存在普遍的市场约束力量;但企业再融资后投资理性程度明显降低;对监管失效的原因分析表明,企业投资理性程度下降受到事前融资动机和事后募资投向变更的影响:监管规则对事前再融资动机缺乏有效把控,导致再融资资格出现错配;而对事后募资用途的监管不严,则导致部分企业对募集资金的用途进行随意变更,使得企业投资理性程度降低。研究结论为完善企业投资决策自治机制、优化权益再融资监管、促进资本市场改革提供了实证依据和一定的现实启示。     

Optimal tax-timing and asset allocation when tax rebates on capital losses are limited

This article studies the portfolio problem with realization-based capital gain taxation when limited amounts of losses qualify for tax rebate payments, as is the case under current US tax law. When the tax rate applicable to realized losses exceeds that on realized capital gains, it can be optimal to realize capital gains immediately and pay capital gain taxes to regain the option to use potential future losses against a higher tax rate. This incentive adds an entirely new and as yet unstudied dimension to the portfolio problem. It causes risk averse investors to hold more equity and attain higher welfare levels than is the case when trading under a tax system that seeks to collect the same amount of taxes, but does not allow for tax rebate payments. This is because the benefit to these investors from having their losses subsidized is greater than the suffering from having profits taxed at a higher rate.     

Do venture capitalists imitate portfolio size?

Venture capitalists face the challenge of determining how many entrepreneurial ventures they should invest in. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (J Corp Finance 9:521–534, 2003) develop a theoretical model based on economic factors that shows how a venture capital fund should set its portfolio size in order to achieve optimal returns. Determining the required economic inputs to this model is difficult in practice however, given the informational asymmetries, uncertainties and ambiguities present in the decision-making environment of venture capitalists. Hence, we contend that general partners of venture capital funds also use their prior venture capital fund management experience, which we refer to as social capital, to overcome the difficulties they face in solving the above optimization problem. Our results support our hypotheses that portfolio size is explained by the interplay of economic and social factors.      

Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey

We review the theory and evidence on venture capital (VC) and other private equity: why professional private equity exists, what private equity managers do with their portfolio companies, what returns they earn, who earns more and why, what determines the design of contracts signed between (i) private equity managers and their portfolio companies and (ii) private equity managers and their investors (limited partners), and how/whether these contractual designs affect outcomes. Findings highlight the importance of private ownership, and information asymmetry and illiquidity associated with it, as a key explanatory factor of what makes private equity different from other asset classes.     

Two-person dynamic equilibrium in the capital market

When several investors with different risk aversions trade competitivelyin a capital market, the allocation of wealth fluctuates randomlyamong them and acts as a state variable against which each marketparticipant will want to hedge. This hedging motive complicatesthe investors' portfolio choice and the equilibrium in the capitalmarket. This article features two investors, with the same degreeof impatience, one of them being logarithmic and the other havingan isoelastic utility function. They face one risky constant-return-to-scalestationary production opportunity and they can borrow and lendto and from each other. The behaviors of the allocation of wealthand of the aggregate capital stock are characterized, alongwith the behavior of the rate of interest, the security marketline, and the portfolio holdings.     

Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries

This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on, resulting in long-run differences in investment, profits, and firm growth. The value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves, economies of scope, and network effects, as is typical for many “new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run.     

DOES VENTURE CAPITAL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE STOCK MARKET?

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.     

Venture capitalists, investment appraisal and accounting information: a comparative study of the USA, UK, France, Belgium and Holland

The differences between the information used for the pre‐investment valuation and the valuation methods used by venture capital investors in five countries (USA, UK, France, Belgium and Holland) are empirically studied. The analysis is based on postal questionnaire surveys of representative samples of senior venture capitalists in each country. Differences are found, which may be attributed to the dominant corporate governance mechanism or the level of development of the venture capital market. Between‐country differences persist even after taking into account between‐country differences in the relative importance of investment stages and venture capital types. Apparently similar systems and venture capital markets place varying emphases on different valuation methods, with theoretically 'correct' methods not always being preferred in practice. The findings of the study highlight the need for venture capital firms entering non‐domestic markets to invest considerable effort in understanding the operation of these markets if they are to exploit fully their perceived competitive advantages and minimize the likelihood of repeating the problems experienced by venture capital entrants into foreign markets in the late 1980s.     

Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance

We study the interaction between exit decisions and contract design in venture capital finance. One of the main characteristics of venture capital funds is that they need to divest their holdings in the portfolio firms after a limited period of time. However, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs often have diverging interests with respect to different exit solutions (e.g., IPOs or trade sales). We show that with convertible securities, the ex-ante agreed optimal exit policy can be implemented. Thereby, we give an explanation for the widespread use of convertible securities in venture capital finance.